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Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
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http://archive.org/details/thirtyyearswar1600 


Epochs  of  History 

EDITED   BY 

EDWARD  E.  MORRIS,  ALA. 


THE  ERA 

oe 

THE  THIRTY  YEARS'  WAR,  1618-1648. 


S.  R.  GARDINER. 


EPOCHS  OF  ANCIENT  HISTORY 

Edited  by  Rev.  G.  W.  Cox  and  Charles  Sankey,  M.A. 
Eleven  volumes,  i6mo,  with  41  Maps  and  Plans 

TROY— ITS  LEGEND,  HISTORY.  AND  LITERA- 
TURE.    By  S.  G.  W.  BeQ>amvQ. 

THE  GREEKS  AND  THE  PERSIAN&  By  G.  W. 
Cox. 

THE  ATHENIAN  EMPIRE.     Ev  G.  W.  Cox. 

THE  SPARTAN  AND  THEBAN  SUPREMACIES* 
By  Charles  Sankev. 

THE  MACEDONIAN  EMPIRE.     By  A.  M.  Curteis. 

EARLY  ROME.     Bv  \V.  Ihne. 

ROME  AND  CARTHAGE.     Bv  R.  Bosworth  Smith. 

THE  GRACCHI,  MARIUS,  AND  SULLA.  By  A.  H. 
Beesley. 

THE  ROMAN  TRIUMVIRATES.  By  Charles  Meri- 
vale. 

THE  EARLY  EMPIRE.    By  W.  Wolfe  Capes. 

THE  AGE  OF  THE  ANTONINES.  By  W.  Wolfe 
Capes. 

EPOCHS  OF  MODERN  HISTORY 

Edited  by  Edward  E.  Morris 

Eighteen  volumes,  iomo,  with  77  Maps,  Plans,  and 
Tables 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.  By  R. 
W.  Church. 

THE  NORMANS  IN  EUROPE.    By  A.  H.  Johnson. 

THE  CRUSADES.     By  G.  W.  Cox. 

THE  EARLY  PLANTAGENETS.     By  Wm.  Stubbs. 

EDWARD  III.     By  W.  Warburton. 

THE  HOUSES  OF  LANCASTER  AND  YORK.  By- 
James  Gairdner. 

THE  ERA  OF  THE  PROTESTANT  REVOLUTION. 
By  Frederic  Seebohm. 

THE  EARLY  TUDORS.     By  C.  E.  Moberiy. 

THE  AGE  OF  ELIZABETH.     By  M.  Crcighton. 

THE  THIRTY  YEARS  WAR.  1618-1648.  By  S.  R. 
Gardiner. 

THE  PURITAN  RE\OLUTION.     By  S.  R.  Gardiner. 

THE  FALL  OF  THE  STUARTS.     By  Edward  Hale. 

THE  ENGLISH  RESTORATION  AND  LOUIS  XIV. 
By  G^roond  Airv. 

THE  AGE  OF  ANNE.     By  Edward  E.  Morris. 

THE  EARLY  HANOVERIANS.    By  Edward  E.  Morris. 

FREDERICK  THE  GREAT.     By  F.  W.  Longman. 

THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  AND  FrRST  EM- 
PIRE. By  W.  O'Connor  Morris.  Appendix  by 
Andrew  D.  White. 

THE  EPOCH  OF  REFORM.  1830-1850.  By  Justin 
Macarthy. 


CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Prostestant  Lay  State*  f    1 
Catholic  Do.       □ 


GERMANY 

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Thirty  Years'  War 

1618-16*8 


Br 

SAMUEL  RAWSON  GARDINER 

Late  Student  of  Christ  Church 

flntkor  of  'History  of  England  from  the  Accession  of  fames  I.   t*  tSi 

Disgrace  of  Justice  Coke'  and  'Prince  Charles  and  the 

Spanish  Marriage' 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

1921 


PREFACE. 


If  the  present  work  should  appear  to  be  written  for 
more  advanced  students  than  those  for  whom  most 
if  not  all  the  other  books  of  the  series  are  designed, 
the  nature  of  the  subject  must  be  pleaded  in  excuse. 
The  mere  fact  that  it  relates  exclusively  to  Continental 
history  makes  it  unlikely  that  junior  pupils  would  ap- 
proach it  in  any  shape,  and  it  is  probably  impossible 
to  make  the  very  complicated  relations  between  the 
German  states  and  other  European  nations  interest- 
ing to  those  who  are  for  the  first  time,  or  almost  the 
first  time,  attempting  to  acquire  historical  knowledge. 
Every  history,  to  be  a  history,  must  have  a  unity  of  its 
own,  and  here  we  have  no  unity  of  national  life  such 
as  that  which  is  reflected  in  the  institutions  of  Eng- 
land and  France,  not  even  the  unity  of  a  great  race  of 
sovereigns  handing  down  the  traditions  of  government 
from  one  generation  to  another.  The  unity  of  the 
*ubject  which  I  have  chosen  must  be  sought  in  the 
growth  of  the  principle  of  religious  toleration  as  it  is 
adopted  or  repelled  by  the  institutions  under  which 
Germany  and  France,  the  two  principal  nations  with 
which  we  are  concerned,  are  living.     Thus  the  history 


.     821774 


vi  Preface. 

of  the  period  may  be  compared  to  a  gigantic  dissolving 
view.  As  we  enter  upon  it  our  minds  are  filled  with 
German  men  and  things.  But  Germany  fails  to  find 
the  solution  of  the  problem  before  it.  Gradually 
France  comes  with  increasing  distinctness  before  us. 
It  succeeds  where  Germany  had  failed,  and  occupies 
us  more  and  more  till  it  fills  the  whole  field  of  action. 

But  though,  as  I  have  said,  the  present  work  is  not 
intended  for  young  children,  neither  is  it  intended 
for  those  who  require  the  results  of  original  research. 
The  data  for  a  final  judgment  on  the  story  are  scat- 
tered in  so  many  repositories  that  the  Germans  them- 
selves have  now  discovered  that  a  complete  investi- 
gation into  one  or  other  of  the  sections  into  which  the 
war  naturally  falls,  is  sufficient  work  for  any  man. 
There  must  surely,  however,  be  many,  as  well  in  the 
upper  classes  of  schools  as  in  more  advanced  life,  who 
would  be  glad  to  know  at  second  hand  what  is  the 
result  of  recent  inquiry  in  Germany  into  the  causes  of 
the  failure  of  the  last  attempt,  before  our  own  day,  to 
constitute  a  united  German  nation.  The  writer  who 
undertakes  such  a  task  encounters,  with  his  eyes  open, 
all  the  hazards  to  which  a  second-hand  narrative  is 
liable.  His  impressions  are  less  sharp,  and  are  ex- 
posed to  greater  risk  of  error  than  those  of  one  who 
goes  direct  to  the  fountain  head.  He  must  be  con- 
tent to  be  the  retailer  rather  than  the  manufacturer 
of  history,  knowing  that  each  kind  of  work  has  its  use. 

Not  that  the  present  book  is  a  mere  collection  of 
other  men's  words.  If  I  have  often  adopted  without 
much  change  the  narrative  or  opinions  of  German 


Preface.  vii 

writers,  I  have  never  said  any  thing  which  I  have  not 
made  my  own,  by  passing  it  through  my  own  mind. 
To  reproduce  with  mere  paste  and  scissors  passages 
from  the  writings  of  men  so  opposed  to  one  anothei 
as  Ranke,  Gindely,  Ritter,  Opel,  Hurter,  Droysen, 
Gfrorer,  Klopp,  Forster,  Villermont,  Uetterodt, 
Koch,  and  others,  would  be  to  bewilder,  not  to  in- 
struct. And  in  forming  my  own  opinions  I  have  had 
the  advantage  not  merely  of  being  in  the  habit  of 
writing  from  original  documents,  but  of  having  studied 
at  least  some  of  the  letters  and  State  papers  of  the  time. 
I  have  thus,  for  example,  been  able,  from  my  know- 
ledge of  the  despatches  of  Sir  Robert  Anstruther,  to 
neglect  Droysen's  elaborate  argument  that  Christian 
IV.  took  part  in  the  war  through  jealousy  of  Gustavus 
Adolphus ;  and  to  speak,  in  opposition  to  Onno  Klopp, 
of  the  persistence  of  the  Dukes  of  Mecklenouig  in  Lie 
support  which  they  gave  to  the  King  of  Denmark. 

More  valuable  than  the  little  additional  knowledge 
thus  obtained  is  the  insight  into  the  feelings  and 
thoughts  of  the  Catholic  princes  gained  by  a  very 
slight  acquaintance  with  their  own  correspondence. 
To  start  by  trying  to  understand  what  a  man  appears 
to  himself,  and  only  when  that  has  been  done,  to  try 
him  by  the  standard  of  the  judgment  of  others,  is  in 
my  opinion  the  first  canon  of  historical  portraiture; 
and  it  is  one  which  till  very  recent  times  has  been 
more  neglected  by  writers  on  the  Thirty  Years'  War 
than  by  students  of  any  other  portion  of  history. 

My  teachers  in  Germany  from  whom  I  have  bor- 
rowed so  -freely ?  and  according  to  the  rules  o£  the  se- 


riii  Preface. 

ries,  without  acknowledgment  in  foot-notes,  will,  1 
hope,  accept  this  little  book,  not  as  an  attempt  to  do 
that  which  they  are  so  much  better  qualified  to  exe- 
cute, but  as  an  expression  of  the  sympathy  which  an 
Englishman  cannot  but  feel  for  the  misfortunes  as 
well  as  the  achievements  of  his  kindred  on  the  Con- 
tinent, and  as  an  effort  to  tell  something  of  the  by- 
gone fortunes  of  their  race  to  those  amongst  his  own 
countrymen  to  whom,  from  youth  or  from  circum- 
stances of  education,  German  literature  is  a  sealed 
book. 

I  have  only  to  add  that  the  dates  are  according  to 
the  New  Style.  Ten  days  must  be  deducted  to  bring 
them  in  accordance  with  those  used  at  the  umi  in 
England. 


CONTENTS. 


Gvrntt  in  English  History  not  noticed  in  the  text,  or  euly  rtferrtd  t» 

are  printed  in  Italics. 


CHAPTER  I. 

CAUSES  OF  THE  THIRTY  YEARS'  WAR. 

SECTION  I. — Political  Institutions  of  Germany  (1440-1317). 

PAG* 

National  institutions  of  Germany  defective    .        .        .  1 

(a)  As  regarded  the  Emperor I 

(b)  As  regarded  the  great  vassals       ....  3 
Attempts  made  to  introduce  order  by  giving  a  regular 

form  to  the  Diet 5 

These,  though  only  partially  successful,  are  not  altoge- 
ther useless        . 6 

Constitution  of  the  Diet        „ 6 

Section  II. — Protestantism  in  Germany  (1517-1570). 

Protestantism  acceptable  to  the  majority  of  the  na- 
tion, but  rejected  by  the  Emperor  and  the  Diet        .      8 

The  result  is  a  civil  war,  resulting  in  a  compromise, 
called  the  Peace  of  Augsburg  (1555).  Its  terms  be- 
ing ambiguous  on  some  important  points,  give  rise  to 
controversy ia 

But  as  Protestantism  is  on  the  increase,  the  ambiguous 
points  are,  at  first,  construed  by  the  Protestants  in 
their  own  favour       .......    11 

ix 


%  Contents. 

MSI 

The  main  points  at  issue  relate  to  the  right  of  Protest- 
ants to  hold  bishoprics,  and  to  the  right  of  Protestant 
princes  to  secularize  church  lands       .        .        .        .     la 

Section  III. — Reaction  against  Protestantism  (1570-1596). 

Theological  controversies  are  carried  on  with  bitterness 
amongst  the  Protestants      ......     13 

The  Catholics,  accordingly,  begin  to  gain  ground        .     14 

And  having  the  Emperor  and  Diet  on  their  side,  are 
able  to  use  force  as  well  as  persuasion        .         .        .     14 

Want  of  any  popular  representation  prevents  any  fair 
settlement  of  the  dispute 15 

Section  IV. — Three  Parlies  and  Three  Leaders  (1596-1612). 

Catholics,  Lutherans,  and  Calvinists  are  respectively 
guided  by  Maximilian  Duke  of  Bavaria,  John  George 
Elector  of  Saxony,  and  Christian  of  Anhalt        .        .     15 

Character  and  policy  of  Maximilian  dangerous  to  the 
Protestants  ........     15 

The  Protestants  of  the  south  more  alive  to  the  danger 
than  the  Protestants  of  the  north        .         .         .        .17 

Spread  of  Calvinism,  especially  in  the  south,  ac- 
counted for  by  the  greater  danger  from  Catholic 
States 17 

Character  and  policy  of  Christian  of  Anhalt  .        .        .     18 
1603    Accession  of  James  I.  of  England 
1605     Gunpowder  Plot 

1607  Donauworth  occupied  by  Maximilian    .         .         .         .     19 

1608  Formation  of  the    Protestant  Union  and  the  Catholic 

League .si 

1609  The  quarrel  for  the  succession  of  Cleves  does  not  result 

in  open  war 21 

1612    John  George  fruitlessly  attempts  to  mediate  between  the 

Catholics  and  the  Calvinists sa 

t6i3     Marriage  of  Frederick  V.,  Elector  Palatine,  to  Eliza- 
beth, dauglUer  of  James  J.  of  England 


Contents.  xi 

CHAPTER  II. 

THE  BOHEMIAN  REVOLUTION. 
SECTION  I. — The  House  of  Austria  and  its  Subjects  (1600-1618). 

PAGB 

Political  and  religious  dissensions  between  the  rulers 

and  their  subjects 24 

1609    The  Emperor  Rudolph,  as  King  of  Bohemia,  grants  the 

Royal  Charter  to  Bohemia 25 

161 1     He  is  succeeded  by  Matthias  in  spite  of  the  intrigues  of 

Christian  of  Anhalt 26 

Matthias  erades  the  charter 27 

1617  Ferdinand  accepted  by  the  Bohemian  Diet  as  King  by 

hereditary  right  ........     23 

1618  The    Protestant   churches   on   ecclesiastical   lands   de- 

clared illegal  by  the  government  of  Matthias ;  one  at 
Braunau  shut  up,  one  at  Klostergrab  pulled  down     .     29 

Section  II. — The  Revolution  at  Prague  {March-May  1618). 

Mar.  5.    Meeting  of  the  Protestant  Estates  of  Bohemia  .        .     29 
May  23.  Attack    headed    by   Thurn    upon    the    Regents  at 
Prague.     Martinitz  and  Slawata  thrown  out  of  win- 
dow.    Beginning  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War        .         .     30 
Appointment  of  Thirty  Directors  as  a   Revolutionary 
Government  in  Bohemia 31 

Section  III. — The  War  in  Bohemia  {May  1618-February  1619). 

Aug.  13.  Bohemia  invaded  by  the  Emperor's  general,  Bucquoi. 
The    Bohemians    look    abroad   for   help.       Mansfeld 
brings  troops  to  them.      He  besieges   Pilsen,  whilst 
Thurn  makes  head  against  Bucquoi    .         .        .         -33 

Nov.  21.  Pilsen  surrenders 34 

Christian  of  Anhalt  urges  Frederick  V.,  Elector  Pala- 
tine, to  intervene  on  behalf  of  the  Bohemians,  and 
asks  the  Duke  of  Savoy  to  help  them         .         .         -34 

T6t9    The  Duke  of  Savoy  talks  of  dividing  the  Austrian  do- 

Fcb,        minions  with  Frederick      .        .        »        .      '  ,        .    35 


xii  Contents. 


SECTION  IV. — Ferdinand   on    his    Defence    (March-November 
1619). 

PAGB 

Mar.  20.  Death  of  Matthias 36 

June  5.     Vienna  besieged  by  Thurn.     Ferdinand  threatened 

by  a  deputation  from  the  Estates  of  Lower  Austria  36 
He  is  delivered  by  a  regiment  of  horse,  and  Thurn 

raises  the  siege 37 

Aug.  28.  Ferdinand  II.  elected  Emperor          .         .        .        .38 
Aug.  26.  Frederick,  Elector  Palatine,  elected  King  of  Bohe- 
mia, Ferdinand  having  been  previously  deposed   .  38 
Nov.  4.     Frederick  crowned  at  Prague 39 


CHAPTER  III. 

IMPERIALIST  VICTORIES   IN   BOHEMIA  AND  THE   PALATINATE. 

Section  I. — The  Attack  upon  Frederick  (November 

l6ig-January  1621). 

1619  Maximilian  of  Bavaria  prepares  for  war  .  .  .39 
Vienna  fruitlessly  attacked  by  Bethlen  Gabor  .  .  40 
Frederick  finds  no  support  in  the  Union   .        .        .41 

1620  The  North  German  Princes   agree  to  neutrality  at 
Mar.         Muhlhausen 43 

June  3.  Spinola,  the  Spanish  General,  prepares  to  attack  the 
Palatinate,  and  the  Union,  being  frightened,  signs 
the  treaty  of  Ulm,  by  which  it  agrees  to  observe 
neutrality  towards  the  League        .         .         .        .4a 

June  23.  Maximilian,  with  Tilly  in  command  of  his  army, 
enters  Austria  and  compels  the  Austrian  Estates  to 
submit,  whilst  Spinola  reduces  the  Western  Pala- 
tinate       42 

Maximilian  joins  Bucquoi,  and  enters  Bohemia        .     43 

Sep.  28.    Frederick,  having  failed  to  organize  resistance,  joins 

the  Bohemian  army 44 

Nov.  8.     Defeat  of  Frederick  at  the  Battle  of  the  White  Hill, 
1619        and  submission  of  Bohemia  to  the  Emperor  .        .    45 

Jan.  22.    Frederick  put  to  the  Ban  of  the  Empire   .        .        .46 


Contents.  xiii 

Section  II. — The  War  in  the  Upper  Palatinate  {January- 
October  1621). 

PAGB 

1621     Frederick  does  not  abandon  hope  of  regaining  Bo- 
Jan,         hernia 47 

Ap.  12.    The  Treaty  of  Mentz  dissolves  the  Union  .        .        .47 
Bad  character  of  Mansfeld's  Army     .        .        .        .48 

May.     Mansfeld  takes  the  offensive 49 

Aug.      Recommencement  of  the  War  in  the  Lower  Palatinate    50 
Oct.     Mansfeld  unable  to  hold  out  in  the  Upper  Palatinate    50 
Oct.  10.  Signs  an  engagement  to  disband  his  forces,  but  escapes 

with  them  to  Alsace 50 

Section  III. — Frederick's  Allies  {October  1621-May  1622). 

1621  James  I.  of  England  proposes  to  take  Mansfeld  into 

his  pay,  but  he  cannot  agree  with  the   House  of 
Commons,  and  is  therefore  in  want  of  money        .    50 

1622  He  then  tries  to  obtain  a  settlement  of  the  German 

disputes  with  the  aid  of  Spain        .         .         .         .51 
May.    A  conference  for  the  pacification  of  Germany  held  at 

Brussels 52 

Frederick  prepares  for  War,  with  the  help  of  Mans- 
feld, the  Margrave  of  Baden,  and  Christian  of 
Brunswick,  the  latter  being  a  Protestant  Adminis- 
trator of  the  Bishopric  of  Halberstadt    .        .        .S3 

He  ravages  the  diocese  of  Paderborn        .  ■     .        .55 

Section  IV. — The  Fight  for  the  Lower  Palatinate  {April- 
July  1622). 
Ap.  12.    Frederick  joins  Mansfeld.      Tilly  defeats   the  Mar- 
May  6.      grave  of  Baden  at  Wimpfen 57 

June.     Frederick,  hopeful  of  success,  refuses  to  consent  to  a 

treaty,  and  seizes  the  Landgrave  of  Darmstadt       .     58 
But  is  driven  by  Tilly  to  retreat        .        .         .        .59 
June  30.  Defeat  of  Christian  of  Brunswick  at  Hochst       .         .     59 
July.     Mansfeld  abandons  the   Palatinate,  and   Frederick, 

after  taking  refuge  at  Sedan,  retires  to  the  Hague  .    6a 


xiv  Contents. 

CHAPTER  IV. 
MANSFELD  AND  CHRISTIAN  IN  NORTH  GERMANY. 
Section  I.— Mansfeld' s  March  into  the  Netherlands  {July- 
November  1622). 

PAG3 

1622  Tilly  proceeds  to  reduce  the  fortified  places  in   the 

Lower  Palatinate 60 

1623  The  Electorate  transferred  from  Frederick  to  Maxi- 
Feb.  13.       milian 61 

1622    Change  of  feeling  in  North  Germany        .        .        .     61 
Aug.     Mansfeld  and  Christian  establish  themselves  in  Lor- 
raine, and  then  try  to  cut  their  way  through  the 
Spanish  Netherlands  to  join  the  Duke    .         .         .63 
Aug.  28.  Battle  of  Fleurus.     Christian  loses  his  arm        .        .    63 
Nov.    Mansfeld  establishes  himself  in  East  Friesland  .        .    64 

Section  II. — Christian  of  Brunswick   in   Lower  Saxony 
(November  1622-August  1623). 

1622  The  Lower  Saxon  Circle  urged  by  Tilly  to  join  him 

against  Mansfeld,  and  by  Christian  of  Brunswick  to 
join  him  against  Tilly       ......     64 

1623,  Feb.  Warlike  preparations  of  the  Circle         .         .         .65 
Aug.  6.  Christian  expelled  from  the  Circle,  and  defeated  by 

Tilly  at  Stadtlohn 66 

Section  III. — Danger  of  the  Lower  Saxon  Circle  (Augustr- 
December  1623). 

1623  The  North  German  Protestant  Bishoprics  in  danger  .  66 
Aug.  Alarm  in  the  Lower  Saxon  Circle  .  .  .  .68 
Dec.    But  nothing  is  done,  and  its  troops  are  disbanded       .    68 

Section  IV. — England  and  France  ( October  1623-August  1624). 

Oct.     Foreign  Powers  ready  to  interfere      .        .        .        .69 

Return  of  the  Prince  of  Wales  from  Madrid      .        .    70 

1624  Divergence  between  the  English  House  of  Commons 
Feb.-May.  and  James  I.  upon  the  mode  of  recovering  the  Pa- 
latinate   .........    70 

Position  of  the  Huguenots  in  France        .        ,        .73 


Contents.  xv 


Section  V. — Rise  of  Richelieu  {August  i6a4-September 
1625). 

PAG* 

Aug.  Lewis  XIII.  makes  Richelieu  his  chief  minister.  He 
is  divided  between  a  desire  to  combat  Spain  and  a 
desire  to  reduce  the  Huguenots  to  submission  .  72 
Richelieu's  position  less  strong  than  it  afterwards 
became.  He  has  to  make  great  allowances  for  the 
King's  humour 74 

Dec.     French   attack  upon  the   Spanish  garrisons  in  the 

Valtelline 75 

1625     Failure  of  Mansfeld's  expedition  intended  by  James 
Jan.-June    to  recover  the  Palatinate 76 

Jan.     Richelieu's  plans  for  engaging  more  deeply  in  the 
war  frustrated  by  the  rising  of  the  Huguenots  of 
Rochelle         ........     77 

Sept      The  Huguenot  fleet  is  defeated,  but  Rochelle  holds 

out 77 


CHAPTER  V. 
INTERVENTION   OF  THE  KING   OF   DENMARK. 
SECTION  I. — Christian  IV.  and  Gustavus  Adolphus  (1624). 
Character   and  position  of  Christian  IV.,  King  of 
Denmark        ........     78 

Genius  of  Gustavus  Adolphus 79 

Sketch  of  the  earlier  part  of  his  reign       .        .        .80 
His  interest  in  German  affairs 82 

Section  II. — English  Diplomacy  {August  i(s2\-July  1625). 

1624  The  Kings  of  Denmark  and  Sweden  asked  by  James 
Aug.         I.  to  join  him  in  recovering  the  Palatinate    ,         .    84 

1625  The  English  Government,  thinking  the  demands  of 
Jan.         Gustavus  exorbitant,  forms  an  alliance  with  Chris- 
tian IV 8j 

June.    Meeting  of  the  first  Parliament  of  Charles  I, 


xvi  Contents. 

PACK 

June.    Gustavus  directs  his  forces  against  Poland        .        .86 
Mar.  27.  Death  of  James  I.     Accession  of  Charles  I.       .        .    86 
July  18.  Christian   IV.,  at  the  head  of  the   Circle  of  Lower 
Saxony,  enters  upon   war  with   the  army   of  the 

League  commanded  by  Tilly 87 

Aug.    Dissolution  of  the  first  Parliament  of  Charles  I. 


Section  III. —  Wallenstein's  Armament  (July  1625- 
February  1626). 

The  Emperor  needs  more  forces        .        .        .        .87 
Wallenstein  offers  to  raise  an  army  for  him.   Account 

of  Wallenstein's  early  life        .  ...     89 

The  system  by  which  the  army  is  to  be  supported  is 

to  be  one  of  forced  contributions    .        .        .        .90 
Oppressive  burdens  laid  thereby  on  the  country          .    91 
Wallenstein  enters  the  dioceses  of  Magdeburg  and 
Halberstadt,  and  lies  quietly  there  during  the  win- 
ter   92 

C626,  Feb.  Failure  of  negotiations  for  peace     .        .        .        .93 


Section  W.— Defeat  of  Mansfeld  and  ChrUtian  IV. 

{February-August  1626). 

1626    Numerical  superiority  on   the  side  of  the   King  of 
Feb.        Denmark,  but  the  Imperialists  are  superioi  in  other 

respects 94 

Failure  of  the  supplies  promised  to  Christian  by 

Charles  1 95 

Feb.    Meeting  of  the  second  Parliament  of  Charles  I. — 
Impeachment  of  Buckingham 
Ap.  25.    Mansfeld  defeated  by  Wallenstein  at  the  Bridge  of 

Dessau 96 

June.  Dissolution  of  the  second  Parliament  of  Charles  I. 
Aug.  27.  Christian  IV.  defeated  by  Tilly  at  Lutter  .         .         .     97 
Wallenstein  pursues  Mansfeld  into  Hungary      .        .    97 


Contents.  xvii 

CHAPTER  VI. 
STRALSUND  AND   ROCHELLE. 

Section  I. — Fresh  Successes  of  Wallenstein  {August  1626- 
October  1627). 

PAGB 

1626  Divergence  between  the  League  and  Wallenstein  .     .     98 
Nov.    Wallenstein  advocates  religious  equality  and  the  pre- 
dominance of  the  army 98 

1627  He  persuades  Ferdinand  to  increase  his  army,  and  is 
Jan.        created  Duke  of  Friedland,  in  spite  of  the  growing 

dissatisfaction  with  his  proceedings          .         .         .  100 
May-Aug.  The  King  of  Denmark  hopes  to  resist  Tilly,  but 
Wallenstein  returns  from  Hungary,  and  gains  pos- 
session ol  Silesia 101 

Sept.  20.  Defeat  of  the  Margrave  of  Baden  at  Heiligen-hafen  102 
Oct.     Christian    IV.  flies  to  the  Island  of  Fiinen,  leaving 

Jutland  to  Wallenstein 102 

Section  II. — Resistance  to  Wallenstein  in  the  fflnpire 
(October  1627-February  1628). 
t627    Meeting  of  the  Electors  at  Miihlhausen.     They  com- 
Oct.         piain  of  Wallenstein 103 

1628  The  commercial  towns  of  North  Gewnany  jealous  of 

Wallenstein 105 

Feb.     The  Emperor  declares  the  Dukes  of  Mecklenburg  to 
have  forfeited  their  lands  and  titles,  and  pledges  the 

territory  to  Wallenstein 106 

Wallenstein   tries   in  vain  to   gain  over   the    Hanse 

Towns 106 

He  attempts  to  establish  himself  on  the  coast  of  the 
Baltic  by  getting  possession  of  the  towns         .         .  108 

Section  III. — The  Siege  of  Stralsund  (August-February  1628). 
Feb.    As   Stralsund  refuses  to  admit  a  garrison,  it  is   at- 
tacked by  Wallenstein's  orders        ....  108 
May.    It  is  succoured  by  Denmark  and  Sweden  .        .         .  109 

Aug.  3.    The  siege  is  raised no 

B 


xviii  Contents. 

Section  IV. — The  Siege  of  Rochelle  (1625-1628). 

PAGI 

1625  Richelieu  would  have  made  peace  with  the  Hugue- 

nots if  he  had  been  able na 

1626  An   agreement    is  effected,   but    comes  to  nothing 

through  the  jealousy  of  Charles  1 11a 

1627  War  between  France   and   England,   Buckingham's 

expedition  to  Rhe 113 

Nov.     Richelieu  besieges  Rochelle 114 

1628.  Mar.  Meeting  of  the  third  Parliament  of  Charles  I. 
May.     Failure  of  an  English  fleet  to  succour  Rochelle        .  115 
June.     The  Petition  of  Right  granted 
Aug.      Murder  of  the  Duke  of  Buckingham         .         .        .113 

Nov.  1.    Surrender  of  Rochelle 113 

Contrast  between  France  and  Germany.     Toleration 
granted  to  the  Huguenots n<! 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  EDICT  OF   RESTITUTION. 

SECTION  I. — Oppression  of  the  Protestants  {March 
i62S-3fay  1629). 

1628,  Mar.  Surrender  of  Stade  to  Tilly 117 

1629,  Jan.    Wallenstein  fails  to  take  Gliickstadt       .        .         .117 
Mar.    Dissolution  of  the  third  Parliament  of  Charles  I. 

May  22.  Peace  of  Lubeck  between   Christian    IV.  and   the 

Emperor 118 

Wallenstein   invested  with  the  Duchy  of  Mecklen- 
burg         118 

1628     The  Protestants  oppressed  in  the  South  of  Germany  119 
1629,    Mar.  29.  Issue  of  the  Edict  of  Restitution        .        .  120 

Section  II. — French  Intervention  in  Italy  (1628-1630). 

1628  War  in    Italy  for  the   succession  to   the   Duchy  of 

Mantua 121 

1629  Richelieu  enters  Italy,  and  compels  the  Spaniards  to 
Mar.        raise  the  siege  of  Casale 12a 

Rebellion  of  Rohan  in  the  south  of  Franc*        .         .  123 


Contents.  xix 

PAGB 

1629  Richelieu  again   enters    Italy,   seizes    Pignerol   and 

Saluces,  and  again  forces  the  Spaniards  to  raise  the 
siege  of  Casale 123 

1630  Negotiations  between  France  and  Sweden        .        .  124 


Section  III. —  Wallenstein  deprived  of  his  Command 
(March  1629-September  1630). 

1629  Wallenstein  increases  his  forces         ....  125 
Jealousy  between  him  and  the  Catholic  Electors        .  126 

1630  Assembly  at  Ratisbon 127 

July  3.     It   demands   that    Wallenstein  be   deprived   of   his 

command 127 

July  4.    Landing  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  in  Germany      .         .  128 

Sept.    Dismissal  of  Wallenstein 129 

Tilly  in  command       . 130 


Section  IV. — The  Swedes  establish  themselves  on  the  CW*  oj  *he 
Baltic  (July  1630-January  163 1). 

July.     Discipline  in  the  Swedish  Army        ....  13c 
The    Duke   of  Pomerania  submits  to  hiro-  r«it  the 
Elector  of  Brandenburg  declares  himself  neutral     .  130 
1651     The  treaty  of  Barwalde  between  France  and  Sweden  13a 

Section  V. — The  Fall  of  Magdeburg  (January-  May  1631). 

Jan.         Success  of  Gustavus  on  the  Baltic  coast     .         .         .  137 
March.    The  Electors  of  Saxony  hold  a  Protestant  /  >sembly 

at  Leipzig 133 

Tilly  attacks  the  Swedes,  but  is  driven  to  retJ-eat  .  134 
Ap.  26.  Treaty  of  Cherasco  between  France  and  the  English  135 
May  15.  Convention   between   Gustavus   and   the  Elector  of 

Brandenburg 136 

May  20.  Magdeburg  stormed,  plundered,  and  burnt        .         .  136 
The  Emperor  refuses  to  cancel  the  Edict  of  Restitu- 
tion   137 


xx  Contents. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  VICTORIES   OF   GUSTAVUS   ADOLPHU3. 

Section  I. — Alliance  between  the  Swedes  and  the  Saxont 
(June-September  1631). 

PA.GB 

June  21.  Gustavus  compels  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg  to  an 

alliance 138 

Tuly.    Gustavus  at  the  Camp  of  Werben      ....  138 

Aug.    Tilly  summons  the  Elector  of  Saxony  to  submit        .  139 
Sept.    He  attacks  Saxony,  upon  which  the  Elector  forms  an 

alliance  with  Gustavus     ......  139 

Gustavus  joins  the  Saxons        .....  140 

Section  II. — Battle  of  Breitenfeld  (September  1631). 

Sept.  17.  Victory  of  Gustavus  over  Tilly  at  Breitenfeld    .  .  141 

Wallenstein's  intrigues  with  Gustavus        .        .  .  142 

Wallenstein  and  Gustavus  unlikely  to  agree       .  .  143 

Political  and  military  designs  of  Gustavus        .  .  144 

He  looks  for  a  basis  of  operations  on  the  Rhine  .  146 

Section  III. — March  of  Ghistavus  into  South  Germany 
(October  1631-May  1632). 
Oct.     March  of  Gustavus  to  Mentz     ,         .        .        .        . ,  148 
1632     In  spite  of  the  objections  of  the  French,  he  attacks ' 

Bavaria .149 

Ap.  14.    Tilly  defeated  and  mortally  wounded  at  the  passage 

of  the  Lech 149 

May  17.  Gustavus  enters  Munich 150 

Section  IV. —  Wallenstein's  Restoration  to  command   . 
(September  1631-June  1632).  ^ 

Sept.   Wallenstein  breaks  off  all  intercourse  with  Gustavus  151 
Nov.    Attempts  to  reconcile  the  Elector  of  Saxony  with  the 

Emperor 15a 

Dec.    Is  reinstated  temporarily  in  the  command  of  the  Im- 
perial Army 153 


Contents.  xxi 

PAGB 

1632    Character  of  that  Army 153 

April.     Wallenstein  permanently  appointed  Commander       .  155 
May.    Offers  peace  to  the  Saxons,  and  drives  them  out  of 

Bohemia 155 

June.     Gustavus  does  not  approve  of  the  terms  of  peace  of- 
fered by  Wallenstein 156 

Section  V. — Struggle  between  Gustavus  and  Wallenstein 
{June-October  1632). 
June.     Gustavus  and  Wallenstein  opposed  to  one  another  at 

Nuremberg 157 

Efforts  of  Gustavus  to  maintain  discipline        .        .  159 

Sept.  4.    Fails  to  storm  Wallenstein's  lines        ....  160 

Sept.  18.  Gustavus  leaves  Nuremberg        .....  160 

Oct.     Wallenstein  marches  into  Saxony       .         .         .  160 

Section  VI. — The  Battle  of  Lutzen  {October-November  1632). 
Oct.     Gustavus  follows  Wallenstein  into  Saxony         .        .  161 

Nov.  16.  Battle  of  Lutzen 162 

Death  of  Gustavus     .......  163 

Victory  of  the  Swedes 164 

Irreparable  loss  by  the  death  of  Gustavus  to  the  Pro- 
testants    164 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  DEATH   OF  WALLENSTEIN  AND  THE  TREATY  OF  PRAGUE. 

Section  I. — French  Influence  in  Germany  {November  1632- 

April  1633). 

1633     Differences  between  Bernhard  and  Oxenstjerna        .  166 

Ap.  23.    The  League  of  Heilbronn  signed       ....  167 

Firm    establishment    of      Richelieu's    authority    in 

France 168 

Richelieu's  interposition  in  German  affairs        .         .  169 


xxii  Contents. 

Section  II. —  Wallenstein's  Attempt  to  dictate  Peace 
(April-December  1633). 

PAGB 

1633  Wallenstein's  peace   negotiations  with   the   Swedes 

and  Saxons     ........  170 

Oct.     He  drives  the  Saxons  out  of  Silesia   ....  172 

Nov.    Ratisbon  taken  by  Bernhard 173 

Spanish   opposition   to  a  peace  which  would  leave 
Spain  exposed  to  French  attacks     ....  I73 
Dec.    Wallenstein  thinks  of  making  peace,  whether  the  Em- 
peror consents  or  not      ......  175 

Section  III. — Resistance  to  Wallenstein' $  Plans 
(January-February  1634). 

1634  Onate,  the  Spanish  Ambassador,  persuades  the  Em- 
Jan,         peror  that  Wallenstein  is  a  traitor  ....  175 

Ferdinand  determines  to  displace  Wallenstein  .        .  176 
Feb.  19.  Wallenstein  engages  the  Colonels  to  support  him      .  -177 

Section  IV. — Assassination  of  Wallenstein  (February  1634). 

Feb.  18.  Wallenstein  declared  a  traitor 179 

Feb.  21.  The  garrison  of  Prague  declares  against  him     .        .  179 

Feb.  24.  Wallenstein  at  Eger 179 

Feb.  25.  He  is  assassinated      .......  181 

Comparison  between  Gustavus  and  Wallenstein        .  181 

Section  V. — Imperialist  Victories  and  the  Treaty  of  Prague 
(February  1634-May  1635). 

1634  The   King    of    Hungary    reorganizes    the    imperial 
Feb.         army 181 

Sept.  6.   In  conjunction  with  the  Cardinal-Infant,  he  defeats 

Bernhard  at  Nordlingen 183 

Consequent  necessity  of  an  increased  French  inter- 
vention      184 

1635  Peace  of  Prague 184 

May  30.  It  is  not  universally  accepted 185 

Miserable  condition  of  Germany.     Notes  of  an  Eng- 
lish traveller    .         .         .        r,         .         .         .        '.  187 


Contents.  xxiii 

CHAPTER  X. 

THE  PREPONDERANCE  OF   FRANCE. 

SECTION  I. — Open  Intervention  of  France  (May  1635). 

PAGE 

1635     Protestantism  not  out  of  danger        .        .         .         .189 

May.   Close  alliance  of  some  of  the  Princes  with  France      .  190 

Importance  of  the  possession  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  191 

May  19.  France  declares  war  against  Spain      ....  192 

Section  II. — Spanish  Successes  (May  \63$-Dccer>iber  1637). 

1635  Failure  of  the  French  attack  on  the  Spanish  Nether- 

lands         192 

1636  Spanish  invasion  of  France 193 

Oct.  4.    Baner's  victory  at  Wittstock 194 

1637  Death   of  Ferdinand    II.      Accession  of  Ferdinand 
Feb.  15.      Ill 194 

Imperialist  success  in  Germany         .        .         ,         .195 

Section  III. — The  Struggle  for  Alsace  {January  1638-July 

1639). 

1638  Bernhard's  victories  in  the  Breisgau  and  Alsace        .  195 
July  8.     Death  of  Bernhard 196 

Section  IV. — French  Successes  (July  1639-Dec.  1642). 

French  maritime  successes 197 

1639  Spanish  fleet  taking  refuge  in  the  Downs  .        .         .  198 
It  is  destroyed  by  the  Dutch 198 

1640  Insurrection  of  Catalonia 199 

Nov.  Independence  of   Portugal         .....  200 

1641  Defeat  of  the  Imperialists  at  Wolfenbuttel        .         .  201 

1642  Defeat  of  the  Imperialists  at  Kempten        .         .         .  201 
Aug.  Charles  I.  sets  up  his  standard.    Beginning  of  the 

English  Civil  War 
Dec  4,    Death  of  Richelieu 201 


xxiv  Contents. 

SECTION  V. — Aims  and  Character  of  Richelieu  {December  1642- 
May  1643). 

PAGB 

Richelieu's  domestic  policy 201 

Contrast  between  France  and  England       .        .         .  203 
Richelieu's  foreign  policy  ......  203 

1643     Moderation  of  his  aims 204 

May  14.  Death  of  Lewis  XIII 205 

Section  VI. — More  French  Victories  {May  i6^-Augv^t  1645). 

1643  Rule  of  Cardinal  Mazarin 205 

May  19.  Enghien  defeats  the  Spaniards  at  Rocroy  .         .         .  206 

The  French  kept  in  check  in  Germany       .         .        .  207 

1644  Enghien  and  Turenne.     Battle  of  Freiburg       .        .  208 
July.   Battle  of  Marston  Moor 

1645,  Aug.  3.  Second  Battle  of  Nordlingen      ....  208 
Mar.  6.    Swedish  victory  at  Jankow        .....  S09 


CHAPTER  XI. 
THE  END  OF  THE  WAR. 

Section  I. — Turenne's  Strategy  {June  \6$$-Octobcr  1648). 

1645  Negotiations  for  peace  begun 209 

June.    Battle  of  Naseby 

Aims  of  the  Emperor  and  the  Duke  of  Bavaria  .         .  210 

1646  Turenne  outmanoeuvres  the  Imperialists     .         .         .  213 

1647,  May-Sept.  Truce  between  the  French  and  the  Bavarians  213 

1648,  May  17.  Defeat  of  the  Bavarians  at  Zusmarshausen        .  213 

Section  II.— The  Treaty  of  Westphalia  {Oct.  1648). 

1648    Terms  of  the  peace 213 

Oct.  24.  How  far  was  toleration  effected  by  it        .        .        .  214 
General  desire  for  peace 217 


Contents.  xxv 

SECTION  III. — Condition  of  Germany. 

PAGB 

Debasing  effects  of  the  war 217 

Decrease  of  the  population 218 

Moral  and  intellectual  decadence       ....  218 
Disintegration  of  Germany         .....  220 
Protestantism  saved,  and  with  it  the  future  culture  of 
Germany 220 

Section  IV. — Continuance  of  the    War  between  France  and 
Spain  (1648-1660). 

1648  Recognition    of    the    independence    of   the    Dutch 

Republic 221 

1649  Execution  of  Charles  I. 

The  Fronde 222 

.  223 
.  223 
.  224 


Continuance  of  the  war  with  Spain    . 
Alliance  between  France  and  Cromwell 
1660    Treaty  of  Pyrenees     .... 
French  greatness  based  on  Tolerance 
Intolerance   of    Lewis   XIV.   and    downfall   of   the 
French  monarchy 226 


THE 

THIRTY  YEARS'  WAR. 


CHAPTER  I. 

CAUSES   OF  THE  THIRTY  YEARS*   WAR. 

Section  I. — Political  Institutions  of  Germany. 

It  was  the  misfortune  of  Germany  in  the  sixteenth  and 
seventeenth  centuries  that,  with  most  of  the  conditions 
requisite  for  the  formation  of  national  unity,    . 

.,...?*■    Want  of 

she    had    no    really    national    institutions,    national   insti- 

— ,  i         i       i      j  tutions  in 

There  was  an  emperor,  who  looked  some-   Germany, 
thing  like  an  English  king,  and  a  Diet,  or 
General   Assembly,   which   looked    something  like   an 
English  Parliament,  but  the  resemblance  was  far  greater 
in  appearance  than  in  reality. 

The  Emperor  was  chosen  by  three  ecclesiastical 
electors,  the  Archbishops  of  Mentz,  Treves  and  Cologne, 
and  four  lay  electors,  the  Elector  Palatine, 
the  Electors  of  Saxony  and  Brandenburg,  peror.  e  m 
and  the  King  of  Bohemia.  In  theory  he  was 
the  successor  of  the  Roman  Emperors  Julius  and  Con- 
stantine.  the  ruler  of  the  world,  or  of  so  much  of  it  at 
least  as  he  could  bring  under  his  sway.  More  particu- 
larly, he  was  the  successor  of  Charles  the  Great  and  Otto 


2         Causes  of  the   Thirty   Years1  War.  1440-15 17. 

the  Great,  the  lay  head  of  Western  Christendom.  The 
Emperor  Sigismund,  on  his  death-bed,  had  directed  that 
his  body  should  lie  in  state  for  some  days,  that  men  might 
see  '  that  the  lord  of  all  the  world  was  dead.'  '  We  have 
chosen  your  grace,'  said  the  electors  to  Frederick  III., 
'  as  head,  protector,  and  governor  of  all  Christendom.' 
Yet  it  would  be  hard  to  find  a  single  fragment  of  reality 
corresponding  to  the  magnificence  of  the  claim. 

As  far,  however,  as  the  period  now  under  review  is 
concerned,  though  the  name  of  Emperor  was  retained,  it 
is  unnecessary  to  trouble  ourselves  with  the 
man  kingship*  rights,  real  or  imaginary,  connected  with  the 
imperial  dignity.  Charles  the  Great,  before 
the  imperial  crown  was  conferred  on  him,  ruled  as  king, 
by  national  assent  or  by  conquest,  over  a  great  part  of 
Western  Europe.  When  his  dominions  were  divided 
amongst  his  successors,  the  rule  of  those  successors  in 
Germany  or  elsewhere  had  no  necessary  connexion  with 
the  imperial  crown.  Henry  the  Fowler,  one  of  the  great- 
est of  the  Kings  of  the  Germans,  was  never  an  emperor 
at  all,  and  though,  after  the  reign  of  his  son  Otto  the 
Great,  the  German  kings  claimed  from  the  Pope  the  im- 
perial crown  as  their  right,  they  never  failed  also  to  re- 
ceive a  special  German  crown  at  Aachen  [Azx-ta-C/ia' 
pelle)  or  at  Frankfort  as  the  symbol  of  their  headship 
over  German  lands  and  German  men. 

When,  therefore,  the  writers  of  the  16th  or  17th  centu- 
ries speak  of  the  rights  of  the  Emperor  in  Germany,  they 

,     .  really  mean  to  speak  of  the  rights  of  the  Em- 

U-  Its  con-  .    ,  .  .         ,-,.  ,  • 

nexion  with       peror  in  his  capacity  of  German  king,  just  as, 

mpire.  wjien  t^ey  Speak  0f  the  Empire,  they  mean 
what  we  call  Germany,  together  with  certain  surround- 
ing districts,  such  as  Switzerland,  the  Netherlands,  Lor- 
raine, and  Eastern  Burgundy  or  Franche  Comte,  which 


I440_ISI7-  Political  Institutions  of  Germany.         3 

are  not  now,  if  Alsace  and  the  newly-conquered  part  of 
Lorraine  be  excepted,  included  under  that  name.  In  the 
Eame  way  the  mere  fragments  of  feudal  supremacy,  and 
the  payment  of  feudal  dues  which  the  emperors  claimed 
in  Italy,  belonged  to  them,  not  as  emperors,  but  simply 
as  Italian  kings,  and  as  wearers  of  the  iron  crown  of 
Lombardy,  which,  as  the  legends  told,  was  formed  of 
nails  taken  from  the  Saviour's  cross. 

Not  that  it  would  be  wise,  even  if  it  were  possible,  to 
do  otherwise  than  to  follow  the  practice  of  contem- 
poraries. The  strange  form,  Emperor  of 
Germany,  by  which,  at  a  later  period,  men  confusion 
unfamiliar  with  Germany  history  strove  to 
reconcile  the  old  claims  with  something  like  the  actual 
fact,  had  not  been  yet  invented.  And,  after  all,  the 
confusions  of  history,  the  use  of  words  and  titles  when 
their  meaning  is  changed,  are  so  many  tokens  to  remind 
us  of  the  unity  of  successive  generations,  and  of  the 
impossibility  of  any  one  of  them  building  anew  without 
regarding  the  foundations  of  their  fathers.  All  that  is 
needed  is  to  remember  that  the  emperor  of  later  times  is 
a  personage  whose  rights  and  functions  can  be  profitably 
compared  with  those  of  Henry  VIII.  of  England  or 
Lewis  XIV.  of  France,  not  with  Julius  or  Constantine 
Whose  successor  he  professed  himself  to  be. 

'  Take  away  the  rights  of  the  Emperor,'  said  a  law 
«oook  of  the  fifteenth  century,  in  language  which  would 
have  startled  an  old  Roman  legislator,  '  and    „     mi 

§  0.  The 

who  can  say,  "This  house  is  mine,  this  vd-   great 
lage  belongs  to   me?'"     But  the   princes 
and  bishops,  the  counts  and  cities,  who  were  glad  enough 
to  plead  on  their  own  behalf  that  their  lands  were  held 
directly  from  the  head  of  the  Empire,  took  care  to  allow 
him   scarcely  any  real   authority.     This  kingly  dignity 


4         Causes  of  the  Thirty   Years'    War.  1440-15 17. 

which  passed  under  the  name  of  the  Empire  was  indeed 
very  weak.  It  had  never  outgrown  the  needs  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  and  was  still  essentially  a  feudal  kingship. 
From  circumstances  which  it  would  take  too  much  space 
to  notice  here,  it  had  failed  in  placing  itself  at  the  head 
of  a  national  organization,  and  in  becoming  the  guard- 
ian of  the  rights  of  the  tillers  of  the  soil  and  the  burghers 
of  the  towns,  who  found  no  place  in  the  ranks  of  the 
feudal  chivalry. 

The  immediate  vassals  of  the  Empire,  in  fact,  were 
almost  independent  sovereigns,  like  the  Dukes  of  Nor- 
mandy in  the  France  of  the  tenth  century, 
independence.  or  tne  Dukes  of  Burgundy  in  the  France  of 
the  fifteenth  century.  They  quarrelled  and 
made  war  with  one  another  like  the  Kings  of  England 
and  France.  Their  own  vassals,  their  own  peasants,  their 
own  towns  could  only  reach  the  Emperor  through  them, 
if  anybody  thought  it  worth  while  to  reach  him  at  all. 

The  prospect  of  reviving  the  German  kingship  which 
was  veiled  under  the  august  title  of  Emperor  seemed  far 
distant  at  the  beginning  of  the  fifteenth  cen- 
of  order.°SpeCt  tury.  But  whilst  the  Empire,  in  its  old  sense, 
with  its  claims  to  universal  dominion,  was  a 
dream,  this  German  kingship  needed  but  wisdom  in  the 
occupant  of  the  throne  to  seize  the  national  feeling,  which 
was  certain  sooner  or  later  to  call  out  for  a  national  ruler, 
in  order  to  clothe  itself  in  all  the  authority  which  was 
needed  for  the  maintenance  of  the  unity  and  the  safety 
of  the  German  people.  That,  when  the  time  came,  the 
man  to  grasp  the  opportunity  was  not  there,  was  the  chief 
amongst  the  causes  of  that  unhappy  tragedy  of  disunion 
which  culminated  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 

In  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century  an  effort  was 
made  to  introduce  a  system  of  regular  assemblies,  un- 


I44°-I5I7'     Political  Institutions  of  Germany        5 
der  the  name  of  a  Diet,  in  order  to  stem  the    . 

.  2  9-     Attempt! 

tide  of  anarchy.  But  it  never  entered  into  to  introduce 
the  mind  of  the  wisest  statesman  living  to 
summon  any  general  representation  of  the  people.  In 
the  old  feudal  assemblies  no  one  had  taken  part  who 
was  not  an  immediate  vassal  of  the  Empire,  and  the 
Diet  professed  to  be  only  a  more  regular  organization  of 
the  old  feudal  assemblies. 

From  the  Diet,  therefore,  all  subjects  of  the  territorial 
princes  were  rigorously  excluded.  Whatever  their  wishes 
or  opinions  might  be,  they  had  neither  part  nor  lot  in 
the  counsels  of  the  nation.  There  was  nothing  in  the 
Diet  answering  to  those  representatives  of 
English  counties,  men  not  great  enough  to  Diet,or  geno- 
assume  the  state  of  independent  princes,  nor  ^^Empire. 
small  enough  to  be  content  simply  to  regis- 
ter without  question  the  decrees  of  those  in  authority 
who  with  us  did  more  than  any  other  class  to  cement 
town  and  country,  king  and  people  together.  Nor  did 
even  the  less  powerful  of  the  immediate  vassals  take 
part  in  the  meetings.  Like  the  lesser  barons  of  the  early 
Plantagenet  reigns,  they  slipped  out  of  a  position  to 
which  they  seemed  to  have  a  right  by  the  fact  that  they 
held  their  few  square  miles  of  land  as  directly  from  the 
Emperor  as  the  Dukes  of  Bavaria  or  the  Electors  of 
Saxony  held  the  goodly  principalities  over  which  they 
ruled. 

Such  a  body  was  more  like  a  congress  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  European  sovereigns  than  an  English  Par- 
liament.    Each  member  came  in  his  own    \  %%.    The 
right.     He  might  or  might  not  speak  the   fit^eforThe 
sentiments  of  his  subjects,  and,  even  if  he   Diet- 
did,  he  naturally  preferred  deciding  pretty  much  as  he 
pleased  at  home  to  allowing  the  question  to  be  debated 


6  Causes  of  the  Thirty  Years'   War.    1440-15 17. 

by  an  assembly  of  his  equals.  An  Elector  of  Saxony,  a 
Landgrave  of  Hesse,  or  an  Archduke  of  Austria  knew 
that  taxes  were  levied,  armies  trained,  temporal  and 
spiritual  wants  provided  for  at  his  own  court  at  Dresden, 
at  Cassel,  or  at  Vienna,  and  he  had  no  wish  that  it  should 
be  otherwise.  Nor  was  it  easy,  even  when  a  prince  had 
made  himself  so  obnoxious  as  to  call  down  upon  him- 
self the  condemnation  of  his  fellows,  to  subject  him  to 
punishment.  He  might,  indeed,  be  put  to  the  ban  of 
the  Empire,  a  kind  of  secular  excommunication.  But  if 
he  were  powerful  himself,  and  had  powerful  friends,  it 
might  be  difficult  to  put  it  in  execution.  It  would  be 
necessary  to  levy  war  against  him,  and  that  war  might 
not  be  successful. 

Still,  at  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  and  the  beginning  of 

the  sixteenth  centuries  some  progress  was  made.     An 

Imperial  Court  {Reichskammergcricht)  came 

sortoforder       into   existence,  mainly  nominated   by   the 

established.  ■  r  .*        -r>  j  ^i_  j    .. 

princes  of  the  Empire,  and  authorized  to 
pronounce  judgment  upon  cases  arising  between  the 
rulers  of  the  various  territories.  In  order  to  secure  the 
better  execution  of  the  sentences  of  this  court,  Germany 
was  divided  into  circles,  in  each  of  which  the  princes 
and  cities  who  were  entitled  to  a  voice  in  the  Diet  of  the 
Empire  were  authorized  to  meet  together  and  to  levy 
troops  for  the  maintenance  of  order. 

These  princes,  lay  and  ecclesiastical,  together  with  the 

cities  holding  immediately  from  the  Empire,  were  called 

_,  the  Estates  of  the  Empire.    When  they  met 

g  13.     The  .  *  .      J 

three  Houses  in  the  general  Diet  they  voted  in  three 
houses.  The  first  house  was  composed  of 
the  seven  Electors,  though  it  was  only  at  an  Imperial 
election  that  the  number  was  complete.  At  all  ordi- 
nary meetings  for  legislation,  or  for  the  dispatch  of  busi- 


I44°_I5I7-     Protestantism  in   Germany.  7 

ness,  the  king  of  Bohemia  was  excluded,  and  six  Electors 
only  appeared.  The  next  house  was  the  House  of 
Princes,  comprising  all  those  persons,  lay  or  ecclesiasti- 
cal, who  had  the  right  of  sitting  in  the  Diet.  Lastly, 
came  the  Free  Imperial  Cities,  the  only  popular  element 
in  the  Diet.  But  they  were  treated  as  decidedly  inferior 
to  the  other  two  houses.  When  the  Electors  and  the 
Princes  had  agreed  upon  a  proposition,  then  and  not  till 
then  it  was  submitted  to  the  House  of  Cities. 

The  special  risk  attending  such  a  constitution  was  that 
it  provided  almost  exclusively  for  the  wants  of  the 
princes  and  electors.  In  the  Diet,  in  the  circles,  and  in 
the  Imperial  Court,  the  princes  and  electors  g  I4.  The 
exercised  a  preponderating,  if  not  quite  an  Cltles  to° weak- 
exclusive  influence.  In  ordinary  times  there  might  be 
no  danger.  But  if  extraordinary  times  arose,  if  any 
great  movement  swept  over  the  surface  of  the  nation,  it 
might  very  well  be  that  the  nation  would  be  on  one  side 
and  the  princes  and  the  electors  on  the  other.  And  if 
this  were  the  case  there  would  be  great  difficulty  in 
bringing  the  nation  into  harmony  with  its  institutions. 
In  England  the  sovereign  could  alter  a  hostile  majority 
in  the  House  of  Lords  by  a  fresh  creation  of  peers,  and 
the  constituencies  could  alter  a  hostile  majority  of  the 
House  of  Commons  by  a  fresh  election.  In  Germany 
there  was  no  House  of  Commons,  and  an  emperor  who 
should  try  to  create  fresh  princes  out  of  the  immediate 
vassals  who  were  too  weak  to  be  summoned  to  the  Diet 
would  only  render  himself  ridiculous  by  an  attempt  to 
place  in  check  the  real  possessors  of  power  by  the  help 
of  those  who  had  the  mere  appearance  of  it. 

Section  II. — Protestantism  in  Germany. 

When,  in  the  sixteenth  century,  Protestantism  sud- 
C 


8  Causes  of  the   Thirty  Years'   War.   151 7—1552. 
denly  raised  its  head,  the  institutions  of  the 

\  1.     The  *  .  ' 

German  peo-  Empire  were  tried  to  the  uttermost.  For 
ProtesuntLm ;  tne  mass  of  the  nation  declared  itself  in 
the  Diet  op-       favour  of  change,  and  the  Diet  was  so  com- 

Dosed  to  it.  h    ' 

posed  as  to  be  hostile  to  change,  as  soon  as 
it  appeared  that  it  was  likely  to  take  the  direction  of 
Lutheranism.  In  the  Electoral  House,  indeed,  the  votes 
of  the  three  ecclesiastical  electors  were  met  by  the  votes 
of  the  three  lay  electors.  But  in  the  House  of  Princes 
there  were  thirty-eight  ecclesiastical  dignitaries  and  but 
eighteen  laymen.  It  was  a  body,  in  short,  like  the  Eng- 
lish House  of  Lords  before  the  Reformation,  and  there 
was  no  Henry  VIII.  to  bring  it  into  harmony  with  the 
direction  which  lay  society  was  taking,  by  some  act 
equivalent  to  the  dissolution  of  the  monasteries,  and  the 
consequent  exclusion  of  the  mitred  abbots  from  their 
seats  in  Parliament.  To  pass  measures  favourable  to 
Protestantism  through  such  a  house  was  simply  impossi- 
ble. Yet  it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  a  really  national 
Parliament  would  have  adopted  Lutheranism,  more  or 
less  modified,  as  the  religion  of  the  nation.  Before  Pro- 
testantism was  fifty  years  old,  in  spite  of  all  difficulties, 
ninety  per  cent,  of  the  population  of  Germany  were  Pro- 
testant. 

In  default  of  national  action  in  favor  of  Protestantism, 
it  was  adopted  and  supported  by  most  of  the  lay  princes 

and  electors.  A  new  principle  of  disinte- 
\  2.    Most  of  .  .  , 

the  lay  princes    gration  was  thus  introduced  into  Germany, 

a  opt '  as  these  princes  were  forced  to  act  in  op- 

position to  the  views  adopted  by  the  Diet. 

If  the  Diet  was  unlikely  to  play  the  part 

v: 


\  3      The  Em- 

peror  Charles     of  an  English  Parliament,  neither  was  the 


Emperor  likely  to  play  the  part  of  Henry 
VIII.     For  the  interests  of  Germany,  Charles  V.,  who 


I5I7-I552-      Protestantism  in   Germany.  9 

had  been  elected  in  1519,  was  weak  where  he  ought 
to  have  been  strong,  and  strong  where  he  ought  to  have 
been  weak.  As  Emperor,  he  was  nothing.  As  feudal 
sovereign  and  national  ruler,  he  was  very  little.  But  he 
was  also  a  prince  of  the  Empire,  and  as  such  he  ruled 
over  the  Austrian  duchies  and  Tyrol.  Further  than  this, 
he  was  one  of  the  most  powerful  sovereigns  of  Europe. 
He  was  king  of  Spain,  and  of  the  Indies  with  all  their 
mines.  In  Italy,  he  disposed  of  Naples  and  the  Mila- 
nese. Sicily  and  Sardinia  were  his,  and,  under  various 
titles,  he  ruled  over  the  fragments  of  the  old  Burgundian 
inheritance,  Franche  Comte,  and  the  seventeen  pro- 
vinces of  the  Netherlands.  Such  a  man  would  influence 
the  progress  of  affairs  in  Germany  with  a  weight  out  of 
all  proportion  to  his  position  in  the  German  constitution. 
And  unhappily,  with  the  power  of  a  foreign  sovereign, 
he  brought  the  mind  of  a  foreigner.  His  mother's 
Spanish  blood  beat  in  his  veins,  and  he  had  the  instinc- 
tive aversion  of  a  Spaniard  to  anything  which  savoured 
of  opposition  to  the  doctrines  of  the  Church.  'That 
man,'  he  said,  when  he  caught  sight  of  Luther  for  the 
first  time,  '  shall  never  make  me  a  heretic' 

Of  this  antagonism  between  the  minority  of  the 
princes  backed  by  the  majority  of  the  nation,  and  the 
majority  of  the  princes  backed  by  an  Em-  i552. 

peror  who  was    also  a    foreign  sovereign,    Convention 
civil  war  was  the  natural  result.    In  the  end,   of  Passau- 
the  triumph  of  the  Protestants  was  so  far  secured  that 
they  forced  their  opponents  in  1 552  to  yield  to  the  Conven- 
tion of  Passau,  by  which  it  was  arranged  that  a  Diet  should 
be  held  as  soon  as  possible  for  a  general  pacification. 

That  Diet,  which  was  assembled  at  Augs-  1555. 

burg  in  1555,  met    under    remarkably   fa-   peace  of6 
vourable  circumstances.   Charles  V.,  baffled  Aus^nir8r 


io  Causes  of  the  Thirty   Years'   War.  1555. 

and  disappointed,  had  retired  from  the  scene,  and  had 
left  behind  him,  as  his  representative,  his  more  con- 
ciliatory brother  Ferdinand,  who  was  already  King  of 
Hungary  and  Bohemia,  and  was  his  destined  successor 
in  the  German  possessions  of  the  House  of  Austria. 
Both  he  and  the  leading  men  on  either  side  were  anxious 
for  peace,  and  v/ere  jealous  of  the  influence  which 
Philip,  the  son  of  Charles  V.,  and  his  successor  in  Spain, 
Italy,  and  the  Netherlands,  might  gain  from  a  continu- 
ance of  the  war. 

There  was  little  difficulty  in  arranging  that  the  Pro- 
testant princes,  who,  before  the   date  of  the  Convention 

,  ,.   ,  of  Passau,  had  seized  ecclesiastical  property 

I  6.    Its  terms.  .  r     tr       J 

within  their  own  territories,  either  for  their 
own  purposes  or  for  the  support  of  Protestant  worship, 
should  no  longer  be  subject  to  the  law  or  authority  of 
the  Catholic  clergy.  The  real  difficulty  arose  in  pro- 
viding for  the  future.  With  Protestantism  as  a  growing 
religion,  the  princes  might  be  inclined  to  proceed  further 
with  the  secularizing  of  the  Church  property  still  left  un- 
touched within  their  own  territories ;  and  besides  this, 
it  was  possible  that  even  bishops  or  abbots  themselves, 
being  princes  of  the  Empire,  might  be  inclined  to  aban- 
don their  religion,  and  to  adopt  Protestantism. 

The  first  of  these  difficulties  was  left  by  the  treaty  in 
some  obscurity ;  but,  from  the  stress  laid  on  the  aban- 
?  7.  Might  donment  by  the  Catholics  of  the  lands  se- 
sefzi"more  cularized  before  the  Convention  of  Passau, 
lands?  jt  would  seem  that  they  might  fairly  urge 

that  they  had  never  abandoned  their  claims  to  lands 
which  at  that  date  had  not  been  secularized. 

The  second  difficulty  led  to  long  discussions.  The 
Protestants  wished  that  any  bishop  or  abbot  who  pleased 
might  be  allowed  to  turn   Protestant,  and  might  then 


x555-  Protestantism  in   Germany.  n 

establish  Protestantism    as  the  religion  of  g  8.    Might 
his   subjects.     The  Catholics   insisted  that   t;cs  turn  pr0"_ 
any  bishop  or  abbot  who  changed  his  religion    testants? 
should  be  compelled  to  vacate  his  post,  and  this  view  of 
the  case  prevailed,  under  the  name  of  the  Ecclesiastical 
Reservation.      It  was    further    agreed  that  the  peace 
should  apply  to  the  Lutheran  Church  alone,  no  other 
confession  having  been  as  yet  adopted  by  any  of  the 
princes. 

Such  a  peace,  acceptable  as  it  was  at  the  time,  was 
pregnant  with  future  evil.  Owing  its  origin  to  a  Diet  in 
which  everything  was  arranged  by  the  princes  and 
electors,  it  settled  all  questions  as  if  nobody  but  princes 
and  electors  had  any  interest  in  the  matter.    ,       _ 

J  §  g.    Dangers 

And,  besides  this,  there  was  a  most  unstates-  of  the  future, 
manlike  want  of  provision  for  future  change. 
The  year  1552  was  to  give  the  line  by  which  the  religious 
institutions  of  Germany  were  to  be  measured  for  all 
time.  There  was  nothing  elastic  about  such  legislation. 
It  did  not,  on  the  one  hand,  adopt  the  religion  of  the  vast 
majority  as  the  established  religion  of  the  Empire.  It 
did  not,  on  the  other  hand,  adopt  the  principle  of  reli- 
gious liberty.  In  thinking  of  themselves  and  their 
rights,  the  princes  had  forgotten  the  German  people. 

The  barriers   set  up   against   Protestantism  were  so 
plainly  artificial  that  they  soon  gave  way.     The  princes 
claimed  the  right  of  continuing  to  secularize 
Church  lands  within  their  territories  as  inse-    croachments"* 
parable  from  their  general  right  of  providing   IjP°?  Church 
for  the   religion   of  their   subjects.     At  all 
events  they  had  might  on  their  side.     About  a  hundred 
monasteries  are  said  to  have  fallen  victims  in  the  Pala- 
tinate alone,  and  an  almost  equal  number,  the  gleanings 
of  a  richer  harvest  which  had  been  reaped  before  the 


12  Causes  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  1555-1570. 

Convention   of   Passau,   were   taken   possession   of   in 
Northern  Germany. 

The  Ecclesiastical  Reservation  applied  to  a  different 

class  of  property,  namely,  to  the  bishoprics  and  abbeys 

held  immediately  of  the  Empire.     Here,  too, 

jii.    The  Ec-  /  v  '         ' 

cicsiastical  the  Protestants  found  an  excuse  for  evading 
the  Treaty  of  Augsburg.  The  object  of  the 
reservation,  they  argued,  was  not  to  keep  the  bishoprics 
in  Catholic  hands,  but  to  prevent  quarrels  arising  be- 
tween the  bishops  and  their  chapters.  If,  therefore,  a 
bishop  elected  as  a  Catholic  chose  to  turn  Protestant,  he 
must  resign  his  see  in  order  to  avoid  giving  offence  to 
the  Catholic  chapter.  But  where  a  chapter,  itself  already 
Protestant,  elected  a  Protestant  bishop,  he  might  take 
the  see  without  hesitation,  and  hold  it  as  long  as  he 
lived. 

In   this  way  eight  of  the   great  northern   bishoprics 

soon  came  under  Protestant  rule.     Not  that  the  Protest- 

_  ant  occupant  was  in  any  real  sense  of  the 

£12.  The  , 

northern  bish-   word  a  bishop.     He  was  simply  an  elected 
testant.  ""  prince,  calling   himself  a  bishop,  or  often 

more  modestly  an  administrator,  and  look- 
ing after  the  temporal  affairs  of  his  dominions. 

In  some  respects  the  arrangement  was  a  good  one. 
The  populations  of  these  territories  were  mainly  Protest- 
ant, and  they  had  no  cause  to  complain, 
bad  side  of  the  Besides,  if  only  a  sufficient  number  of  these 
arrangement,  bishoprics  could  be  gained  to  Protestantism, 
the  factitious  majority  in  the  Diet  might  be  reversed, 
and  an  assembly  obtained  more  truly  representing  the 
nation  than  that  which  was  in  existence.  But  it  must  be 
acknowledged  that  the  whole  thing  had  an  ugly  look ; 
and  it  is  no  wonder  that  Catholics  pronounced  these  ad- 
ministrators to  be  no  bishops  at  all,  and  to  have  no  right 


X570_I595-  Reaction  against  Protestantism.  13 

to  hold  the  bishops'  lands,  or  to  take  their  seat  as  bishops 
in  the  Diet  of  the  Empire. 

Section  III. — Reaction  against  Protestantism. 
In  course  of  time  Protestantism,  in  its  turn,  exposed 
itself  to  attack.      Each  petty  court  soon  had   its  own 
school   of  theologians,  whose   minds  were    .       _,.     ,    . 

.  *  \  1.     lheologi- 

dwarfed  to  the  limits  of  the  circle  which  they  cai  deputes 
influenced  with  their  logic  and  their  elo-  tenants.™ 
quence.  The  healthful  feeling  which  springs 
from  action  on  a  large  stage  was  wanting  to  them. 
Bitterly  wrangling  with  one  another,  they  were  eager  to 
call  in  the  secular  arm  against  their  opponents.  Seizing 
the  opportunity,  the  newly-constituted  order  of  Jesuits 
stepped  forward  to  bid  silence  in  the  name  of  the  reno- 
vated Papal  Church,  alone,  as  they  urged,  able  to  give 
peace  instead  of  strife,  certainty  instead  of  disputation. 
The  Protestants  were  taken  at  a  disadvantage.  The 
enthusiasm  of  a  national  life,  which  repelled  the  Jesuits 
in  the  England  of  the  sixteenth  century,  and  the  enthu- 
siasm of  scientific  knowledge  which  repels  them  in  the 
Germany  of  the  nineteenth  century,  were  alike  wanting 
to  a  Germany  in  which  national  life  was  a  dream  of  the 
past,  and  science  a  dream  of  the  future.  Luther  had 
long  ago  passed  away  from  the  world.  Melanchthon's 
last  days  were  spent  in  hopeless  protest  against  the  evil 
around  him.  '  For  two  reasons,'  he  said,  as  he  lay  upon 
his  death-bed,  '  I  desire  to  leave  this  life :  First,  that  I 
may  enjoy  the  sight,  which  I  long  for,  of  the  Son  of  God 
and  of  the  Church  in  Heaven.  Next,  that  I  may  be  set 
free  from  the  monstrous  and  implacable  hatreds  of  the 
theologians.' 

In  the  face    of    a  divided    people,   or    self-seeking 
princes,  and  of  conflicting    theories,  the  Jesuits  made 


14       Causes  of  the  Tliv'ty  Years'  War.   15 70-1 59 6. 

their  way.     Step  by  step  the  Catholic  reac- 
Catholics  tion  gained  ground,  not  without  compulsion, 

\n  e  progress,  j^  ^^  nQt  without  that  moral  force  which 
makes  compulsion  possible.  The  bishops  and  abbots 
gave  their  subjects  the  choice  between  conversion  and 
exile.  An  attempt  made  by  the  Archbishop  of  Cologne 
to  marry  and  turn  Protestant  was  too  plainly  in  contradic- 
tion to  the  Ecclesiastical  Reservation  to  prosper,  and 
when  the  Protestant  majority  of  the  Chapter  of  Stras- 
burg  elected  a  Protestant  bishop  they  were  soon  over- 
powered. A  Protestant  Archbishop  of  Magdeburg  offer- 
ing to  take  his  place  amongst  the  princes  of  the  Empire 
at  the  Diet  was  refused  admission,  and  though  nothing 
was  done  to  dispossess  him  and  the  other  northern  ad- 
ministrators of  their  sees,  yet  a  slur  had  been  cast  upon 
'their  title  which  they  were  anxious  to  efface.  A  few 
years  later  a  legal  decision  was  obtained  in  the  cases  of 
four  monasteries  secularized  after  the  Convention  of 
Passau,  and  that  decision  was  adverse  to  the  claim  of 
the  Protestants. 

Out  of  these  two  disputes — the  dispute  about  the  Pro- 
testant administrators  and  the  dispute  about  the  secular- 
l  3.  The  dis-  ized  lands — the  Thirty  Years'  War  arose. 
Fed  finally0 to  The  Catholic  party  stood  upon  the  strict  let- 
war-  ter  of  the  law,  according,  at  least,  to  their 

own  interpretation,  and  asked  that  everything  might  be 
replaced  in  the  condition  in  which  it  was  in  1552,  the 
date  of  the  Convention  of  Passau.  The  Protestant  view, 
that  consideration  should  be  taken  for  changes,  many 
of  which  at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century  were  at 
least  a  generation  old,  may  or  may  not  have  been  in 
accordance  with  the  law,  but  it  was  certainly  in  accord* 
ance  with  the  desires  of  the  greater  part  of  the  popula* 
tion  affected  by  them. 


1596-1607.    Three  Parties  and  Three  Leaders.        15 

There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  if  Germany  had 
possessed  anything  like  a  popular  representation  its 
voice  would  have  spoken  in  favour  of  some    , 

.  $  4-    Nopopu- 

kind  of  compromise.     There  is  no  trace  of    far  represen- 

,,.,.,  ,  ,         tation. 

any   mutual   hostility  between  the  popula- 
tions of  the  Catholic  and  Protestant  districts  apart  from 
their  rulers. 

Section  IV. —  Three  Parties  and  Three  Leaders. 

Two  men  stood  forward  to  personify  the  elements  of 
strife — Maximilian,  the  Catholic  Duke  of  Bavaria,  and  the 
Calvinist  Prince  Christian  of  Anhalt,  whilst    „        _ 

i  1.     Tne 

the  warmest  advocate  of  peace  was  John    leaders  of 
George,  the  Lutheran  Elector  of  Saxony. 

Maximilian  of  Bavaria  was  the  only  lay  prince  of  any 
importance  on  the  side  of  the  Catholics.  He  had  long 
been  known  as  a  wise  administrator  of  his  own  domin- 
ions.    No  other  ruler  was  provided  with  so    , 

I  2.     Maximi- 

well-filled  a  treasury,  or  so  disciplined  an  lianoftsava- 
army.  No  other  ruler  was  so  capable  of 
forming  designs  which  were  likely  to  win  the  approba- 
tion of  others,  or  so  patient  in  waiting  till  the  proper  time 
arrived  for  their  execution.  '  What  the  Duke  of  Bava- 
ria does,'  said  one  of  his  most  discerning  opponents, 
'  has  hands  and  feet.'  His  plans,  when  once  they  were 
launched  into  the  world,  seemed  to  march  forwards  of 
themselves  to  success. 

Such  a  man  was  not  likely  to  take  up  the  wild  theories 
which  were  here  and  there  springing  up,  of  the  duty  of 
uprooting  Protestantism  at  all  times  and  all  a  3  His  love 
places,  or  to  declare,  as  some  were  declar-  oflegallty- 
ing,  that  the  Peace  of  Augsburg  was  invalid  because  it 
had  never  been  confirmed  by  the  Pope.  To  him  the 
Peace  of  Augsburg  was  the  legal  settlement  by  which  all 


1 6       Causes  of  the  Thirty   Years'   War.    1596-1'  ^7. 

questions  were  to  be  tried.  What  he  read  there  was 
hostile  to  the  Protestant  administrators  and  the  seculariz- 
ing princes.  Yet  he  did  not  propose  to  carry  his  views 
into  instant  action.  He  would  await  his  opportunity. 
But  he  would  do  his  best  to  be  strong,  in  order  that  he 
might  not  be  found  wanting  when  the  opportunity  ar- 
rived, and,  in  spite  of  his  enthusiasm  for  legal  rights,  it 
was  by  no  means  unlikely  that,  if  a  difficult  point  arose, 
he  might  be  inclined  to  strain  the  law  in  his  own  favour. 
Such  an  opponent,  so  moderate  and  yet  so  resolute, 
was  a  far  more  dangerous  enemy  to  the  Protestants  than 
^  the   most   blatant   declaimer   against    their 

I  4.     Danger  & 

of  the  Protest-  doctrines.  Naturally,  the  Protestants  re- 
garded his  views  as  entirely  inadmissible. 
They  implied  nothing  less  than  the  forcible  conversion 
of  the  thousands  of  Protestants  who  were  inhabitants  of 
the  administrators'  dominions,  and  the  occupation  by 
the  Catholic  clergy  of  points  of  vantage  which  would 
serve  them  in  their  operations  upon  the  surrounding  dis- 
tricts. It  is  true  that  the  change,  if  effected  would  sim- 
ply replace  matters  in  the  position  which  had  been  found 
endurable  in  1552.  But  that  which  could  be  borne  when 
the  Catholics  were  weak  and  despondent  might  be  an 
intolerable  menace  when  they  were  confident  and  ag- 
gressive. 

Resistance,  therefore,  became  a  duty,  a  duty  to  which 
the  princes  were  all  the  more  likely  to  pay  attention  be- 
cause it  coincided  with  their  private  interest. 

g  5.     Danger 

of  the  Protest-     In  the  bishoprics  and  chapters  they  found 
provision    for    their   younger     sons,     from 
which  they  would  be  cut  off  if  Protestants  were  hereafter 
to  be  excluded. 

The  only   question  was  in   what  spirit  the  resistance 
should  be  offered.     The  tie  which  bound  the  Empire  to- 


1596-1607.    Three  Parties  and  Three  Leaders.        i"] 

gether  was  so  loose,  and  resistance  to  law,  \  6.  Protest- 
or  what  was  thought  to  be  law,  was  so  like-  north  and 
ly  to  lead  to  resistance  to  law  in  general,  south- 
that  it  was  the  more  incumbent  on  the  Protestants  to 
choose  their  ground  well.  And  in  Germany,  at  least, 
there  was  not  likely  to  be  any  hasty  provocation  to  give 
Maximilian  an  excuse  for  reclaiming  the  bishoprics. 
Far  removed  from  the  danger,  these  northern  Lutherans 
found  it  difficult  to  conceive  that  there  was  any  real  dan- 
ger at  all.  The  states  of  the  south,  lying  like  a  wedge 
driven  into  the  heart  of  European  Catholicism,  were 
forced  by  their  geographical  position  to  be  ever  on  the 
alert.  They  knew  that  they  were  the  advanced  guard 
of  Protestantism.  On  the  one  flank  was  the  Catholic 
duchy  of  Bavaria,  and  the  bishoprics  of  Wurzburg  and 
Bamberg.  On  the  other  flank  were  the  ecclesiastical 
electorates  on  the  Rhine  and  the  Moselle,  the  bishoprics 
of  Worms,  Spires,  and  Strasburg,  the  Austrian  lands  in 
Swabia  and  Alsace,  and  the  long  line  of  the  Spanish 
frontier  in  Franche  Comte  and  the  Netherlands  garri- 
soned by  the  troops  of  the  first  military  monarchy  in 
Europe.  What  wonder  if  men  so  endangered  were  in 
haste  to  cut  the  knot  which  threatened  to  strangle  them, 
and  to  meet  the  enemy  by  flying  in  his  face  rather  than 
by  awaiting  the  onslaught  which  they  believed  to  be  in- 
evitable. 

Under  the  influence  of  this  feeling  the  princes  of  these 
southern  regions  for  the  most  part  adopted  a  religion 
very  different  from  the  courtly  Lutheranism    , 

?  7-     Spread 

of   the    north.     If  Wurtemberg    continued    of  Calvinism. 
Lutheran  under  the  influence  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Tubingen,  the  rulers  of  the  Palatinate,  of  Hesse 
Cassel,  of  Baden-Durlach,  of  Zwei-Briicken,  sought  for 
strength  in  the  iron  discipline  of  Calvinism,  a  form  of 


1 8         Causes  of  the  Thirty  Years'1   War.   15 96-1 607. 

religion  which  always  came  into  favour  when  there 
was  an  immediate  prospect  of  a  death-struggle  with 
Rome. 

Unhappily,  German  Calvinism  differed  from  that  of 
Scotland  and  the  Netherlands.  Owing  to  its  adoption 
,       c  by  the  princes  rather  than  bythepeople.it 

character  of  failed  in  gaining  that  hardy  growth  which 
Germany.  made  it  invincible  on  its  native  soil.    It  had 

less  of  the  discipline  of  an  army  about  it, 
less  resolute  defiance,  less  strength  altogether.  And 
whilst  it  was  weaker  it  was  more  provocative.  Excluded 
from  the  benefits  of  the  Peace  of  Augsburg,  which  knew 
of  no  Protestant  body  except  the  Lutheran,  the  Calvin- 
ists  were  apt  to  talk  about  the  institutions  of  the  Empire 
in  a  manner  so  disparaging  as  to  give  offence  to  Luther- 
ans and  Catholics  alike. 

Of  this  Calvinist  feeling   Christian  of  Anhalt  became 

the   impersonation.      The   leadership   of  the    Calvinist 

states  in  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth 

j?  9.     Frede- 

rick  IV.,  century  would  naturally  have  devolved   on 

Palatine.  Frederick  IV.,  Elector  Palatine.     But  Fred- 

erick was  an  incapable   drunkard,  and  his 

councillors,  with  Christian  at  their  head,  were  left  to  act 

in  his  name. 
Christian  of  Anhalt  possessed  a  brain  of  inexhaustible 

fertility.     As  soon  as  one  plan  which  he  had  framed  ap- 
peared    impracticable,  he  was   ready  with 

?  10.    Chris-       r  _*;  ,  ,.    ,  /  , 

tian  of  another.     He  was  a  born   diplomatist,  and 

all  the  chief  politicians  of  Europe  were  in- 
timately known  to  him  by  report,  whilst  with  many  of 
them  he  carried  on  a  close  personal  intercourse.  His 
leading  idea  was  that  the  maintenance  of  peace  was 
hopeless,  and  that  either  Protestantism  must  get  rid  of 
the  House  of  Austria,  or  the  House  of  Austria  would  get 


1607.        Three  Parties  and  Three  Leaders.  19 

rid  of  Protestantism.  Whether  this  were  true  or  false,  it 
is  certain  that  he  committed  the  terrible  fault  of  under- 
estimating his  enemy.  Whilst  Maximilian  was  drilling 
soldiers  and  saving  money,  Christian  was  trusting  to 
mere  diplomatic  finesse.  He  had  no  idea  of  the  tena- 
c?*"y  with  which  men  will  cling  to  institutions,  however 
rotten,  till  they  feel  sure  that  some  other  institutions  will 
be  substituted  for  them,  or  of  the  strength  which  Maxi- 
milian derived  from  the  appearance  of  conservatism  in 
which  his  revolutionary  designs  were  shrouded  even 
from  his  own  observation.  In  order  to  give  to  Protes- 
tantism that  development  which  in  Christian's  eyes  was 
necessary  to  its  safety,  it  would  be  needful  to  overthrow 
the  authority  of  the  Emperor  and  of  the  Diet.  And  if 
the  Emperor  and  the  Diet  were  overthrown,  what  had 
Christian  to  offer  to  save  Germany  from  anarchy  ?  If 
his  plan  included,  as  there  is  little  doubt  that  it  did,  the 
seizure  of  the  lands  of  the  neighbouring  bishops,  and  a 
fresh  secularization  of  ecclesiastical  property,  even  Pro- 
testant towns  might  begin  to  ask  whether  their  turn 
would  not  come  next.  A  return  to  the  old  days  of 
private  war  and  the  law  of  the  strongest  would  be 
welcome  to  very  few. 

In  1607  an  event  occurred  which  raised  the  alarm  of 
the  southern  Protestants  to  fever  heat.     In  the  free  city 

of   Donauworth  the  abbot  of  a   monastery 

1607. 
saw  fit  to  send  out  a  procession  to  flaunt  its    ?  n.  The 

banners  in  the  face  of  an  almost"  entirely  of  Donau" 
Protestant  population.  Before  the  starting-  wSrth- 
point  was  regained  mud  and  stones  were  thrown,  and 
some  of  those  who  had  taken  part  in  the  proceedings 
were  roughly  handled.  The  Imperial  Court  (Reich- 
skammergericht) ,  whose  duty  it  was  to  settle  such  quar- 
rels, was  out  of  working  order  in  consequence  of  the 


2o  Causes  of  the  Thirty  Years'   War.  1608. 

religious  disputes ;  but  there  was  an  Imperial  Council 
(Reichshofrath),  consisting  of  nominees  of  the  Emperor, 
and  professing  to  act  out  of  the  plenitude  of  imperial  au- 
thority. By  this  council  Donauworth  was  put  to  the  ban 
of  the  Empire  without  due  form  of  trial,  and  Maximilian 
was  appointed  to  execute  the  decree.  He  at  once 
marched  a  small  army  into  the  place,  and,  taking  pos- 
session of  the  town,  declared  his  intention  of  retaining 
his  hold  till  his  expenses  had  been  paid,  handing  over 
the  parish  church  in  the  meanwhile  to  the  Catholic 
clergy.  It  had  only  been  given  over  to  Protestant  wor- 
ship after  the  date  of  the  Convention  of  Passau,  and 
Maximilian  could  persuade  himself  that  he  was  only 
carrying  out  the  law. 

It  was  a  flagrant  case  of  religious  aggression  under 
the  name  of   the  law.      The  knowledge  that  a  partial 

tribunal  was  ready  to  give  effect  to  the  com- 
a  12.    The        plaints  of  Catholics  at  once  threw  the  great 

Protestant  cities  of  the  South — Nuremberg, 
Ulm,  and  Strasburg  into  the  arms  of  the  neighbouring 
princes  of  whom  they  had  hitherto  been  jealous.  Yet 
there  was  much  in  the  policy  of  those  princes  which 
would  hardly  have  reassured  them.  At  the  Diet  of  1608 
the  representatives  of  the  Elector  Palatine  were  foremost 
in  demanding  that  the  minority  should  not  be  bound  by 
the  majority  in  questions  of  taxation  or  religion  ;  that  is 
to  say,  that  they  should  not  contribute  to  the  common 
defence  unless  they  pleased,  and  that  they  should  not 
be  subject  to  any  regulation  about  ecclesiastical  proper- 
ty unless  they  pleased.  Did  this  mean  only  that  they 
were  to  keep  what  they  had  got,  or  that  they  might  take 
more  as  soon  as  it  was  convenient  ?  The  one  was  the 
Protestant,  the  other  the  Catholic  interpretation  of  their 
theory. 


1609.  Three  Parties  and  Three  Leaders.  21 

On  May  14,  160S,  the  Protestant  Union,  to  which  Lu- 
therans and  Calvinists  were  alike  admitted,  came  into 
existence  under  the  guidance  of  Christian    . 

2  13-      Forma- 

of  Anhalt.     It  was  mainly  composed  of  the    tion  of  the 
princes  and  towns  of  the  south.     Its  ostensi- 
ble purpose  was  for  self-defence,  and  in  this  sense  it  was 
accepted   by  most  of  those   who   took   part   in   it.     Its 
leaders  had  very  different  views. 

A  Catholic  League  was  at  once  formed  under  Maximi- 
lian. It  was  composed  of  a  large  number  of  bishops 
and  abbots,  who  believed  that  the  princes    . 

.  .  §  14.      Forma- 

of  the  Union  wished  to  annex  their  territo-  tion  of  the 
ries.  Maximilian's  ability  gave  it  a  unity 
of  action  which  the  Union  never  possessed.  It,  too,  was 
constituted  for  self-defence,  but  whether  that  word  was 
to  include  the  resumption  of  the  lands  lost  since  the 
Convention  of  Passau  was  a  question  probably  left  for 
circumstances  to  decide. 

Whatever  the  majority  of  the  princes  of  the  Union 
may  have  meant,  there  can  be  no  doubt  §  15.  Revoiu- 
that  Christian  of  Anhalt  meant  aggression,  c^ofthe 
He  believed  that  the  safety  of  Protestantism  Uoion. 
could  not  be  secured  without  the  overthrow  of  the  Ger- 
man branch  of  the  House  of  Austria,  and  he  was  san- 
guine enough  to  fancy  that  an  act  which  would  call  up 
all  Catholic  Europe  in  arms  against  him  was  a  very  easy 
undertaking. 

Scarcely  had  the  Union  been   formed  when   events 

occurred  which  aknost  dragged  Germ-any  into  war.     In 

the  spring  of  1609  the  Duke  of  Cleves  died. 

1609. 
The  Elector  of  Brandenburg  and  the  son  of  §16.  The  sue 

the  Duke  of  Neuburg  laid  claim  to  the  sue-   cieves!  ° 

cession.     On  the  plea  that  the  Emperor  had 

the  right  to  settle  the  point,  a  Catholic  army  advanced 


3  2  Causes  of  the  Thirty  Years'   War.  1612. 

to  take  possession  of  the  country.     The  two  pretenders, 

both  of  them  Lutherans,  made  common  cause  against 

the  invaders.     Henry  IV.  of  France  found 
1610.  .  J 

in  the  dispute  a  pretext  for  commencing  his 

long-meditated  attack  upon  Spain  and  her  allies.     But 

his  life  was  cut  short  by  an  assassin,  and  his  widow  only 

thought  of  sending  a  small  French  force  to  join  the 

English  and  the  Dutch  in  maintaining  the  claims  of  the 

two  princes,  who  were  ready  to  unite  for  a  time  against 

a  third  party. 

It  was  not  easy  to  bring  the  princes  to  an  arrangement 
/t>r  the  future.  One  day  the  young  Prince  of  Neuburg 
proposed  what  seemed  to  him  an  excellent 
$17.  Vhe  box  way  out  of  the  difficulty.  '  He  was  ready,' 
on  the  ear.  ke  saj  j)  <  to  maiTy  the  Elector's  daughter, 
if  only  he  might  have  the  territory.'  Enraged  at  the 
impudence  of  the  proposal,  the  Elector  raised  his  hand 
and  boxed  his  young  rival's  ears.  The  blow  had  unex- 
pected consequences.  The  injured  prince  renounced  his 
Protestantism,  and  invoked,  as  a  good  Catholic,  the  aid 
of  Spain  and  the  League.  The  Elector  passed  from 
Lutheranism  to  Calvinism,  and  took  a  more  active  part 
than  before  in  the  affairs  of  the  Union.  That  immediate 
war  in  Germany  did  not  result  from  the  quarrel  is  proba- 
bly the  strongest  possible  evidence  of  the  reluctance  of 
the  German  people  to  break  the  peace. 

The  third  party,  the  German  Lutherans,  looked  with 
equal  abhorrence  upon  aggression  on  either  side.  Their 
leader,  John  George,  Elector  of  Saxony,  stood 
?i8.  John  aloof  alike  from  Christian  of  Anhalt,  and 
tor°o7saxony.  from  Maximilian  of  Bavaria.  He. was  at- 
tached by  the  traditions  of  his  house  as  well 
as  by  his  own  character  to  the  Empire  and  the  House 
of  Austria.     But  he  was  anxious  to  obtain  security  for 


1 613.  Three  parties  and  three  Leaders.  23 

his  brother  Protestants.  He  saw  there  must  be  a  change ; 
but  he  wisely  desired  to  make  the  change  as  slight  as 
possible.  In  1612,  therefore,  he  proposed  that  the  high- 
est jurisdiction  should  still  be  retained  by  the  Imperial 
Council,  but  that  the  Council,  though  still  nominated  by 
the  Emperor,  should  contain  an  equal  number  of  Catho- 
lics and  Protestants.  Sentences  such  as  that  which  had 
deprived  Donauworth  of  its  civil  rights  would  be  in  future 
impossible. 

Unhappily,  John  George  had  not  the  gift  of  ruling 
men.     He  was  a  hard  drinker  and  a  bold  huntsman,  but 
to  convert  his  wishes  into  actual  facts  was    . 
beyond  his  power.     When  he  saw  his  plan    weakness  of 
threatened  with  opposition  on  either  side  he 
left  it  to  take  care  of  itself.     In  161 3  a  Diet  met,  and 
broke  up  in  confusion,  leaving  matters  in  such  a  state 
that  any  spark  might  give  rise  to  a  general  confla- 
gration* 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   BOHEMIAN   REVOLUTION. 

Section  I. —  The  Hottse  of  Austria  and  its  Subjects. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth  century  the  domi- 
nions of  the  German  branch  of  the  House  of  Austria  were 

parcelled  out  amongst  the  various  descen- 
Austrian  dants  of  Ferdinand  I.,  the  brother  of  Charles 

V.  The  head  of  the  family,  the  Emperor 
Rudolph  II.,  was  Archduke  of  Austria — a  name  which  in 
those  days  was  used  simply  to  indicate  the  archduchy 
itself,  and  not  the  group  of  territories  which  are  at  pre- 
sent ruled  over  by  the  Austrian  sovereign — and  he  was 
also  King  of  Bohemia  and  of  Hungary.  His  brothel 
Maximilian  governed  Tyrol,  and  his  cousin  Ferdinand 
ruled  in  Styria,  Carinthia,  and  Carniola. 

The  main  difficulty  of  government  arose  from  the  fact 
that  whilst  every  member  of  the  family  clung  firmly  to 

the  old  creed,  the  greater  part  of  the  no- 

#  2.     Ans-  °  r  r 

tocracyand        pulation,  excepting  in  Tyrol,  had  adopted 

Protestantism.      ,,  ,  .  ..      .  ., 

the  new ;  that  is  to  say,  that  on  the  great 
question  of  the  day  the  subjects  and  the  rulers  had  no 
thoughts  in  common.  And  this  difficulty  was  aggravated 
by  the  further  fact  that  Protestantism  prospered  mainly 
from  the  support  given  to  it  by  a  powerful  aristocracy,  so 
that  political  disagreement  was  added  to  the  difference 
in  religion.  Ferdinand  had,  indeed,  contrived  to  put 
down  with  a  strong  hand  the  exercise  of  Protestantism 
in  his  own  dominions  so  easily  as  almost  to  suggest  the 
inference  that  it  had  not  taken  very  deep  root  in  those 
Alpine  regions.  But  Rudolph  was  quite  incapable  of 
24 


1609^     The  House  of  Austria  and  its  Subjects.         25 

following  his  example.     If  not  absolutely  insane,  he  was 

subject  to  sudden  outbursts  of  temper,  proceeding  from 

mental  disease. 

In    1606,  a  peace  having  been   concluded  with   the 

f  urks,  Rudolph  fancied  that  his  hands  were  at  last  free 

to  deal  with  his  subjects  as  Ferdinand  had 

J  1606 

dealt  with  his.     The  result  was  a  general   \  3.    Rudolph 

uprising,  and  if  Rudolph's  brother  Matthias 

had  not  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  the  movement,  in 

order  to  save  the  interests  of  the  family,  some  stranger 

would  probably  have  been  selected  as  a  rival  to  the 

princes  of  the  House  of  Austria. 

In  the  end,  two  years  later,  Austria  and  Hungary  were 
assigned  to  Matthias,  whilst  Bohemia,  Moravia  and 
Silesia  were  left  to  Rudolph  for  his  lifetime. 

The  result   of  Rudolph's   ill-advised   energy  was  to 

strengthen   the  hands   of   the   Protestant   nobility.     In 

Hungary  the  Turks  were  too  near  to  make 

.  1609. 

it  easy  for  Matthias  to  refuse  concessions  to   a  4.    The 

a  people  who  might,  at  any  time,  throw  0f°Bohemi" e* 
themselves  into  the  arms  of  the  enemy,  and 
in  Austria  he  was  driven,  after  some  resistance,  to  agree 
to  a  compromise.  In  Bohemia,  in  1609,  the  Estates  ex- 
torted from  Rudolph  the  Royal  Charter  {Majesiatsbrief) 
which  guaranteed  freedom  of  conscience  to  every  inha- 
bitant of  Bohemia,  as  long  as  he  kept  to  certain  recognised 
creeds.  Bnt  freedom  of  conscience  did  not  by  any 
means  imply  freedom  of  worship.  A  man  might  think 
as  he  pleased,  but  the  building  of  churches  and  the  per-, 
formance  of  divine  service  were  matters  for  the  authori- 
ties to  decide  upon.  The  only  question  was,  who  the 
authorities  were. 

By  the  Royal  Charter  this  authority  was  given  over  to 
members  of  the  Estates,  that  is  to  say,  to  about  1,400  of 


26  7 he  Bohemian  Revolution.  1609. 

the  feudal  aristocracy  and  42  towns.     In  an  agreement 

attached  to  the  charter,  a  special  exception  was  made  for 

„    .  .        the  royal  domains.    A  Protestant  landowner 

$  5.     Position  J 

of  the  land-        could  and  would  prohibit  the  erection  of  a 
Catholic  church  on  his  own  lands,  but  the 

king  was  not  to  have  that  privilege.     On  his  domains 

worship  was  to  be  free. 

From  this  bondage,  as  he  counted  it,  Rudolph  strug- 
gled  to   liberate   himself.      There   was   fresh    violence, 
ending  in  161 1  in  Rudolph's  dethronement 

tiies  to  get        in  favour  of  Matthias,  who  thus  became  king 
of  Bohemia.     The  next  year  he  died,  and 

Matthias  succeeded  him  as  Emperor  also. 

During  all   these  troubles,    Christian   of  Anhalt  had 

done  all  that  he  could  to  frustrate  a  peaceful  settlement. 

,       „,  .   .       '  When    Hungary,    Moravia,    Austria,  and 

jf  7.     Christian        _  °      ' 

of  Anhalt  Silesia  are  on  our  side,'  he  explained.be- 

generai  fore  the  Royal  Charter  had  been  granted,  to 

confusion.  &    diplomatist    in    his    employment,    '  the 

House  of  Hapsburg  will  have  no  further  strength  to  re 
sist  us,  except  in  Bohemia,  Bavaria,  and  a  few  bishop- 
rics. Speaking  humanly,  we  shall  be  strong  enough  not 
only  to  resist  these,  but  to  reform  all  the  clergy,  and 
bring  them  into  submission  to  our  religion.  The  game 
will  begin  in  this  fashion.  As  soon  as  Bavaria  arms  to 
use  compulsion  against  Austria,'  (that  is  to  say,  against 
the  Austrian  Protestants,  who  were  at  that  time  resisting 
Matthias)  '  we  shall  arm  to  attack  Bavaria,  and  retake 
Donauworth.  In  the  same  way,  we  shall  get  hold  of 
two  or  three  bishops  to  supply  us  with  money.  Cer- 
tainly, it  seems  that  by  proceeding  dexterously  we  shall 
give  the  law  to  all,  and  set  up  for  rulers  whom  we  will.' 
For  the  time  Christian  was  disappointed.  The  do- 
minions of  Matthias  settled  down  into  quietness.     But 


(6i  7-      The  House  of  Austria  and  its  Subjects.         27 

Matthias  was  preparing  another  opportunity  for  his  an- 
tagonist.    Whether  it  would  have  been  possible  in  those 
days  for  a  Catholic  king  to  have  kept  a  Protestant  nation 
in  working  order  we  cannot  say.      At  all 
events,  Matthias   did  not  give  the  experi-    thias  King  of 

r  .         .1TT,..  ..        ,  .       Bohemia. 

ment  a  fair  trial.  He  did  not,  indeed,  attack 
the  Royal  Charter  directly  on  the  lands  of  the  aristocracy. 
But  he  did  his  best  to  undermine  it  on  his  own.  The 
Protestants  of  Braunau,  on  the  lands  of  the  Abbot  of 
Braunau  and  the  Protestants  of  Klostergrab,  on  the 
lands  of  the  Archbishop  of  Prague,  built  churches  for 
themselves,  the  use  of  which  was  prohibited  by  the  abbot 
and  the  archbishop.  A  dispute  immediately  arose  as  to 
the  rights  of  ecclesiastical  landowners,  and  it  was  ar- 
gued on  the  Protestant  side,  that  their  lands  were  tech- 
nically Crown  lands,  and  that  they  had  therefore  no 
right  to  close  the  churches.  Matthias  took  the  opposite 
view. 

On  his  own  estates  Matthias  found  means  to  evade 
the  charter.  He  appointed  Catholic  priests  to  Protes- 
tant churches,  and  allowed  measures  to  be    . 

2  9.     He 

taken  to  compel  Protestants  to  attend  the  evades  the 
Catholic  service.  Yet  for  a  long  time  the 
Protestant  nobility  kept  quiet.  Matthias  was  old  and 
infirm,  and  when  he  died  they  would,  as  they  supposed, 
have  an  opportunity  of  choosing  their  next  king,  and  it 
was  generally  believed  that  the  election  would  fall  upon 
a  Protestant.  The  only  question  was  whether  the  Elec- 
tor Palatine  or  the  Elector  of  Saxony  would  be  chosen. 

Suddenly,  in  1617,  the   Bohemian    Diet 
was  summoned.     When  the  Estates  of  the  l6 

kingdom  met  they  were  told  that  it  was  a   ? IO-,  *"«■<«- 

0  '  nana  pro- 

mistake  to   suppose  that  the  crown  of  Bo-    posed  as  king 

,  .  ,        .  „    .  .  of  Bohemia. 

hernia  was   elective.      Evidence   was   pro- 


2 8  The  Bohemian  Revolution.  1617. 

duced  that  for  some  time  before  the  election  of  Matthias 
the  Estates  had  acknowledged  the  throne  to  be  heredi- 
tary, and  the  precedent  of  Matthias  was  to  be  set  aside 
as  occurring  in  revolutionary  times.  Intimidation  was 
used  to  assist  the  argument,  and  men  in  the  confidence 
of  the  court  whispered  in  the  ears  of  those  who  refused 
to  be  convinced  that  it  was  to  be  hoped  that  they  had  at 
least  two  heads  on  their  shoulders. 

If  ever  there  was  a  moment  for  resistance,  if  resist- 
ance was  to  be  made  at  all,  it  was  this.  The  arguments 
of  the  court  were  undoubtedly  strong,  but  a 
Bohemians  skilful  lawyer  could  easily  have  found  tech- 
him'aTthefr6  nicalities  on  the  other  side,  and  the  real 
king.  evasion  of   the  Royal  Charter  might  have 

been  urged  as  a  reason  why  the  court  had  no  right  to 
press  technical  arguments  too  closely.  The  danger  was 
all  the  greater  as  it  was  known  that  by  the  renunciation 
of  all  intermediate  heirs  the  hereditary  right  fell  upon 
Ferdinand  of  Styria,  the  man  who  had  already  stamped 
Protestantism  out  in  his  own  dominions.  Yet,  in  spite 
of  this,  the  Diet  did  as  it  was  bidden,  and  renounced  the 
right  of  election  by  acknowledging  Ferdinand  as  their 
hereditary  king. 

The  new  king  was  more  of  a  devotee  and  less  of  a 
statesman  than  Maximilian  of  Bavaria,  his  cousin  on  his 
»  I2  His  mother's  side.  But  their  judgments  of  events 
character.  were  formed  on  the  same  lines.     Neither 

of  them  were  mere  ordinary  bigots,  keeping  no  faith 
with  heretics.  But  they  were  both  likely  to  be  guided 
in  their  interpretation  of  the  law  by  that  which  they 
conceived  to  be  profitable  to  their  church.  Ferdinand 
was  personally  brave ;  but  except  when  his  course  was 
very  clear  before  him,  he  was  apt  to  let  difficulties  settle 
themselves  rather  than  come  to  a  decision. 


ioiS.  The  Revolution  at  Prague.  29 

He  had  at  once  to  consider  whether  he  would  swear 
to  the  Royal  Charter.     He  consulted  the  Jesuits,  and 
was  told  that,  though  it  had  been  a  sin  to  grant  it,  it 
was  no  sin  to  accept  it  now  that  it  was  the  law  of  the 
land.      As  he  walked  in   state  to   his   coronation,  he 
turned  to  a  nobleman  who  was  by  his  side.    . 
'  I  am  glad,'  he  said,  '  that  I  have  attained   takes  the 
the  Bohemian  crown  without  any  pangs  of    Royal 
conscience.'      He  took    the    oath    without   Charter- 
further  difficulty. 

The  Bohemians  were  not  long  in  feeling  the  effects  of 
the  change.  Hitherto  the  hold  of  the  House  of  Austria 
upon  the  country  had  been  limited  to  the  life  of  one  old 
man.  It  had  now,  by  the  admission  of  the  Diet  itself, 
fixed  itself  for  ever  upon  Bohemia.  The  proceedings 
against  the  Protestants  on  the  royal  domains  assumed  a 
sharper  character.  The  Braunau  worshippers  were 
rigorously  excluded  from  their  church.  The  walls  of 
the  new  church  of  Klostergrab  were  actually  levelled 
with  the  ground. 

Section  II. —  Hie  Revolution  at  Prague. 
The  Bohemians  had  thus  to  resist  in  1618,  under  every 
disadvantage,  the  attack  which  they  had  done  nothing 
to  meet  in    1617.     Certain    persons   named 
Defensors  had,  by  law,  the  right  of  sum-    ji.    The 

t  ,  r  ,     . .  j.     Bohemians 

moning  an  assembly  of  representatives  of    petition 
the  Protestant  Estates.     Such  an  assembly    Matthias, 
met  on  March  5,  and  having    prepared  a  petition  to 
Matthias,  who  was  absent  from  the  kingdom,  adjourned 
to  May  21. 

Long  before  the  time  of  meeting  came,  an  answer  was 
sent  from  Matthias  justifying  all  that  had  been  done, 
and  declaring  the  assembly  illegal.    It  was  believed  at 


30  The  Bohoytian  Revolution.  1618. 

I  2.  Reply  of  ^e  time,  though  incorrectly,  that  the  answer 
Matthias.  was   prepared   by   Slawata   and   Martinitz, 

two  members  of  the  regency  who  had  been  notorious 
for  the  vigour  of  their  opposition  to  Protestantism. 

In  the  Protestant  assembly  there  was  a  knot  of  men, 
headed  by  Count  Henry  of  Thurn,  which  was  bent  on 

the  dethronement  of  Ferdinand.  They  re- 
counse'u.ent        solved   to   take   advantage  of  the   popular 

feeling  to  effect  the  murder  of  the  two  re- 
gents, and  so  to  place  an  impassable  gulf  between  the 
nation  and  the  king. 

Accordingly,  on  the  morning  of  Mav  23,  the  '  begin- 
ning and  cause,'   as  a  contemporary  calls  it,   '  of  all  the 

coming  evil,'  the  first  day,  though  men  as 
nitz  and  Sla-  yet  knew  it  not,  of  thirty  years  of  war, 
out  of  vrifr"  Thurn  sallied  forth  at  the  head  of  a  band  o\ 
dow'  noblemen  and  their  followers,  all  of  them 

with  arms  in  their  hands.  Trooping  into  the  room  where 
the  regents  were  seated,  they  charged  the  obnoxious  two 
with  being  the  authors  of  the  king's  reply.  After  a  bitter 
altercation  both  Martinitz  and  Slawata  were  dragged  to 
a  window  which  overlooked  the  fosse  below  from  a  dizzy 
height  of  some  seventy  feet.  Martinitz,  struggling 
against  his  enemies,  pleaded  hard  for  a  confessor. 
'  Commend  thy  soul  to  God,'  was  the  stern  answer. 
'  Shall  we  allow  the  Jesuit  scoundrels  to  come  here  ?  ' 
In  an  instant  he  was  hurled  out,  crying,  "Jesus,  Mary  ! ' 
'  Let  us  see,"  said  some  one  mockingly,  '  Whether  his 
Mary  will  help  him."  A  moment  later  he  added  :  "  By 
God,  his  Mary  has  helped  him."  Slawata  followed, 
and  then  the  secretary  Fabricius.  By  a  wonderful  pre- 
servation, in  which  pious  Catholics  discerned  the  pro- 
tecting hand  of  God,  all  three  crawled  away  from  the 
spot  without  serious  hurt. 


1618.  The  Revolution  at  Prague.  31 

There  are  moments  when  the  character  of  a  nation  or 
party   stands  revealed   as    by  a   lightning 
flash,  and  this  was  one  of  them.     It  is  not   beginning, 
in  such  a  way  as  this  that  successful  revolu- 
tions are  begun. 

The  first  steps  to  constitute  a  new  government  were 
easy.  Thirty  Directors  were  appointed,  and  the  Jesuits 
were  expelled  from  Bohemia.   The  Diet  met   .     „,, 

.  .  ?  6.  The  re- 

and  ordered  soldiers  to  be  levied  to  form  an  voiutionary 
army.  But  to  support  this  army  money  governmen 
wo_uld  be  needed,  and  the  existing  taxes  were  insuffi- 
cient. A  loan  was  accordingly  thought  of,  and  the 
nobles  resolved  to  request  the  towns  to  make  up  the 
sum,  they  themselves  contributing  nothing.  The  pro- 
ject falling  dead  upon  the  resistance  of  the  towns,  new 
taxes  were  voted  ;  but  no  steps  were  taken  to  collect 
them,  and  the  army  was  left  to  depend  in  a  great  mea- 
sure upon  chance. 

Would  the  princes  of  Germany  come  to  the  help  of 
the  Directors  ?  John  George  of  Saxony  told  them  that 
he  deeply  sympathized  with  them,  but  that    „       M 

...  .  9.  7-     The 

rebellion  was  a  serious  matter.  To  one  who  Elector  of 
asked  him  what  he  meant  to  do,  he  replied,  wt^h^yf0r 
'  Help  to  put  out  the  fire.'  Peace- 

There  was  more  help  for  them  at  Heidelberg  than  at 
Dresden.     Frederick  IV.  had  died  in   1610,  and  his  son, 
the  young  Frederick  V.,  looked  up  to  Chris- 
tian  of  Anhalt  as  the  first  statesman  of  his    Elector  Pala- 
age.     By  his  marriage  with   Elizabeth,  the    outhopes  of 
daughter  of  James  I.  of  England,  he  had    assistance- 
contracted  an  alliance  which  gave  him  the  appearance 
rather  than  the  reality  of  strength.     He  offered  every 
encouragement  to  the  Bohemians,  but  for  the  time  held 
back  from  giving  them  actual  assistance. 


5  2  The  Bohemian  Revolution.  1618. 

Section  III. —  The  War  in  Bohemia. 

The  Directors  were  thus  thrown  on  their  own  re- 
sources. Ferdinand  had  secured  his  elec- 
ofwar."  tion  as  king  of  Hungary,  and,  returning  to 

Vienna,  had  taken  up  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment in  the  name  of  Matthias.  He  had  got  together  an 
army  of  14,000  men,  under  the  command  of  Bucquoi, 
an  officer  from  the  great  school  of  military  art  in  the 
Netherlands,  and  on  August  13,  the  Bohemian  frontier 
was  invaded.  War  could  hardly  be  avoided  by  either 
side.  Budweis  and  Pilsen,  two  Catholic  towns  in  Bo- 
hemia, naturally  clung  to  their  sovereign,  and  as  soon 
as  the  Directors  ordered  an  attack  upon  Budweis,  the 
troops  of  Matthias  prepared  to  advance  to  its  succour. 

The  Directors  took  alarm,  and  proposed  to  the   Diet 

that  new  taxes  should  be  raised  and  not  merely  voted, 

„,    _,       and  that,  in  addition  to  the  army  of  regular 

3  2.     The  Bo-  .  '  ° 

hemians  vote  soldiers,  there  should  be  a  general  levy  of  a 
ject 'to  paying  large  portion  of  the  population.  To  the 
taxes.  jeVy  ^g  r^jet  consented  without  difficulty. 

But  before  the  day  fixed  for  discussing  the  proposed 
taxes  arrived,  the  majority  of  the  members  deliberately 
returned  to  their  homes,  and  no  new  taxes  were  to  be  had. 

This  day,  August  30,  may  fairly  be  taken  as  the  date 

of  the  political  suicide  of  the  Bohemian  aristocracy.     In 

almost  every  country  in   Europe  order  was 

are  not  likely      maintained    by    concentrating     the     chief 

1  ""'"''  powers  of  the  State  in  the  hands  of  a  single 

governor,  whether  he  were  called  king,  duke,  or  elector. 
To  this  rule  there  were  exceptions  in  Venice,  Switzer- 
land, and  the  Netherlands,  and  by-and-by  there  would 
be  an  exception  on  a  grander  scale  in  England.  But 
the  peoples  who  formed  these  exceptions  had  proved 


j6iS.  The  War  in  Bohemia.  33 

themselves  worthy  of  the  distinction,  and  there  would  be 
no  room  in  the  world  for  men  who  had  got  rid  of  their 
king  without  being  able  to  establish  order  upon  anothel 
basis. 

Still  there  were  too  many  governments  in  Europe  hos- 
tile to  the  House  of  Austria  to  allow  the  Bo-  3  4.  Help 
hemians  to  fall  at  once.  Charles  Em-  irom  &ilvo*- 
manuel,  Duke  of  Savoy,  had  just  brought  a  war  with 
Spain  to  a  close,  but  he  had  not  become  any  better  dis- 
posed towards  his  late  adversary.  He  accordingly  en- 
tered into  an  agreement  with  the  leaders  of  the  Union, 
by  which  2,000  men  who  had  been  raised  for  his  service 
were  to  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Bohemian  Di- 
rectors. 

The  commander  of  these  troops  was  Count  Ernest  of 
Mansfeld,  an  illegitimate  son  of  a  famous  general  in 
the  service  of  Spain.  He  had  changed  his  3  5.  Mans- 
religion  and  deserted  his  king.  He  now  eld- 
put  himself  forward  as  a  champion  of  Protestantism. 
He  was  brave,  active,  and  versatile,  and  was  possessed 
of  those  gifts  which  win  the  confidence  of  professional 
soldiers.  But  he  was  already  notorious  for  the  readiness 
with  which  he  allowed  his  soldiers  to  support  themselves 
on  the  most  unbridled  pillage.  An  adventurer  himself, 
he  was  just  the  man  to  lead  an  army  of  adventurers. 

Soon  after  his  arrival  in  Bohemia,  Mansfeld  was  em- 
ployed in  the  siege  of  Pilsen,  whilst  Thurn  was  occupied 
with  holding  Bucquoi  in  check.  The  failure  »  6  ^  forced 
in  obtaining  additional  taxes  had  led  the  'oan- 
Directors  to  adopt  the  simple  expedient  of  levying  a 
forced  loan  from  the  few  rich. 

For  a  time  this  desperate  expedient  was  successful. 
The  help  offered  to  Ferdinand  by  Spain  was  not  great, 
and  it  was  long  in  coming.     The  prudent  Maximilian  ve> 


34  The  Bohemian  Revolution.  16  tj. 

fused  to  ruin  himself  by  engaging  in  an  ap- 
oftheBo-  parently  hopeless  cause.     At  last  the  Silc* 

'  sians,   who   had  hesitated   long,   threw   in 

their  lot  with  their  neighbours,  and  sent  their  troops  to 
their  help  early  in  November.  Bucquoi  was  in  full  re- 
treat to  Budweis.  On  the  21st  Pilsen  surrendered  to 
Mansfeld.  Further  warfare  was  stopped  as  winter  came 
on — a  terrible  winter  for  the  unhappy  dwellers  in 
Southern  Bohemia.  Starving  armies  are  not  particular 
in  their  methods  of  supplying  their  wants.  Plunder,  de- 
vastation and  reckless  atrocities  of  every  kind  fell  to  the 
lot  of  the  doomed  peasants,  Bucquoi's  Hungarians  being 
conspicuous  for  barbarity. 

Meanwhile,  Christian  of  Anhalt  was  luring  on  the 
young  Elector  Palatine  to  more  active  intervention.  The 
.  _     _  ,  Bohemian  leaders  had  already  beeun  to  talk 

{J  8.     Scheme  .  J         ° 

of  christian  of  placing  the  crown  on  Frederick's  head. 
Frederick,  anxious  and  undecided,  consent- 
ed on  the  one  hand,  at  the  Emperor's  invitation,  to  join 
the  Duke  of  Bavaria  and  the  Electors  of  Mentz  and 
Saxony  in  mediating  an  arangement,  whilst,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  gave  his  assent  to  an  embassy  to  Turin,  the 
object  of  which  was  to  dazzle  the  Duke  of  Savoy  with 
the  prospect  of  obtaining  the  imperial  crown  after  the 
death  of  Matthias,  and  to  urge  him  to  join  in  an  attack 
upon  the  German  dominions  of  the  House  of  Austria. 

The  path  on  which   Frederick  was  entering  was  the 

more  evidently  unsafe,  as  the  Union,  which  met  at  Hcil- 

_    ,  bronn  in  September,  had  shown  great  cool- 

\<).     Coolness  ,        *  _,     .     .  c 

of  the  ness  in  the  Bohemian  cause.     Christian  of 

Anhalt  had  not  ventured  even  to  hint  at  the 
projects  which  he  entertained.  If  Vie  was  afterwards  de- 
serted by  the  Union  he  could  not  say  that  its  members 
as  a  body  had  engaged  to  support  him 


1619.  Ferdinand  on  his  Defence.  35 

The  Duke  of  Savoy,  on  the  other  hand,  at  least  talked 
as  if  the  Austrian  territories  were  at  his  feet.  In  August 
1618  he  had  given  his  consent  to  the  pro-  l6l„ 

posed  elevation  of  Frederick  to  the  Bohe-  ^^  ^eavoy 
mian  throne.  In  February  1619  he  ex-  gives  hopes, 
plained  that  he  wished  to  have  Bohemia  for  himself. 
Frederick  might  be  compensated  with  the  Austrian  lands 
in  Alsace  and  Swabia.  He  might,  perhaps,  have  the 
Archduchy  of  Austria  too,  or  become  King  of  Hungary. 
If  he  wished  to  fall  upon  the  bishops'  lands,  let  him  do  it 
quickly,  before  the  Pope  had  time  to  interfere.  This 
sort  of  talk,  wild  as  it  was,  delighted  the  little  circle  of 
Frederick's  confidants.  The  Margrave  of  Anspach,  who, 
as  general  of  the  army  of  the  Union,  was  admitted  into 
the  secret,  was  beyond  measure  pleased :  '  We  have  now,' 
he  said,  '  the  means  of  upsetting  the  world.' 

For  the  present,  these  negotiations  were  veiled  in 
secresy.      They   engendered    a     confident    „ 

.  .  1  xr-     Conser- 

levity,  which  was  certain  to  shock  that  con-   vative  feeling 
servative,   peace-loving  feeling  which   the 
Bohemians  had  already  done  much  to  alienate. 

Section  IV. — Ferdinand  on  his  Defence. 
If  the  assistance  of  the  Union  was  thus  likely  to  do 
more  harm  than  good  to  the  Bohemians,  their  hopes  of 
aid  from  other  powers  were  still  more  delu-  a  1.  The  Bo- 
sive.  The  Dutch,  indeed,  sent  something,  fejdnfr0mk 
and  would  willingly  have  sent  more,  but  they  fore'gn  powers, 
had  too  many  difficulties  at  home  to  be  very  profuse  in 
their  offers.  James  of  England  told  his  son-in-law 
plainly  that  he  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  any  en- 
croachment upon  the  rights  of  others,  and  he  had  under- 
taken at  the  instigation  of  Spain  a  formal  mediation 
between   the  Bohemians  and  their  king — a  mediation 


36  The  Bohemian  Revolution.  1619. 

which  had  been  offered  him  merely  in  order  to  keep  his 
hands  tied  whilst  others  were  arming. 

On  March  20,  before  the  next  campaign  opened, 
Matthias  died.  Ferdinand's  renewed  promises  to  respect 
the  Royal  Charter — made  doubtless  under 
upon  Vienna.  tne  reservation  of  putting  his  own  interpreta- 
tion upon  the  disputed  points — were  rejected 
with  scorn  by  the  Directors.  The  sword  was  to  decide 
the  quarrel.  With  the  money  received  from  the  Dutch, 
and  with  aid  in  money  and  munitions  of  war  from  Hei- 
delberg, Thurn  and  Mansfeld  were  enabled  to  take  the 
field.  The  latter  remained  to  watch  Bucquoi,  whilst  the 
former  undertook  to  win  the  other  territories,  which  had 
hitherto  submitted  to  Matthias,  and  had  stood  aloof  from 
the  movement  in  Bohemia.  Without  much  difficulty  he 
succeeded  in  revolutionizing  Moravia,  and  he  arrived  on 
June  5  under  the  walls  of  Vienna.  Within  was  Ferdi- 
nand himself,  with  a  petty  garrison  of  300  men,  and  as 
many  volunteers  as  he  could  attach  to  his  cause.  Thurn 
hoped  that  his  partisans  inside  the  cities  would  open  the 
gates  to  admit  him.  But  he  lost  time  in  negotiations 
with  the  Austrian  nobility.  The  estates  of  the  two  terri- 
tories of  Upper  and  Lower  Austria  were  to  a  great  extent 
Protestant,  and  they  had  refused  to  do  homage  to  Fer- 
dinand on  the  death  of  Matthias.  The  Lower  Austrian? 
now  sent  a  deputation  to  Vienna  to  demand  permission 
to  form  a  confederation  with  the  Bohemians,  on  terms, 
which  would  practically  have  converted  the  whole  coun- 
try, from  the  Styrian  frontier  to  the  borders  of  Silesia, 
into  a  federal  aristocratic  republic. 

In  Ferdinand  they  had  to  do  with  a  man  who  was 
not  to  be  overawed  by  personal  danger.  He  knew  well 
that  by  yielding  he  would  be  giving  a  legal  basis  to  a 
system  which  he  regarded  as  opposed  to  all  law,  human 


1 6 1 9 .  Ferdinand  on  his  Defence.  3  7 

and  divine.      Throwing  himself  before  the    . 

b  I  3.     Ferdi- 

crucifix,  he  found  strength  for  the  conflict    nand  resists 
into  which  he  entered  on  behalf  of  his  fami-   of'theTower 
ly,  his  church,  and,  as  he  firmly  believed,    ^fac^n 
of  his  country  and  his  God — strength  none 
the  less  real  because  the  figure  on  the  cross  did  not,  as 
men  not  long  afterwards  came  fondly  to  believe,  bow 
its  head    towards  the  suppliant,  or  utter  the  consoling 
words:  '  Ferdinand,  I  will  not  forsake  thee.' 

To  a  deputation  from  the  Austrian  Estates  he  was  firm 
and  unbending.  They  might  threaten  as  they  pleased, 
but  the  confederation  with  Bohemia  he  would  not  sign. 
Rougher  and  rougher  grew  the  menaces  addressed  to 
him.  Some  one,  it  is  said,  talked  of  de-  g  4  Rescue 
throning  him  and  of  educating  his  children  arnves- 
in  the  Protestant  religion.  Suddenly  the  blare  of  a 
trumpet  was  heard  in  the  court  below.  A  regiment  of 
horse  had  slipped  in  through  a  gate  unguarded  by 
Thurn,  and  had  hurried  to  Ferdinand's  defence.  The 
deputation,  lately  so  imperious,  slunk  away,  glad  enough 
to  escape  punishment. 

Little  would  so  slight  a  reinforcement  have  availed  if 
Thurn  had  been  capable  of  assaulting  the  city.  But,  un- 
provided with  stores  of  food  or  siege  muni-  3  .  The 
tions,  he  had  counted  on  treason  within.  siese  raised. 
Disappointed  of  his  prey,  he  returned  to  Bohemia,  to 
find  that  Bucquoi  had  broken  out  of  Budweis,  and  had 
inflicted  a  serious  defeat  on  Mansfeld. 

Ferdinand  did   not  linger  at  Vienna  to  dispute  his 

rghts  with  his  Austrian  subjects.     The  election  of  a  new 

Emperor  was  to  take  place  at   Frankfort,    .        „, 
,    .  .  .  -  ?•  6    The 

and  it  was  of  importance  to  him  to  be  on  imperial 
the  spot.  To  the  German  Protestants  the  e  ec  10n- 
transfer  of  the  Imperial  crown  to  his  head  could  not  be 


38  The  Bohemian  Revolution.  1619. 

a  matter  of  indifference.  If  he  succeeded,  as  there 
seemed  every  probability  of  his  succeeding,  in  re-estab- 
lishing his  authority  over  Bohemia,  he  would  weigh  with 
a  far  heavier  weight  than  Matthias  upon  the  disputes  by 
which  Germany  was  distracted.  The  Elector  Palatine 
and  his  councillors  had  a  thousand  schemes  for  getting 
rid  of  him,  without  fixing  upon  any.  John  George  of 
Saxony,  in  1619  as  in  161 2,  had  a  definite  plan  to  pro- 
pose. Ferdinand,  he  said,  was  not  in  possession  of 
Bohemia,  and  could  not,  therefore,  vote  as  King  of  Bo- 
hemia at  the  election.  The  election  must,  therefore,  be 
postponed  till  the  Bohemian  question  had  been  settled 
by  mediation.  If  only  the  three  Protestant  electors 
could  have  been  brought  to  agree  to  this  course,  an  im- 
mediate choice  of  Ferdinand  would  have  been  impossi- 
ble. 

Whatever  might  be  the  merits  of  the  proposal  itself, 

it  had  the  inestimable  advantage  of  embarking  the  Lu- 

„    ,.     therans  of  the  North  and  the  Calvinists  of 

I  7.     Ferdi-  . 

nand  chosen   the  South  in  a  common  cause.     But  Frede- 

mperor.        ^.^  distrusted  John  George,  and  preferred 

another  plan  of  his  own.     John  George  lost  his  tempei, 

and  voted  unconditionally  for  Ferdinand.      Frederick, 

if  he  did  not  mean  to  be  left  alone  in  impotent  isolation, 

had  nothing  for  it  but  to  follow  his  example.     He  had 

no  other  candidate  seriously  to  propose  ;  and  on  August 

28,  1619,  Ferdinand  was  chosen  by  a  unanimous  vote. 

He  was  now  known  as  the  Emperor  Ferdinand  II. 

Two  days  before,  another  election  had  taken  place  at 

Prague.      The   Bohemians,   after  deposing 

I  8.     Frede-  9  •  ,  .  .  r  & 

rick  elected     Ferdinand  from  the  throne,  which  in   1017 
Bohfmia.        they  had   acknowledged    to    be  his,  chose 

Frederick  to  fill  the  vacant  seat. 
Would  Frederick  accept  the  perilous  offer  ?    Opinions 


i620.  The  Attack  upon  Frederick.  39 

round  him  were  divided  on  the  advisability  of  the  step. 
The  princes  of  the  Union,  and  even  his  own  coun- 
cillors,  took   opposite   sides.      In   his   own    , 

.  ?  9-     He 

family,  his  mother  raised  a  voice  of  warn-  accepts  the 
ing.  His  wife,  Elizabeth  of  England,  the 
beautiful  and  high-spirited,  urged  him  to  the  enterprise. 
The  poor  young  man  himself  was  well-nigh  distracted. 
At  last  he  found  a  consolation  in  the  comfortable  belief 
that  his  election  was  the  act  of  God.  Amidst  the  tears 
of  the  good  people  of  Heidelberg  he  set  out  from  the 
proud  castle,  magnificent  even  now  in  its  ruins  as  it 
looks  down  upon  the  rushing  stream  of  the  Neckar. 
'  He  is  carrying  the  Palatinate  into  Bohemia,'  said  his 
sorrowing  mother.  On  November  4  he  was  crowned  at 
Prague,  and  the  last  act  of  the  Bohemian  Revolution 
was  accomplished. 


CHAPTER  III. 

IMPERIALIST  VICTORIES   IN   BOHEMIA   AND   THE 

PALATINATE. 

Section  I. —  The  Attack  upon  Frederick. 
The  news  of  Frederick's  acceptance  of  the  Bohemian 
crown  sent  a  thrill  of  confidence  through  the  ranks  of 
his   opponents.       'That    prince'    said    the 

,  .  .  '  ?  1-     Maximi- 

Pope,  '  has  cast  himself  into  a  fine  laby-  lian  prepares 
rinth.'  'He  will  only  be  a  winter-king,' 
whispered  the  Jesuits  to  one  another,  certain  that  the 
summer's  campaign  would  see  his  pretensions  at  an  end. 
Up  to  that  time  the  Bohemian  cause  stood  upon  its  own 
merits.  But  if  one  prince  of  the  Empire  was  to  be  al- 
lowed, on  any  pretext,  to  seize  upon  the  territories  of 
another,  what  bulwark  was  there  against  a  return  of  the 
E 


40  Imperialist  Victories  in  Bohemia.  1620 

old  fist-right,  or  general  anarchy  ?  Frederick  had  at- 
tacked the  foundations  on  which  the  institutions  of  his 
time  rested,  without  calling  up  anything  to  take  their 
place. 

Maximilian  saw  more  clearly  than  any  one  the  mis- 

take  that  had  been  committed.     In  an  interview  with 

the  new  Emperor  he  en^aired  to  forsake  his 

a  2.     Makes 

use  of  inaction.     Hitherto  he  had  kept  quiet,  be- 

nilstakes.  S  cause  he  knew  well  that  the  apparent  ag- 
gressor would  have  the  general  opinion  of 
the  world  against  him.  Now  that  the  blunder  had  been 
committed,  he  was  ready  to  take  advantage  of  it.  At 
the  same  time,  he  did  not  forget  his  own  interests,  and 
he  stipulated  that,  when  all  was  over,  Frederick's  electo- 
ral dignity — not  necessarily  his  territory — should  be 
transferred  to  himself,  and  that  he  should  retain  Upper 
Austria  in  pledge  till  his  military  expenses  had  been  re- 
paid. 

The  effect  of  the  change  from  the  passive  endurance 
of  Ferdinand  to  the  active  vigour  of  Maximilian  was 
immediately  perceptible.  His  first  object 
Gabor  attacks  was  to  gain  over  or  neutralize  the  German 
Protestants,  and  events  in  the  East  were 
seconding  him  to  a  marvel.  About  one-fifth  only  of  Hun- 
gary was  in  Ferdinand's  possession.  The  rest  was  about 
equally  divided  between  the  Turks  and  Bethlen  Gabor, 
the  Protestant  Prince  of  Transylvania,  a  semi-barbarous 
but  energetic  chieftain,  who  hoped,  with  Turkish  sup- 
port, to  make  himself  master  of  all  Hungary,  if  not  of  Aus- 
tria as  well.  In  the  first  days  of  November,  his  hordes, 
in  friendly  alliance  with  the  Bohemians,  were  burning 
and  plundering  round  the  walls  of  Vienna.  But  such 
armies  as  his  can  only  support  themselves  by  continuous 
success  ;  and  Bethlen  Gabor  found  the  capture  of  Vienna 


1620.  The  Attack  upon  Frederick.  41 

as  hopeless  in  the  winter  as  Thurn  had  found  it  in  the 
summer.  Retiring  eastwards,  he  left  behind  him  a  bit' 
ter  indignation  against  those  who  had  abetted  his  pro- 
ceedings, and  who  had  not  been  ashamed,  as  their  ad- 
versaries declared,  to  plant  the  Crescent  upon  the  ruins 
of  Christianity  and  civilization. 

Such   declamation,    overstrained  as  it  was,   was  not 
without  its  effect.     German  Protestantism  had  no  enthu- 
siasm to  spare  for  Frederick's  enterprise  in    ?  4.    The 
Bohemia.     At   a  meeting  of  the  Union  at   to  support 
Nuremberg,    Frederick's   cause    found    no    Fredenck- 
support.     Maximilian    could    well  afford  to  leave    the 
Union  to  its  own  hesitation,  and  to  think  only  of  concili- 
ating the    Elector   of  Saxony   and  the   North  German 
princes. 

That  John  George  should  have  taken  serious  alarm  at 
his  rival's  increase  of  power  is  not  surprising.  Not  only 
did  it  assail  whatever  shadow  still  remained  1620. 

of  the  protecting  institutions  of  the  Empire,  |greement  of 
but  it  did  so  in  a  way  likely  to  be  especially  Muhihausen. 
disagreeable  at  Dresden.  The  revolution  at  Prague  did 
not  simply  raise  an  otherwise  powerless  person  into 
Ferdinand's  place.  It  gave  the  crown  of  Bohemia  to  a 
man  whose  territories  were  already  so  extensive  that  if 
he  managed  to  consolidate  his  new  dominion  with  them 
he  would  unite  in  his  hands  a  power  which  would  be 
unequalled  in  the  Empire,  and  which  would  bring  with 
it  the  unheard-of  accumulation  of  two  votes  upon  one 
person  at  imperial  elections.  John  George  would  de- 
scend from  being  one  of  the  first  of  the  German  princes 
to  a  mere  second-rate  position. 

John  George  was  not  to  be  won  for  nothing.  At  an 
assembly  held  at  Muhihausen  in  March  1620,  the 
League  promised    that  they    would  never    attempt    to 


4.2  Imperialist  Victories  in  Bohemia.  1620. 

J  6.    The  ec-     recover  by  force  the  lands  of  the  Protestant 

clesiastical  .    .  . 

lands  held  by  administrators,  or  the  secularized  lands  in 
guaranteed  the  northern  territories,  as  long  as  the 
juwjercondi-  holders  continued  to  act  as  loyal  subjects; 
and  this  promise  was  confirmed  by  the 
Emperor. 

That  this  engagement  was  not  enough,  later  events 
were  to  show.  For  the  present  it  seemed  satisfactory  to" 
I  7.  Spinola  John  George,  and  Maximilian  was  able  to 
attackHe0  turn  his  attention  to  the  actual  preparations 
Palatinate.  for  wan  jn  May  orders  had  been  issued 
from  Madrid  to  Spinola,  the  Spanish  general  in  the 
Netherlands,  to  make  ready  to  march  to  the  Emperor's 
defence ;  and  on  June  3  the  frightened  Union  signed  the 
treaty  of  Ulm,  by  which  they  promised  to  observe  neu- 
trality towards  the  League,  thus  securing  to  Maximilian 
freedom  from  attack  in  the  rear  during  his  march  into 
Bohemia.  The  Union,  however,  if  it  should  be  attacked, 
was  to  be  allowed  to  defend  its  own  territories,  including 
the  Palatinate. 

At  the  head  of  Maximilian's  army  was  the  Walloon 
Tilly,  a  man  capable  of  inspiring  confidence  alike  by  the 
l  8.    The  probity  of  his  character  and  by  the  posses- 

mvasions.  sion  of  eminent  military  capacity.     On  June 

23  he  crossed  the  Austrian  frontier.  On  August  20  the 
Estates  of  Upper  Austria  unconditionally  bowed  to  Fer- 
dinand as  their  lord  and  master.  Lower  Austria  had 
already  submitted  to  its  fate.  About  the  same  time 
John  George  had  entered  Lusatia,  and  was  besieging 
Bautzen  in  Ferdinand's  name.  Spinola,  too,  had 
marched  along  the  Rhine,  and  had  reached  Mentz  by 
the  end  of  August. 

The  army  of  the  Union  was  drawn  up  to  oppose  the 
Spaniards.     But  there   was  no   harmony    amongst  the 


1620.  The  Attack  upon  Frederick.  43 

leaders  ;  no  spirit  in  the   troops.      Falling   |u9bdu^spitn^a 
upon  one  town  after  another,  Spinola  now   Western 
brought  into  his  power  nearly  the  whole  of 
that  portion  of  the  Palatinate  which  lay  on  the  left  bank 
of  the   Rhine.     The  army  of  the  Union  retreated  help- 
lessly to  Worms,  waiting  for  what  might  happen  next. 
Maximilian  was  now  ready  to  attack  Bo-    , 

....  g  10.     Inva' 

hernia.     He  soon  effected  a  junction  with   sionof 
Bucquoi.     Frederick's  position  was  deplor- 
able. 

At  first  he  had  been  received  at  Prague  with  tha 
liveliest  joy.  When  a  son  was  born  to  him,  who  was 
in  after  days  to  become  the  Prince  Rupert  |n,  Grow- 
of  our  English  civil  wars,  every  sign  of  re-  ianty"of>PU" 
joicing  accompanied  the  child  to  the  font.  Frederick. 
But  it  was  not  long  before  Frederick's  Lutheran  subjects 
were  offended  by  his  Calvinistic  proceedings.  In  the 
royal  chapel  pictures  of  the  saints  were  ruthlessly  torn 
down  from  the  walls,  and  the  great  crucifix,  an  object 
of  reverence  to  the  Lutheran  as  well  as  the  Catholic,  was 
tossed  aside  like  a  common  log  of  wood.  The  treasures 
of  art  which  Rudolph  II.  had  collected  during  his  life  of 
seclusion  were  catalogued  that  they  might  be  offered  for 
sale  ;  and  it  is  said  that  many  of  them  were  carried  off 
by  the  officials  entrusted  with  the  duty.  And  besides 
real  grievances,  there  were  others  that  were  purely  ima- 
ginary. A  story  has  been  told  which,  whether  true  or 
false,  is  a  good  illustration  of  the  impracticable  nature 
of  the  Bohemian  aristocracy.  Frederick  is  said  to  have 
convened  some  of  them  to  council  early  in  the  morning 
and  to  have  received  an  answer  that  it  was  against  their 
privileges  to  get  up  so  soon. 

The  Bohemians  were  not  long  in  discovering  that  no 
real  strength  had  been  brought  to  them  bv  Frederick, 


44  Imperialist  Victories  in  Bohemia.  1620. 

I  i2.  Frede-  He  had  been  set  upon  the  throne,  not  for 
strengthM* the  ms  personal  qualities,  but  because  he  was 
Bohemians.  supposed  to  have  good  friends,  and  to  be  able 
to  prop  up  the  falling  cause  of  Bohemia  by  aid  from  all 
parts  of  Protestant  Europe.  But  his  friends  gave  him 
little  or  no  help,  and  he  was  himself  looking  tranquilly 
on  whilst  the  storm  was  gathering  before  his  eyes.  In 
his  ranks  there  was  neither  organization  nor  devotion. 
Christian  of  Anhalt  had  been  placed  in  command  of  the 
army,  but,  though  personally  brave  he  did  not  inspire 
confidence.  The  other  generals  were  quarrelling  about 
precedence.  New  levies  were  ordered,  but  the  men 
either  remained  at  home  or  took  the  earliest  opportunity 
to  slink  away.  Those  who  remained,  scantily  provided 
with  the  necessities  of  life,  were  on  the  verge  of  mutiny. 
On  September  28  Frederick  joined  the  army.  He 
still  cherished  hope.  Bethlen  Gabor,  who  had  deserted 
his  cause  a  few  months  before,  had  repented  his  dcfec- 
.,     ,      tion,  and  was  now  coming  to  his  aid.    Sick- 

jS  13.     March  .  ° 

ofi'iiiy  and  ness  was  raging  in  the  enemy's  camp.  Yet, 
in  spite  of  sickness,  Tilly  pressed  on,  taking 
town  after  town,  and  choosing  his  positions  too  skilfully 
to  be  compelled  to  fight  unless  it  suited  him.  On  the 
morning  of  November  8  the  Imperialists  were  close 
upon  Prague.  The  enemy  was  posted  on  the  White 
Hill,  a  rising  ground  of  no  great  height  outside  the  walls. 
The  Imperial  army  had  been  weakened  by  its  suffer- 
ings ;  and  Bucquoi  still  counselled  delay.  But  Tilly 
knew  better,  and  urged  an  immediate  advance.  As  the 
commanders  were  disputing,  a  Dominican  friar,  who  ac- 
companied the  armies,  stepped  forward.  '  Sons  of  the 
church,'  he  said,  '  why  do  you  hang  back  ?  We  ought 
to  march  straight  forward,  for  the  Lord  hath  delivered 
►ne  enemy  into  our  hands.     We  shall  overcome  them  as 


1620.  The  Attack  upon  Frederick.  45 

sure  as  we  are  alive.'  Then  showing  them  a  figure  of 
the  Virgin  which  had  been  defaced  by  Protestant 
hands,  '  See  here,'  he  said,  '  what  they  have  done.  The 
prayers  of  the  Holy  Virgin  shall  be  yours.  Trust  in 
God,  and  go  boldly  to  the  battle.  He  fights  on  your 
side,  and  will  give  you  the  victory.'  Before  the  fiery 
utterances  of  the  friar  Bucquoi  withdrew  his  opposition. 
It  was  a  Sunday  morning,  and  the  gospel  of  the  day 
contained  the,  words,  '  Render  unto  Caesar  the  things 
that  be  Caesar's,'  and  the  warriors  of   the    .        „ 

.  g  14.     The 

Caesar  at  Vienna  felt  themselves  inspired  to  battle  of  the 
fulfil  the  Saviour's  words.  The  task  which 
they  had  before  them  was  more  difficult  in  appearance 
than  in  reality.  Frederick  was  inside  the  city  entertain- 
ing two  English  ambassadors  at  dinner  whilst  the  blow 
was  being  struck.  Some  Hungarians  on  whom  he  chief- 
ly relied  set  the  example  of  flight,  and  the  day  was  irre- 
trievably lost.  Frederick  fled  for  his  life  through  North 
Germany,  till  he  found  a  refuge  at  the  Hague. 

The  reign  of  the  Bohemian  aristocracy  was  at  an  end. 
Tilly,  indeed,  had  mercifully  given  time  to  the  leaders 
to  make  their  escape.     But,  blind  in  adver- 

f  .  ?  £5-     Sub- 

sity  as  they  had  been  in  prosperity,  they  mission  of 
made  no  use  of  the  opportunity.  The  chiefs  °' emia' 
perished  on  the  scaffold.  Their  lands  were  confiscated, 
and  a  new  German  and  Catholic  nobility  arose,  which 
owed  its  possessions  to  its  sovereign,  and  which,  even 
if  the  Royal  Charter  had  remained  in  existence,  would 
have  entered  into  the  privileges  which  allowed  their 
predecessors  to  convert  the  churches  in  their  domains 
to  what  use  they  pleased.  But  the  Royal  Charter  was 
declared  to  have  been  forfeited  by  rebellion,  and  the 
Protestant  churches  in  the  towns  and  on  the  royal  es- 
tates had  nothing  to  depend  on  but  the  will  of  the  con- 


46  Imperialist  Victories  in  Bohemia.  1620. 

queror.  The  ministers  of  one  great  body, — the  Bohe« 
mian  Brethren — were  expelled  at  once.  The  Lutherans 
were  spared  for  a  time. 

Was  it  yet  possible  to  keep  the  Bohemian  war  from 
growing  into  a  German  one  ?     Ferdinand  and  Maximi- 
lian were  hardly  likely  to  stop  of  themselves 
rick  put  to       in  their  career  of  victory.     To  them  Frede- 

the  ban.  .    ,  ,  ., 

rick  was  a  mere  aggressor,  on  whom  they 
were  bound  to  inflict  condign  punishment.  Would  he 
not,  if  he  were  allowed  to  recover  strength,  play  the 
same  game  over  again  ?  Besides,  the  expenses  of  the 
war  had  been  heavy.  Ferdinand  had  been  obliged  to 
leave  Upper  Austria  in  pledge  with  Maximilian  till  his 
share  of  those  expenses  had  been  repaid  to  him.  It 
would  be  much  pleasanter  for  both  parties  if  Maximilian 
could  have  a  slice  of  the  Palatinate  instead.  With  this 
and  the  promised  transference  of  the  electorate  to  Maxi- 
milian, there  would  be  some  chance  of  securing  order  and 
a  due  respect  for  the  Catholic  ecclesiastical  lands.  On 
January  22,  therefore,  Frederick  was  solemnly  put  to  the 
ban,  and  his  lands  and  dignities  declared  to  be  forfeited. 
Whether  Ferdinand  was  justified  in  doing  this  was 
long  a  moot  point.  He  had  certainly  promised  at  his 
_  election  that  he  would  not  put  anyone  to  the 

2  17.     Danger 

of  the  Pro-  ban  without  giving  him  the  benefit  of  a  fair 
trial.  But  he  argued  that  this  only  applied 
to  one  whose  guilt  was  doubtful,  and  that  Frederick's 
guilt  had  been  open  and  palpable.  However  this  may 
have  been,  something  of  far  greater  importance  than  a 
legal  or  personal  question  was  at  issue.  For  Frederick 
there  was  little  sympathy  in  Germany ;  but  there  was  a 
strong  feeling  that  it  would  not  do  to  allow  a  Protestant 
country  to  fall  into  Catholic  hands,  both  for  its  own  saka 
and  for  the  sake  of  its  Protestant  neighbours. 


r62i.        Hie  War  in  the  Upper  Palatinate.  4  J 

Section  II. —  The  War  in  the  Upper  Palatinate. 

If  Frederick  could  only  have  made  it  clear  that  he  had 
really  renounced  all  his  pretensions  to  meddle  with  other 
people's  lands  he  might  possibly  have  ended      i     F^^ 
his  days  peaceably  at  Heidelberg.     But  he    rick  does  not 

.  ,  .  i-i  r  ■     •         i  •       give  up  hope. 

could  not  give  up  his  hopes  of  regaining  his 
lost  kingdom.  One  day  he  talked  of  peace;  another 
day  he  talked  of  war.  When  he  was  most  peaceably  in- 
clined he  would  give  up  his  claim  if  he  could  have  an 
amnesty  for  the  past.  But  he  would  not  first  give  up  his 
claim  and  then  ask  for  an  amnesty. 

Even  to  this  he  had  been  driven  half  un-    ,    _ 

jS  2. Part  taken 

willingly  by  his   father-in-law.     The    King   by  James  of 
of  England  charged  himself  with  the  office      ng  an 
of  a  mediator,  and  fancied  that  it  was  unnecessary  to 
arm  in  the  meantime. 

The  states  of  the  Union  were  in  great  perplexity. 
The  Landgrave  of  Hesse  Cassel  was  compelled  by  his 
own  subjects  to  come  to  terms  with  Spinola.  „ 

.  .  I  3-     Dissolu- 

The  cities  of  Strasburg,  Ulm,  and  Nurem-    t'ionofthe 
berg  were  the  next  to  give  way.     On  April 
12  a  treaty  was  signed  at  Mentz,  by  which  the  Union 
dissolved  itself,  and  engaged  to  withdraw  its  troops  from 
the  Palatinate.     On  the  other  hand,  Spinola  promised  to 
suspend  hostilities  till  May  14. 

The  danger  to  which  the  Palatinate  was  exposed,  and 
the  hints  let  drop  that  the  conquest  of  the  Palatinate 
might  be  followed  by  the  transference  of  the    . 

-  ,  ,  ?,  4-     Chances 

electorate,  caused  alarm  m  quarters  by  no    in  Frederick's 
means  favourable  to  Frederick.  John  George 
began  to  raise  objections,  and  even  the  Catholic  eccle* 
siastics  were  frightened  at  the  prospects  of  the  enlarge 
ment  of  the  war,  and  at  the  risk  of  seeing  many  pow°*"} 


4-8         Imperialist  Victories  in  the  Palatinate.      1621. 

hitherto  neutral,  taking  the  part  of  the  proscribed  Elec 

tor. 

The  claim  kept  up  by  Frederick   to    Bohemia  was 

something  more  than  a  claim  to  an  empty  title.     He  had 

appointed  Mansfeld  to  act  there  as  his  gene- 
Z  5.   He  still  rr  & 

holds  places  in    ral ;  and,  though  Mansfeld  had  lost  one  post 

after  another,  at  the  end  of  April  he  still 
held  Tabor  and  Wittingau  in  Frederick's  name. 

The  appointment  of  Mansfeld  was  unfortunately  in  it- 
self fatal  to  the  chances  of  peace.  Ever  since  the  capture 
of  Pilsen,  his  troops,  destitute  of  support,  had  been  the 

terror  of  the  country  they  were  called  upon 

1 6      Mans-  J  '  r 

fold's  army.  to  defend.  In  those  days,  indeed,  the  most 
disciplined  army  was  often  guilty  of  excesses 
from  which  in  our  days  the  most  depraved  outcasts  would 
shrink.  The  soldiers,  engaged  merely  for  as  long  a 
time  as  they  happened  to  be  wanted,  passed  from  side 
to  side  as  the  prospect  of  pay  or  booty  allured  them. 
No  tie  of  nationality  bound  the  mercenary  to  the  stan- 
dard under  which  accident  had  placed  him.  He  had 
sold  himself  to  his  hirer  for  the  time  being,  and  he  sought 
his  recompense  in  the  gratification  of  every  evil  passion 
of  which  human  nature  in  its  deepest  degradation  is 
capable. 

Yet,  even  in  this  terrible  war,  there  was  a  difference 

between  one  army  and  another.    In  an  enemy's  country 

all  plundered   alike.     Tilly's  Bavarians  had 

g  7.       Soldiers  . 

of  the  Thirty  been  guilty  of  horrible  excesses  in  Bohemia. 
But  a  commander  like  Tilly,  who  could  pay 
his  soldiers,  and  could  inspire  them  with  confidence  in 
his  generalship,  had  it  in  his  power  to  preserve  some 
sort  of  discipline ;  and  if,  as  Tilly  once  told  a  complain- 
ing official,  his  men  were  not  nuns,  they  were  at  all 
events  able  to  refrain  on  occasion  from  outrageous  vil- 


i  O2 1.         The  War  in  the  Upper  Palatinate.  49 

(any.  A  commander  like  Mansfeld,  who  could  not  pay 
his  soldiers,  must,  of  necessity,  plunder  wherever  he 
was.  His  movements  would  not  be  governed  by  mili- 
tary or  political  reasons.  As  soon  as  his  men  had  eaten 
up  one  part  of  the  country  they  must  go  to  another,  if 
they  were  not  to  die  of  starvation.  They  obeyed,  like 
the  elements,  a  law  of  their  own,  quite  independent  of 
the  wishes  or  needs  of  the  sovereign  whose  interests  they 
were  supposed  to  serve. 

Before  the  end  of  May  the  breaking  up  of  the  army  of 
the  Union  sent  fresh  swarms  of  recruits  to  Mansfeld's 
camp.     He  was  soon  at  the  head  of  a  force    . 

r  {S  8.     Mans- 

of  16,000  men  in  the  Upper  Palatinate.  The  feid  takes  the 
inhabitants  suffered  terribly,  but  he  was 
strong  enough  to  maintain  his  position  for  a  time.  Nor 
was  he  content  with  standing  on  the  defensive.  He 
seized  a  post  within  the  frontiers  of  Bohemia,  and  threat- 
ened to  harry  the  lands  of  the  Bishop  of  Bamberg  and 
Wurzburg  if  he  did  not  withdraw  his  troops  from  the 
army  of  the  League.  He  then  fell  upon  Leuchtenberg, 
and  carried  off  the  Landgrave  a  prisoner  to  his  camp. 

The  first  attack  of  the  Bavarians  failed  entirely. 
Bethlen  Gabor,  too,  was  again  moving  in  Hungary,  had 

slain  Bucquoi,  and  was  driving  the  Empe-    „ 

.  .       2  9-    A  truce 

ror's  army  before  him.      Under  these  cir-    impossible 

cumstances,  even  Ferdinand  seems  to  have 
hesitated,  and  to  have  doubted  whether  he  had  not  bet- 
ter accept  the  English  offer  of  mediation.     Yet  such  was 
the  character  of  Mansfeld's  army  that  it  made  mediation 
impossible.     It  must  attack  somebody  in  order  to  exist. 

Yet  it  was  in  the  Lower,  not  in  the  Upper,  Palatinate 
that  the  first  blow  was  struck.  Sir  Horace  Vere,  who 
had  gone  out  the  year  before,  with  a  rejri-   ?  «>■    Vere  '■ 

*•',..,  .         the  Lower 

ment  ot   English   volunteers,   was   now    in    Palatinate. 


50         Imperialist  Victories  in  the  Palatinate.      1621. 

command  for  Frederick.  But  Frederick  had  neithei 
money  nor  provisions  to  give  him,  and  the  sup- 
plies of  the  Palatinate  were  almost  exhausted.  The 
existing  truce  had  been  prolonged  by  the  Spaniards. 
But  the  lands  of  the  Bishop  of  Spires  lay  temptingly  near. 
Salving  his  conscience  by  issuing  the  strictest  orders 
against  pillage,  he  quartered  some  of  his  men  upon  them. 
The  whole  Catholic  party  was  roused  to  indignation. 

1  11.  War  re-  Cordova,  left  in  command  of  the  Spanish 
in'the  Lower  troops  after  Spinola's  return  to  Brussels,  de- 
Palatmate.  clared  the  truce  to  have  been  broken,  and 
commenced  operations  against  Vere. 

By  this    time    Mansfeld's    power   of    defending  the 

Upper  Palatinate  was  at  an  end.     The  magistrates  of  the 

towns  were  sick  of  his  presence,  and  pre- 

2  12.     Mans-  .  .  ,       .      ... 

feld  driven  ferred  coming  to  terms  with  Maximilian  to 
Uppcr  submitting  any  longer  to  the  extortions  of 

Palatinate.  their  master's  army.  Mansfeld,  seeing  how 
matters  stood,  offered  to  sell  himself  and  his  troops  to 
the  Emperor.  But  he  had  no  real  intention  of  carrying 
out  the  bargain.  On  October  10  he  signed  an  engage- 
ment to  disband  his  forces.  Before  the  next  sun  arose  he 
had  slipped  away,  and  was  in  full  march  for  Heidelberg. 

Tilly  followed  hard  upon  his  heels.  But  Mans- 
feld did  not  stop  to  fight  him.  Throwing  himself  upon 
Alsace,  he  seized  upon  Hagenau,  and  converted  it  into 
a  place  of  strength. 

Section  III. — Frederick's  Allies. 

The  winter  was  coming  on,  and  there  would  be  time 
for  negotiations  before  another  blow  was  struck.  But  to 
I  1.  Proposal  give  negotiations  a  chance  it  was  necessary 
feld  into  Eng-  that  Mansfeld's  army  should  be  fed,  in  order 
giish  pay.  that  he  might  be  able  to  keep  quiet  while 

the  diplomatists  were  disputing.     James,  therefore,  wise- 


1 6  2  2 .  Frederick '  s  A  Hies.  5 1 

ly  proposed  to  provide  a  sum  of  money  for  this  purpose 
But  a  quarrel  with  the  House  of  Commons  hurried  on  a 
dissolution,  and  he  was  unable  to  raise  money  sufficient 
for  the  purpose  without  a  grant  from  Parliament. 

James,  poor  and  helpless,  was  thus  compelled  to  fall 
back  upon  the  friendship  of  Spain,  a  friendship  which  he 
hoped  to  knit  more  closely  by  a  marriage  <s  2.  England 
between  his  son,  the  Prince  of  Wales,  and  a  and  Spain- 
Spanish  Infanta.  The  Spanish  Government  was  anx- 
ious, if  possible,  to  avoid  an  extension  of  the  war  in  Ger- 
many. Though  all  the  riches  of  the  Indies  were  at  its 
disposal,  that  government  was  miserably  poor.  In  a 
land  where  industry,  the  source  of  wealth,  was  held  in 
dishonour,  all  the  gold  in  the  world  was  thrown  away. 
Scarcely  able  to  pay  the  armies  she  maintained  in  time 
of  peace,  Spain  had  now  again  to  find  money  for  the 
war  in  the  Netherlands.  In  162 1  the  twelve  years'  truce 
with  the  Dutch  had  come  to  an  end,  and  Spinola's 
armies  in  Brabant  and  Flanders  could  not  live,  like 
Mansfeld's  at  the  expense  of  the  country,  for  fear  of 
throwing  the  whole  of  the  obedient  provinces,  as  they 
were  called,  into  the  enemies'  hands.  If  possible,  there- 
fore, that  yawning  gulf  of  the  German  war,  which 
threatened  to  swallow  up  so  many  millions  of  ducats, 
must  be  closed.  And  yet  how  was  it  to  be  done  ?  The 
great  difficulty  in  the  way  of  peace  did  not  lie  in  Frede- 
rick's pretensions.  They  could  easily  be  swept  aside. 
The  great  difficulty  lay  in  this — that  the  Catholics,  hav- 
ing already  the  institutions  of  the  Empire  in  their  hands, 
were  now  also  in  possession  of  a  successful  army.  How, 
under  such  circumstances,  was  Protestantism,  with  which 
so  many  temporal  interests  were  bound  up,  to  feel  itself 
secure  ?  And  without  giving  security  to  Protestantism, 
how  could  a  permanent  peace  be  obtained  ? 


5 2         Imperialist  Victories  in  the  Palatinate.      1622. 

To  this  problem  the  Spanish  ministers  did  not  care  to 
address  themselves.  They  thought  that  it  would  be 
j  3  Spanish  enough  to  satisfy  personal  interests^  They 
P,ans-  '    offered  James  a  larger  portion  with  the  In- 

fanta than  any  other  sovereign  in  Europe  would  have 
given.  They  opposed  tooth  and  nail  the  project  for 
transferring  the  Electorate  to  Maximilian,  as  likely  to 
lead  to  endless  war.  But  into  the  heart  of  the  great 
question  they  dared  not  go,  tied  and  bound  as  they  were 
by  their  devotion  to  the  Church.  Could  not  Frederick 
and  James,  they  asked,  be  bought  off  by  the  assurance 
of  the  Palatinate  to  Frederick's  heirs,  on  the  simple  con- 
dition of  his  delivering  up  his  eldest  son  to  be  educated 
at  Vienna?  Though  they  said  nothing  whatever  about 
any  change  in  the  boy's  religion,  they  undoubtedly 
hoped  that  he  would  there  learn  to  become  a  good 
Catholic. 

Such  a  policy  was  hopeless  from  the  beginning.  Fred- 
erick had  many  faults.  He  was  shallow  and  obstinate. 
\  4.  Frederick  But  he  really  did  believe  in  his  religion  as 
ac'ede^o  l°  firmly  as  any  Spaniard  in  Madrid  believed 
them.  jn  hjg.  an(j   jt  was   certain   that  he  would 

never  expose  his  children  to  the  allurements  of  the 
Jesuits  of  Vienna. 

It  was  settled  that  a  conference  should  be  held  at 
Brussels,  the  capital  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  first 
|s  5.  A  con-  to  arrange  terms  for  a  suspension  of  arms, 
held  at t0  6  and  then  to  prepare  the  way  for  a  general 
Brussels.  peace.    The  Spanish  plan  of  pacification  was 

net  yet  announced.  But  Frederick  can  hardly  be  blamed 
for  suspecting  that  no  good  would  come  from  diplomacy, 
or  for  discerning  that  a  few  regiments  on  his  side  would 
weigh  more  heavily  in  his  favour  than  a  million  of  words. 

The  only  question  for  him  to  decide  was  the  quarter 


1 62  2.  Frederick"1  s  Allies.  53 

in  which  he  should  seek  for  strength.  His  weakness 
had  hitherto  arisen  from  his  confidence  in  \  6.  Where 
physical  strength  alone.  To  get  together  as  J^ck  toexpect 
many  thousand  men  as  possible  and  to  helP? 
launch  them  at  the  enemy  had  been  his  only  policy,  and 
he  had  done  nothing  to  conciliate  the  order-loving  portion 
of  the  population.  The  cities  stood  aloof  from  his  cause. 
„  The  North  German  princes  would  have  nothing  to  say 
to  him.  If  he  could  only  have  renounced  his  past,  if  he 
could  have  acknowledged  that  all  he  had  hitherto  done 
had  been  the  fruitful  root  of  disaster,  if  he  could,  with 
noble  self-renunciation,  have  entreated  others  to  take  up 
the  cause  of  German  Protestantism,  which  in  his  hands 
had  suffered  so  deeply,  then  it  is  not  impossible  that 
opinion,  whilst  opinion  was  still  a  power  in  Germany, 
would  have  passed  over  to  his  side,  and  that  the  coming 
mischief  might  yet  have  been  averted. 

But  Frederick  did  not  do  this.  If  he  had  been  capable 
of  doing  it  he  must  have  been  other  than  he  was.  In 
1622,  as  in   1610,  the  pupil  of  Christian  of    „     „. 

g  7.  His  pre- 

Anhalt  looked  to  the  mere  development  of    pactions  for 
numerical  strength,  without  regard  to  the 
moral  basis  of  force. 

It  must  be  acknowledged  that  if  numbers  could  give 
power,  Frederick's  prospects  were  never  better  than  in 
the  spring  of  1622.  Mansfeld's  army  was  g  8.  Frede- 
not,  this  time,  to  stand  alone.  '  In  the  south  rick's  allies- 
the  Margrave  of  Baden-Durlach  was  arming  in  Frede- 
rick's cause.  In  the  north,  Christian  of  Brunswick  was 
preparing  to  march  to  the  aid  of  the  Palatinate.  Such 
names  as  these  call  up  at  once  before  us  the  two  main 
difficulties  which  would  have  remained  in  the  way  of 
peace  even  if  the  question  of  the  Palatinate  could  have 
rbeen  laid  aside. 


54  Imperialist  Victories  in  the  Palatinate.      1622. 

The  Margrave  of  Baden-Durlach  had  long  been  no- 
_  torious  for  the  skill  with  which  he  had  found 

fq.      1  he 

Margrave  of  excuses  for  appropriating  ecclesiastical  pro- 
perty, and  for  defeating  legal  attempts  to 
embarrass  him  in  his  proceedings. 

Christian  of  Brunswick  was  a  younger  brother  of  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel.  By  the  influence  of 
1616.  his  family  he  secured  in  1616  his  election  to 

tian  of  '  the  bishopric  or  administratorship  of  Hal- 
Brunswick,  berstadt.  The  ceremonies  observed  at  the 
institution  of  the  youth,  who  had  nothing  of  the  bishop 
but  the  name,  may  well  have  seemed  a  degrading  pro- 
fanation in  the  eyes  of  a  Catholic  of  that  day.  As  he 
entered  the  Cathedral  the  Te  Deum  was  sung  to  the 
pealing  organ.  He  was  led  to  the  high  altar  amidst  the 
blaze  of  lighted  candles.  Then,  whilst  the  choir  sang 
'Oh  Lord!  save  thy  people,'  the  four  eldest  canons 
placed  him  upon  the  altar.  Subsequently  he  descended 
and,  kneeling  with  the  canons  before  the  altar,  three 
times  intoned  the  words  '  Oh  Lord,  save  thy  servant.' 
Then  he  was  placed  again  upon  the  altar  whilst  a  hymn 
of  praise  was  sung.  Lastly,  he  took  his  place  opposite 
the  pulpit  whilst  the  courtly  preacher  explained  that 
Christian's  election  had  been  in  accordance  with  the  ex- 
press will  of  God.  This,'  he  cried'triumphantly,  'is  the 
bishop  whom  God  himself  has  elected.  This  is  the  man 
whom  God  has  set  as  the  ruler  of  the  land.' 

Christian's  subsequent  proceedings  by  no  means  cor- 
responded with  the  expectations  of  his  enthusiastic  ad- 
_  .        mirers.      Like  one  who  has  been  handed 

J  XI.     Chris-  , 

tian's  fond-        down  to  evu  renown  in  early  English  his- 

fighting.  tory,  he  did  nought  bishoplike.       He  was 

not  even  a  good  ruler  of  his  domain.     He 

left  his  people  to  be  misgoverned  by  officials,  whilst  he 


1622.  Frederick's  Allies.  55 

wandered  about  the  world  in  quest  of  action.  As  brain- 
less for  all  higher  purposes  as  Murat,  the  young  Bishop 
was  a  born  cavalry  officer.  He  took  to  fighting  for  very 
love  of  it,  just  as  young  men  in  more  peaceful  times  take 
to  athletic  sports. 

And,  if  he  was  to  fight  at  all,  there  could  be  no  ques- 
tion on  which  side  he  would  be  found.  There  was  3 
certain  heroism  about  him  which  made  him    . 

g  12.     He 

love  to  look  upon  himself  as  the  champion  takes  up  the 
of  high  causes  and  the  promoter  of  noble  Elizabeth, 
aims.  To  such  an  one  it  would  seem  to  be 
altogether  debasing  to  hold  his  bishopric  on  the  mere 
tenure  of  the  agreement  of  Muhlhausen,  to  be  debarred 
from  taking  the  place  due  to  him  in  the  Diet  of  the  Em- 
pire, and  to  be  told  that  if  he  was  very  loyal  and  very 
obedient  to  the  Emperor,  no  force  would  be  employed  to 
wrest  from  him  -that  part  of  the  property  of  the  Church 
which  he  held  through  a  system  of  iniquitous  robbery. 
Then,  too,  came  a  visit  to  the  Hague,  where  the  bright 
eyes  of  his  fair  cousin  the  titular  Queen  of  Bohemia 
chained  him  for  ever  to  her  cause,  a  cause  which  might 
soon  become  his  own.  For  who  could  tell,  when  once 
the  Palatinate  was  lost,  whether  the  agreement  of  Miihl- 
hausen  would  be  any  longer  regarded  ? 

In  the  summer  of  1621  Christian  levied  a  force  with 
which  he  marched  into  the  Catholic  bishopric  of  Pader- 
born.     The  country  was  in  the  course  of    . 

g    jj,       [fig 

forcible  conversion  by  its  bishop,  and  there    ravages  in 
was  still  in  it  a  strong  Lutheran  element,   ofPiader- 

which  would  perhaps  have  answered  the  bora- 
appeal  of  a  leader  who  was  less  purely  an  adventurer. 
But  except  in  word,  Catholic  and  Protestant  were  alike 
to  Christian,  so  long  as  money  could  be  got  to  support 
his  army.  Castles,  towns,  farmhouses  were  ransacked 
F 


56         Imperialist  Victories  in  the  Palatinate.      1622. 

for  the  treasure  of  the  rich,  and  the  scanty  hoard  of  the 
poor.  We  need  not  be  too  hard  on  him  if  he  tore  dowt 
the  silver  shrine  of  a  saint  in  the  cathedral  of  Paderborn, 
and  melted  it  into  coin  bearing  the  legend : — '  The 
friend  of  God  and  the  enemy  of  the  priests.'  But  it  is 
impossible  to  forget  he  was  the  enemy  of  the  peasants 
as  well.  Burning-masters  appear  among  the  regulai 
officers  of  his  army  ;  and  many  a  village,  unable  to 
satisfy  his  demands,  went  up  in  flames,  with  its  peaceful 
industry  ruined  for  ever.  At  last,  satiated  with  plundei, 
he  turned  southward  to  the  support  of  Mansfeld. 

Such  were  the  commanders  into  whose  hands  the  for- 
tunes of  German  Protestantism  had  fallen.      Mansfeld 
told  Vere  plainly  that  whether  there  were  a 

2  14.     Mans- 
feld will  not        truce  or  not,  he  at  least  would  not  lay  down 

make  peace.        i_  •  i  -i  j  •  ^     j     r 

his  arms  unless  he  were  indemnified  for 
his  expenses  by  a  slice  out  of  the  Austrian  possession  of 
Alsace. 

If  the  three  armies  of  the  Margrave  of  Baden,  of 
Christian  of  Brunswick,  and  of  Mansfeld,  could  be 
brought  to  co-operate,  Tilly,  even  if  supported  by  Cordo- 
va's Spaniards,  would  be  in  a  decided  numerical  inferiori- 
ty. But  he  had  the  advantage  of  a  central  situation,  of 
commanding  veteran  troops  by  whom  he  was  trusted, 
and  above  all  of  being  able  to  march  or  re- 
in  the  midst  mam  quiet  at  his  pleasure,  as  not  being  de- 
■iiesSene  pendent  on   mere   pillage  for  his  commis- 

sariat. He  was  inspired,  too,  by  a  childlike 
faith  in  the  cause  for  which  he  was  fighting  as  the  cause 
of  order  and  religion  against  anarchy  and  vice. 

Section  IV. —  The  Fight  for  the  Lower  Palatinate 
By  the   middle   of  April  the  hostile  armies  were  l»t 
movement,  converging  upon  the  Palatinate,  where  the 


1 62  2.  The  Fight  for  the  Lower  Palatinate.         57 

fortresses  of  Heidelberg,  Mannheim,  and  \  1.  Frede- 
Frankenthal  were  safe  in  Vere's  keeping.  ManifeW  in 
Frederick  himself  had  joined  Mansfeld's  the  Palatinate. 
army  in  Alsace,  and  his  first  operations  were  attended 
with  success.  Effecting  a  junction  with  the  Margrave 
of  Baden  he  inflicted  a  severe  check  upon  Tilly  at  Wies- 
loch.  The  old  Walloon  retreated  to  Wimpfen,  calling 
Cordova  to  his  aid,  and  he  did  not  call  in  vain.  Mans- 
feld,  on  the  other  hand,  and  the  Margrave  could  not 
agree.  Each  had  his  own  plan  for  the  campaign,  and 
neither  would  give  way  to  the  other.  Besides,  there  were 
no  means  of  feeding  so  large  an  army  if  it  kept  together. 
Mansfeld  marched  away,  leaving  the  Margrave  to  his 
fate. 

The  battle  of  Wimpfen  was  the  result.  On  May  6 
Tilly  and  Cordova  caught  the  Margrave  alone,  and  de- 
feated him  completely.  As  soon  as  the  ac-  «  2_  Battle  of 
tion  was  over,  Cordova  left  the  field  to  re-  Wimpfen. 
sist  the  progress  of  Mansfeld  ;  and  Mansfeld,  whose, 
men  were  almost  starving,  was  unable  to  overcome  seri- 
ous resistance.  There  was  nothing  for  it  but  a  speedy 
retreat  to  Alsace. 

In  the  meantime  the  diplomatists  had  met  at  Brussels. 
After  some  difficulties  of  form  had  been  got  over,   Sir 
Richard  Weston,  the  representative  of  Eng- 
land,  sent  to  ask  Frederick  to  agree  to  a    Congress  at 
truce.     When  the  message  reached  him  the      russe  s* 
battle  of  Wimpfen  had  not  been  fought,  and  his  hopes 
were  still  high.     A  truce,  he  wrote  to  his  father-in-law, 
would  be  his  utter  ruin.     The  country  was  exhausted. 
Unless  his  army  lived  by  plunder  it  could  not  exist.     A 
few  days  later  he  was  a  beaten  man.     On  May  13  he 
gave  way,  and  promised  to  agree  to  the  truce.     On  the 
28th  all  was  again  changed.     He  had  learned  that  the 


58         Imperialist  Victories  in  the  Palatitiate.     1022. 

Margrave  of  Baden  hoped  to  bring  back  his  army  into 
the  field.  He  knew  that  Christian  of  Brunswick  was  ap- 
proaching from  beyond  the  Main ;  and  he  informed 
Weston  that  he  could  do  nothing  to  assist  the  negotia- 
tions at  Brussels. 

On  June  1  Frederick  and  Mansfeld  marched  out  of 
Mannheim  to  meet  Christian.  On  their  way  they  passed 
I  4.  Seizure  by  Darmstadt.  The  Landgrave  was  espe- 
grave  of "  "  cially  obnoxious  to  them,  as  a  Lutheran 
Darmstadt.  prince  who  had  warmly  adopted  the  Em- 
peror's side.  Love  of  peace,  combined  with  pretensions 
to  lands  in  dispute  with  the  Landgrave  of  Hesse  Cassel, 
in  which  he  hoped  to  be  supported  by  Ferdinand,  had 
made  him  a  bitter  enemy  of  Mansfeld  and  his  proceed- 
ings ;  and  though  it  was  not  known  at  the  time  that  he 
was  actually  in  receipt  of  a  Spanish  pension,  Frederick 
was  not  likely  to  attribute  to  other  than  interested  mo- 
tives a  line  of  action  which  seemed  so  incomprehensi- 
ble. 

As  soon  as  the  troops  reached  Darmstadt,  they  com- 
»,     r , ,    menced    their    usual   work,  ravaging    the 

§  5.    Mansfeld  .  o      o 

unable  to  pass     country,  and  driving  off  the  cattle.     To  the 

the  Main.  T  ,  ,  .     ,         ,       .      . 

Landgrave,  who  recommended  submission 
to  the  Emperor  as  the  best  way  of  recovering  peace, 
Frederick  used  high  language.  It  was  not  in  quest  of 
peace  that  he  had  come  so  far.  The  Landgrave  had  a 
fortified  post  which  commanded  a  passage  over  the 
Main,  and  its  possession  would  enable  the  army  to  join 
Christian  without  difficulty.  But  the  Landgrave  was 
firm  ;  and  finding  that  a  denial  would  not  be  taken,  tried 
to  avoid  his  importunate  guests  by  flight.  He  was  over- 
taken and  brought  back  a  prisoner.  But  even  in  this 
plight  he  would  give  no  orders  for  the  surrender  of  the 
post,  and  its  commander  resolutely  refused  to  give  it  up 


1 62  2.       The  Fight  for  the  Lower  Palatinate.  59 

without  instructions.  Before  another  passage  could  be 
found,  Tilly  had  received  reinforcements,  and  Frede- 
rick, carrying  the  Landgrave  with  him,  was  driven  to  re- 
treat to  Mannheim,  not  without  loss. 

Once  more  Frederick  was  ready  to  consent  to  the  ces- 
sation of  arms  proposed  at  Brussels.     But  Cordova  and 

Tilly    were    now    of    a    different    opinion.    ,  ,     _     ,, 
1  ?  6-    Condi- 

Christian,  they  knew,  would  soon  be  on  the    Hon  of  Mans- 

Main,  and  they  were  resolved  to  crush  him  e  sarmy- 
whilst  he  was  still  unaided.  Lord  Chichester,  who  had 
come  out  to  care  for  English  interests  in  the  Palatinate, 
and  who  judged  all  that  he  saw  with  the  eye  of  an  ex- 
perienced soldier,  perceived  clearly  the  causes  of  Frede- 
rick's failure.  '  I  observe,'  he  wrote,  '  so  much  of  the 
armies  of  the  Margrave  of  Baden  and  of  Count  Mans^ 
feld,  which  I  have  seen,  and  of  their  ill  discipline  and 
order,  that  I  must  conceive  that  kingdom  and  principali- 
ty for  which  they  shall  fight  to  be  in  great  danger  and 
hazard.  The  Duke  of  Brunswick's,  it  is  said,  is  not 
much  better  governed :  and  how  can  it  be  better  or 
otherwise  where  men  are  raised  out  of  the  scum  of  the 
people  by  princes  who  have  no  dominion  over  them, 
nor  power,  for  want  of  pay,  to  punish  them,  nor  means 
to  reward  them,  living  only  upon  rapine  and  spoil  as 
they  do  ? ' 

On  June  20,  the  day  before  these  words  were  written, 
Tilly  and  Cordova  had  met  with  Christian  at  Hochst,  and 
though  they  did  not  prevent  him  from  crossing  the  Main, 
they  inflicted  on  him  such  enormous  losses  *  ,  Battie  of 
that  he  joined  Mansfeld  with  the  mere  frag-  H0**5'- 
ments  of  his  army. 

Great  was  the  consternation  at  Mannheim  when  the 
truth   was  known.     The  Margrave  of  Baden  at   onco 


Bo  Mansfeld  and  Christian  in  the  North.  1623. 
,  „     ,,  abandoned  his  associates.     Mansfeld   and 

\  8.  Mans- 
feld abandons  Christian,  taking  Frederick  with  them,  re- 
treated into  Alsace,  where  Frederick  form- 
ally dismissed  them  from  his  service,  and  thus  washed 
his  hands  of  all  responsibility  for  their  future  proceed- 
ings. 

Retiring  for  a  time  to   Sedan,  he  watched  events  as 

they  passed  from  that  quiet  retreat.     '  Would  to  God,' 

„    ,         he  wrote  to  his  wife,  '  that  we  possessed  a 

I  9.      Frede-  * 

rick  goes  back    little  corner  of  the  earth  where  we   could 
ague.     rest  tQggfkgj.  jn  peace#'     The  destinies  of 

Germany  and  Europe  had  to  be  decided  by  clearer 
heads  and  stronger  wills  than  his.  After  a  short  delay 
he  found  his  way  back  to  the  Hague,  to  prove,  as  many 
a  wiser  man  had  proved  before  him,  how  bitter  a  lot  it  is 
to  go  up  and  down  on  the  stairs  which  lead  to  the  ante- 
chambers of  the  great :  to  plead  for  help  which  never  is 
given,  and  to  plan  victories  which  never  come. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


MANSFELD   AND   CHRISTIAN   IN   NORTH    GERMANY. 

Section.  I. — Mansfeld' s  March  into  the  Netherlands. 
When  once  Tilly  had  got  the  better  of  the  armies  in  the 
field,  the  reduction  of  the  fortresses  in  the  Palatinate  was 

merely  a  work  of  time.  Heidelberg  surren- 
t'ionofthe         dered  on  September  16.     On    November  8 

Vere  found  Mannheim  no  longer  tenable. 
Frankenthal  alone  held  out  for  a  few  months  longer,  and 
was  then  given  up  to  the  Spaniards. 

James  still  hoped  that  peace  was  possible,  though  the 
conference  at  Brussels  had  broken  up  in  September.   In 


£623.   Mansfeld 's  March  into  the  Netherlands.        61 

the  meanwhile,  Ferdinand  and  Maximilian 
were  pushing  on  to  the  end  which  they  had   Catholics, 
long  foreseen  ;  and  an  assembly  of  princes 
was  invited  to  meet  at  Ratisbon  in  November  to  assent 
to  the  transference  of  the  electorate  to  the  Duke  of  Ba- 
varia. 

Constitutional  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  Protestants 
was  impossible.  In  addition  to  the  majority  against  them 
amongst  the  princes,  there  was  now,  by  the 
mere  fact  of  Frederick's  exclusion,  a  major-  \  3.  The  Elec- 
ity  against  them  amongst  the  Electors,  a  re(j  to  Maxi- 
majority  which  was  all  the  more  firmly  es-  ITilllian- 
tablished  when,  on  February  13,  the  transfer  was  sol- 
emnly declared.  Maximilian  was  to  be  Elector  for  his 
lifetime.  If  any  of  Frederick's  relations  claimed  that 
the  electorate  ought  rather  to  pass  over  to  them,  they 
would  be  heard,  and  if  their  case  appeared  to  be  a  good 
one,  they  would  receive  what  was  due  to  them  after 
Maximilian's  death.  If,  in  the  meanwhile,  Frederick 
chose  to  ask  humbly  for  forgiveness,  and  to  abandon 
his  claim  to  the  electoral  dignity,  the  Emperor  would  take 
his  request  for  the  restitution  of  his  lands  into  favourable 
consideration.  Against  all  this  the  Spanish  ambassador 
protested ;  but  the  protest  was  evidently  not  meant  to  be 
followed  by  action. 

The  question  of  peace  or  war  now  depended  mainly  on 
the  North  German  Protestants,  Nobody  doubted  that, 
if  they  could  hit  upon  a  united  plan  of  action,    ,     _    ^T    . 

/  r  r  <S  4.  Tfee  North 

and  if  they  vigorously  set  to  work  to  carry  German  Pro- 
it  out,  they  would  bring  an  irresistible  weight 
to  bear  upon  the  points  at  issue.  Unfortunately,  however, 
such  uniformity  of  action  was  of  all  things  most  improba- 
ble. John  George,  indeed,  had  more  than  -cwice  been 
urged  in  different  directions  during  the  past  years  by 


62  Mansf eld  and  Christian  in  the  Ncrrth.      16*3. 

events  as  they  successively  arose.  The  invasion  of  the 
Palatinate  had  shaken  him  in  his  friendship  for  the  Em- 
peror. Then  had  come  the  kidnapping  of  the  Landgrave 
of  Darmstadt  to  give  him  a  shock  on  the  other  side. 
Later  in  the  year  the  news  that  an  excuse  had  been  found 
for  driving  the  Lutheran  clergy  out  of  Bohemia  had 
deeply  exasperated  him,  and  his  exasperation  had  been 
increased  by  the  transference  of  the  electorate,  by  which 
the  Protestants  were  left  in  a  hopeless  minority  in  the 
Electoral  House.  But  the  idea  of  making  war  upon  the 
Emperor,  and  unsettling  what  yet  remained  as  a  security 
for  peace,  was  altogether  so  displeasing  to  John  George 
that  it  is  doubtful  whether  anything  short  of  absolute  ne- 
cessity would  have  driven  him  to  war.  What  he  would 
have  liked  would  have  been  a  solemn  meeting,  at  which 
he  might  have  had  the  opportunity  of  advancing  his 
views.  But  if  those  views  had  been  seriously  opposed 
he  would  hardly  have  drawn  the  sword  to  uphold 
them. 

If  the  only  danger  to  be  apprehended  by  the  North 

Germans  had  been  the  march  of  Tilly's  army,  it  is  not 

unlikely  that  the  war  would  here  have  come  to  an  end. 

,,,    Ferdinand  and  Maximilian  would  doubtless 

\  5.     Mansfetd 

and  Christian  have  respected  the  agreement  of  Miihlhau- 
sen,  and  there  would  hardly  have  been 
found  sufficient  determination  in  the  northern  princes  to 
induce  them  to  arm  for  the  recovery  of  the  Palatinate. 
But  a  new  danger  had  arisen.  Mansfeld  and  Christian 
had  not  laid  down  their  arms  when  Frederick  dismissed 
them  in  July,  and  so  far  from  being  ready  to  make  sacri- 
fices for  peace,  they  were  ready  to  make  any  sacrifices 
for  the  sake  of  the  continuance  of  the  war. 

It  was  not  long  before  the  adventurers  were  forced  to 
leave  Alsace.    They  had  eaten  up  everything  that  was 


1623.  MansfelcT s  March  into  the  Netherlands,         63 

to  be  eaten  there,  and  the  enemy  was  known 
to  be  on  their  track.     Throwing  themselves    r        ifoa. 
into  Lorraine,  they  settled  down  for  a  time    tabiish  Then* 
like  a  swarm  of  locusts  upon  that  smiling   *!^s  in  Lor' 
land.     But  where  were  they  to  turn  next  ? 
The  French  government  hurried  up  reinforcements  to 
guard  their  frontier.     That   road,  at    all    events,  was 
barred  to  them,  and  Christian,  whose  troops  were  in  a 
state  of  mutiny,  tried  in  vain  to  lead  them  towards  the 
Lower  Rhine.     Whilst  the  leaders  hardly  knew  what  to 
do,  they  received  an  invitation  to  place  themselves  for 
three  months  at  the  disposal  of  the  Dutch  Republic. 

Matters  had  not  been  going  well  with  the  Dutch  since 
the  re-opening  of  the  war  in  1621.  Their  garrison  at 
Juliers  had  surrendered  to  Spinola  in  the 
winter,  and  the  great  Spanish  commander  j^em-us"6 
was  now  laying  siege  to  Bergen-op-Zoom, 
with  every  prospect  of  reducing  it.  To  come  to  its  relief 
Mansfeld  would  have  to  march  across  the  Spanish 
Netherlands.  On  August  28  he  found  Cordova  on  his 
way  to  Fleurus,  as  he  had  stood  in  his  way  in  the  Palati- 
nate the  year  before.  Worse  than  all.  two  of  his  own 
regiments  broke  out  into  mutiny,  refusing  to  fight  unless 
they  were  paid.  At  such  a  time  Mansfeld  was  at  his 
best.  He  was  a  man  of  cool  courage  and  infinite  re- 
source, and  he  rode  up  to  the  mutineers,  entreating  them 
if  they  would  not  fight  at  least  to  look  as  if  they  meanl 
to  fight.  Then,  with  the  rest  of  his  force,  he  charged  the 
enemy.  Christian  seconded  him  bravely  at  the  head  of 
his  cavalry,  fighting  on  in  spite  of  a  shot  in  his  left  arm. 
Three  horses  were  killed  under  him.  The  loss  was 
enormous  on  both  sides,  but  Mansfeld  gained  his  object, 
and  was  able  to  pursue  his  way  in  safety. 

Christian's  arm  was  amputated.     He  ordered  tha^,  the 


64  Mans/eld  and  Christian  in  the  North.      1623. 

operation  should  be.  performed  to  the  sound  of  trumpets. 

1  The  arm  that  is  left,'   he  said,   '  shall  give 

loses  his  arm3"   mv  enemies  enough  to   do.'      He    coined 

money  out  of  the  silver  he  had  taken  from 

the  Spaniards,  with  the  inscription  '  Altera  restat.' 

Bergen-op-Zoom  was  saved.     Spinola  raised  the  siege. 

But  Mansfeld's  disorderly  habits  did  not  comport  well 

r,j    with  the  regular  discipline    of  the  Dutch 

I  9.     Mansfeld  °  r 

in  Munsterand  army.  Those  whom  he  had  served  were 
glad  to  be  rid  of  him.  In  November  he 
was  dismissed,  and  marched  to  seek  his  fortune  in  the 
diocese  of  Munster.  But  the  enemy  was  too  strong  for 
him  there,  and  he  turned  his  steps  to  East  Friesland,  a 
land  rich  and  fertile,  easily  fortified  against  attack,  yet 
perfectly  helpless.  There  he- settled  down  to  remain  till 
the  stock  of  money  and  provisions  which  he  was  able 
to  wring  from  the  inhabitants  had  been  exhausted. 

Section  II. —  Christian  of  Brunswick  in  Lower  Saxony. 

Here  then  was  a  new  rock  of  offence,  a  new  call  for 

the  Emperor  to  interfere,  if  he  was  in  any  way  to  be  re- 

,     _._    ,  .      garded  as  the  preserver  of  the  peace  of  the 

|t.  Difficulties     °  r  r 

of  the  Lower       Empire.     But  a  march  of  Tilly  against  an 

Saxon  circle.  .„„.,.  .         . 

enemy  in  East  r  nesland  was  not  a  simply 
military  operation.  Not  a  few  amongst  the  northern 
princes  doubted  whether  a  victorious  Catholic  army 
would  respect  the  agreement  of  Miihlhausen.  Christian 
of  Brunswick,  of  course,  lost  no  time  in  favouring  the 
doubt.  For,  whatever  else  might  be  questionable  there 
was  no  question  that  the  diocese  of  Halberstadt  was  no 
longer  secured  by  the  provisions  of  that  agreement. 
Neither  the  League  nor  the  Emperor  had  given  any  pro- 
mise to  those  administrators  who  did  not  continue  loyal 
to  the  Emperor,  and  no  one  could  for  a  moment  contend 
that  Christian  had  ever  shown  a  spark  of  loyalty. 


1623.    Christian  of  Brunswick  in  Lower  Saxony.      65 

On  the  one  side  was   Christian,  assuring   those  poor 
princes  that  neutrality  was  impossible,  and 
that  it  was  their  plain   duty  to  fight  for  the    |nd  Till"  urge 
bishoprics  and  Protestantism.    On  the  other   ^,em  to  °pp°" 

"  site  courses. 

side  was  Tilly,  equally  assuring  them  that 
neutrality  was  impossible,  but  asserting  that  it  was  their 
plain  duty  to  fight  for  their  Emperor  against  Mansfeld 
and  brigandage.  The  princes  felt  that  it  was  all  very 
hard.  How  desirable  it  would  be  if  only  the  war  would 
take  some  other  direction,  or  if  Tilly  and  Christian  would 
mutually  exterminate  one  another,  and  rid  them  of  the 
difficulty  of  solving  such  terrible  questions ! 

But  the  question  could  not  be  disposed  of.  Halberstadt 
was  a  member  of  the  Lower  Saxon  circle, 
one  of  those  districts  of  which  the  princes  sfa|'t  danger, 
and  cities  were  legally  bound  together  for 
mutual  defence.  The  Lower  Saxon  circle,  therefore, 
was  placed  between  two  fires.  The  Catholic  troops  were 
gathering  round  them  on  the  south.  Mansfeld  was  issu- 
ing forth  from  his  fastness  in  East  Friesland  and  threat- 
ening to  occupy  the  line  of  the  Weser  on  the  north. 

In  February  the  circle  determined  to  levy  troops  and 
prepare  for  war.  But  the  preparations  were  %  Warlike 
father  directed  against  Mansfeld  than  against  preparations. 
Tilly.  If  the  Emperor  could  only  have  given  satisfaction 
about  the  bishoprics,  he  would  have  had  no  vassals  more 
loyal  than  the  Lower  Saxon  princes.  But  in  Ferdinand's 
eyes  to  acknowledge  more  than  had  been  acknowledged 
at  Miihlhausen  would  be  to  make  himself  partaker  in 
other  men's  sins.  It  would  have  been  to  acknowledge 
that  robbery  might  give  a  lawful  title  to  possession. 

Almost  unavoidably  the  circle  became  further  involved 
in  opposition  to  the  Emperor.  Christian's  brother, 
Frederick     Ulric,     the     reigning     Duke     of      Bruns- 


66  Mansf eld  and  Christian  in  the  North.      1623. 

}■  5*.  Christian    wick-Wolfenbiittel,  was  a  weak  and  incom- 

mvited  to  take  .  »»»•«*• 

service  under     petent    prince  much    under    his    mother's 

his  brother.  .  .  .         .  ,  . 

guidance.  Anxious  to  save  her  favourite 
son,  the  dashing  Christian,  from  destruction,  the  Duch- 
ess persuaded  the  Duke  to  offer  his  brother  a  refuge  in  his 
dominions.  If  he  would  bring  his  troops  there,  he  and 
they  would  be  taken  into  the  service  of  the  Duke,  a  re- 
spectable law-abiding  prince,  and  time  would  be  afforded 
him  to  make  his  peace  with  the  Emperor. 

Christian  at  once  accepted  the  offer,  and  entered  into 
negotiations  with  Ferdinand.  But  he  had  never  any- 
thought  of  really  abandoning  his  adventur- 
of  SudUohn"le  ous  career.  Young  princes,  eager  for  dis- 
tinction, levied  troops  and  gathered  round 
his  standard.  Every  week  the  number  of  his  followers 
increased.  At  last  the  neighbouring  states  could  bear  it 
no  longer.  The  authorities  of  the  circle  told  him  plainly 
to  be  gone.  Reproaching  them  for  their  sluggishness  in 
thus  abandoning  the  cause  of  the  Gospel,  he  started  for 
the  Dutch  Netherlands,  with  Tilly  following  closely  upon 
him.  On  August  6  he  was  overtaken  at  Stadtlohn,  within 
a  few  hours'  march  of  the  frontier,  behind  which  he  would 
have  been  in  safety.  His  hastily  levied  recruits  were  no 
match  for  Tilly's  veterans.  Of  20,000  men  only  6,000 
found  their  way  across  the  border. 

Section  III. — Danger  of  the  Lower  Saxon  Circle. 

Christian's  defeat,  however  disastrous,  settled  nothing. 
Mansfeld  was  still  in  East  Friesland.     The  princes  of 

Lower  Saxony  were  still  anxious  about  the 
of  the  bishoprics.    Even  if  the  agreement  of  Miihl- 

bishopnics.         hausen  were  scrupulously  observed,  was  it 

so  very  certain  that  the  bishoprics  might 
not  be  wrenched  from  them  in  another  way  than  by 


1623.        Danger  of  the  Lower  Saxon  Circle.  67 

force  of  arms  ?  The  administrators  held  the  sees  simply 
because  they  had  been  elected  by  the  chapters,  and  if 
only  a  Catholic  majority  could  be  obtained  in  a  chaptei 
the  election  at  the  next  vacancy  would  be  certain  to  fall 
~upon  a  Catholic.  Often  it  happened  that  the  Protestant 
majority  had  taken  care  to  perpetuate  its  power  by- 
methods  of  very  doubtful  legality,  and  it  would  be  open 
to  the  Emperor  to  question  those  methods.  It  might 
even  come  to  pass  that  strict  law  might  turn  the  majority 
into  a  minority.  Already,  on  April  18,  the  chapter  of 
Osnabriick  had  chosen  a  Catholic  to  succeed  a  Protest- 
ant bishop,  perhaps  not  altogether  uninfluenced  by  the 
near  neighbourhood  of  a  Catholic  army.  Christian  of 
Brunswick,  certain  that  he  would  not  be  allowed  to  re- 
tain his  see,  had  formally  given  in  his  resignation,  and 
it  was  not  impossible  that  with  some  manipulation  the 
chapter  of  Halberstadt  might  be  induced  to  follow  the 
example  of  Osnabriick.  The  question  of  the  bishoprics 
had,  no  doubt,  its  low  and  petty  side.  It  may  be  spoken 
of  simply  as  a  question  interesting  to  a  handful  of  aristo- 
cratic sinecurists,  who  had  had  the  luck  to  reap  the  good 
things  of  the  old  bishops  without  doing  their  work.  But 
this  would  be  a  very  incomplete  account  of  the  matter. 
Scattered  as  these  bishoprics  were  over  the  surface  of 
North  Germany,  their  restitution  meant  nothing  less  than 
the  occupation  by  the  Emperor  and  his  armies  of  points 
of  vantage  over  the  whole  of  the  north.  No  one  who 
casts  his  eyes  over  the  map  can  doubt  for  an  instant 
that,  with  these  bishoprics  open  to  the  troops  ot  the 
League,  or  it  might  be  even  to  the  troops  of  the  King  of 
Spain,  the  independence  of  the  princes  would  have  been 
a  thing  of  the  past ;  and  it  must  never  be  forgotten  that, 
as  matters  stood,  the  cause  of  the  independence  of  the 
princes  was  inextricably  bound  up  with  the  independ* 


68  Man sf eld  and  Christian  in  the  North.      1623. 

ence  of  Protestantism.  If  Ferdinand  and  Maximilian 
had  their  way,  German  Protestantism  would  exist  merely 
upon  sufferance ;  and  whatever  they  'and  the  Jesuits 
might  say,  German  Protestantism  was,  in  spite  of  all  its 
shortcomings,  too  noble  a  creed  to  exist  on  suffer^ 
ance. 

Would  the  members  of  the  circle  of  Lower  Saxony  be 
strong  enough  to  maintain  their  neutrality  ?  They  sent 
,        _  ambassadors  to  the  Emperor,  asking  him  to 

i  1.     The  x  ° 

Lower  Saxon  settle  the  question  of  the  bishoprics  in  their 
nothing.  favour,  and  to  John  George  to  ask  for  his 

support.  The  Emperor  replied  that  he 
would  not  go  beyond  the  agreement  of  Muhlhausen. 
John  George  gave  them  good  advice,  but  nothing  more. 
And,  worse  than  all,  they  were  disunited  amongst  them- 
selves. Princes  and  towns,  after  agreeing  to  support 
troops  for  the  common  defence,  had  done  their  best  to 
evade  their  duties.  As  few  men  as  possible  had  been 
sent,  and  the  money  needed  for  their  support  was  still 
slower  in  coming  in.  As  usual,  unpaid  men  were  more 
dangerous  to  the  country  which  they  were  called  upon 
to  protect  than  to  the  enemy.  The  circle  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  it  would  be  better  to  send  the  troops 
home  than  to  keep  them  under  arms.  By  the  beginning 
of  the  new  year,  Lower  Saxony  was  undefended,  a 
tempting  prey  to  him  who  could  first  stretch  out  his 
hand  to  take  it. 

It  was  the  old  story.     With  the  Empire,  the  Diet  and 

the  Church  in  the  hands  of  mere  partisans,  there  was 

nothing  to  remind  men  of  their  duty  as  citi- 

g  3.  Low  state  °  .  .  , 

of  public  feel-    zens  of  a  great  nation.     Even  the  idea    of 

being  members  of  a  circle  was  too  high  to 

be  seriously  entertained.     The  cities  strove  to  thrust  the 

burden  of  defence    upon  the   princes,  and  the  princes 


1624.  England  and  France.  6q 

thrust  it  back  upon  the  cities.     The  flood  was  rising 
rapidly  which  was  to  swallow  them  all. 

Section  IV. — England  and  France. 
In  the  spring  of  1624  there  was  rest  for  a  moment. 
Mansfeld,   having  stripped   East  Friesland   bare,  drew 
back  into  the  Netherlands.    The  only  army 

_  _  $  1.  Foreign 

still  on  foot  was  the  army  of  the  League,  powers  ready 
and  if  Germany  had  been  an  island  in  the  oinerere- 
middle  of  the  Atlantic,  exercising  no  influence  upon 
other  powers  and  uninfluenced  by  them,  the  continuance 
in  arms  of  those  troops  might  fairly  be  cited  in  evidence 
that  the  Emperor  and  the  League  wished  to  push  their 
advantages  still  further,  in  spite  of  their  assertions  that 
they  wanted  nothing  more  than  assurance  of  peace. 

But  Germany  was  not  an  island.  Around  it  lay  a 
multitude  of  powers  with  conflicting  interests,  but  all 
finding  in  her  distractions  a  fair  field  for  „    , 

°  ?  2.  Ferdi- 

pursuing  their  own  objects.  Ferdinand,  in  nand's  weak- 
fact,  had  made  himself  just  strong  enough 
to  raise  the  jealousy  of  his  neighbours,  but  not  strong 
enough  to  impose  an  impassible  barrier  to  their  attacks. 
He  had  got  on  his  side  the  legal  and  military  elements 
of  success.  He  had  put  down  all  resistance.  He  hao 
frightened  those  who  dreaded  anarchy.  But  he  had  not 
touched  the  national  heart.  He  had  taught  men  to 
make  it  a  mere  matter  of  calculation  whether  a  foreign 
invasion  was  likely  to  do  them  more  damage  than  the 
success  of  their  own  Emperor.  Whilst  he  affected  to 
speak  in  the  name  of  Germany,  more  than  half  of  Ger- 
many was  neutral  if  not  adverse  in  the  struggle. 

England,  at  last,  was  giving  signs  of  warlike  prepara- 
tion. Prince  Charles  had  paid  a  visit  to  Madrid  in 
hopes   of   bringing    home   a    Spanish  bride,    and    of 


70  Mansfeld  and  Christian  in  the  North.      1624. 

1623.  regaining  the  Palatinate  for  his  brother-in- 

betweeiT^Eng-  law-  He  had  come  back  without  a  wife, 
sr'ainind  an(*  W^  tne  ProsPect  °f  getting  back  the 

Palatinate  as  distant  as  ever.  He  had 
learned  what  the  Spanish  plan  was,  that  wonderful 
scheme  for  educating  Frederick's  children  at  Vienna, 
with  all  ostensible  guarantees  for  keeping  them  in  their 
father's  faith,  which  were,  however,  almost  certain  to 
come  to  nothing  when  reduced  to  practice.  And  so  he 
came  back  angry  with  the  Spaniards,  and  resolved  to 
urge  his  father  to  take  up  arms.  In  the  spring  of  1624 
all  negotiations  between  England  and  Spain  were 
brought  to  an  end,  and  Parliament  was  discussing  with 
the  king  the  best  means  of  recovering  the  Palatinate. 

In  the  English  House  of  Commons  there  was  but  little 
real  knowledge  of  German  affairs.     The  progress  of  the 

Emperor  and  the  League  was  of  too  recent 
plans."815         a   date    to    be  thoroughly  comprehended. 

Men,  remembering  the  days  of  Philip  II., 
were  inclined  to  overestimate  the  power  of  Spain,  and 
to  underestimate  the  power  of  the  Emperor.  They  there- 
fore fancied  that  it  would  be  enough  to  attack  Spain  by 
sea,  and  to  send  a  few  thousand  soldiers  to  the  aid  01 
the  Dutch  Republic. 

James,  if  he  was  not  prompt  in  action,  at  all  events 

knew  better  than  this.     He  believed  that  the  Imperial 

_  power  was  now  too  firmly  rooted  in  Germany 

$  5.     Ques-  r  *  ' 

t'ion  between  to  fall  before  anything  short  of  a  great  Euro* 
the  House  of  pean  confederacy.  From  this  the  Commons 
Commons.  shrunk.    A  war  upon  the  continent  would  be 

extremely  expensive,  and,  after  all,  their  wrath  had  been 
directed  against  Spain,  which  had  meddled  with  their 
internal  affairs,  rather  than  against  the  Emperor,  who 
had  nevtr  taken  the  slightest  interest  in  English  politics. 


r  6  2  4.  England  and  France.  7 1 

The  utmost  they  would  do  was   to  accept  the    king's 
statement   that   he  would  enter  into   negotiations  with 
other  powers  and  would  lay  the  results  before  them  in 
_  the  winter. 

James  first  applied  to  France.  He  saw  truly  that  the 
moment  the  struggle  in  Germany  developed  into  a  Euro- 
pean war  the  key  to  success  would  lie  in  the    , ,     _ 

1  J  f  6.     The 

hands  of  the  French  governmment.  In  that  French 
great  country,  then  as  now,  ideas  of  the  and  the 
most  opposite  character  were  striving  for  the  Husuenots- 
mastery.  Old  thoughts  which  had  been  abandoned  in 
England  in  the  sixteenth  century  were  at  issue  with  new 
thoughts  which  would  hardly  be  adopted  in  England 
before  the  eighteenth.  In  France  as  well  as  in  England 
and  Germany,  the  question  of  the  day  was  how  religious 
toleration  could  be  granted  without  breaking  up  the 
national  unity.  In  England  that  unity  was  so  strong  that 
no  party  in  the  state  could  yet  be  brought  to  acknow- 
ledge that  toleration  should  be  granted  at  all.  But  for 
that  very  reason  the  question  was  on  the  fair  way  to  a 
better  settlement  than  it  could  have  in  France  or  Ger- 
many. When  the  nation  was  once  brought  face  to  face 
with  the  difficulty,  men  would  ask,  not  whether  one 
religion  should  be  established  in  Northumberland  and 
another  in  Cornwall,  but  what  amount  of  religious  liberty 
was  good  for  men  as  men  all  over  England.  In  Ger- 
many it  could  not  be  so.  There  the  only  question  was 
where  the  geographical  frontier  was  to  be  drawn  between 
two  religions.  Neither  those  who  wished  to  increase  the 
power  of  the  princes,  nor  those  who  wished  to  increase 
the  power  of  the  Emperor,  were  able  to  rise  above  the  idea 
of  a  local  and  geographical  division.  And  to  some 
extent  France  was  in  the  same  condition.  The  Edict  of 
Nantes  had  recognised  some  hundreds  of  the  country 
G 


/2  Mansfeld  and  Christian  in  the  North.       1624, 

houses  of  the  aristocracy,  and  certain  cities  and  towns, 
as  places  where  the  reformed  religious  doctrines  might 
be  preached  without  interference.  But  in  France  the 
ideal  of  national  unity,  though  far  weaker  than  it  was  hi 
England,  was  far  stronger  than  it  was  in  Germany.  In 
order  to  give  security  to  the  Protestant,  or  Huguenot 
♦owns  as  they  were  called  in  France,  they  had  been 
allowed  the  right  of  garrisoning  themselves,  and  of  exclud- 
ing the  royal  troops.  They  had  thus  maintained  them- 
selves as  petty  republics  in  the  heart  of  France,  pra*-  tically 
independent  of  the  royal  authority. 

Section  V. — Rise  of  Rickelieu. 

Such  a  state  of  things  could  not  last.      The  Hea  in- 
volved in  the  exaltation  of  the  monarchy  was  the  unity 
a z  of  the  nation.     The   idea  involved  in   the 

Lewis  XIII.  maintenance  of  these  guarantees  wac  its  dis- 
integration. Ever  since  the  young  king,  Lew.c  XIII., 
had  been  old  enough  to  take  an  active  part  in  i-<Tairs  he 
had  been  striving  to  establish  his  authority  from  one  end 
of  the  kingdom  to  the  other. 

The  supremacy  and  greatness  of  the  mona'chy  was 
the  thought  in  which  he  lived  and  moved.  His  intellect 
was  not  of  a  high  order,  and  he  was  not  likely  *o  origi- 
nate statesmanlike  projects,  or  to  carry  them  ouj  success- 
fully to  execution.  But  he  was  capable  of  appreciating 
merit,  and  he  would  give  his  undivided  confidence  to 
1 2.    His  anY  man  wh°  could  do  the  thing  which  he 

ideas.  desired  to  have  done,  without  himself  ex- 

actly knowing  how  to  do  it. 

During  the  first  years  of  his  reign  everything  seemed 

falling  to  pieces.     As  soon  as  his  father's  strong  hand 

was  removed  some  of  the  nobility  fell  back 

years  rfffi     into     half-independenre     of    the     Crown, 

reign.  whilst  others  submitted   to  <t  in  c«nsidera- 


1624.  Rise  of  Richelieu.  73 

tion  of  receiving  large  pensions  and  high  positions  in 
the  state.  To  this  Lewis  was  for  the  time  obliged  to 
submit.  But  the  privileges  of  the  Huguenot  towns 
roused  his  indignation.  It  was  not  long  before  he  levied 
war  upon  them,  determined  to  reduce  them  to  submis- 
sion to  the  royal  authority. 

All  this  foreboded  a  future  for  France  not  unlike  the 
future  which  appeared  to  be  opening  upon  Germany. 
There  were  too  many  signs  that  the  estab-  The 

lishment  of  the  king's  authority  over  the    intolerant 
towns  would  be  followed  by  the  forcible  es-   court* 
tablishment  of  his  religion.     There  was  a 
large  party  at  Court  crying  out  with  bigoted  intolerance 
against  any  attempt  to  treat   the  Huguenots  with  con- 
sideration, and  that  cry  found  an  echo  in  the  mind  of 
the  king.     For  he  was  himself  a  devout  Catholic,  and 
nothing  would  have  pleased  him  better  than  to  see  the 
victories  of  his  arms  attended    by  the  victories  of  the 
Church  to  which  he  was  attached. 

If  Lewis  was  not  a  Ferdinand,  it  was  not  because  he 
was  a  nobler  or  a  better  man,  but  because  he  had  his  eye 
open  to  dangers  from  more  quarters  than 
one.     When  the  troubles  in  Germany  first    jealous  of 
broke  out,  French  influence  was  exerted  on     paw 
the  side  of  the  Emperor.  French  ambassadors  had  taken 
part  in  the  negotiations  which  preceded  the  treaty  of 
Ulm,  and  had  thrown  all  their  weight  in  the  scale  to  se« 
cure  the  safety  of  Maximilian's  march  into  Bohemia. 
But  in  1622  the  conquest  of  the  Palatinate  brought  other 
thoughts  into  the  mind  of  the  King  of  France.     His 
monarchical  authority  was  likely  to  suffer  far  more  from 
the  victorious  union  between  the  two  branches  of  the 
House  of  Austria  than  from  a  few  Huguenot  towns.    For 
many  a  long  year  Spain  had  planted  her  standards  not 


74  Mansfeld  and  Christian  in  the  North.      1624. 

only  beyond  the  Pyrenees,  but  in  Naples,  Milan, 
Franche  Comto,  and  the  Netherlands.  Frankenthal 
and  the  Western  Palatinate  were  now  garrisoned  by  her 
troops,  and  behind  those  troops  was  the  old  shadowy 
empire  once  more  taking  form  and  substance,  and  pre- 
senting itself  before  the  world  as  a  power  hereafter  to  be 
counted  with.  In  1622,  accordingly,  Lewis  made  peace 
with  the  Huguenots  at  home.  In  1623  he  sent  some 
slight  aid  to  Mansfeld.  In  1624  he  called  Richelieu  to 
his  counsels. 

It  would  be  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  cool  and 
far-sighted  Cardinal  who  was  thus  suddenly  placed  at 
„  ,     „.  ,  the  head  of  the  French  ministry  had  it  all 

i  6.     Kiche-  .  ■* 

Iicu's  acces-  his  own  way  from  the  first.  He  had  to  take 
powcr.  into  account  the  ebb  and  flow  of  feeling  in 

the  Court  and  the  country,  and  the  ebb  and 
flow  of  feeling  in  Lewis  himself.  There  was  still  with 
Lewis  the  old  anxiety  to  crush  the  Huguenots  and  to 
make  himself  absolute  master  at  home,  alongside  with 
the  new  anxiety  to  shake  off  the  superiority  of  the  House 
of  Austria  abroad.  It  was  Richelieu's  task  to  show  him 
how  to  satisfy  both  his  longings ;  how  to  strike  down  re- 
bellion whilst  welcoming  religious  liberty,  and  how,  by 
uniting  Catholic  and  Protestant  in  willing  obedience  to 
his  throne,  he  might  make  himself  feared  abroad  in  pro- 
portion as  he  was  respected  at  home. 

Richelieu's  first  idea  was  not  altogether  a  successful 
one.     He  encouraged   Lewis  to  pursue  the  negotiation 
which  had  been  already  commenced  for  a  marriage  be- 
tween his  sister  and  the  Prince  of  Wales.     At  the  wish 
either  of  Lewis  himself  or  of  Richelieu  the 

2  7-     Mar-  .  .  .... 

riage  of  marriage  was  hampered  with  conditions  for 

MariT  a  tne  religious  liberty  of  the  English  Catholics, 

to  which   the   prince,  when   he   afterwards 


1624.  Rise  of  Richchen.  75 

came  to  the  throne  as  Charles  I.,  was  unwilling  or  un- 
able to  give  effect.  These  conditions  were  therefore  the 
beginning  of  an  ill  feeling  between  the  two  crowns, 
which  helped  ultimately  to  bring  about  a  state  of  war. 

Nor  were  other  causes  of  dispute  wanting.  James  and 
his  son  expected  France  to  join  them  in  an  avowed 
league  for  the  recovery  of  the  Palatinate.    ,  „    _     . 

0  J  §  8.    Foreign 

But  to  this  Lewis  and  Richelieu  refused  to    policy  of  Lewis 

T         •  1       c  .v  r     and  Richelieu. 

consent.  Lewis  was  proud  01  the  name  of 
Catholic,  and  he  was  unwilling  to  engage  in  open  war 
with  the  declared  champions  of  the  Catholic  cause.  But 
he  was  also  King  of  France,  and  he  was  ready  to  satisfy 
his  conscience  by  refusing  to  join  the  league,  though  he 
had  no  scruple  in  sending  money  to  the  support  of 
armies  who  were  fighting  for  Protestantism.  He  agreed 
to  pay  large  subsidies  to  the  Dutch,  and  to  join  the  King 
of  England  in  promoting  an  expedition  which  was  to 
march  under  Mansfeld  through  France  to  Alsace,  with 
the  object  of  attacking  the  Palatinate.  At  the  same 
time  he  was  ready  to  carry  on  war  in  Italy.  The  Span- 
iards had  taken  military  possession  of  the  Valtelline,  a 
valley  through  which  lay  the  only  secure  military  road 
from  their  possessions  in  Italy  to  the  Austrian  lands  in 
Germany.  Before  the.  end  of  the  year  a  French  army 
entered  the  valley  and  drove  out  the  Spaniards  with  ease. 
Mansfeld's  expedition,  on  the  other  hand,  never 
reached  Alsace  at  all.  Before  the  troops  of  which  it  was 
composed  were  ready  to  sail  from  England,  Richelieu 
had  found  an  excuse  for  diverting  its  course.  Spinola 
had  laid  siege  to  Breda,  and  the  Dutch  were  as  anxiously 
seeking  for  means  to  succour  it  as  they  had  sought  for 
means  to  succour  Bergen-op-Zoom  when  it 
was  besieged  in  1622.     The  French  averred   ^9  Mansfeld's 

°  expedition. 

that  Mansfeld  would  be  far  better  employed 


J  6  Mansfeld  and  Christian  in  the  North.      1625. 

at  Breda  than  in  Alsace.  At  all  events,  they  now  de- 
clined positively  to  allow  him  to  pass  through 
France. 

James  grumbled  and  remonstrated  in  vain.  At  last, 
after  long  delays,  Mansfeld  was  allowed  to  sail  for  the 
Dutch  coast,  with  strict  orders  to  march  to 
{!  icVaiiure.  the  Palatinate  without  going  near  Breda. 
tioi?16  CXpe'li"  He  had  with  him  12,000  English  foot,  and 
was  to  be  accompanied  by  2,000  French 
horse  under  Christian  of  Brunswick.  No  good  came  of 
the  expedition.  James  had  consented  to  conditions  ap- 
pended to  his  son's  marriage  contract  which  he  did  not 
venture  to  submit  to  discussion  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  Parliament  was  not,  therefore,  allowed  to 
meet.  "Without  help  from  Parliament  the  Exchequer 
was  almost  empty,  and  James  was  unable  to  send  money 
with  Mansfeld  to  pay  his  men.  Upon  their  landing,  the 
poor  fellows,  pressed  a  few  weeks  before,  and  utterly 
without  military  experience,  found  themselves  destitute 
of  everything  in  a  hard  frost.  Before  long  they  were 
dying  like  flies  in  winter.  The  help  which  they  were  at 
last  permitted  to  give  could  not  save  Breda  from  sur- 
render, and  the  handful  which  remained  were  far  too 
few  to  cross  the  frontier  into  Germany. 

Richelieu  had  hoped  to  signalize  the  year  1625  by  a 
larger  effort  than  that  of  1624.  He  had  mastered  the 
Valtelline  in  alliance  with  Venice  and  Savoy,  and 
French  troops  were  to  help  the  Duke  of  Savoy  to  take 
Genoa,  a  city  which  was  in  close  friendship  with  Spain. 
There  was  further  talk  of  driving  the  Spaniards  out  of 
the  Duchy  of  Milan,  and  even  intervention  in  Germany 
was  desired  by  Richelieu,  though  no  decision  had  been 
come  to  on  the  subject.     In  the  midst  of  these  thoughts 


1615.  Rise  of  Richelieu.  77 

he  was  suddenly  reminded  that  he  was  not 
completely  master    at    home.     The    peace   fny'0fthe 
made  with  the  Huguenots  in    1622  had  not   £™cllHugue" 
been  fairly  kept :    royal    officials   had  en- 
croached upon  their  lands,  and  had  failed  to  observe  the 
terms  of  the  treaty.     On  a  sudden,  Soubise,  a  powerful 
Huguenot  nobleman  with  a  fleet  of  his  own,  swooped 
down  upon  some  of  the  king's  ships  lying  at  Blavet,  in 
Brittany,  and  carried  them  off  as  his  prize.     Sailing  to 
Rochelle,  he  persuaded  that  great  commercial  city  to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  him,  and  to  declare  for 
open  resistance  to  the  king's  authority. 
-  If  Richelieu  intended   seriously  to  take   part  in  the 
German   war,    this   was   cause    enough    for    hesitation. 
Cleverly   availing   himself  of  the  expecta- 
tions formed  of  the  French  alliance  in  Eng-    mptionto^" 
[and  and  Holland,  he  contrived  to  borrow   51^  foHnter- 
ship's  from  both  those  countries,  and  before    Y,ening  in 

1  _  Ueriaany. 

the  autumn  was  over  Soubise  was  driven  to 
take  refuge  in  England.  But  Rochelle  and  the  Hugue- 
nots on  land  were  still  unconquered,  and  Ferdinand  was 
safe  for  the  moment  from  any  considerable  participation 
of  France  in  the  German  war.  Whether  Richelieu 
would  at  any  time  be  able  to  take  up  again  the  thread 
of  his  plans  depended  in  the  first  place  upon  his  success 
in  suppressing  rebellion,  but  quite  as  much  upon  the  use 
which  he  might  make  of  victory  if  the  event  proved  fa- 
vourable to  him.  A  tolerant  France  might  make  war  with 
some  chances  in  its  favour.  A  France  composed  of  con- 
querors and  conquered,  in  which  each  party  regarded 
the  other  as  evil-doers  to  be  suppressed,  not  as  erring 
brothers  to  be  argued  with,  would  weigh  lightly  enough 
in  the  scale  of  European  politics. 


CHAPTER  V. 

INTERVENTION   OF   THE   KING  OF   DENMARK. 

Section  I. —  Christian  IV.  and  Gustavus  Adolphus. 
Whilst   France   was  thus  temporarily  hindered  from 
taking  part  in  German  affairs,  and  whilst  James  and  his 
son  were  promising  more  than  their  poverty 
mark  and  would  allow  them  to  perform,  the  rulers  of 

Denmark  and  Sweden  were  watching  with 
increasing  interest  the  tide  of  war  as  it  rolled  north, 
wards. 

Christian  IV.  of  Denmark  had  every  reason  to  look 
with  anxiety  upon  the  future.  As  Duke  of  Holstein,  he 
\  2  Chris-  was  a  member  of  the  Lower  Saxon  circle, 
nan  IV.  an(j  ^e  jja(j  jong  been  doing  his  best  to  ex- 

tend his  influence  over  the  coasts  of  the  North  Sea.  By 
his  new  fortifications  at  Gluckstadt  he  aimed  at  inter- 
cepting the  commerce  of  Hamburg,  and  his  success  in 
procuring  for  one  of  his  sons  the  Bishopric  of  Verden 
and  the  coadjutorship  and  eventual  succession  to  the 
archbishopric  of  Bremen  was  doubtless  specially  grate- 
ful to  him  on  account  of  the  position  he  thus  acquired 
on  the  Elbe  and  the  Weser.  The  question  of  the  Pro- 
testant bishoprics  was  therefore  a  very  important  ques- 
tion to  him  personally,  and  he  was  well  aware  that  a 
real  national  empire  in  Germany  would  make  short  work 
with  his  attempts  to  establish  his  dominion  over  the 
mouths  of  the  German  rivers. 

His  attention  was  not  now  called  for  the  first  time  to 

the  progress  of  the  war.     Like  all  the  Lutheran  princes, 

he    had   thoroughly  disapproved  of  Frede- 

t  3.   His  early  °      *  *    , 

interest  in  the     rick's     Bohemian    enterprise.      But    when 
Frederick  was  a  fugitive  he  had  seen  that  a 
78 


1624.      Christian  IV.  and  Gustavus  Adolphus.  79 

strong  force  was  needed  to  stop  the  Emperor  from  a  re- 
taliation which  would  be  ruinous  to  the  Protestants,  and 
he  had  in  the  beginning  of  1621  given  a  willing  ear  to 
James's  proposal  for  a  joint  armament  in  defence  of  the 
Palatinate.  Had  the  war  been  undertaken  then,  with 
the  character  of  moderation  which  James  and  Christian 
would  have  been  certain  to  impress  upon  it,  the  world 
might  perhaps  have  been  spared  the  spectacle  of  Mans- 
feld's  plunderings,  with  their  unhappy  results.  But 
James  came  too  soon  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  un- 
necessary to  arm  till  mediation  had  failed  ;  and  Chris- 
tian, auguring  no  good  from  such  a  course,  drew  back 
and  left  the  Palatinate  to  its  fate.  But  the  events  which 
followed  had  increased  his  anxiety,  and  in  1624  his  mind 
was  distracted  between  his  desire  to  check  the  growth 
of  the  imperial  power  and  his  hesitation  to  act  with 
allies  so  vacillating  and  helpless  as  the  Lower  Saxon 
princes  were  proving  themselves  to  be.  In  his  own 
lands  he  had  shown  himself  a  good  administrator  and 
able  ruler.  Whether  he  was  possessed  of  sufficient  mili- 
tary capacity  to  cope  with  Tilly  remained  to  be  seen. 

Gustavus  Adolphus,  King  of  Sweden,  was  a  man  of  a 
higher  stamp.  His  is  the  one  of  the  few  names  which 
relieve  the  continental  Protestantism  of  the  »  4  Gustavus 
seventeenth  century  from  the  charge  of  bar-  Adolphus. 
renness.  Possessed  of  a  high  and  brilliant  imagination, 
and  of  a  temperament  restless  and  indefatigable,  to 
which  inaction  was  the  sorest  of  trials,  he  was  never 
happier  than  when  he  was  infusing  his  own  glowing 
spirit  into  the  comrades  of  some  perilous  enterprise. 
Christian  of  Brunswick  was  not  more  ready  than  he  to 
lead  a  charge  or  to  conduct  a  storm.  But  he  had,  too, 
that  of  which  no  thought  ever  entered  the  mind  of  Chris- 
tian for  an  instant — the  power  of  seeing  facts  in  their  in* 


80         Intervention  of  the  King  of  Denmark.      1 6 1 1 . 

finite  variety  as  they  really  were,  and  the  self-restraint 
vith  which  he  curbed  in  his  struggling  spirit  and  his 
passionate  longing  for  action  whenever  a  calm  survey  of 
the  conditions  around  showed  him  that  action  was  inex- 
pedient. In  all  the  pages  of  history  there  is  probably  no 
man  who  leaves  such  an  impression  of  that  energy  un- 
der restraint,  which  is  the  truest  mark  of  greatness  in 
human  character  as  it  is  the  source  of  all  that  is  sublime 
or  lovely  in  nature  or  in  art. 

Such  a  man  was  certain  not  to  be  a  mere  enthusiast 
embarking  heedlessly  in  a  Protestant  crusade.  Neither 
g  5.  His  con-  would  he  be  careful  for  mere  temporal  or 
land  and  political  power,  regardless  of  the  higher  in- 

Russia.  terests  of  his  time.     His  first  duty,  and  he 

never  forgot  it,  was  to  his  country.  When  he  came  to 
the  throne,  in  161 1,  Sweden  was  overrun  by  Danish 
armies,  and  in  an  almost  desperate  condition.  In  two 
years  he  had  wrested  a  peace  from  the  invaders,  under 
conditions  hard  indeed,  but  which  at  least  secured  the 
independence  of  Sweden.  His  next  effort,  an  effort  which 
to  the  day  of  his  death  he  never  relaxed,  was  to  bring  into 
his  own  hands  the  dominion  of  the  Baltic.  He  drove 
the  Russians  from  its  coasts.  '  Now,'  he  said  tri- 
umphantly in  1617,  'this  enemy  cannot,  without  our  per- 
mission launch  a  single  boat  upon  the  Baltic'  He  had 
another  enemy  more  dangerous  than  Russia.  Sigis- 
mund,  King  of  Poland,  was  his  cousin,  the  son  of  his 
father's  elder  brother,  who  had  been  driven  from  the 
throne  of  Sweden  for  his  attachment  to  the  Catholic  be- 
lief. And  so  Gustavus  was  involved  in  the  great  ques- 
tion which  was  agitating  Europe.  The  bare  legal  right 
which  gave  the  whole  of  the  seventeen  provinces  of  the 
Netherlands  to  Spain,  which  gave  Bohemia  to  Ferdi- 
nand, and  the  Protestant  bishoprics  and  the  secularized 


j 617.       Christian  IV.  and  Gustavus  Adolphus.        81 

lands  to  the  Catholic  clergy,  gave  also  Sweden  to  Sigis- 
mund.  Was  it  strange  if  Gustavus  stood  forth  to  com- 
bat this  doctrine  to  the  death,  or  if  in  his  mind  the 
growth  of  the  two  branches  of  the  House  of  Austria,  by 
whom  this  doctrine  was  maintained,  became  inextrica- 
bly blended  with  the  creed  which  that  doctrine  was  to 
favour  ?  Was  it  strange,  too,  if  Protestantism  and  the 
national  right  of  each  separate  country  to  go  its  own  way 
untrammelled  by  such  a  doctrine  appeared  in  his  eyes, 
as  in  his  days  for  the  most  part  they  really  were,  but 
two  forms  of  the  same  spirit  ? 

The  peace  concluded  by  Gustavus  with  Russia  in  1617 
was  accompanied  by  a  fresh  outbreak  of  the  war  with 
Poland ;  and  this  renewal  of  the  contest  with 
the  old  rival  of  his  house  naturally  drew  the  ^mlny.5*  M 
king's  attention  to  affairs  in  Germany  ;  for 
Ferdinand,  now  rising  into  power,  was  the  brother-in- 
law  of  Sigismund,  and  likely  to  give  him  what  aid  he 
could  in  his  Swedish  enterprise.  And  Gustavus,  too,  was 
not  quite  a  foreigner  in  Germany.  Through  his  mother 
German  blood  ran  in  his  veins,  and  when,  in  the  summer 
of  1618,  he  visited  Berlin  in  secret,  he  was  won  by  the 
lovely  face  of  the  daughter  of  that  energetic  Elector  of 
Brandenburg  who  after  boxing  the  ears  of  the  rival  can- 
didate for  the  dukedom  of  Cleves  had  adopted  the  Cal- 
vinist  creed  and  had  entered  the  Union.  The  death  of 
the  Elector  delayed  the  marriage,  and  it  was  not  till  1620 
chat,  on  a  second  visit,  Gustavus  wrung  a  consent  from 
the  new  Elector,  George  William,  whose  weakness  and 
vacillation  were  to  be  a  sore  trial  to  the  Swedish  king  in 
after  years.  In  strict  incognito,  Gustavus  travelled  as 
far  as  Heidelberg,  at  a  time  when  the  Elector  was  far 
away,  in  the  midst  of  his  short-lived  splendour  at  Prague, 
Gustavus    learned    something    from    that    visit    which 


82         Intervention  of  the  King  of  Denmark.     1624. 

he  never  forgot.  He  saw  the  rich  luxuriance  of  that  fair 
Rhine  valley,  stretching  away  till  the  western  hills  are 
but  dimly  visible  in  the  blue  distance,  and  which,  com- 
pared by  Venetian  travellers  to  the  green  Lombard 
plain,  must  have  caused  strange  sensations  of  wonder  in 
the  wanderer  from  the  cold  and  barren  north.  And  he 
saw  another  sight,  too,  which  he  never  forgot — the  wealth 
and  magnificence  of  the  Rhenish  prelates.  '  If  these 
priests  were  subjects  to  the  king  my  master'  (he  spoke 
in  the  assumed  character  of  a  Swedish  nobleman)  'he 
would  long  ago  have  taught  them  that  modesty,  humility, 
and  obedience  are  the  true  characteristics  of  their  pro- 
fession.' 

Plainly  in  this  man  there  was  something  of  Christian 

of  Anhalt,  something  of  the  desire  to  overthrow  existing 

institutions.     But   there   was   that    in    him 

V  7-     His 

daring  and      which  Christian  of  Anhalt  was  ignorant  of — ■ 

the  long  and  calm  preparation  for  the  crisis, 

and  the  power  of  establishing  a  new  order,  if  his  lite 

should  be  prolonged,  to  take  the  place  of  the  old  which 

was  falling  away. 

Gustavus  returned  to  carry  on  the  war  with  Poland 
•  c-n,  ,    with  renewed  vigour.     In  1621  Riga  surren- 

f  8.     Renewed  °  ° 

war  with  dered  to  him.     The  next  year  he  concluded 

a  truce  which  gave  him  leisure  to  look  about 
him. 
The   year    1624  brought  with   it  fresh   alarm.     The 
empire,  hostile  to  Sweden  and  the  religion  of  Sweden, 
.  .  was  growing  terribly  strong.     Unlike  Chris- 

terest  in  the  tian  of  Denmark,  Gustavus  had  sympathized 
with  Frederick's  Bohemian  undertaking,  al- 
though he  had  expected  but  little  from  an  enterprise 
under  Frederick's  guidance.  And  now  the  tide  of  vic- 
tory was  running  northward.     An  empire  with   a  firm 


1624.      Christian  IV.  and  Gustavus  Adolphus.         83 

grasp  on  the  shores  of  Mecklenburg  and  Pomerania 
would  soon  call  in  question  the  Swedish  dominion  of  the 
Baltic.  If  this  was  to  be  the  end,  Gustavus  had  gained 
but  little  by  his  victories  over  Russia  and  Poland. 

It  all  sounds  like  mere  selfishness, — Christian  alarmed 
for  his  family  bishoprics,  and  his  hold  upon  the  Elbe  and 
the  Weser ;  Gustavus  providing  against  an    „ 

•  ,  ,  §  10.     Charac- 

attack  upon  his  lordship  in  the  Baltic.  But  ter  of  his 
it  does  not  follow  that  with  both  of  them,  and  po  icy" 
especially  with  Gustavus,  the  defence  of  the  persecuted 
Gospel  was  not  a  very  real  thing.  Historians  coolly 
dissect  a  man's  thoughts  as  they  please,  and  label  them 
like  specimens  in  a  naturalist's  cabinet.  Such  a  thing, 
they  argue,  was  done  for  mere  personal  aggrandize- 
ment; such  a  thing  for  national  objects;  such  a  thing 
from  high  religious  motives.  In  real  life  we  may  be  sure 
it  was  not  so.  As  with  Ferdinand  and  Maximilian,  the 
love  of  law  and  orderly  government  was  indissolubly 
blended  with  the  desire  to  propagate  the  faith  on  which 
their  own  spiritual  life  was  based ;  so  it  was  with  Gus- 
tavus. To  extend  the  power  of  Sweden,  to  support  the 
princes  of  Germany  against  the  Emperor's  encroach- 
ments, to  give  a  firm  and  unassailable  standing  ground 
to  German  Protestantism,  were  all  to  him  parts  of  one 
great  work,  scarcely  even  in  thought  to  be  separated 
from  one  another.  And,  after  all,  let  it  never  be  for- 
gotten that  the  unity  which  he  attacked  was  the  unity  of 
the  Jesuit  and  the  soldier.  It  had  no  national  stand- 
ing ground  at  all.  The  Germany  of  a  future  day,  the 
Germany  of  free  intelligence  and  ordered  discipline, 
would  have  far  more  in  common  with  the  destroyer  than 
with  the  upholder  of  the  hollow  unity  of  the  seven- 
teenth century. 


84  Intervention  of  the  King  of  Denmark.      1624. 

Section  II. — English  Diplomacy. 
In  August  1624  two  English  ambassadors,  Sir  Robert 
Anstruthei  and  Sir  James  Spens,  set  out  from  London  ; 
1 1.  English  the  first  to  the  King  of  Denmark,  the  second 
Sweden  and  to  the  King  of  Sweden.  The  object  of  the 
Denmark.  embassies  was  identical,  to  urge  upon  the 

two  kings  the  necessity  of  stirring  themselves  up  to 
take  part  in  a  war  for  the  recovery  of  the  Palatinate,  and 
for  the  re-establishment  of  the  old  condition  of  things  in 
Germany. 

Christian  hesitated  only  so  far  as  to  wish  to  be  quite 
sure  that  James  was  too  much  in  earnest  to  turn  back  as 

he  had  turned  back  in  162 1.  Anstruther  was 
Danish  to    go    round    the  circle  of  the  princes  of 

Lower  Saxony,  and  as  soon  as  a  favorable 
report  was  received  from  them,  and  the  impression  made 
by  that  report  was  strengthened  by  the  news  of  Mansfeld's 
preparations  in  England,  Christian  engaged  to  take  part 
in  the  war. 

Gustavus  was  far  more  cautious.  Never  doubting  for 
a  moment  that  the  task  before  him  was  one  of  enormous 

magnitude,  he  argued  that  it  would  not  be 

I  3.     Fore-  &  .'  & 

sight  of  Gus-  too  much  if  all  who  had  reason  to  complain 
of  the  House  of  Austria,  from  Bethlen 
Gabor  in  the  east  to  Lewis  of  France  in  the  west,  were  to 
join  heart  and  soul  in  the  great  enterprise.  With  this 
view  he  was  already  in  close  communication  with  his 
brother-in-law,  George  William,  the  Elector  of  Branden- 
burg, who  for  once  in  his  life  was  eager  for  war,  perhaps 
because  he  had  hardly  reached  to  a  full  conception  of 
all  that  such  a  war  implied. 

Gustavus,  too,  had  his  own  ideas  about  the  way  in 
which  the  war  was  to  be  carried  on.  In  the  first  place 
there   must  be   no  divided  command,  and  he  himself 


1625.  English  Diplomacy.  85 

must  have  the  whole  military  direction  of  the  troops. 
A  certain  number  of  men  must  be  actually  levied,  and 
a  certain  sum  of  money  actually  paid  into  » 4  jjis 
his  hands.  To  the  mere  promises  which  answer- 
satisfied  Christian  he  would  not  listen.  And  besides,  two 
ports,  one  en  the  Baltic,  the  other  on  the  North  Sea,  must 
be  given  over  to  him  in  order  to  secure  his  communica- 
tions. Perhaps,  however,  the  part  of  his  scheme  which 
gives  the  greatest  evidence  of  his  prescience  is  that 
which  relates  to  France.  Avoiding  the  rock  upon  which 
the  English  government  was  splitting,  he  made  no  at- 
tempt to  force  a  Catholic  sovereign  like  Lewis  into 
over-close  union  with  the  Protestant  powers.  Help  from 
France  he  would  most  willingly  have  if  he  could  get  it ; 
but  he  argued  that  it  would  be  better  for  the  French 
forces  to  find  a  sphere  of  action  for  themselves  in  South 
Germany  or  Italy,  far  away  from  the  regions  in  which 
Gustavus  himself  hoped  to  operate  at  the  head  of  a  purely 
Protestant  army. 

In  January  1625  the  answers  of  the  two  kings  were 
Known  in  England.  Of  the  50,000  men  demanded  by 
Gustavus,  17,000  were  to  be  paid  out  of  the  1625. 

English   exchequer.     Till  four  months'  pay   fJopts  the  " 
had  been  provided  he  would  not  stir.     He,    Damsh  Plan- 
for  his  part,  had  no  intention  of  being  a  second  Mans/eld, 
.the  leader  of  an  army  driven  by  sheer  necessity  to  exist 
upon  pillage. 

Christian's  ideas  were  framed  on  a  more  moderate 
scale.  He  thought  that  30,000  men  would  be  sufficient  al- 
together, and  that  6,000  would  be  enough  to 

r  f,  11  r  t-       1  ,      t  ?6-     Thinking 

fall  to  the  share  of  England.     Both  James    it  easier  to 
and  Charles  declared  that  if  they  must  make    tian\]ian  "S" 
a  choice   they  preferred  the   Danish  plan.    Gustavus- 
Even  6,000  men  would  cost  them  30,000/.  a  month,  and, 


86  Intervention  of  the  King  of  Denmark.       1625. 

though  the  French  marriage  was  settled,  Parliament  had 
not  yet  been  summoned  to  vote  the  subsidies  on  which 
alone  such  an  expenditure  could  be  based.  But  they 
did  not  yet  understand  that  a  choice  was  necessary. 
They  thought  that  Gustavus  might  still  come  in  as  an 
auxiliary  to  the  Danish  armament.  To  this  suggestion, 
however,  Gustavus  turned  a  deaf  ear.  He  had  no  con- 
fidence in  Christian,  or  in  allies  who  had  taken  so  scant 
a  measure  of  the  difficulties  before  them.  It  was  true,  he 
replied  to  a  remonstrance  from  the  English  ambassador, 
that  he  had  asked  for  hard  conditions.  '  But,'  he  added, 
'  if  anyone  thinks  it  easy  to  make  war  upon  the  most 
powerful  potentate  in  Europe,  and  upon  one,  too,  who 
has  the  support  of  Spain  and  of  so  many  of  the  German 
princes,  besides  being  supported,  in  a  word,  with  the 
whole  strength  of  the  Roman  Catholic  alliance ;  and  if 
he  also  thinks  it  easy  to  bring  into  common  action  so 
many  minds,  each  having  in  view  their  own  separate 
object  and  to  regain  for  their  own  masters  so  many  lands 
out  of  the  power  of  those  who  tenaciously  hold  them,  we 
shall  be  quite  willing  to  leave  to  him  the  glory  of  his 
achievement,  and  all  its  accompanying  advantages.' 

With  these  words  of  bitter  irony  Gustavus  turned  away 
for  a  time  from  the  German  war  to  fight  out  his   own 

quarrel  with  the  King  of  Poland,  a  quarrel 
I  7.    Gustavus       ,.,,        ,  ,    ,  I         ,  ,  . 

attacks  which  he  always  held  to   be  subservient  to 

the  general  interests  in  so  far  as  it  hindered 
Sigismund  from  taking  part  in  the  larger  conflict. 

Christian's  more  sanguine  ideas  were  soon  to  be  put 
Aj  the  test.  In  March  James  of  England  died,  and  two 
f8.  Attempt  months  later  Charles  I.  entered  into  an 
fulfil  Ws"  t0  engagement  to  supply  the  king  of  Denmark 
engagements.  wjth  30,000/.  a  m0nth,  and  scraped  together 
46,000/.  to  make   a  beginning.      Mansfeld,   it  was  ar- 


l62ij.  Wallensteiri ' s  Ar/nament.  87 

ranged,  should  abandon  his  hopeless  attempt  to  reach 
the  Palatinate  along  the  Rhine,  and  should  convey  the 
remnants  of  his  force  by  the  sea  to  the  assistance  of 
Christian. 

After,  all,  however,  the  main  point  was  the  success  or 
failure  of  the  king  to  gain  support  in  Germany  itself. 
The  circle  of  Lower  Saxony,  indeed,  chose   §9.   Com- 
him  for  its  military  chief.     But  even  then    ™XfSSLh 
there  was  much  division  of  opinion.     With    war- 
the  commercial  classes  in  the  towns  war  against  the 
Emperor  was  as  yet  decidedly  unpopular.     They  were 
tolerably  well  assured  that  they  would  reap  no  benefit 
from  any  accession  of  strength  to  the  princes,  whilst  the 
danger  from  the  Emperor  was  still  in  the  future.     But 
they  were  not  strong  enough  to  carry  the  circle  with  them. 
A  centre  of  resistance  was  formed,  which  must  be  broken 
down  if  the  Emperor's  pretensions  were  not  to  be  abated. 
On  July  c8  Tilly  crossed  the  Weser  into  Lower  Saxony, 
and  the  Danish  war  began. 

Sectiqh  III. —  Wallensteiri  $  Armament. 
Would  Tilly's  force  be  sufficient  to  overcome  the  King 
of  Denmark  and  his  foreign  allies  i    Ferdinand  and  his 
ministers  doubted  it.     In  proportion  as  his    ,       _.    _ 

K      r  §  t.     The  Em- 

power increased,  the  basis  on  which  it  rested    peror's  need 

grew  narrower.  Of  his  allies  of  1620  the 
League  alone  supported  him  still.  Spain,  exhausted  for 
the  time  with  die  siege  of  Breda,  could  do  little  for  him, 
and  contented  herself  with  forming  clever  plans  for  ca- 
joling the  Elector  of  Saxony,  and  with  urging  the  Pope 
to  flatter  the  Lutherans  by  declaring  them  to  be  far 
better  than  the  Calvinists.  Of  all  such  schemes  as  this 
nothing  satisfactory  was  likely  to  come.  John  George  of 
Saxony,  indeed,  refused  to  joicriarthe'King  of  Denmark's 
H 


88  Intervention  of  the  King  of  Denmark.       1625. 

movement.  He  thought  that  the  Lower  Saxony  princes 
ought  to  have  been  content  with  the  agreement  of  Miihl- 
hausen,  and  that  Frederick  ought  to  have  made  his  sub- 
mission to  the  Emperor.  But  even  in  the  eyes  of  John 
George  the  Lower  Saxon  war  was  very  different  from  the 
Bohemian  war.  The  Emperor's  refusal  to  confirm  perma- 
nently the  Protestant  bishoprics  had  made  it  impossible  for 
any  Protestant  to  give  him  more  than  a  passive  support. 
And  if  the  Emperor's  friends  were  fewer,  his  enemies 
were  more  numerous.  Christian  IV.  was  more  formidable 
than  Frederick.     Bethlen  Gabor,  who  had 

i  2.     His 

numerous  made  peace  in  1622,  was  again  threatening 

enemies.  .      ,,  .  ,  ,.  , 

in  the  east ;  and  no  one  could  say  how  soon 
France  might  be  drawn  into  the  strife  in  the  west.  Fer- 
dinand needed  another  army  besides  Tilly's.  Yet  his 
treasury  was  so  empty  that  he  could  not  afford  to  pay  a 
single  additional  regiment. 

Suddenly,  in  the  midst  of  his  difficulties,  one  of  his  own 
subjects  offered  to  take  the  burden  on  his  shoulders. 
i  3.  Waller*-  Albert  of  Waldstein,  commonly  known  as 
stem's  offer.  Walienstein,  sprang  from  an  impoverished 
branch  of  one  of  the  greatest  of  the  families  of  the  Bohe- 
mian aristocracy.  His  parents  were  Lutheran,  but 
when,  at  the  age  of  twelve,  he  was  left  an  orphan,  he 
was  placed  under  the  care  of  an  uncle,  who  attempted  to 
educate  him  in  the  strict  school  of  the  Bohemian  Brother- 
hood, a  body  better  known  in  later  times  under  the  name 
of  Moravians,  and  distinguished,  as  they  are  now,  for 
their  severe  moral  training. 

The  discipline  of  the  brethren  seems  to  have  had 
much  the  same  influence  upon  the  young  nobleman  that 
?4.    His  the  long  sermons  of  the  Scotch  Presbyte- 

carlyhfe.  rians  had  upon  Charles  II.     The  boy  found 

his  way  to  the  Jesuits  at  Olmiitz,  and  adopted  their  religion, 


1 62^.  Wallensteiri 's  Armament.  89 

so  far  as  he  adopted  any  religion  at  all.  His  real  faith 
was  in  himself  and  in  the  revelations  of  astrology,  that 
mystic  science  which  told  him  how  the  bright  rulers  of 
the  sky  had  marked  him  out  for  fame.  For  a  young  Pro- 
testant of  ability  without  wealth  there  was  no  room  in 
Bohemia  under  the  shadow  of  the  great  houses.  With 
Ferdinand,  as  yet  ruler  only  of  his  three  hereditary 
duchies,  he  found  a  soldier's  welcome,  and  was  not  long 
in  displaying  a  soldier's  capacity  for  war.  To  Wallen- 
stein  no  path  came  amiss  which  led  to  fortune.  A 
wealthy  marriage  made  him  the  owner  of  large  estates. 
When  the  revolution  broke  out  he  was  colonel  of  one  of 
the  regiments  in  the  service  of  the  Estates  of  Moravia. 
The  population  and  the  soldiers  were  alike  hostile  to  the 
Emperor.  Seizing  the  cash-box  of  the  estates  he  rode 
off,  in  spite  of  all  opposition,  to  Vienna.  Ferdinand  re- 
fused to  accept  booty  acquired  after  the  fashion  of  a 
highwayman,  and  sent  the  money  back  to  be  used 
against  himself.  The  Moravians  said  openly  that  Wal- 
lenstein  was  no  gentleman.  But  the  events  which  were 
hurrying  on  brought  his  name  into  prominence  in  con- 
nexion with  more  legitimate  warfare,  and  he  had  become 
famous  for  many  a  deed  of  skill  and  daring  before 
Frederick's  banner  sunk  before  the  victors  on  the  White 
Hill. 

Wallenstein  was  now  in  a  position  to  profit  by  his 
master's  victory.  Ferdinand  was  not  a  man  of  business. 
In  peace  as  in  war  he  gladly  left  details  to    „ 

,  j      1  1 1       ■    1  •  ,8S.     Offers  to 

others,  and  there  were  good  pickings  to  be    raise  an 
had  out  of  the  ruin  of  the  defeated  aristoc-   army- 
racy.     Besides   the   lands   which   fell  to   Wallenstein's 
share  as  a  reward  for  his  merit,  he  contrived  to  purchase 
large  estates  at  merely  nominal  prices.     Before  long  he 
was   the  richest  landowner  in  Bohemia.     He   became 


90  Intervention  of  the  King  of  De?imark.       1625. 

Prince  of  Friedland.  And  now,  when  Ferdinand's  diffi- 
culties were  at  their  height,  Wallenstein  came  forward 
offering  to  raise  an  army  at  his  own  cost.  The  Emperor 
needed  not  to  trouble  himself  about  its  pay.  Nor  was  it 
to  be  fed  by  mere  casual  plunder.  Wherever  it  was 
cantoned  the  general  would  raise  contributions  from  the 
constituted  authorities.  Discipline  would  thus  be  main- 
tained, and  the  evils  upon  which  Mansfeld's  projects  had 
been  wrecked  would  be  easily  avoided. 

Modern  criticism  has  rejected  the  long  accredited 
story  of  Wallenstein's  assertion  at  this  time  that  he 
. ,    r-.  could   find   means  to  support   an  army  of 

0  6.      1  he  J 

larger  the  50,000  men,  but  not  an  army  of  20,000.     It 

is  certain  that  his  original  request  was  for 
only  20,000.  But  the  idea  was  sure  to  occur  to  him 
sooner  or  later.  Government  by  military  force  was  the 
essence  of  his  proposal,  and  for  that  purpose  the  larger 
the  number  of  his  army  the  better. 

The  connexion  between  two  men  whose  characters 

differed  so  widely  as  those  of  Ferdinand  and  Wallenstein 

,,    ,  was  from  first  to  last  of  a  nature  to  excite 

\  7.  Ferdi- 
nand cannot  curiosity.  Yet,  after  all,  it  was  only  the  natu- 
ral result  of  Ferdinand's  own  methods  of 
government.  The  ruler  who  knows  nothing  beyond  the 
duty  of  putting  the  law  in  execution,  whilst  he  shuts  his 
eyes  to  the  real  requirements  of  those  for  whom  the  law 
ought  to  have  been  made,  must  in  the  end  have  recourse 
to  the  sword  to  maintain  him  and  his  legality  from  de- 
struction. 

The  substitution  of  contributions  for  pillage  may  have 

seemed   to   Ferdinand  a  mode  of  having  recourse  to    a 

lesral,  orderly  way  of  making  war.    Unfortu- 

§8.     Wallen-  6    ,'  ,  .         .  .        ,  .    ., 

Ftein's  sys-         nately  for  him,  it  was  not  so.     As  the  civil 
laws  of  the  Empire  gave  him  no  right  to  raise 


1625.  Wallenstein  s  Armament.  91 

a  penny  for  military  purposes  without  the  assent  of  the 
Diet,  and  as,  in  the  distracted  condition  of  Germany, 
the  Diet  was  no  longer  available  for  the  purpose,  no  one 
was  likely  to  regard  money  so  raised  as  legal  in  any  sense 
at  all.  In  fact,  it  could  only  be  justified  as  Charles  I. 
justified  the  forced  loan  of  1626,  as  an  act  done  out  of 
the  plenitude  of  power  inherent  in  the  Crown,  authorizing 
him  to  provide  in  cases  of  emergency  for  the  good  of  his 
subjects.  Ferdinand,  in  truth, had  brought  himself  into 
a  position  from  which  he  could  neither  advance  nor  re- 
treat with  honour.  If  he  did  not  accept  Wallenstein's 
services  he  would  almost  certainly  be  beaten.  If  he  did 
accept  them,  he  would  almost  certainly  raise  a  feeling 
in  Germany  which  would  provoke  a  still  stronger  opposi- 
tion than  that  which  he  had  for  the  present  to  deal  with. 
For  the  contributions  were  to  be  raised  by  military 
authority,  with  no  check  or  control  whatever  from  civil 
officials.     Even   if  the   utmost   moderation    ,        .     , 

$  g.     Modera- 

was  used  there  was  something  utterly  exas-    ticm  impossible 

. •■  ,,        .  .         to  Wallenstein. 

perating  to  the  peasant  or  the  townsman  in 
having  to  pay  over  a  greater  or  less  share  of  his  hoard- 
ings to  a  colonel  who  had  no  civil  authority  to  produce, 
and  who  had  no  limit  to  his  demands  excepting  in  his 
own  conscience.  Those  who  expected  that  moderation 
would  be  used  must  have  formed  a  very  sanguine  idea 
of  the  influence  of  the  events  of  the  war  upon  ordinary 
military  character. 

In  point  of  fact,  neither  Wallenstein  nor  his  soldiers 
thought  of  moderation.  With  him  there  was  just  enough 
of  regularity  to  preserve  the  discipline  he  a  IO  Wailen- 
needed;  just  enough  order  to  wring  the  ut-  st«»sarmy. 
most  possible  amount  of  money  out  of  the  country, 
'God  help  the  land  to  which  these  men  come,'  was  the 
natural  exclamation  of  a  frightened  official  who  watched 
the  troops  march  past  him. 


92  Intervention  of  the  King  of  Denmark.      1625. 

How  was  it  then,  if  Wallenstein's  system  was  no  better 
than  Mansfeld's  system  more  thoroughly  organized,  that 
\  11.  Ex-  he  did  not  meet  with  Mansfeld's  misfor- 
?Va"lenstei°n's  tunes  ?  The  true  explanation  doubtless  is 
success.  that  he  was  able  to  avoid  the  cause  of  Mans- 

feld's misfortunes.  Mansfeld  was  a  rolling  stone  from/ 
the  beginning.  With  troops  supporting  themselves  by 
plunder,  he  had  to  make  head  against  armies  in  excellent 
condition,  and  commanded  by  such  generals  as  Tilly  and 
Cordova,  before  his  own  men  had  acquired  the  consist- 
ency of  a  disciplined  army.  Wallenstein  made  up  his 
mind  that  it  should  not  be  so  with  him.  He  would  lead 
his  new  troops  where  there  was  much  to  be  gained  and 
little  to  do.  In  due  course  of  time  they  would  learn  to 
have  confidence  in  him  as  their  leader,  and  would  be 
ready  to  march  further  under  his  orders. 

In  the  autumn,  Wallenstein  entered  the  dioceses  of 
Magdeburg  and  Halberstadt,  levying  the  means  of  sup- 
j?  12.  Walien-  port  for  his  army  upon  rich  and  poor.  Nor 
amuron  of6  were  the  requirements  of  himself  and  his 
l625,  men  like  the  modest  requirements  of  Tilly. 

With  him  every  man  was  more  highly  paid.  Splendid 
equipments  and  magnificence  of  every  kind  were  ne- 
cessaries of  life  to  the  general  and  his  officers,  and  the 
example  was  quickly  followed,  so  far  as  imitation  was 
possible,  in  the  lower  ranks  of  the  army.  To  Tilly's 
entreaties  for  aid  Wallenstein  turned  a  deaf  ear,  and  left 
him  to  carry  on  the  war  against  the  Danes  as  best  he 
could.  He  was  doubtless  wise  in  refusing  to  expose  his 
recruits  so  early  to  the  fierce  trial  of  battle.  With  him 
everything  was  based  on  calculation.  Even  his  luxury 
and  splendour  would  serve  to  fix  upon  him  the  eyes  of 
his  soldiers,  and  to  hold  out  to  them  another  prospect 
than  that  of  the  endless  hardships,  varied  by  an  occa- 


1 626.  Wj.Uensteit{ s  ArmamcnL  93 

sional  debauch  at  the  storming  of  a  town,  which  was  the 
lot  of  those  who  followed  Tilly.  Yet  Wallenstein  never 
allowed  this  luxury  and  splendour  to  stand  in  the  way  of 
higher  objects.  He  was  himself  a  strategist  of  no  mean 
order.  He  had  a  keen  eye  for  military  capacity.  He 
never  troubled  himself  to  inquire  what  a  man's  religion 
was  if  he  thought  he  could  render  good  service  as  a 
soldier.  There  were  generals  in  his  army  whose  an- 
cestry was  as  illustrious  as  that  of  any  sovereign  in 
Europe,  and  generals  who  had  no  other  title  to  eminence 
than  their  skill  and  valour.  High  and  low  were  equal 
before  his  military  code.  Honours  and  rewards  were 
dispensed  to  the  brave :  his  friendship  was  accorded  to 
those  who  had  been  distinguished  for  special  acts  of 
daring. 

It  was  a  new  power  in  Germany,  a  power  which  had  no 
connexion  with  the  princes  of  the  Empire,  scarcely  more 
than  a    nominal   connexion  with  the    Em-    . 

$  13.     Wallea- 

peror  himself.     And  the  man  who  wielded  stein  not  a 
it  was  not  even  a  German.     By  his  birth  he 
was  a  Bohemian,  of  Slavonian  race.    The  foremost  men 
of  the  war,  Tilly,  Wallenstein,  Gustavus,  were  foreigners. 
Germany  had  failed  to  produce  either  a  statesman  or  a 
warrior  of  the  first  rank. 

During  the  winter,  negotiations  for  peace  were  opened 
at  Brunswick.  But  they  foundered  on  the  old  rock.  The 
Emperor  and  the  League  would  grant  the  re^, 

terms  of  Mfihlhausen  and  nothing  more.  It  |fs iea(^.ail,!ire 
was  against  their  consciences  to  grant  a  per-  negotiation 
manent  guarantee  to  the  Protestant  administrators,  and 
to  admit  them  to  the  full  enjoyment  of  the  privileges  of 
princes  of  the  Empire.  With  this  the  Lower  Saxon 
princes  refused  to  be  contented.  Amongst  the  means 
by  which  the  chapters  had  secured  their  Protestant  cha- 


94         Intervention  of  the  King  of  Denmark.     1626. 

racter  were  some  acts  of  formal  and  even  of  technical 
illegality.  Such  acts  might  easily  be  made  use  of  by  the 
Emperor  and  his  council  to  effect  an  alteration  in  the 
character  of  those  bodies.  The  Emperor  and  his  coun- 
cil might  possibly  intend  to  be  just,  but  somehow  or  an- 
other they  always  contrived  to  decide  disputed  questions 
in  favour  of  their  own  partisans.  Cm  behalf  of  the  reli- 
gious and  political  institutions  of  Protestant  Germany, 
the  King  of  Denmark  and  his  allies  refused  to  accept  the 
terms  which  had  been  offered  them,  and  demanded  that 
Protestant  territories  should  receive  a  legal  and  perma- 
nent confirmation  of  their  right  to  continue  Protestant. 


Section  IV. — Defeat  of '  Mans f eld and  Christian  IV. 

When  the  campaign  opened,  in  the  spring  of  1626,  the 
numbers  at  the  disposal  of  the  two  belligerents  were  not 
f«.  Campaign  so  very  unequal.  Wallenstein's  forces  had 
of  1626.  been  swelling  far  beyond  his  original  reckon- 

ing. He  and  Tilly  together,  it  is  said  could  command 
the  services  of  70,000  men,  whilst  60,000  were  ready  to 
march  against  them.  On  Christian's  side  were  fighting 
Mansfeld  and  Christian  of  Brunswick,  and  a  nobler  than 
either,  John  Ernest  of  Saxe-Weimar,  on  whom,  first  of 
German  men,  the  idea  had  dawned  of  composing  the 
distractions  of  his  fatherland  by  proclaiming  a  general 
toleration.  Bethlen  Gabor  was  once  more  threatening 
Vienna  from  the  side  of  Hungary.  Even  the  Protestant 
peasants  in  Lower  Austria  had  risen  in  defence  of  their 
religion  and  their  homes  against  the  Bavarian  garrisons 
which  guarded  the  land  till  their  master's  expenses 
had  been  paid. 

In  other  respects  than  numbers,  however,  the  condi- 
tions were  most  unequal.     Tilly  and  Wallenstein  both 


1626.      Defeat  of  Mansfeld  and  Christian  IV.         95 
quartered    their    troops    on    the    enemy's    .       „  .   '. 

n  .   .  r     .  \ z-     Christian 

country.  In  raising  supplies  they  had  no  sus-  IV.  at  a  dis- 
ceptibilities  to  consult,  no  friendly  princes  van  ge' 
or  cities  to  spare.  Christian,  on  the  other  hand,  was  still 
amongst  his  allies,  and  was  forced,  on  pain  of  driving 
them  over  to  the  Emperor,  to  show  them  every  consid- 
eration. And  in  the  midst  of  these  difficulties  one  source 
of  supply  on  which  he  had  been  justified  in  counting  en- 
tirely failed  him. 

Charles  I.  of  England  had  engaged  in  the  spring  of 
1625  to  pay  over  to  the  King  of  Denmark  30,000/.  a 
month,  reckoning  that  Parliament  would  enable  him  to 
fulfil  his  promise.  Parliament  met  in  May,  but  it  had 
no  confidence  either  in  Charles  or  in  his  1625. 

favourite  and  adviser,  the  Duke  of  Bucking-  fj^,'  English 
Ham.  A  war  carried  on  in  Germany  with  suPPlies- 
English  money  was  most  distasteful  to  the  English  feel- 
ing. The  session  came  to  an  end  after  a  vote  of  a  bare 
140,000/.,  to  meet  a  war  expenditure  scarcely,  if  at  all, 
short  of  1,000,000/.  a  year.  Still  Charles  persisted.  In 
the  winter  Buckingham  went  over  to  Holland  and  nego- 
tiated the  Treaty  of  the  Hague,  by  which  the  Dutch  were 
to  pay  5,000/.  a  month,  and  the  English  renewed  their 
obligation  to  pay  the  30,000/.  already  promised  to  Chris- 
tian IV.  This  time,  it  was  thought,  a  fresh  Parliament 
would  be  ready  to  take  up  the  king's  engagement.  But 
the  fresh  Parliament  proved  more  recalcitrant  than  its 
predecessor.  The  sum  of  46,000/.  which  had  been  sent 
across  the  seas  in  May  1625  was  the  only  representative 
of  Charles'  promised  support. 

Christian  of  Denmark  and  his  allies,  therefore,  were 
to   some   extent   in   the   position   in  which  1626. 

Mansfeld  had  been  in  1621  and  1622.     If    ^S 
not  utterly  without  resource,  they  were  sadly   army- 


96  Intervention  of  the  King  of  Denmark.      1626. 

straitened,  and  were  obliged  to  govern  their  movements 
by  the  necessity  of  finding  supplies  rather  than  by  mili- 
tary calculations. 

Mansfeld  was  the  first  to  meet  the  enemy.     For  some 

time  he  had  been  quartered  beyond  the  Elbe,  making 

himself  troublesome  to  the  Liibeckers  and 

2  5.     Mans- 
feld in  the  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg.    But  this  could 

not  go   on   for  ever.     Wallenstein  was   in 

front  of  him,  and  he  must  fight  him,  or  leave  him  to  join 

Tilly  against  the  king. 

Wallenstein  never,  in  his  whole  career,  exposed  his 

men  to  a  battle  in  the  open  field  if  he  could  help  it ;  and 

least  of  all  was  he  likely  to  do  so  whilst  they  were  yet 

untried.     He  seized  upon  the  bridge  of  Dessau  over  the 

Elbe,  and,  having  fortified  it  strongly,  waited  for  Mans- 

„    ,     ,    feld  to  do  his  work.     On  April  25  Mansfeld 

g6.     Battle  of  .  ,      ,      .    .  • 

the  bridge  of  appeared.  In  vain  he  dashed  his  troops 
against  the  entrenchments,  Then,  watch- 
ing a  favourable  opportunity,  Wallenstein  ordered  a 
charge.  The  enemy  fled  in  confusion  and  the  victory 
was  gained. 

Not  long  after  Mansfeld's  defeat  at  the  bridge  of 
Dessau,  Christian  of  Brunswick  died.  The  remaining 
g  7.  Mans-  chiefs  of  the  Danish  party  had  a  desperate 
towards"0  game  to  play.  Mansfeld,  reinforced  by  John 
Hungary.  Ernest  of  Weimar,  was  dispatched  through 

Silesia,  to  hold  out  a  hand  to  Bethlen  Gabor.  Wallen- 
stein followed  in  pursuit,  after  sending  some  of  his  regi- 
ments to  the  assistance  of  Tilly. 

What  could  Christian  do  in  the  face  of  the  danger  ? 
The  English  subsidies  did  not  come.     To  remain  on  the 

,  „    _  defensive  was  to  court  starvation,  with  its 

\ 8-    The  •  •  -i-i       j 

battle  of  inevitable  accompaniment,  mutiny.    Elated 

by  a  slight  success  over  the  enemy,  he  made 


£626.     Defeat  of  Mansf eld  and  Christian  IV.  97 

a  dash  at  Thuringia,  hoping  to  slip  through  into  Bo- 
hemia, and  to  combine  with  Bethlen  Gabor  and  Mans- 
feld  in  raising  the  old  Protestant  flag  in  the  heart  of  the 
Emperor's  hereditary  dominions.  But  Tilly  was  on  the 
watch.  On  August  27  he  came  up  with  the  Danish  army 
at  Lutter.  The  fight  was  fiercely  contested.  But  before 
it  was  decided  a  cry  arose  from  some  of  the  men  in  the 
Danish  ranks  that  they  would  fight  no  longer  without 
pay.  Christian  was  driven  from  the  field.  In  after  days 
he  complained  bitterly  that  if  the  King  of  England  had 
fulfilled  his  promises  the  battle  would  have  ended  other- 
wise. 

The  soldiers  lent  by  Wallenstein  to  Tilly  had  borne 
them  well  in  the  fight.  Wallenstein  himself  was  far 
away.  Mansfeld  had  been  welcomed  by  the  Protestants 
of  Silesia,  and  when  Wallenstein  followed  he  found  the 
principal  towns  garrisoned  by  the  enemy.  ^  „  M»ns- 
By  the  time  he  reached  Hungary  Mansfeld  'e'ds  death- 
had  joined  Bethlen  Gabor.  Once  more  Wallenstein 
pursued  his  old  tactics.  Taking  up  a  strong  position,  he 
left  his  opponents  to  do  what  they  could.  The  events 
showed  that  his  calculations  were  well  founded.  Bethlen 
Gabor  had  counted  on  help  from  the  Turks.  But  the 
Turks  gave  him  no  adequate  assistance,  and  he  did  not 
venture  to  repeat  unaided  the  operation  of  the  bridge  of 
Dessau,  and  to  attack  Wallenstein  in  his  entrenchments. 
He  preferred  making  a  truce,  one  of  the  conditions  of 
which  was  that  Mansfeld  should  be  expelled  from  Hun- 
gary. On  his  way  to  Venice  the  great  adventurer  was 
seized  by  a  mortal  disease.  The  unconquerable  man, 
like  an  old  northern  warrior,  refused  to  die  in  a  bed. 
'Raise  me  up,'  he  said  to  his  friends,  '  I  am  dying  now.' 
Propped  up  in  an  upright  position  in  their  arms,  and  gaz- 
ing out  upon  the  dawn,  which  was  lighting  up  the  hill* 


9  8  Stralsund  and  Roche  lie.  1626. 

with  the  first  rays  of  morning,  he  passed  away.  '  Be 
united,  united,'  he  murmured  with  his  last  breath ;  '  hoM 
out  like  men.'  His  own  absence  from  the  scene  would 
perhaps  remove  one  of  the  chief  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
union. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

STRALSUND   AND   ROCHELLE. 

Section  I. — Fresh  Successes  of  Wallenstein. 
Differences  had  already  arisen  between  Wallenstein 
and  the  League.     It  was  understood  that  the  defeat  of 
1626.  the  northern  rebels  would  lead  to  confisca- 

tions in°theSCa"  tions  in  the  north,  as  the  defeat  of  Frederick 
north.  ^ad  jeci  to  confiscations  in  the  south.     To 

part  at  least  of  the  land  of  one  of  the  defeated  princes 
the  Elector  of  Mentz  laid  claim.  Wallenstein  wished  to 
have  it  all  for  George  of  Luneburg,  who,  Lutheran  as  he 
was,  had  held  high  command  in  the  imperial  army. 

The  quarrel  was  more  than  a  mere  personal  dispute. 

The  League  wished  to  pursue  the  old  policy  of  pushing 

forward  the  interests  of  the  Catholic  clergy 

I  2.     Wallen-  ,  OJ 

stein  ad-  under  cover  of  legality.    Wallenstein  wished 

religious  Catholic  and  Protestant,  already  united  in 

equality.  njs  arrriy>  to  be  equally  united  in  the  Em- 

pire. Rebellion  would  then  be  the  only  punishable 
crime ;  loyalty,  and  especially  the  loyalty  of  his  own  of- 
ficers, the  only  virtue  to  be  rewarded. 

Another  question  between  the  two  powers  reached 
almost  as  deeply.  The  League  demanded  that  Wallen- 
j!  3.  Comes  stein  should  support  his  army  upon  supplies 
triththe'51  taken  from  the  Protestants  alone.    Wallen- 

>^ague.  stein  asserted  his  right,  as  the  Emperor'* 


r62G.  Fresh  Successes  of  Wallenstein.  99 

general,  to  quarter  his  men  where  he  would,  and  to  levy 
contributions  for  their  maintenance  even  on  the  terri- 
tories of  the  League. 

For  the  first  time  for  many  a  long  year,  a  friendly  voice 
had  been  heard  urging  the  Emperor  in  the  only  wise 
direction.  Ferdinand,  turning  aside  from  the    \  4.    Walien- 

,-  r  iv  t  t-        stein  could 

promotion  of  a  sectional  policy,  was,  11  he  not  found 
would  listen  to  Wallenstein,  to  place  the  unity  umty- 
of  the  Empire  above  the  interests  of  the  princes,  by  rest- 
ing it  on  the  basis  of  religious  equality.  Unhappily  that 
advice  was  tendered  to  him  by  a  man  who  could  not 
offer  him  security  for  the  realization  of  so  wise  a  policy. 
To  stand  above  parties  it  is  necessary  to  obtain  the  con- 
fidence of  a  nation,  and  how  could  men  have  confidence 
in  Wallenstein  ?  Durable  institutions  may  be  guarded  by 
the  sword.  They  cannot  be  founded  by  the  sword.  All 
that  was  known  of  Wallenstein  in  Germany  was  that  he 
was  master  of  an  army  more  numerous  and  more  oppres- 
sive than  that  of  Tilly.  German  unity,  coming  in  the 
shape  of  boundless  contributions  and  extortions,  and  en« 
forced  by  the  example  of  starving  peasants  and  burning 
villages,  was  not  likely  to  prove  very  attractive. 

It  is  strange  that  the  better  part  of  Wallenstein's  pro- 
gramme did  not  repel  Ferdinand  at  once.     But  Ferdi- 
nand  never  made  up  his  mind  in  a  hurry    \  5.    Wallen- 
when  there  were  difficulties  on  both  sides,    ference'with 
and  he  was  accustomed  to  defer  to  the  opi-    Eggenberg. 
nion  of  his  chief  minister,  Eggenberg.     In  November 
Wallenstein  held  a  conference  with  that  minister.     He 
unfolded  all  his  scheme.     He  would  increase  his  army, 
if  it  were  necessary,  to  70,000  men.     With  such  a  force 
he  would  be  able  to  avoid  a  pitched  battle,  always  dan- 
gerous to  troops  not  thoroughly  inured  to  campaigning. 
By  the  occupation  of  superior  strategical  points,  he  would 


I  oo  Stralsund  and  Roche  lie.  1 6  2  7. 

be  able  to  out-manoeuvre  the  enemy.  And  then  Fer- 
dinand would  be  master  in  Germany.  The  whole  of  the 
Empire  would  be  brought  under  contribution.  There 
would  be  submission  at  home,  and  abroad  no  power 
would  be  strong  enough  to  lay  a  finger  upon  the  re-esta- 
blished Empire. 

Eggenberg  was  easily  persuaded,  and  when  Eggenberg 
was  won,  Ferdinand  was  won.    In  January,  Wallenstein 

was  created   Duke  of  Friedland,  a  higher 
1627. 
I  6.  Ferdi-         title  than  that  of  Prince  of  Friedland,  which 

ports  Wal-  ne  already  bore,  in  token  of  the  Emperor's 
lenstein.  approbation.      If    only   Wallenstein   could 

have  shown  Ferdinand  the  way  to  win  the  hearts  of 
Germans  as  readily  as  he  showed  him  the  way  to  over- 
power their  resistance,  the  history  of  Germany  and  of 
Europe  would  have  been  changed. 

The   resistance   of  the   Protestants  to  the  institutions 

of  the  Empire  had  hitherto  failed.    They  had  been  weak 

because  there  had  been  something  revolu- 

j?  7.    Prepon-  , 

derance  of  tionary  in  all  their  proceedings.  And  now 
those  institutions,  which  up  to  this  time  had 
been  working  harmoniously,  were  giving  signs  of  break- 
ing-up.  There  was  a  little  rift  in  them  which  might  any 
day  become  wider.  "  Is  the  Emperor,"  asked  Wallen- 
stein, "  to  be  a  mere  image  which  is  never  to  move?" 
"It  is  not  only  the  Empire,"  answered  the  representa- 
tives of  the  League,  "  which  is  bound  to  the  Emperor. 
The  Emperor  is  also  bound  to  the  Empire."  There  was 
nothing  to  reconcile  the  opposing  theories.  The  Em- 
peror who  claimed  to  be  something  had  been  the  tool 
of  a  few  bishops;  he  would  be,  if  Wallenstein  had  his 
way,  the  tool  of  a  successful  general.  The  Empire,  in 
the  mouth  of  the  representatives  of  the  League,  meant 
riot  the  populations  of  Germany,  not  even  the  true  inter- 


1627.  Fresh  Successes  of  Wallenstein.  101 

est  of  the  princes,  but  simply  the  interest  of  the  bishops 
and  their  Church. 

The  time  had  not  yet  come  for  an  open  quarrel.  The 
enemy,  though  weakened,  was  still  powerful. 
Charles  I.,  by  dint  of  a  forced  loan,  which  campaign  of 
every  Englishman  except  himself  and  his  *  7' 
courtiers  declared  to  be  in  violation  of  all  constitutional 
precedents,  contrived  to  get  some  money  into  his  exche- 
quer, and  Sir  Charles  Morgan  was  sent  over  to  the  King 
of  Denmark's  aid  with  an  army  nominally  of  6,000  men, 
but  which  in  reality  never  reached  two-thirds  of  that 
number.  Thurn,  the  old  hero  of  the  revolution  at  Prague, 
and  the  Margrave  of  Baden-Durlach,  brought  their  ex- 
perience, such  as  it  was,  to  Christian's  aid,  and  a  younger 
brother  of  John  Ernest's,  soon  to  be  known  to  fame  as 
Bernhard  of  Weimar,  was  also  to  be  found  fighting  under 
his  banners.  Strong  towns — Wolfenbiittel,  Nordheim, 
and  Nienburg — -still  held  out  on  his  side,  and  peasants 
and  citizens  were  eager  to  free  the  land  from  the  oppres- 
sions of  the  soldiery  and  the  yoke  of  the  priests. 

Once  more  the  Protestants  of  the  north  looked  anx- 
iously to  the  east.  But  Bethlen  Gabor  did  not  stir. 
Without  Turkish  help  he  could  do  nothing,    .      _  ,    . 

{S9.  Submis- 

and  the  Turks,  involved  in  a  war  with  Per-   sionofBeth- 
sia,  resolved  to  negotiate  a  peace  with  the 
Emperor.     When  peace  was  agreed  upon  in  September 
Bethlen  Gabor  was  powerless. 

Wallenstein's  hands  were  freed  as  soon  as  these  nego- 
tiations were  opened.  John  Ernest  of  Weimar  had  died 
the  year  before,  but  his  lieutenants  were  still    ,       „,  , 

#  10.   Wal- 

in  possession  of  Silesia.     In  May,  Wallen-   lenstein  in 
stein  sent  Duke  George  of  Liineburg  to  cut 
off  their  retreat.     In  July,  he  was  in  Silesia  himself.  His 
men  were  three  to  one  of  the  enemy.     Place  after  plac© 


to2  Stralswid  and  Rochelk.  1627. 

surrendered.  Only  once  did  lie  meet  with  an  attempt  at 
resistance  in  the  open  field.  Before  the  end  of  August 
the  whole  of  Silesia  was  in  his  hands.  Fifty-five 
standards  were  sent  in  triumph  to  Vienna.  The  Silesian 
towns  were  set  to  ransom,  and  the  money  of  the  citi- 
zens went  to  swell  the  military  chest  of  the  Emperor's 
general. 

When  Silesia  was  lost  Christian  sought  to  avert  de- 
struction by  offering  terms  of  peace.  But  the  two  generals 
would  accept  nothing  less  than  the  surrender  of  Holstein, 
and  to  that  Christian  refused  to  accede.     Wallenstein 
„     ,  and  Tilly  joined  their  forces  to  drive  him 

g  ii.  Combat  J    J 

of  HeiHgen-  northwards  before  them.  By  this  move- 
ment the  Margrave  of  Baden  was  cut  off 
from  the  rest  of  the  Danish  army.  Making  his  way  to 
the  coast  near  Wismar,  he  had  long  to  wait  before  trans- 
ports arrived  to  carry  him  across  the  sea  to  join  the  King 
of  Denmark.  Scarcely  had  he  landed  at  Heiligenhafen 
when  a  large  body  of  imperialist  troops  arrived,  and  at 
once  commenced  the  attack.  He  himself  and  a  few  of 
his  principal  officers  escaped  on  ship-board.  His  men, 
seeing  themselves  deserted,  took  service  under  Wallen- 
stein, and  seven  of  the  best  regiments  in  the  Danish 
army  were  lost  to  Christian. 

Tilly  found  occupation  for  his  men  in  the  seige  of  the 

strong  places  in  Lower  Saxony.  Wallenstein 

quest  of""  undertook  to  follow  up  the  King  of  Den- 

Schleswig  mark.     Before    the    end   of   the    year   all 

and  Jutland.  » 

Schleswig  and  Jutland,  with  the  exception 
of  two  or  three  fortified  towns,  were  in  Wallenstein's 
hands. 

A  few  sieges,  and  all,  it  seemed,  would  be  over.  Wal- 
lenstein had  begun  to  cherish  the  wildest  plans.     Whes 


1627.  Resistance  to  Wallenstein.  103 

resistance  had  been  put  down  in  Germany, 

1  iii  1  •  1  r  i         1  1        r    $  lr*-   Wailen- 

ne  would  place  himself  at  the  head  of  stein's 
100,000  men  and  drive  the  Turks  out  of  sc  emes' 
Constantinople.  Such  dreams,  however,  were  to  remain 
dreams.  If  Denmark  had  been  beaten  down,  Tilly  was 
still  there,  and  Tilly  represented  forces  with  which  the 
new  military  Empire  was  certain  sooner  or  later  to  be 
brought  into  collision. 

Section  II. — Resistance  to  Wallenstein  in  the  Empire. 

In  October,  the  electors  in  person,  or  by  deputy,  met 
at  Miihlhausen  to  take  into  consideration  the  condition 
of  the  Empire.     The  Ecclesiastical  electors    „       „,, 

■  g  I.     The 

urged  that  the  engagement  given  in  1620  to  Assembly  of 
the  Protestant  administrators  was  no  longer 
valid.  They  had  been  told  that  they  would  not  be  dis- 
possessed by  force  if  they  acted  as  loyal  subjects.  But 
they  had  not  been  loyal  subjects.  They  had  joined  the 
King  of  Denmark  in  a  war  in  which,  with  the  aid  of 
foreign  powers,  he  had  attempted  to  dismember  the  Em- 
pire. It  was  now  time  for  justice  to  prevail,  and  for  the 
Church,  so  far  as  the  Peace  of  Augsburg  allowed,  to  come 
by  its  own.  To  this  reasoning  the  new  Elector  of  Bava- 
ria gave  the  whole  weight  of  his  authority,  and  even  the 
two  Protestant  electors  did  not  venture  to  meet  the  argu- 
ment by  an  open  denial.  The  circle  of  Lower  Saxony 
had  entered  upon  the  war  against  the  advice  of  John 
George,  and  he  held  that  the  administrators  were  only 
reaping  the  consequences  of  neglecting  his  counsel. 

The  Catholic  electors  felt  themselves  within  reach  of 
the  settlement  which  they  had  long  proclaimed  as  the 
object  of  their   desires.     They  then   pro-    .       _ 

?  2.     The 

ceeded  to  kick  away  the  ladder  by  which  Catholic 

they  had  climbed  so  high.     It  is  not  dero-  complain  of 

gating  from  the  merits  of  Tilly  and  his  vete-  Wallenstein- 
1 


104  Stralsund  and  Roche  lie.  1627. 

rans  to  say  that  without  Wallenstein  they  would  have 
been  unable  to  cope  with  the  forces  opposed  to  them. 
Wallenstein's  army  had  driven  Mansfeld  back,  had 
hemmed  in  Bethlen  Gabor,  had  recovered  Silesia,  had 
contributed  to  the  victory  of  Lutter.  And  yet  that  army 
threatened  to  establish  itself  upon  the  ruins  of  the  au- 
thority  of  the  princes  and  electors,  and  to  set  up  a  mili- 
tary despotism  of  the  most  intolerable  kind.  Every- 
where Wallenstein's  recruiting  officers  were  beating  their 
drums.  Quiet  episcopal  cities  in  the  south  of  Germany, 
which  hoped  to  have  seen  the  last  of  their  troubles  when 
Mansfeld  vanished  westward  out  of  Alsace  in  1622,  found 
themselves  suddenly  selected  as  a  trysting-place  for 
some  new  regiment.  Rough  men  poured  in  from  every 
direction  to  be  armed,  clothed,  lodged,  and  fed  at  their 
expense.  The  alarming  doctrine  that  the  army  was  to 
support  itself,  that  men  were  to  be  raised  for  the  purpose 
not  of  fighting  the  enemy,  but  of  pressing  contributions 
out  of  friends  caused  universal  consternation.  Wallen- 
stein's officers,  too,  had  been  heard  to  talk  with  military 
frankness  about  pulling  down  princes  and  electors,  and 
making  a  real  sovereign  of  the  Emperor. 

The  voice  of  complaint  swelled  loudly.     But  those 

who  raised  it  did  not  see  that  their  own  policy  was  at 

fault;  that  but  for  their  refusal  to   yield  on 

3  3.     Yet  they 

cannot  do  the  question  of  the  bishoprics,  there  would 

wit  ou  im.  nave  been  no  need  for  Wallenstein's  army 
at  all.  What  they  were  doing  required  the  aid  of  over- 
powering military  force,  and  they  were  startled  when  he 
who  wielded  the  sword  insisted  on  being  their  master. 
For  the  present,  therefore,  the  electors  did  not  venture 
on  anything  more  than  a  gentle  remonstrance  with  Wal- 
lenstein, and  a  petition  to  the  Emperor  to  remove  the 
abuses  which,  as  they  well  knew,  were  radically  con- 
nected with  the  new  system. 


1 62S.  Resistance  to  Wallenstein.  105 

The  dislike  of  the  rule  of  the  sword  which  was  felt 
amongst  those  for  whom  that  sword  had  been  drawn  was 
sure  to  be  felt  far  more  strongly  in  the  Pro- 
testant cities  of  North  Germany.     Up   to     ?4.    The 

,TT    „  .     ,  ^,  .    1     commercial 

Wallenstein  s  appearance  the  commercial  towns  of  the 
oligarchies  by  which  those  cities  were  go-  north- 
verned,  had  shown  themselves  at  the  best  but  lukewarm 
in  the  Protestant  cause.  The  towns  of  the  south  had 
been  the  first  to  desert  the  Union.  The  towns  of  the 
north  had  been  dragged  half  against  their  will  into  the 
Danish  war.  To  them  the  imperial  sway  was  connected 
by  a  tradition  of  centuries  with  support  against  the  en- 
croachments of  the  princes.  But  they  had  no  traditions 
in  favour  of  an  army  living  at  free  quarters  amongst 
them,  of  bullying  colonels  and  hectoring  soldiers.  Mag- 
deburg braved  all  the  terrors  of  Wallenstein's  anger 
rather  than  admit  a  single  company  within  its  walls. 
Hamburg  declared  itself  ready  to  submit  to  the  Emperor's 
authority,  but  closed  its  gates  against  his  army.  And 
though  Magdeburg  might  be  besieged  when  there  was 
leisure,  Hamburg  and  the  other  maritime  towns  were  less 
easily  to  be  gained.  All-powerful  on  land,  Wallenstein's 
authority  ended  at  low-water  mark.  The  King  of  Den- 
mark had  fled  to  his  islands.  The  King  of  Sweden  was 
master  of  the  Baltic.  If  it  was  doubtful  whether  they  could 
set  an  army  in  battle  array  in  Germany,  at  least  they  could 
throw  provisions  and  munitions  of  war  into  a  besieged 
seaport  town.  If  the  Empire  was  to  be  secured,  these  sea- 
ports must  be  brought  under  the  Emperor's  authority. 

Here,  therefore,  in  the  midst  of  the  danger 
Wallenstein   determined   to    plant   himself  gs   Wallen- 
firmly,  with  the  instinctive  conviction  that  the    stein in  p?s" 

'  session  ot 

post  of  danger  is  the  post  of  power.     The    the  Duchy 

of  Mecklen* 

two  Dukes  of  Mecklenburg  had  steadily  sup-    burg. 


io6  Stralsund  and  Rochelle.  1628 

ported  the  King  of  Denmark  in  his  struggle  against  the  Em- 
peror. In  1627,  when  most  of  the  other  states  ceased  to  pay 
any  contributions  towards  the  war,  they  had  continued 
to  fulfil  their  engagements,  and  though  they  now  pro- 
fessed their  readiness  to  make  their  submission,  it  was 
Wallenstein's  interest  to  make  the  most  of  their  treason, 
and  the  least  of  their  repentance.  In  February,  1628, 
the  Emperor,  using  the  rights  which  he  had  claimed  in 
the  case  of  the  Elector  Palatine,  declared  them  to  have 
forfeited  their  lands  and  dignities,  and  placed  the  Duchies 
in  Wallenstein's  hands  as  a  pledge  for  the  payment  of 
military  expenses  which  still  remained  to  be  liquidated. 
It  was  significant  of  the  change  of  feeling  in  Germany 
that  the  ecclesiastical  electors,  who  had  seen  nothing 
amiss  in  the  deprivation  of  Frederick,  had  not  a  good 
word  to  say  for  this  concession  to  Wallenstein. 

In   Mecklenburg  the  imperial  general  had  gained  a 

footing  on  the  Baltic   coast.     But  more  than  that  was 

needed  if  he  was  to  be  safe  from  attack.   All 

$  ft.  Negotia-  .  . 

tion  with  the      through  the  winter  negotiations  had  been 

Hanse  Towns.  .  >j.  »l       ti  f  *.-l 

gomg  on  with  the  Hanse  Towns,  the  man- 
time  cities  of  the  old  commercial  league,  which  had 
once  taken  up  a  dominant  position  in  the  north,  and 
which,  though  shorn  of  its  ancient  glory,  was  still  worth 
courting  by  a  power  which  aspired  to  rule  in  Germany. 
Reasons  were  not  wanting  to  induce  the  Hanse  Towns 
to  accept  the  Emperor's  offers.     There  was  something 

very  tempting  in  the  notion  of  having  the 

I  7.    Wallen-  y  ,     ,         .  .    .  .  ,   ,,    ,        , 

stein's  offers  power  of  the  imperial  armies  to  tail  back 
tempting.  Up0n   in  their  conflicts  with  foreign   states. 

Hamburg  especially  had  been  the  object  of  the  jealousy 
of  these  states,  as  the  mart  from  whence  the  western 
nations  supplied  themselves  with  the  materials  used  in 
ship-building.     The  King  of  Denmark  had  built  Gliick- 


1628.  Resistance  to  Wallenstein. 


107 


stadt,  lower  down  the  Elbe,  in  the  hope  of  intercepting 
so  lucrative  a  trade.  The  King  of  England  had  block- 
aded the  river,  and  carried  off  Hamburg  vessels  which 
he  suspected  of  being  freighted  with  timber  and  hemp 
for  the  use  of  his  enemies  in  Spain. 

From  the  growth  of  a  national  authority  in  Germany, 
therefore,  the  Hanse  Towns  would  have  had 

.  .  §  8.  But  they 

everything   to   gain.      But   Ferdinand   was    are  repelled 
not,  could  not  be  really  national.     What  he    understand 
had  to  offer  was  a  special  agreement  with    hls  plan- 
Spain,  which  would  have  given  them  the  monopoly  of 
the  trade  between  Germany  and  the  Spanish  dominions. 
Such  a  trade  could  only  be  supported  by  war.     It  was  a 
privilege  which  would  bring  with  it  a  deadly  conflict 
with  England  and  Holland,  perhaps  with  Denmark  and 
Sweden  as  well.     And  the  prospect  was  none  the  more 
alluring  because  Wallenstein  was  to  play  the  principal 
part  in  the  design.     The  general  of  the  imperial  forces 
was   appointed  Admiral  of  the  Baltic,  and  the  Hanse 
Towns  were  expected  to  find  him  a  fleet. 

What  a  prospect  for  a  body  of  calculating  traders. 
The  Spanish  monopoly,  under  such  circumstances,  was 
hardly  to  be  recommended  as  a  prudent  in- 
vestment.    The  Emperor's  overtures  were    decline  to 
politely  declined.     Wallenstein,   when   he    accePthls 

r  *  '  proposal. 

heard  of  their  answer,  rated  them  soundly. 
He  had  means,  he  said,  to  shut  up  their  trade  by  land, 
and  to  seize  goods  which  they  might  import  either  from 
England  or  the  Netherlands.  He  would  deal  with  them, 
in  short,  as  Napoleon  was  to  deal  with  them  two  centu- 
ries later. 

Wallenstein's  thoughts,  however,  were  more   imme- 
diately directed  to  the  towns  on   the   Baltic.     He  had 


1 08  Stralsund  and  Rochelle.  1627. 

I  *?■  Walien-     Ion?  been    alarmed   at    the  danger  whicn 

Jtein  and  the  °  .  ° 

Baltic  towns.  threatened  him  from  Sweden.  In  Novem- 
ber, 1627,  he  had  entered  into  negotiations 
with  an  adventurer  who  offered  to  set  fire  to  the  ships 
in  the  Swedish  harbours.  But  as  the  project  had 
broken  down  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  gain  posses- 
sion of  the  port  towns  on  the  Baltic  coast,  and  to  bar 
them  against  the  enemy.  For  no  man  could  expect  that 
Gustavus  would  look  on  quietly,  whilst  a  great  military 
power  was  forming  on  the  southern  coast  of  the  Baltic. 

Wismar  was  soon  in  Wallenstein's  hands.  The  har- 
bour of  Rostock  was  blocked  up  by  a  line  of  sunken 
ships.  Though  Boguslav,  the  Duke  of  Pomerania,  pro- 
mised to  keep  his  long  line  of  coast  safe  from  attack,  he 
1 11.  Growth  was  compelled  to  admit  a  strong  imperialist 
o  is  power.  force  within  his  territory.  Everything 
seemed  to  be  succeeding  as  Wallenstein  wished. 

Section  III. —  The  Siege  of  Stralsund. 
One  town  alone  held  out.     Stralsund  was  not  a  free 
city  of  the  Empire.    But  though  it  was  nominally  depen- 
„     ,  dent  on  the  Duke  of  Pomerania  it  was  prac- 

{  1.   Stral-  .   .  K 

»und  holds         tically  its  own  mistress.     The  citizens  had 
no  wish  to  put  themselves  forward  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  Emperor,  far  less  to  assist  a  foreign  power  to 
gain  a  footing  in  Germany.    But  they  would  never  admit  a 
garrison  of  such  troops  as  Wallenstein's  within  their  walls. 
Wallenstein  would  have  all  or  nothing.     He  ordered 
his  commander  in  those  parts,  the  Lutheran  Arnim,  to 
enforce    submission.      "  I    will    never,"    he 
orders  die  wrote,  "  allow  them  to  keep  anything  back 

siege  to  be  from  me,  lest  others  should  be  encouraged 

commenced.  ° 

to  do  the  like."     Arnim,  already  master  of 
Rugen,  seized  Danholm,  a  smaller  island  commanding 


'628.  The  Siege  of  Stralsitnd.  109 

*«e  mouth  of  the  harbour.  In  February  hostilities  were 
commenced.  In  March  the  citizens  attacked  the  impe- 
rialists in  Danholm,  and  drove  them  out  of  the  island. 

It  was  Wallenstein's  first  check,  and  desperately  did 
he  struggle  to  wipe  out  the  disgrace.  Every  day  the 
spirit  of  the  citizens  was  rising.    There  were    „ 

1  .  ?  3-   Wallen- 

old  soldiers  there,  fugitives  from  the  Danish  stein's  first 
war,  and  peasants  who  had  fled  from  their 
desolated  homes,  and  who  had  terrible  tales  to  tell  of 
the  wretchedness  which  followed  in  the  track  of  Wal- 
lenstein's soldiers.  In  April,  all  within  the  town  bound 
themselves  by  a  solemn  oath  to  defend  their  religion 
and  their  liberty  to  the  last  drop  of  their  blood,  and  to 
admit  no  garrison  within  their  walls.  In  the  midst  of 
their  resistance  they  still  kept  up  some  recollection  of 
their  nationality,  so  far  as  any  tie  of  nationality  could  still 
be  said  to  exist.  The  name  of  the  Emperor  was  care- 
fully avoided,  but  they  professed  attachment  to  the  Em- 
pire and  its  laws. 

Practically,  however,  the  shape  in  which  the  Empire 
presented  itself  to  them  was  that  of  Wallenstein's  army, 

and  if  they  were  to   resist  that  army,  the 

?  4-    Succour 
Stralsunders   must,  whether  they  liked  it  or   from  Denmark 

1  vi.    ,i  i         and  Sweden. 

not,  make  common  cause  with  those  who 
were  hostile  to  the  Empire.  In  May  a  Danish  embassy 
appeared  amongst  them,  and  the  King  of  Sweden  sent  a 
present  of  gunpowder.  When  the  siege  was  formally 
opened,  these  overtures  were  followed  by  a  succour  of 
armed  men.  Sweden  and  Denmark  were  working  to- 
gether to  break  up  the  new  military  Empire,  and  their 
forlorn  hope  was  thrown  into  Stralsund. 

Wallenstein  saw  that  the  case  was  serious,  and  came 
in  person  to  the  help  of  his  lieutenant.  According 
to    a    doubtful    story,    he    exclaimed,     'I    will    have 


no  Stralsttnd  and  RotJi  elle.  1 6  2  8 . 

J  5.    Wallen-     Stralsund,  even  if  it  be  fastened  by  chains 

stein  aoandons  .  ' 

the  siege.  to  heaven.'     It  is  certain  that  when  a  depu- 

tation from  the  citizens  pleaded  with  him  that  he  would 
abandon  his  demand  that  they  should  admit  a  garrison 
within  their  walls,  he  drew  his  hand  along  the  surface  of 
a  table  before  him,  and  answered  sternly,  'Your  town 
shall  be  made  as  flat  as  this.'  But  the  problem  of  over- 
coming the  resistance  of  a  fortress  open  to  unlimited  suc- 
cours by  sea  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  in  the  whole  art 
of  war.  Still,  however,  there  were  fearful  odds  in  favour 
of  the  besiegers.  Without  the  walls  Wallenstein  had  no 
enemy  to  fear.  He  was  himself  Duke  of  Mecklenburg. 
With  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg  and  the  Duke  of  Po* 
merania  he  was  on  friendly  terms,  and  he  had  received 
the  support  of  the  latter  in  his  attempts  upon  the  town. 
Within  the  walls  there  was  no  certainty  of  ultimate  suc- 
cess. Those  who  had  anything  to  lose  placed  their 
property  on  shipboard.  Many  sent  their  wives  and 
daughters  to  seek  a  safe  refuge  in  Sweden.  But  what- 
ever doubts  might  arise  the  defenders  of  the  town  fought 
sturdily  on.  Week  after  week  passed  away,  and  Stral- 
sund was  still  untaken.  Wallenstein  lowered  his  terms. 
He  ceased  to  demand  entrance  for  a  garrison  of  his  own 
men.  It  would  be  enough,  he  now  said,  if  the  citizens 
would  entrust  their  walls  to  troops  of  their  own  ruler,  the 
Duke  of  Pomerania,  and  would  in  this  manner  tear  them- 
selves away  from  the  connexion  with  foreign  powers  hos- 
tile to  the  Emperor.  And  to  this  offer  the  governing 
council  of  the  town  was  ready  to  assent.  But  the  gene- 
ral body  of  the  citizens  rejected  it  utterly.  They  delibe- 
rately preferred  the  alliance  of  the  two  foreign  kings  to 
submission,  however  indirect,  to  the  Emperor's  authority. 
Before  this  resolution,  Wallenstein,  with  all  his  armies, 
was  powerless.     On  August  3  he  raised  the  siege. 


£6zS.  The  Siege  of  Rochellc.  m 

Wallenstein's  failure  was  an  event  of  incalculable  im- 
portance in  the  history  of  Germany.  It  was  much  that 
one,  and  that  not  one  of  the  first,  towns  of 

'  {>  o.     Lnarac- 

the  Empire  should  have  beaten  back  the  terofthe 
tide  of  conquest.  But  it  was  more  that  the 
resistance  should  have  been  attempted  in  a  case  which 
sooner  or  later  would  be  the  cause  of  the  great  majority 
of  Germans.  Ferdinand  had  floated  to  power  because 
he  personified  order  as  opposed  to  anarchy.  The  Stral- 
sunders  fought  for  the  Protestant  religion  and  freedom 
from  the  presence  of  a  garrison.  Ferdinand's  order 
meant  the  rule  of  the  priest,  and  the  rule  of  the  soldiers. 
Slowly  and  unwillingly  the  citizens  of  Stralsund  declared 
for  the  presence  of  foreigners  as  better  than  such  order 
as  this. 

Section  IV. —  The  Siege  of  Rochelle. 

The  tide  was  on  the  turn  in  Germany.  But  the  tide 
was  not  on  the  turn  in  France.  There,  too,  a  maritime 
city,  greater  and  wealthier  than  Stralsund,    „ 

3     &  '     §  i.  Stral- 

and  supported  by  fleets  and  armies  from  sund  and 
beyond  the  sea,  was  defending  the  cause  of 
Protestantism  against  the  central  government.  Mainly 
because  in  France  the  central  government  represented 
something  more  than'  the  rule  of  the  priest  and  the 
soldier,  the  resistance  which  was  successful  in  Germany- 
was  overpowered  in  France. 

During  the  year  1625  the  coolness  between  England 
and  France  had  been  on  the  increase.     The  persecution 
of  the  English  Catholics  by  Charles,  in  con- 
travention of  his  promises,  had  greatly  ex-    ?  1.  Englana 
asperated   Lewis,  and   the   seizure  by  the   an     rance- 
English  cruisers  of  numerous  French  vessels  charged 
with  carrying  on  a  contraband  traffic  with  the  Spanish 


t  i  *  Stralsund  and  Rochelle.  1626. 

Netherlands  had  not  contributed  to  calm  his  indignation, 
Charles,  on  the  other  hand,  regarded  himself  as  the 
natural  protector  of  the  French  Protestants,  and  made 
demands  in  their  favour  which  only  served  to  make 
Lewis  more  resolved  to  refuse  every  concession. 

Richelieu  had  therefore  a  hard  part  to  play.  He  knew 
perfectly  well  that  the  government  had  violated  its  en- 
l  Riche-  gagements  with  the  Huguenots,  especially  in 
lieu  would         keeping  up  the  fortifications  of  Fort  Louis,  a 

have  made  .  ,. 

peace  with  work  commanding  the  entrance  to  the  har- 
ness if'he6"  hour  of  Rochelle,  which  it  had  long  ago 
could.  promised  to  pull  down.     If  Richelieu  had 

had  his  way  he  would  have  pulled  down  the  fort,  and  by 
generous  concessions  to  the  Huguenots  would  have  car- 
ried them  with  him  to  the  support  of  his  foreign  policy. 
But  such  a  policy,  in  appearance  so  rash,  in  reality  so 
wise,  was  not  likely  to  be  palatable  to  Lewis,  and  Riche- 
lieu had  to  steer  his  way  between  the  danger  of  offending 
the  king  and  the  danger  of  lighting  up  still  more  vividly 
the  flames  of  civil  war.  In  the  course  of  the  winter  all 
that  could  be  done  he  did.  Deputies  of  the  Huguenot 
towns  appeared  to  negotiate  a  peace,  with  the  support  of 
two  English  ambassadors.  But  they  were  instructed  to 
demand  the  demolition  of  the  fort,  and  to  this  the  king 
steadily  refused  his  consent. 

The    priests    and    the    friends   of   the    priests    were 
delighted   at  the   prospect  of  another  civil  war.     The 
1626.  assembled  clergy  commissioned  one  of  their 

agreement  number  to  offer  to  the  king  a  considerable 

effected.  sum  0f  money  for  the  suppression  of  rebel- 

lion. The  time  was  appointed  for  his  audience,  but 
Richelieu  contrived  to  put  it  off  for  a  few  hours  longer, 
and,  by  a  representation  of  the  dangers  of  the  situation, 
induced  the  Huguenot  deputies,  with  the  support  of  the 


1627.  The  Siege  of  Roehette.  113 

English  ambassadors,  to  be  satisfied  with  a  loose  verbal 
promise  from  the  king.  When  the  clerical  train  swept 
into  the  royal  presence  it  was  too  late.  The  king  had 
already  promised  the  Huguenot  deputies  that  if  they  be- 
haved as  good  subjects  he  would  do  for  them  more  than 
they  could  possibly  expect.  His  ministers  had  already 
assured  them  that  these  words  pointed  to  the  demolition 
of  the  fort. 

If  a  peace  thus  made  was  to  be  enduring,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  keep  up  for  a  long  time  the  appearance  of 

its  being   a   submission   and  not  a   peace.    . 

&  *  ?  5.  Inter- 

Unhappily,  the  intervention  of  the  King  of  vention  of 

England  was  not  likely  to  help  to  keep  up 
appearances.     He  urged  Lewis  to  engage  in  the  war  in 
Germany  in  the  exact  way  and  to  the  exact  extent  that 
suited  the  English  government,  and  he  put  himself  osten- 
tatiously forward  as  the  protector  of  the  Huguenots. 

Such  conduct  awoke  once  more  the  susceptibilities  of 
Lewis.  It  was  bad  enough  to  be  bearded  by  his  own 
subjects.  But  it  was  worse  to  be  bearded  ^  Lewis 
by'a  foreign  sovereign.  A  group  of  Hugue-  indlsnant- 
not  communities  in  the  south  of  France  supported  in 
practical  independence  by  England  would  be  as  insup- 
portable to  him  as  the  resistance  of  the  Hanse  Towns 
was  two  years  later  to  Wallenstein. 

Fort  Louis,  therefore,  was  not  demolished.     A  peace 

was  patched  up  between   France  and  Spain.     Charles 

grew  more  and  more  angry  with  Lewis  for 

1627. 

deserting  the  common  cause.     Fresh  seiz-    ?  7.    War 
ures   of  French   ships  by  English   cruisers    France  and 
came  to  exasperate  the  quarrel,  and  in  the    En&land- 
early  months  of  1627  war  existed  between  the  two  na- 
tions, in  reality  if  not  in  name.     In  July  a  great  English 
fleet,  with  a  land  army  on  board,  appeared  off  Rochelle, 


r  1 4  Stralsund  and  Rochells.  1627. 

under  the  command  of  Charles'  favourite,  Buckingham. 
A  landing  was  effected  on  the  Isle  of  Rhe,  and  siege  was 
laid  to  the  principal  fort  of  the  island.  At  last  the  gar- 
rison was  almost  starved  out,  and  the  commander  offered 
to  come  the  next  morning  into  the  English  quarters  to 
treat  for  terms  of  surrender.  That  night  a  stiff  easterly 
breeze  sprung  up,  and  a  French  flotilla,  heavily  laden 
with  provisions,  put  off  from  the  main  land.  Some  of 
the  boats  were  taken,  but  most  of  them  made  their  way 
safely  through  the  English  guardships,  and  delivered 
their  precious  store  under  the  guns  of  the  fort.  Buck- 
ingham lingered  for  some  weeks  longer.  Every  day  the 
besiegers  swept  the  horizon  in  vain  with  theii  glasses, 
looking  for  succour  from  England.  But  Charles,  vithout 
parliamentary  support,  was  too  poor  to  send  off  skv.-tm.-s 
hurriedly,  and  when  they  were  at  last  ready  a  long  con- 
tinuance of  westerly  winds  prevented  them  from  leaviug 
the  Channel.  Before  they  could  put  to  sea,  a  French 
force  was  landed  on  the  island,  and  Buckingham,  to  save 
himself  from  defeat,  was  forced  to  break  up  the  siege  and 
to  return  home  discomfited. 

Richelieu  and  the  king  were  now  thoroughly  of  one 
mind.  The  French  city  which  could  enter  into  an  under- 
l  s  Siese  of  standing  with  the  foreigner  must  be  reduced 
Kochelle.  to  submission.     An  army  of  thirty  thousand 

men  gathered  round  the  walls,  and  on  the  land  side  the 
town  was  as  hopelessly  blocked  up  as  Stralsund.  The 
only  question  was  whether  it  would  be  possible  to  cut  off 
the  entrance  of  English  supplies  by  sea.  By  the  end  of 
November  a  commencement  was  made  of  the  mole  which 
was  to  shut  off  Rochelle  from  all  external  help.  Piles 
were  driven  in  with  stones  between  them.  Heavily  laden 
vessels  were  scuttled  and  sunk.  Richelieu  himself  di- 
rected the  operations,  this  time  with  the  full  support  of 


1628.  The Siege  of  Rochelle.  115 

the  clergy,  who  poured  their  money  lavishly  into  the 
royal  treasury.  In  May,  1628,  the  work,  in  spite  of  the 
storms  of  winter,  was  almost  completed.  An  English 
fleet,  which  came  up  to  the  succour  of  the  town,  retired 
without  accomplishing  anything. 

Inside  the  town  distress  was  rapidly  growing  unendur- 
able.    The  mayor,  Jean  Guiton,  was  still  the  soul  of  the 
resistance.     But  he  had  to  struggle  against   g9.    in- 
an  increasing  number  who  counselled  sur-   spondencyln 
render.     He  did  not  venture  to  appear  in   the  town- 
the  streets  without  a  pistol  in  his  hand  and  half-a-dozen 
stout  guardians  around  him, 

The  only  hope  for  Rochelle  lay  in  the  great  armament 
which  was  known  to  be  prepared  in  England,  and  which 
was  to   be   conducted   by   Buckingham  in   g  10.    Failure 

t'i.      tt  c  f  -L     j  of  the  English 

person.  The  House  of  Commons  had  pur-  attemptto 
chased  the  Petition  of  Right  with  large  sub-  succourit- 
sidies,  and  Charles,  for  the  first  time  in  his  reign,  was 
enabled  to  make  an  effort  worthy  of  his  dignity.  But 
the  -popular  hatred  found  a  representative  in  the  mur- 
derer Felton,  and  a  knife  struck  home  to  the  favourite's 
heart  put  an  end  to  his  projects  for  ever.  The  dissatis- 
faction which  arrayed  the  English  people  against  its 
government  had  found  its  way  into  the  naval  service. 
When  the  fleet  arrived  in  September,  under  a  new  com- 
mander, all  was  disorganization  and  confusion.  It 
returned  to  England  without  accomplishing  a  single 
object  for  which  it  had  been  sent  forth. 

The  surrender  of  Rochelle  followed  as  a  matter  of 
necessity.  On  November  1  the  king  entered    . 
the  conquered  town  in  triumph.     The  inde-    render  of 
pendence  of  French  cities  was  at  an  end. 

The  different  success  of  the  two  great  sieges  of  the 
year  may  partly  be  accounted  for  by  the  difference  ol 


1 1 6  Siralsund  and  Roche  lie.  1 6  2  3. 

vigour  in  the  powers  to  which  the  threatened  towns  looked 
for  succour.      Charles   was   very    far   from 

f>  12.  Cause  .  .  * 

of  Richelieu's  being  a  Christian  IV.,  much  less  a  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus;  and  if  England  at  unity 
with  itself  was  stronger  than  Sweden,  England  distracted 
by  civil  broils  was  weaker  than  Sweden.  But  there  were 
more  serious  reasons  than  these  for  Richelieu's  victory 
and  Wallenstein's  failure.  Richelieu  represented  what 
Wallenstein  did  not — the  authority  of  the  state.  His 
armies  were  under  the  control  of  discipline ;  and,  even 
if  the  taxation  needed  to  support  them  pressed  hardly 
upon  the  poor,  the  pressure  of  the  hardest  taxation  was 
easy  to  be  borne  in  comparison  with  a  far  lighter  con- 
tribution exacted  at  random  by  a  hungry  and  rapacious 
soldiery.  If  Richelieu  had  thus  an  advantage  over 
Wallenstein,  he  had  a  still  greater  advantage  over  Fer- 
dinand and  Maximilian.  He  had  been  able  to  isolate  the 
Rochellese  by  making  it  clear  to  their  fellow  Huguenots 
in  the  rest  of  France  that  no  question  of  religion  was  at 
stake.  The  Stralsunders  fought  with  the  knowledge  that 
their  cause  was  the  cause  of  the  whole  of  Protestant 
Germany.  The  Rochellese  knew  that  their  resistance 
had  been  tacitly  repudiated  by  the  whole  of  Protestant 
France. 

When  Lewis  appeared  within  the  walls  of  Rochelle 

he  cancelled  the  privileges  of  the  town,  ordered  its  walls 

_  ,.  .        to  be  pulled  down  and  its  churches  to  be 

i  13.   Religious 

liberty  of  the  given  over  to  the  Catholic  worship.  But 
under  Richelieu's  guidance  he  announced 
his  resolution  to  assure  the  Protestants  a  continuance  of 
the  religious  liberties  granted  by  his  father.  No  towns  in 
France  should  be  garrisoned  by  troops  other  than  the 
king's.  No  authorities  in  France  should  give  orders 
independently  of  the   king.     But  wherever   a  religion 


1628.  Oppression  of  the  Protestants.  117 

which  was  not  that  of  the  king  had  succeeded  in  esta- 
blishing its  power  over  men's  minds  no  attempt  should 
be  made  to  effect  a  change  by  force.  Armed  with  such 
a  principle  as  this,  France  would  soon  be  far  stronger 
than  her  neighbours.  If  Catholic  and  Huguenot  could 
come  to  regard  one  another  as  Frenchmen  and  nothing 
else,  what  chance  had  foreign  powers  of  resisting  her? 
She  had  already  beaten  back  the  attack  of  a  divided 
England.  Would  she  not  soon  acquire  a  preponder- 
ance over  a  divided  Germany  ?  It  is  time  for  us  now  to 
ask  what  steps  were  being  taken  in  Germany  to  meet  or 
to  increase  the  danger. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   EDICT   OF    RESTITUTION. 

Section  I. — Oppression  of  the  Protestants. 

It  was  not  at  Stralsund  only  that  Wallenstein  learned 

that  he  could  be  successfully  resisted.     Stade  had  sur« 

rendered  with  its  English  garrison  to  Tilly  in 

0        °  '  .  1628. 

April,  but  Gliickstadt  still  held  out.    In  vain   a  1.  Siege  of 

Wallenstein  came  in  person  to  Tilly's  aid. 
The  Danish  cruisers  kept  the  sea  open.     Wallenstein 
was  obliged  to  retire.    In  January,  1629,  the  works  of  the 
besiegers  were  destroyed  by  a  sally  of  the  garrison. 

Wallenstein,  the  great  calculator,  saw  that  peace  with 
Denmark  was  necessary.     The  Swedes  and  the  Danes 
were  beginning  to  act  together,  and  resist- 
ance to  one  nation,  if  there  must  be  re-   ^2' ¥he 
sistance,  would  be  easier  than  resistance  to    Lubeec£f 
two.     Much  to  his    satisfaction   he   found 
Christian  not  unwilling  to   listen   to   the   voice  of  hia 
charming.     Just  as  the  eagle  eye  of  Gustavus  descried 


n8  7  he  Edict  of  Restitution.  1629. 

the  first  feeble  beams  of  light  on  the  horizon,  the  King 
of  Denmark,  weary  of  misfortune  and  vexed  at  the  pros- 
pect of  having  to  crave  help  from  his  old  competitor  of 
Sweden,  laid  down  his  arms.  On  May  22,  1629,  a  treaty 
of  peace  was  signed  at  Lubeck.  Christian  received  back 
the  whole  of  his  hereditary  possessions.  In  return  he 
resigned  all  claim  to  the  bishoprics  held  by  his  family  in 
the  Empire,  and  engaged  to  meddle  no  further  with  the 
territorial  arrangements  of  Lower  Saxony. 

If  the  Peace  of  Lubeck  was  really  to  be  a  source  of 

strength  to  Ferdinand  it  must  be  accompanied  by  some 

such  measures  as  those  with  which  Richelieu 

\  3.  Neces- 
sity of  heal-       was  accompanying  his  victory  at  Rochelle. 

ing  measures.      Ti  ,  ,  .  ,       r 

It  was  not  enough  to  have  got  rid  of  a 
foreign  enemy.  Some  means  must  be  found  to  allay  the 
fears  of  the  Germans  themselves,  which  had  found  ex- 
pression in  the  resistance  of  Stralsund. 

That  there  was  much  to  be  done  in  this  direction  was 

openly  acknowledged  by  almost  all  who  had  been  con- 

^       .       cerned  in  the  imperialist  successes.     Maxi- 

f  4.   Opposite 

views  as  to         milian  and  the  League  held  that  it  was  above 

what  measures       ,,  ,,.  .      .      ., 

are  needed.        all  things  necessary  to  restrain  the  excesses 

of  Wallenstein  and  his  soldiers.  Wallenstein 
held  that  it  was  above  all  things  necessary  to  restrain 
the  excessive  demands  of  Maximilian  and  the  clergy. 
Ferdinand,  the  man  in  whose  hands  fortune  had  placed 
the  decision  of  the  great  question,  probably  stood  alone 
in  thinking  that  it  was  possible  to  satisfy  both  the  sol- 
diers and  the  priests  without  weakening  his  hold  on  the 
Empire. 

The  first  act  of  Ferdinand  after  the  signature  of  the 
treaty  was  to  invest  Wallenstein  formally  with  the  Duchy 
of  Mecklenburg.  Offence  was  thus  given  to  those  who 
believed  that  the   rights  of  territorial  sovereignty  had 


1629.  Opprex  iio?i  of  tfie  Protestants.  119 

been  unduly  invaded,  and  who  were  jealous  of  the  right 
claimed  by  the  Emperor  to  supersede  by  his  own  au- 
thority a  prince  of  the  Empire  in  favour  of  a  successful 
soldier. 

On  the  other  side  offence  was  given  still  more  widely 
co  those  who  wished  to  maintain  the  rights  of  Protestant- 
ism. Without  wishing  to  enter  upon  a  eene-    . 

0  f  5  l  5.   HI  treai- 

ral  persecution,  Ferdinand  was  resolved  to  meat  of  the 
allow  no  rights  against  his  church  to  those 
who  could  not  conclusively  prove  to  his  own  satisfaction 
that  those  rights  were  under  the  guarantee  of  unassaila- 
ble law.  He  had  begun  in  his  own  hereditary  dominions. 
It  is  true  that  in  Bohemia  and  Austria  no  tortures  were 
inflicted,  no  martyrs  suffered  either  at  the  stake  or  on  the 
scaffold.  But  it  was  found  that  the  stern,  relentless  pres- 
sure of  daily  annoyance  was  sufficient  for  the  purpose 
of  producing  at  least  external  conformity.  By  1627  the 
desired  result  had  been  obtained,  and  Protestantism 
existed  only  as  A  -proscribed  religion.  Then  came  the 
turn  of  the  Palatinate.  For  a.  time  there  had  been  no 
open  persecution.  In  1625  Maximilian  had  written  to 
the  governor  of  Heidelberg  not  to  let  any  opportunity 
slip,  if  he  could  find  an  excuse  for  turning  out  a  Pro- 
testant minister  from  his  parish  and  replacing  him  by  a 
Catholic  priest,  in  February,  1628,  the  Jesuits  were  able 
to  report  that  they  had  made  400  converts  in  Heidelberg 
itself,  and  1,200  in  the  neighbouring  country  districts. 
Then  came  a  further  change.  In  March  an  agreement 
was  drawn  up  between  Maximilian  and  Ferdinand.  The 
Emperor  received  back  Upper  Austria,  and  made  over 
to  the  Elector  of  Bavaria,  in  its  stead,  the  Upper  Palati- 
nate and  that  part  of  the  Lower  Palatinate  which  lies  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine.  Maximilian  held  that  by 
this  transfer  he  had  acquired  the  full  rights  of  a  territo- 
K. 


lao  7ke  Edict  of  Restitution.  1629. 

rial  prince,  and  that  amongst  these  rights  tras  mat  of  dis- 
posing of  the  religion  of  his  new  subjects.  In  June  all 
noblemen  residing  in  the  country  were  told  that  they 
must  either  change  their  religion  within  two  months  or 
go  into  exile.  In  September  the  order  was  extended  to 
the  inhabitants  generally. 

The  year  1628  was  a  year  of  alarm  over  all  Protestant 
,  South  Germany.     There  at  least  Ferdinand 

cities  of  South  was  ready  to  carry  out  the  wishes  expressed 
by  the  Catholic  electors  at  Muhlhausen  the 
year  before.  Whilst  Maximilian  was  threatening  th« 
Palr.tinate,  imperial  commissioners  were  passing  through 
the  other  territories  and  cities,  taking  account  of  churches 
and  church  property  which  had  come  into  Protestant 
possession  dice  the  Convention  of  Passau.  To  the 
wishco  of  the  populations  not  the  slightest  attention  was 
paid.  In  Nordlingen,  for  instance,  not  a  single  Catholic 
was  to  be  found.  Every  church  in  the  place  was  none 
the  less  marked  down  for  re-dclivery  to  the  Catholic 
clergy.  In  some  places  to  which  the  commissioners 
came,  Shylock-like,  to  claim  their  pound  of  flesh,  they 
demanded  more  even  than  the  strict  letter  of  the  law 
allowed  them,,  Not  content  with  restoring  to  the  Catholic 
worship  churches  which  had  with  general  consent  been 
in  the  hands  of  Protestants  for  half  a  century,  they  pro 
ceeded  to  compel  the  inhabitants  of  the  towns  to  attend 
the  mass. 

The  success  of  these  outrageous  measures  in  the  south 

encouraged  Ferdinand  to  pursue  the  same  course  in  the 

_  north.     There  he  had  to  deal  not  merely 

i  7.     The  * 

Edict  of  with  scattered  towns,  or  a  few  abbeys,  but 

with  the  great  lay  bishoprics,  many  of  which 

were  extensive  enough  to  form  the  domain  of  a  duke  01 

a  landgrave.     On  March  29,  1629,  before  the  Peace  of 


tbzg.  French  Intervention  in  Italy.  \2\ 

Liibeck  was  actually  signed,  he  issued  the  fatal  Edict  of 
Restitution.  With  a  stroke  of  his  pen,  the  two  arch- 
bishoprics of  Magdeburg  and  Bremen,  the  twelve  bishop- 
rics of  Minden,  Verden,  Halberstadt,  Liibeck,  Ratze- 
burg,  Misnia,  Merseburg,  Naumburg,  Brandenburg, 
Havelberg,  Lebus,  and  Camin,  with  about  a  hundred  and 
twenty  smaller  ecclesiastical  foundations,  were  restored 
to  the  Catholic  clergy. 

The  wheel  had  come  full  circle  round  since  the  day 
when  Christian  of  Anhalt  had  planned  the  great  uprising 
to  sweep  away  the  Catholic  bishops  and  the 
Hcuse  oi  Austria.  The  House  of  Austria  was    weakness  of 
firmer  in  its  seat  than  ever.     The  Catholic      e    mperc> 
bishops    were  triumphant.     But   in  the  midst  of  their 
triumph  the  enemies  of  the  Empire  were  watching  them 
keenly,  and  judging  that  both  they  and  the  Emperor 
were  all  the  weaker  for  this  grand  vindication  of  legality. 

Section  II. — French  Intervention  in  Italy, 
In  the  north  Gustavus  had  an  eye  not  likely  to  be 
deceived  for  the  joints  of  Ferdinand's  harness.  In  the 
west  Richelieu  was  preparing  for  the  day  g  T  Gustavus 
when  he  too  might  aid  in  the  overthrow  of  the  a-nd  Rlclieheu- 
Colossus.  It  is  true  that  his  first  thought  was  of  Spain 
and  not  of  Germany.  But  he  could  hardly  be  brought 
into  collision  with  one  branch  of  the  House  of  Austria 
without  having  sooner  or  later  to  deal  with  the  other. 

In  Italy,  the  death  of  the  Duke  of  Mantua  and  Mont- 
ferrat  without  near  heirs  had  given  rise  to  war.  "Tie 
next  heir  was  a  very  distant   relation,   the    .       m, 

?.  2-     The 

Duke   of  Nevers,  whose   family  had   long    Maimum 
been  naturalized  in  France.     To  Spain  the 
presence  of  a  dependent  of  France  so  near  her  posses 
sions  in  the  Milanese  was  in  the  highest  decree  undesi- 


122  The  Edict  of  Restitution.  1629. 

rable,  and  she  called  upon  Ferdinand  to  sequester  the 
territory  till  another  way  of  disposing  it  could  be  found. 
If  in  Germany  before  Ferdinand's  election  the  rights  of 
the  Emperors  had  been  but  a  shadow,  those  which  they 
possessed  in  the  old  kingdom  of  Italy  were  but  the 
shadow  of  a  shade.  But  whatever  they  were,  Ferdinand 
was  the  man  to  put  them  forth,  and  whilst  Richelieu  was 
engaged  at  Rochellc,  Spanish  troops  had  overrun  Man- 
tua, and  in  conjunction  with  the  Duke  of  Savoy,  ready 
now  to  seek  his  own  interests  by  fighting  for  Spain,  as  in 
earlier  days  to  seek  his  own  interests  by  fighting  against 
her,  were  besieging  the  Duke  of  Nevers  in  Casale,  the 
only  fortress  which  remained  to  him. 

This  intervention  of  the  Spaniards  in  the  Emperor's 

name  caused  even  greater  indignation  in  Italy  than  their 

intervention  in  the  Palatinate  had  caused  in  Germany. 

For  in  Germany  the  Emperor's  name  was  in 

i  3.     Italian  .  J  \ 

feeling  against  1 62 1  still  connected  with  the  ideas  of  law 
mperor.  an(j  order.  In  Italy  it  reminded  men  of 
nothing  but  foreign  domination,  a  memory  which  was 
none  the  less  vivid  when  the  Emperor  used  his  au- 
thority, whatever  it  might  be,  to  support  the  real  foreign 
domination  of  the  immediate  present,  the  Spanish  domi- 
nation in  Milan.  The  Italian  princes  took  alarm.  Venice 
and  the  pope  summoned  France  to  their  aid,  and  in 
March,  1629,  Richelieu,  taking  Lewis  with  him  across 
the  snowy  passes  of  the  Alps,  reduced  the  Duke  of  Savoy 
to  submission,  and  forced  the  Spaniards  to  raise  the 
siege  of  Casale. 

Casale  was  the  Stralsund  of  Italy.  A  power  which 
g  4.  Check  had  ventured  to  clothe  itself  in  the  attributes 
him  by  °"  of  a  national  authority ,  with  even  less  reason 
Richelieu.  t}ian  ;n  Germany,  had  found  its  limits. 
Richelieu  had  the  general  feeling  on  his  side. 


1629.  French  Intervention  in  Italy.  123 

He  did  not  venture  to  do  more  in  Italy.  The  Duke 
of  Rohan,  the  brother  of  that  Soubise  who  had  begun  the 
war  of  Rochelle  in   1625,  had  roused  the    ,       _,    , 

?  S.     The  last 

Huguenots  of  Languedoc  and  the  Cevennes  Huguenot 
to*  a  fresh  attempt  at  resistance,  half  Pro- 
testant, half  aristocratic.  As  if  the  Rochellese  had  not 
sufficiently  suffered  for  the  mistake  of  calling  in  foreign 
aid,  Rohan  followed  their  example,  and  was  foolish 
enough  to  ask  for  help  from  Spain.  But  the  Spanish 
troops  came  not  to  his  aid.  Richelieu  hurried  back  from 
Italy,  made  peace  with  England,  and  pitilessly  crushed 
the  rebellion  in  the  south.  Once  more  the  victory  was 
attended  by  the  confirmation  of  the  religious  liberties  of 
the  Huguenots.  They  might  worship  as  they  pleased,  but 
political  independence  they  were  not  to  have. 

The  French  monarchy  was  stronger  for  external  en- 
terprise than  ever.     By  crushing  all  resistance,  it  had  no 
longer  to  fear  occupation  for  its  energies  at 
home,  and  by  its  tolerance  of  religion  it  had    of  Fran^f* 
rendered  itself  capable  of  accepting  the  ser- 
vice of  all  its  subjects,  and  it  could  offer  its  alliance  to 
Protestant  states  without  fear  of  suffering  a  rebuff. 

Richelieu  was  again  able  to  turn  his  attention  to  Italy. 
In  the  summer  of  1629  an  imperialist  force  of  20,000 
men  descended  from  the  Alps  and  laid  siege    „ 

■     ?  7-  Riche- 

to  Mantua.     Ferdinand,  having  established    lieu  and  the 
peace   in  Germany,  fancied  that  he   could    &  Fuly. S 
take  up  again  in  Italy  the  work  which  had 
been  too  great  for  Barbarossa.     Spinola  came  to  his  aid 
with  an  army  of  equal  force,  and  recommenced  the  attack 
upon  Casale.     In  the  spring  of  1630  Richelieu  was  once 
more  in  Italy.     Cardinal  as  he  was,  he  was  placed  in 
command  of  the  army.    But  instead  of  marching  against 
the  Spaniards,  he  turned  first  upon  the  Duke  of  Savoy- 


124  The  Edict  of  Restitution.  1630. 

Seizing  Pignerol  and  Saluces,  he  gained  possession  of 
the  Alpine  passes.  Then,  with  Piedmont  at  his  feet,  he 
passed  on  to  relieve  Casale,  and  forced  the  Spanish  be- 
siegers to  retreat.  But  Richelieu  was  prudent  as  well  as 
daring,  and  he  left  Mantua  for  the  present  in  the  hands 
of  Spain  and  the  Emperor. 

It  was  a  hard  thing  to  attack  the  united  forces  of 
Spain  and  the  Empire  face  to  face.  It  might  be  easier  to 
3  8  State  of  support  their  enemies  abroad,  and  to  favour 
Germany.  dissensions  at  home.     In  the  Netherlands, 

the  Dutch,  encouraged  by  the  diversion  of  the  Italian 
war,  were  at  last  taking  the  offensive,  and  entering  upon 
that  aggressive  warfare  which  ended  by  bringing  the 
whole  of  North  Brabant  under  their  authority.  In  the 
north,  Gustavus  had  concluded  a  peace  with  Poland,  and 
was  making  preparations  for  actual  intervention  in  Ger- 
many. In  all  this  Richelieu  was  deeply  interested.  An 
ambassador  of  Lewis  was  engaged  in  arranging  with 
Gustavus  the  terms  on  which  France  should  assist  him 
in  the  attack  upon  the  Empire  which  he  already  con- 
templated. 

Not  that  even  Richelieu  foresaw  the  possibility  of  the 

magnificent  results  which  were  to  follow  from  that  enter- 

,      R. ,  prise.  In  1630,  as  in  1624  and  1625,  he  would 

fieu's  expec-      have    preferred    that  a    Protestant    power 

should   not  be  too  successful.     He  would 

rather  conquer  with  Sweden  than   not  at  all.     But  he 

would  rather  conquer  with  the  help  of  the  League  than 

with  the  help  of  Sweden.    Gustavus  might  be  pushed  on 

to  do  his  best.     He  would  effect  a  diversion,  and  that 

would  be  enough. 

Section  III. —  Wallenstein  deprived  of  his  Command. 

The  long  expected  breach  between  the  League  and 

the  Emperor's  general  had  come  at  last.     Instead  of  re* 


1630.  Wallenstein  deprived  of  Command.  125 

ducing  his  forces  after  the  Peace  of  Lubeck,    2  1-.  Strong 

position  of 

Wallenstein  had  increased  them.  He  was  WaUeastein. 
now  at  the  head  of  100,000  men.  From  a 
military  point  of  view  no  one  could  say  it  was  too  much. 
He  had  Mantua  to  defend,  the  coasts  of  the  North  Sea 
to  watch,  perhaps  France  to  guard  against,  and  that  too 
with  all  the  princes  and  peoples  of  Germany  exasperated 
against  him.  Some  efforts  he  made  to  curb  the  vio- 
lence of  his  soldiers.  But  to  restrain  the  monster  he  had 
created  was  beyond  his  power.  And  if  his  soldiers  bore 
hard  upon  burgher  and  peasant,  he  himself  treated 
the  princes  with  contemptuous  scom.  He  asked  why 
the  electors  and  the  other  princes  should  not  be  treated 
as  the  Bohemian  nobles  had  been  treated.  The  Estates 
of  the  Empire  had  no  more  right  to  independence  than 
the  Estates  of  the  kingdom.  It  was  time  for  the  Empe- 
ror to  make  himself  master  of  Germany,  as  the  kings  of 
France  and  Spain  were  masters  of  their  own  dominions. 
All  this  made  the  electors  above  measure  indignant. 
"A  new  domination,"  they  told  Ferdinand,  "has  arisen 
for  the  complete  overthrow  of  the  old  and  praiseworthy 
constitution  of  the  Empire." 

A  reconstruction  of  that  old  rotten  edifice  would  have 
done  no  harm.  But  its  overthrow  bv  military    „      „„ 
violence  was  another  matter.     A  new  torra   could  he 
of  government,  to  be  exercised  by  a  soldier 
with  the  help  of  soldiers,  could  never  be  found  in  justice, 

For  always  formidable  was  the  league 
And  partnership  of  free  power  and  free  will. 
The  way  of  ancient  ordinances,  though  it  winds, 
Is  yet  no  devious  path.     Straight  forward  goes 
The  lightning's  path,  and  straight  the  fearful  path 
Of  the  cannon-ball.     Direct  it  flies,  and  rapid, 
Shattering  that  it  may  reach,  and  shattering  what  it  reaches. 
Schiller'^  PiccoXemitu,  act  i.  scene  4. 


126  The  Edict  of  Restitution.  163a 

Even  whilst  he  was  defending  the  universality  of  op- 
pression on  the  principle  that  it  was  but  fair  that  all 
estates   should   contribute  to  the   common 
partiality.  defence,  he  was  exhibiting  in  his  own  case  an 

extraordinary  instance  of  partiality.  Whilst 
all  Germany  was  subjected  to  contributions  and  ex- 
actions, not  a  soldier  was  allowed  to  set  foot  on  Wallen- 
stein's  own  duchy  of  Mecklenburg. 

And  if  the  Catholic  electors  had  good  reason  to  com- 
plain of  Wallenstein,  Wallenstein  had  also  good  reason 
to  complain  of  the  electors.     The  process  of 
Edict  of  carrying  out   the  Edict  of  Restitution  was 

Restitution  .        ..  ,  f,  .  .  ,.m, 

carried  out.  increasing  the  number  of  his  enemies.  The 
Emperor,"  he  said,  "  needed  recruits,  not 
reforms."  Ferdinand  did  not  think  so.  He  had  per- 
suaded the  chapter  of  Halberstadt  to  elect  a  younger 
son  of  his  own  as  their  bishop.  He  induced  the  chapter 
of  Magdeburg  to  depose  their  administrator,  on  the 
ground  that  he  had  taken  part  in  the  Danish  war.  But, 
in  spite  of  the  Edict  of  Restitution,  the  chapter  of  Magde- 
burg refused  to  choose  a  Catholic  bishop  in  his  place, 
and  preferred  a  son  of  the  Elector  of  Saxony.  John 
George  was  thereby  brought  by  his  family  interests  into 
collision  with  the  Edict  of  Restitution. 

The  city  of  Magdeburg  had  not  been  on  good  terms 

with  the  chapter.     Wallenstein  offered  to  support  its  re- 

,..     ,         sistance  with  the  help  of  a  garrison.    But  the 

i  5.    Magdc-  ,  .        . 

burg  refuses       city  refused,  and  Wallenstein,  in  the  face  ol 
the  growing  opposition,  did  not  venture  to 
force  it  to  accept  his  offer. 

Of  the  fact  of  the  growing  opposition  no  one  could  be 
doubtful.  As  to  its  causes  there  was  much  difference  of 
I  6.  Growing  opinion.  The  priests  ascribed  it  to  the  bar- 
WattaMeia.      barities.  of  the  soldiers.  Wallenstein  ascribed 


1630.         Wallenstein  deprived  of  Command.  127 

it  to  the  violence  of  the  priests,  and  especial!/  to  the 
vigour  with  which  they  were  attempting  to  reconvert  the 
inhabitants  of  the  archbishopric  of  Bremen,  which  they 
had  recovered  in  virtue  of  the  Edict  of  Restitution. 

On  every  side  the  priests  and  their  schemes  were  in 
the  way  of  Wallenstein's  dazzling  visions  of  a  grand  im- 
perialist restoration.  The  Pope,  as  an  Italian    , 

*    ,  r  j)  7.  He  talks 

prince,  had  sympathized  with  France.     "It   of  attacking 
is    a    hundred    years,"    said    Wallenstein, 
"  since  Rome  has  been  plundered,  and  it  is  richer  now 
than  ever." 

On  July  3,  1630,  Ferdinand  assembled  round  him  the 
princes  and  electors  at  Ratisbon,  in  the  hope  of  inducirg 
them  to  elect  his  son,  the  King  of  Hungary, 
as  King  of  the  Romans,  and  therefore  as  his  \#  Ration/ 
successor  in  the  Empire.  But  to  this  project 
the  electors  refused  even  to  listen.  All  who  attended 
the  assembly  came  with  their  minds  full  of  the  excesses 
of  Wallenstein's  soldiery.  The  commissioners  of  that 
very  Duke  of  Pomerania  who  had  served  the  imperial 
cause  so  well  in  the  siege  of  Stralsund,  had  a  tale  of  dis- 
tress to  pour  out  before  the  princes.  His  master's  sub- 
jects, he  said,  had  been  driven  to  feed  upon  grass  and 
the  leaves  of  trees.  Cases  had  occurred  in  which  starv- 
ing wretches  had  maintained  life  by  devouring  human 
flesh.  A  woman  had  even  been  known  to  feed  upon  her 
own  child. 

Other  tales  were  told,  bad  enough,  if  not  quite  so  bad 
as  this,  and  the  misery  of  the  populations  \  9.  The 
gave  support  to  the  political  grievances  of  J waHenstein 
their  rulers.  Ferdinand  was  plainly  told  dem*nded- 
that  the  electors  did  not  mean  to  be  subjected  to  mili- 
tary despotism.  He  must  choose  between  them  and 
Wallenstein. 


128  The  Edict  of  Restitution.  1630. 

Behind  the  Catholic  Electors  was  Richelieu  himself. 

Together  with  the  recognized  French   ambassadors,  the 

_.  ,         Capuchin  Father  Joseph,  Richelieu's  trusted 

i  10.     Richc-  r  1  1       J 

fieu'sin-  confidant,  had  come  to  Ratisbon,  encoura- 

ging the  opposition  to  Wallenstein,  and  urg- 
ing the  electors  to  demand  the  neutrality  of  the  Empire, 
if  a  war  broke  out  between  France  and  Spain. 

Unhappily  for  Germany,  the  policy  of  the  electors  was 

purely   conservative.     There  was  nothing  constructive 

even  in  Maximilian,  the  greatest  of  them 

p  it.     Policy 

6f  the  all.     The  old  loose  relationship  between  the 

princes  and  the  Emperor  was  to  be  restored 
whether  it  was  adequate  to  the  emergency  or  not.  At  the 
very  moment  when  he  had  every  need  of  conciliating 
opposition,  he  and  his  brother  electors  were  refusing  the 
petition  of  the  deputies  of  the  Duke  of  Pomcrania  that 
their  masters  might  be  allowed  to  keep  possession  of  the 
bishopric  of  Camin. 

1 12.  Landing  At  the  moment  when  the  offence  was 
of  Gustavus.  given,  it  was  known  at  Ratisbon  that  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus  had  landed  on  the  coast  of  Pomerania. 
Five  years  before  Gustavus  had  refused  to  stir  against 
the  Emperor  without  the  aid  of  a  powerful  coalition.  He 
_  now  ventured  to  throw  himself  alone  into 

(  13.     Gus- 
tavus comes       the  midst  of  Germany.    He  had  no  certainty 

without  allies.  r  r*  »       ■  j        r™       t-  ,  , 

even  of  French  aid.  The  French  ambassa- 
dor had  offered  him  money,  but  had  accompanied  the 
offer  by  conditions.  Gustavus  thrust  aside  both  the  money 
and  the  conditions.  If  he  went  at  all,  he  would  go  on 
his  own  terms. 

He  knew  well  enough  that  the  task  before  him,  appa- 
rently far  harder  than  in  1625,  was  in  reality  far  easier. 
He  saw  that  between  the  ecclesiastical  Elec- 
bopofulncss.       tors  on  the  one  hand,  and  Wallenstein  on 


#630.  Wallenstein  deprived  of  Command.  129 

the  other,  the  Protestant  princes  must  cling  to  him  for 
safety.  To  one  who  suggested  that  even  if  he  were  vic- 
torious the  princes  would  seek  to  profit  by  his  victory,  he 
answered,  with  the  assurance  of  genius,  '  If  I  am  victo- 
rious, they  will  be  my  prey.' 

Events  were  working  for  him  at  Ratisbon.  Before  the 
persistent  demand  of  the  electors  for  Wallenstein's  dis- 
missal  Ferdinand    was    powerless.     Even    ■        _. 

1  §  15.     Dis- 

Wallenstein  would  not  have  been  strong  missal  of 
enough  to  contend  against  the  League, 
backed  by  France,  with  a  whole  Protestant  north  burst- 
ing into  insurrection  in  his  rear.  But,  in  truth,  neither 
Ferdinand  nor  Wallenstein  thought  of  resistance.  The 
general,  strong  as  his  position  was,  at  the  head  of  the 
mos\  numerous  and  well-appointed  army  in  Europe, 
retired  into  private  life  without  a  murmur.  He  may, 
perh  tps,  have  calculated  that  it  would  not  be  long  be- 
fore he  would  be  again  needed. 

That  Ferdinand  felt  the  blow  keenly  it  is  impossible 
to  doubt.     He  thought  much  of  the  main-    ,,_,,. 

.  $  l6-     Ferdi- 

tenance  of  the  imperial  dignity,  and  the  up-    nand's 
rising  of  the  electors  was  in  some  sort  an   posi '" 
uprising  against  himself.     But  the   system  which   had 
fallen  was  the  system  of  Wallenstein  rather  than  his  own. 
He  had  sanctioned  the  contributions  and  exactions,  feebly 
hoping  that  they  were  not  so  bad  as  they  seemed,  or  that 
if  anything  was  wrong  a  little  more  energy  on  Wallen- 
stein's part  would  set  things  straight.     As  to  Wallen- 
stein's idea  of  a  revolutionary  empire  founded  on  the 
ruins  of  the  princes,  Ferdinand  would  have  been  the 
first  to  regard  it  with  horror.     His  policy  was  in  the  main 
far  more  in  accordance  with   that  of  Maximilian  than 
with  that  of  Wallenstein. 
Wallenstein's  dismissal  was  not  the  only  sacrifice  to 


130  The  Edict  of  Restitution.  1630. 

I  17.    Conces-   which  Ferdinand  was  obliged  to  consent. 

sions  of  perch-  . 

nand  in  Italy.  He  agreed  to  invest  the  Duke  of  Nevers  with 
the  Duchy  of  Mantua,  hoping  in  return  to  se- 
cure the  neutrality  of  France  in  his  conflict  with  Sweden. 
The  result  of  that  conflict  depended  mainly  on  the 
attitude  taken  by  the  Protestants  of  the  north,  whom 
?  18.  Tilly  Ferdinand,  in  combination  with  the  Catholic 
in  command.  electors,  was  doing  his  best  to  alienate. 
Tilly  was  placed  in  command  of  the  army  which  had 
lately  been  Wallenstein's,  as  well  as  of  his  own.  The 
variety  of  habits  and  of  feeling  in  the  two  armies  did  not 
promise  well  for  the  future.  But,  numerically,  Tilly  was 
far  superior  to  Gustavus. 

Section  IV. —  The  Swedes  establish  themselves  on 
the  Coast  of  the  Baltic 

Gustavus,  on  the  other  hand,  commanded  a  force  in- 
ferior only  in  numbers.  Thoroughly  disciplined,  it  was 
a  1.    The  instinct  with  the  spirit  of  its  commander.     It 

Swedish  army.  shared  hjs  religious  enthusiasm  and  his 
devotion  to  the  interests  of  his  country.  It  had  followed 
him  in  many  a  hardly-won  fight,  and  had  never  known 
defeat  under  his  orders.  It  believed  with  justice  that  his 
genius  for  war  was  far  greater  than  that  of  any  comman- 
der who  was  likely  to  be  sent  against  him. 

The  first  attempt  of  Gustavus  to  win  over  a  prince  of 
the  Empire  to  his  side  was  made  before  Stettin,  the  capital 
1 1.  The  Duke  of  the  Duke  of  Pomerania.  He  insisted  on 
submits0  to"*  a  personal  interview  with  the  aged  Boguslav, 
Gustavus.  the  last  of  the  old  Wendish  line.     Boguslav 

had  ever  been  on  good  terms  with  the  Emperor.  He 
had  helped  Wallenstein  at  Stialsund.  But  his  deputies 
had  pleaded  in  vain  at  Ratisbon  for  his  right  to  retain 


1630.  The  Swedes  on  the  Baltic  Coast.  131 

the  bishopric  of  Camin  and  for  some  amelioration  of  the 
misery  of  his  subjects.  He  now  pleaded  in  person  with 
Gustavus  to  be  allowed  to  remain  neutral.  Gustavus, 
like  Tilly  in  1623,  would  hear  nothing  of  neutrality.  The 
old  man  could  hold  out  no  longer.  "  Be  it  as  you 
wish,  in  God's  name,"  he  said.  He  begged  the  king  to 
be  a  father  to  him.  "  Nay,"  replied  Gustavus,  "  I  would 
rather  be  your  son."  The  inheritance  of  the  childless 
man  would  make  an  excellent  bulwark  for  the  defence 
of  the  Baltic. 

For  some  time  longer  Gustavus  was  busy  in  securing  a 
basis  of  operations  along  the  coast  by  clearing  Pomerania 
and  Mecklenburg  of  imperialist  garrisons. 
But,  as  yet,  the  northern  princes  were  un-  Elector  of 
willing  to  support  him.  In  vain  Gustavus  prefe^neu-8 
reasoned  with  the  ambassador  of  his  brother-  trallty- 
in-law,  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg,  who  had  come  to 
announce  his  master's  neutrality.  "  It  is  time,"  he  said, 
"for  his  highness  to  open  his  eyes,  and  to  rouse  himself 
from  his  ease,  that  his  highness  may  no  longer  be  in  his 
own  land  a  lieutenant  of  the  Emperor,  nay,  rather  of  the 
Emperor's  servant.  He  who  makes  a  sheep  of  himself 
is  eaten  by  the  wolf.  His  highness  must  be  my  friend 
or  enemy,  when  I  come  to  his  frontier.  He  must  be  hot 
or  cold.  No  third  course  will  be  allowed,  be  you  sure  of 
that."  The  words  were  thrown  away  for  the  present. 
There  may  have  been  something  of  mere  cowardice  in 
the  Elector's  resistance  to  the  overtures  made  to  him. 
Frederick  had  failed,  and  Christian  had  failed,  and  why 
not  Gustavus  ?  But  there  was  something,  too,  of  the  old 
German  feeling  remaining,  of  unwillingness  to  join  with 
the  foreigner  against  the  Empire.  "To  do  so,"  said  the 
Brandenburg  ambassador,  "  would  be  both  dishonoura- 
ble and  disloyal." 


132  The  Edict  of  Restitution.  1631. 

Gustavus   had  but  to  wait  till    Ferdinand's  repeated 
blunders  made  loyalty  impossible  even  with  the  much- 
enduring  George  William.     Fortunately  for 
tiationslje-        Gustavus,  he  was  now  in  a  position  in  which 
twcen  Sweden    ^e  was  abie  to  wait  a  little.  An  attempt  had 

and  trance.  r 

been  made  in  France  to  overthrow  Riche- 
lieu, in  which  the  queen  mother,  Mary  of  Medici,  hnd 
taken  a  leading  part.  Richelieu,  she  warned  her  son, 
was  leading  him  to  slight  the  interests  of  the  Church. 
But  Lewis  was  unconvinced,  and  Mary  of  Medici  found 
that  all  political  authority  was  in  Richelieu's  hands. 

The  complete  success  of  the  princes  opposed  to  Wal- 
lenstein  had  perhaps  exceeded  Richelieu's  expectations. 

,63T  A  balance  of  power  between  Wallenstein 

TreatT1^f  anc^  t^ie  League  would  have  served  his  pur- 

Birwaide.  pose  better.     But  if   Ferdinand  was  to  be 

strong,  it  did  not  matter  to  France  whether  the  army 
which  gave  him  strength  was  commanded  by  Wallen- 
stein or  by  Tilly.  Richelieu,  therefore,  made  up  his  mind 
to  grant  subsidies  to  Gustavus  without  asking  for  the 
conditions  which  had  been  refused  in  the  preceding 
spring.  On  January  23  the  Treaty  of  Barwalde  was 
signed  between  France  and  Sweden.  A  large  payment 
of  money  was  assured  to  Gustavus  for  five  years.  Gus- 
tavus, on  his  part,  engaged  to  respect  the  constitutions 
of  the  Empire  as  they  were  before  Ferdinand's  victories, 
and  to  leave  untouched  the  Catholic  religion  wherever 
he  found  it  established.  Out  of  the  co-operation  of  Catho- 
lic and  Protestant  states,  a  milder  way  of  treating  reli- 
gious differences  was  already  arising,  just  as  the  final 
establishment  of  toleration  in  England  grew  out  of  the 
co-operation  between  the  Episcopal  Church  and  tha 
Nonconformists. 


1631.  The  Fall  of  Magdeburg.  133 

Section  V. —  The  Fall  oj  Magdeburg. 
Further  successes  marked  the  early  months  of  1631. 
But  till  {he  two  Protestant  Electors  could  make  up  their 
minds  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  Gustavus,    „       „    . 

ji  I.     Hesita- 

nothing  serious  could  be  effected.  John  uonofthe 
George  felt  that  something  ought  to  be  done.  Saxony.° 
All  over  North  Germany  the  Protestants 
were  appealing  to  him  to  place  himself  at  their  head. 
To  say  that  he  was  vacillating  and  irresolute,  born  to 
watch  events  rather  than  to  control  them,  is  only  to  say 
that  he  had  not  changed  his  nature.  But  it  must  never 
be  forgotten  that  the  decision  before  him  was  a  very  hard 
one.  In  no  sense  could  it  be  regarded  otherwise  than  as 
a  choice  between  two  evils.  On  the  one  side  lay  the  pre- 
ponderance of  a  hostile  religion.  On  the  other  side  lay 
the  abandonment  of  all  hope  of  German  unity,  a  unity 
which  was  nothing  to  Giistavus,  but  which  a  German 
Elector  could  not  venture  to  disregard.  It  might  be, 
indeed,  that  a  new  and  better  system  would  arise  on  the 
ruins  of  the  old.  But  if  Saxony  were  victorious  with  the 
aid  of  Sweden,  the  destruction  of  the  existing  order  was 
certain,  the  establishment  of  a  new  one  was  problematical. 
A  great  Protestant  assembly  held  at  Leipzig  in  March, 
determined  to  make  one  more  appeal  to  the  Emperor. 
If  only  he  would  withdraw  that  fatal  Edict   .       _ 

.       .  ?  2.     The  As- 

of  Restitution,  the  Protestants  of  the  north  sembiyat 
would  willingly  take  their  places  as  obedient  Lip2Ug- 
estates  of  the  Empire.  No  foreign  king  should  win  them 
from  their  allegiance,  or  induce  them  to  break  asunder 
the  last  ties  which  bound  them  together  to  their  head. 
But  this  time  the  appeal  was  accompanied  by  a  step  in 
the  direction  of  active  resistance.  The  Protestant  estates 
represented  at  Leipzig  agreed  to  levy  soldiers,  in  orde* 
to  be  prepared  for  whatever  might  happen. 


»34  Ike  Edict  of  Restitution.  1631. 

Time  was  pressing.  The  Treaty  of  Barwalde  had 
opened  the  eyes  of  Maximilian  and  the  League  to  the 
danger  of  procrastination.  If  they  had  en- 
fn3the  Lorth.  tertained  any  hope  that  France  would  leave 
them  to  contend  with  Gustavus  alone,  that 
hope  was  now  at  an  end.  Tilly  was  despatched  into  the 
north  to  combat  the  Swedish  king. 

Ferdinand  had  despised  the  danger  from  Gustavus. 
"  We  have  got  a  new  little  enemy,"  he  said,  laughing, 
„      „.„  ,         when  he  heard  of  the  disembarkation  of  the 

g  4.  Tilly  s 

advmce  and  Swedes.  Tilly  knew  better.  He  pressed 
rapidly  forward,  hoping  to  thrust  himself 
between  Gustavus  in  Pomerania  and  his  lieutenant, 
Horn,  in  Mecklenburg.  If  he  succeeded,  the  invading 
army  would  be  cut  in  two,  and  liable  to  be  defeated 
in  detail.  Success  at  first  attended  his  effort.  On  March 
29,  whilst  the  princes  were  debating  at  Leipzig,  he  took 
New  Brandenburg,  cutting  down  the  whole  Swedish 
garrison  of  2,000  men.  But  Gustavus  was  too  rapid  for 
him.  Uniting  his  forces  with  those  of  Horn,  he  pre- 
sented a  bold  front  to  the  enemy.  Tilly  was  driven  back 
upon  the  Elbe.  The  remaining  fortresses  on  the  Baltic, 
and  the  important  post  of  Frankfort  on  the  Oder,  gar- 
risoned with  eight  imperialist  regiments,  fell  into  the 
power  of  the  conqueror. 

A  greater  and  more  important  city  than  Frankfort  was 
at  stake.  The  citizens  of  Magdeburg  had  raised  the 
t  -  Maede-  standard  of  independence  without  waiting 
°urz-  for  leave  from  John  George  of  Saxony.  Gus- 

tavus had  sent  a  Swedish  officer  to  conduct  their  defence. 
But  without  the  support  of  the  Electors  of  Saxony  and 
Brandenburg,  he  durst  not  bring  his  army  to  their  as- 
eiitance. 

The  imperialists  were  gathering  thickly  round  Mag- 


1 63 1 .  The  Fall  of  Magdeburg.  135 

deburg.     On   April  26  a  treaty  was  signed  at  Cherasco, 
between  France  and  the  Empire,  which  re- 
stored peace  in  Italy,  and  set  free  the  Em-    °f  cherasoo. 
peror's  troops  beyond  the  Alps  fur  service 
in  Germany.    If  Tilly  saw  matters  still  in  a  gloomy  light, 
his  fiery  lieutenant,  Pappenheim,  thought  there  was  no 
reason   to    despair.     "This    summer,"    he   wrote,    "we 
can  sweep  our  enemies  before  us.     God  give  us  grace 
thereto." 

As  the  siege  went  on,  Gustavus,  writing  under  his 
enforced  inaction,  pleaded  hard  with  the  two  Electors. 
From  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg  he  de- 
manded the  right  to  occupy  the  two  for-  f;07n  wi°hlhe" 
tresses  of  Kiistrin  and  Spandau.  Hopes  Braudenbanj 
were  held  out  to  him  of  the  surrender  of 
Kiistrin,  but  he  was  assured  that  Spandau  should  never 
be  his.  Accompanied  by  a  picked  body  of  troops,  he 
marched  straight  upon  Berlin.  On  May  13,  outside  the 
city  gates,  he  held  a  long  conference  with  his  brother-in- 
law,  the  Elector.  He  argued  in  vain.  To  one  of  the 
Dukes  of  Mecklenburg,  who  had  accompanied  him,  he 
spoke  in  bitter  words.  "  I  am  marching,"  he  said, 
"  upon  Magdeburg,  to  deliver  the  city.  If  no  one  will 
assist  me,  I  will  retreat  at  once.  I  will  offer  peace  to 
the  Emperor,  and  go  home  to  Stockholm.  I  know  that 
the  Emperor  will  agree  to  my  terms.  But  you  Pro- 
testants will  have  to  answer  at  the  day  of  judgment  that 
you  would  do  nothing  for  the  cause  of  God.  In  this 
world,  too,  you  will  be  punished.  Magdeburg  will  be 
taken,  and,  if  I  retire,  you  will  have  to  look  to  your- 
selves." The  next  day  the  conference  was  resumed. 
P'rom  early  morning  till  nine  at  night  the  Elector  per- 
sisted in  his  refusal.  But  the  armed  men  who  stood 
behind  Gustavus  were  the  most  powerful  of  arguments. 


136  7he  Edict  of  Restitution.  1631. 

At  last  the  Swedish  king  had  his  way.     On  the  15th  the 
gates  of  Spandau  were  thrown  open  to  his  troops. 

But,  if  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg  had  given  way.  the 
Elector  of  Saxony  was  not  to  be  moved.  He  had  not 
yet  received  an  answer  to  his  appeal  to  the 
anceofthe*  Emperor ;  and  till  that  arrived  he  would 
Saxon1  °f  enter  into  no  alliance  with  a  foreigner.  Fur- 
ther advance  was  impossible.  Cut  to  the 
heart  by  the  refusal,  Gustavus  withdrew,  leaving  Mag- 
deburg to  its  fate. 

That  fate  was  not  long  in  coming.     The  city  was 

hardly  in  a  state  to  make  a  desperate  resistance.     The 

council  had  levied  men  to  fight  their  battle. 

I  9.  Storm-  ° 

mg  of  Mag-  But  amongst  the  body  of  the  townsmen  there 
were  some  who  counselled  submission,  and 
others  who  preferred  taking  their  ease  whilst  the  hired 
soldiers  were  manning  the  walls.  On  May  20,  Pappen- 
heim  stormed  the  city.  In  those  days  the  sack  of  a  town 
taken  by  storm  was  claimed  as  a  right  by  the  soldiers,  as 
firmly  by  those  of  Gustavus  as  by  those  of  Tilly  and 
Wallenstein.  But  a  few  weeks  before,  the  Protestant 
population  of  Frankfort  had  been  exposed  to  the  violence 
and  greed  of  the  Swedish  army,  simply  because  they  had 
been  unable  to  prevent  the  imperialists  from  defending 
the  place.  But  the  sack  of  Magdeburg  was  accompanied 
by  circumstances  of  peculiar  horror.  Scarcely  had  the 
first  rush  taken  place  over  the  walls  when,  either  inten- 
tionally or  by  accident,  some  of  the  houses  were  set  on 
fire.  In  the  exeitement  of  plunder  or  of  terror  no  one 
thought  of  stopping  the  progress  of  the  flames.  The 
conquerors,  angered  by  the  thought  that  their  booty  was 
being  snatched  away  from  before  their  eyes  by  an  enemy 
more  irresistible  than  themselves,  were  inflamed  almost 
to  madness.     Few  could   meet  that  infuriated  soldiery 


1 63 1 .  The  Fall  of  Magdeburg.  137 

and  live.  Whilst  every  form  of  death,  and  of  outrage 
worse  than  death,  was  encountered  in  the  streets,  the 
shrieks  of  the  wretched  victims  were  overpowered  by  the 
roaring  of  the  flames.  In  a  few  hours  the  great  city,  the 
virgin  fortress  which  had  resisted  Charles  V.  and  Wallen- 
stein,  with  the  exception  of  the  Cathedral  and  a  few 
houses  around  it,  was  reduced  to  a  blackened  ruin,  be- 
neath which  lay  the  calcined  bones  of  men,  of  tender 
women,  and  of  innocent  babes. 

For  the  horrors  of  that  day  Tilly  was  not  personally 
responsible.  He  would  have  hindered  the  storm  if  he 
had  been  able.     The   tales   which   carried    ,       _.    • 

§  IO-   Tilly  s 

through    all    Protestant    Germany  the    evil    part  in  the 
deeds  of  the  old  warrior,  and  represented 
him  as  hounding  on  his  men  to  the  wretched  work,  were 
pure  inventions.     He  had  nothing  to  gain  by  the  de- 
struction of  Magdeburg.     He  had  everything  to  gain  by 
saving  it  as  a  basis  of  operations  for  his  army. 

But  if  Tilly  was  not  responsible  for  the  consequences 
of  the  siege,  he  and  his  masters  were  responsible  for  the 
policy  which  had  made  the  siege  possible. 
That  cathedral  standing  out  from  amidst  the   policy  which 
ruins  of  Magdeburg  was  but  too  apt  a  sym-   j^^y 
bol  of  the  work  which  he  and  the  League 
had  set  themselves  to  do.     That  the  rights  of  the  clergy 
and  the  church  might  be  maintained,  all  the  homes  and 
dwellings  of  men  in  Germany  were  to  be  laid  waste,  all 
the  social  and  political  arrangements  to  which  they  had 
attached  themselves  were  to  be  dashed  into  ruin. 

Even  now  Ferdinand  was  preparing  his  answer  to  the 
last  appeal  of  the  faithful  Protestant  estates. 
The  Edict  of  Restitution  he  would  maintain   ?  I2;  Fe,rdi- 

nand  refuses 

to  the  uttermost.     Of  the  armament  of  the   to  cancel  the 

,  r  Edict  of 

princes  he  spoke  in  terms  of  contemptuous   Restitution. 


l$8  Victories  of  Gustavus  Adolphus.  1631. 

arrogance.  Let  John  George  and  his  companions  in  ill- 
doing  dismiss  their  soldiers,  and  not  presume  to  dictate 
terms  by  force  to  the  head  of  the  Empire.  Ferdinand 
had  declared  the  law  as  it  was,  and  by  the  law  he  meant 
to  abide. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


THE  VICTORIES  OF  GUSTAVUS  ADOLPHUS. 

Section  I. — Alliance  between  the  Swedes  and  the  Saxons. 
A  great  fear  fell  upon  the  minds  of  all  Protestant  men. 
The  cities  of  the  south,  Augsburg  and  Nuremberg,  which 

had  begun  to  protest  against  the  execution 
2 1.  The  camp    of  the  edict,  fell  back  into  silence.     In  the 

north,  Gustavus,  using  terror  to  counteract 
terror,  planted  his  cannon  before  the  walls  of  Berlin,  and 
wrung  from  his  reluctant  brother-in-law  the  renunciation 
of  his  neutrality.  But  such  friendship  could  last  no 
longer  than  the  force  which  imposed  it,  and  John  George 
could  not  be  won  so  easily.  William  of  Hesse  Cassel 
was  the  first  of  the  German  princes  to  come  voluntarily 
into  the  camp  of  Gustavus.  Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar 
came  too,  young  as  he  was,  full  of  military  experience, 
and  full  too  of  memories  of  his  forefathers,  the  heroes  of 
that  old  Saxon  line  which  had  forfeited  the  Saxon  Elec- 
torate for  the  sake  of  the  Gospel.  But  neither  William 
nor  Bernhard  could  bring  much  more  than  their  own 
swords.  Gustavus  dared  not  take  the  offensive.  Throw- 
ing up  an  entrenched  camp  at  Werben,  where  the  Havel 
joins  the  Elbe,  he  waited  for  Tilly,  and  repulsed  an 
attack  made  upon  him.  But  what  was  such  a  victory 
worth  ?  Hardships  and  disease  were  thinning  his  ranks, 
and  unless  aid  came,  the  end  would  be  very  near. 


1631.     Alliance  between  Sweden  and  Saxony.         139 

The  aid  which  he  needed  was  brought  to  him  by  the 
blindness  of  Ferdinand.  At  last  the  results  of  the  treaty 
of  Cherasco  were  making  themselves  felt,  g  2  Tiliy 
The  troops  from  Italy  had  reached  the  north,  reinforced. 
and,  in  August,  Tilly  was  at  the  head  of  40,000  men. 
With  the  reinforcements  came  orders  from  the  Emperor. 
The  tame  deflection  of  John  George  from  the  line  of  strict 
obedience  was  no  longer  to  be  borne.  Tilly  must  com- 
pel him  to  lay  down  his  arms,  or  to  join  in  the  war 
against  the  foreign  invasion. 

These  orders  reached  Tilly  on  August  18.     On  the 
24th  he  sent  a  message  to  the  Elector,  ask-    \  3.    Sum-  • 
ing  him  by  what  right  he  was  in  arms  against   George  "to" 
the  laws  of  the  Empire.     John  George  had   dlsarm- 
some  difficulty  in  finding  an  answer,  but  he  refused  to 
dismiss  his  troops. 

If  Tilly  had  only  let  the  Elector  alone,  he  would  pro- 
bably have  had  nothing  to  fear  from  him  for  some  time 
to  come.  But  Tilly  knew  no  policy  beyond  * 4  Attacks 
the  letter  of  his  instructions.  He  at  once  Saxony- 
crossed  the  Saxon  frontier.  Pappenheim  seized  Merse- 
burg.  Tilly  reduced  Leipzig  to  surrender  by  the  threat 
that  he  would  deal  with  the  city  worse  than  with  Magde- 
burg. The  Elector,  so  long  unwilling  to  draw  the  sword, 
was  beyond  measure  angry.  He  sent  speedy  couriers  to 
Gustavus,  offering  his  alliance  on  any  terms. 

Gustavus  did  not  wait  for  a  second  bidding.  The  wish 
of  his  heart  was  at  last  accomplished.  He  put  his  forces 
at  once  in  motion,  bringing  the  Elector  of  §5.  Union  of 
Brandenburg  with  him.  The  Saxon  com-  andtheT  eS 
mander  was  the  Lutheran  Arnim,  the  very  Saxons- 
man  who  had  led  Wallenstein's  troops  to  the  siege  of 
Stralsund.  The  Edict  of  Restitution  had  taught  him  that 
Wallenstein's  idea  of  a  Germany  united  without  respect 


£4°  Victories  of  Gustavus  Adolphus.         1631. 

for  differences  o.*  .•eligion  was  not  to  be  realized  under 
Ferdinand.  He  had  thrown  up  his  post,  and  had  sought 
service  with  Jonn  George.  Without  being  in  any  way 
a  man  of  commanding  ability,  he  had  much  experience 
in  war. 

The  Saxon  soldiers  were  a  splendid  sight.  New 
clothed  and  new  armed,  they  nad  with  them  all  the  pomp 
J  6.    The  and  circumstance  of  glorious  war.    But  they 

baxon  troops.  ha(j  ^ad  no  experience  of  fighting.  They 
were  as  raw  as  Wallenstein's  troops  had  been  when  he 
first  entered  the  diocese  of  Halberstadt  in  1625. 

The  Swedes  were  a  rabble  rout  to  look  upon,  at  least 

in  the  eyes  of  the  inexperienced  Saxons.     Their  new 

m,  allies  lausdied  heartily  at  their  uniforms,  rasr- 

2  7-     The  .      °  }  '       s 

Swedish  ged  with  long  service  and  soiled  with  the 

troops.  ^ust  q£  tke  camp  an(j  j.jjg  bivouac.     But  the 

war-worn  men  had  confidence  in  their  general,  and  their 
general  had  confidence  in  them. 

Such  confidence  was  based  on  even  better  grounds 

than  the  confidence  of  the  veterans  of  the  League  in 

Tilly.     Tilly  was  simply  an  excellent  com- 

tavusasa  mander  of  the  old  Spanish  school.     He  had 

comman  er.       won  ^.g  battles  ^y  j^g  p0wer  0f  vvaiting  till 

he  was  superior  in  numbers.  When  the  battles  came  they 
were  what  are  generally  called  soldiers'  battles.  The 
close-packed  columns  won  their  way  to  victory  by  sheer 
push  of  pike.  But  Gustavus,  like  all  great  commanders, 
was  an  innovator  in  the  art  of  war.  To  the  heavy 
masses  of  the  enemy  he  opposed  lightness  and  flexibility. 
His  cannon  were  more  easily  moved,  his  muskets  more 
easily  handled.  In  rapidity  of  fire  he  was  as  superior  to 
the  enemy  as  Frederick  the  Great  with  his  iron  ramrods 
at  Mollwitz,  or  Moltke  with  his  needle-guns  at  Sadowa. 
He  had,  too,  a  new  method  of  drill.     His  troops  were 


1631.  The  Battle  of  Breitenfeld.  141 

drawn  up  three  deep,  and  were  capable  of  maneuvering 
with  a  precision  which  might  be  looked  for  in  vain  from 
the  solid  columns  of  the  imperialists. 

Section  II. —  The  Battle  of  Breitenfeld. 

On  the  morning  of  September  17  Swede  and  Saxon 
were  drawn  up  opposite  Tilly's  army,  close  to  the  village 
of  Breitenfeld,  some  five  miles  distant  from 
Leipzig.  Gustavus  had  Reed  of  all  his  skill.  Breitenfeid° 
Before  long  the  mocking  Saxons  were  flying 
in  headlong  rout.  The  victors,  unlike  Rupert  at  Marston 
Moor,  checked  themselves  to  take  the  Swedes  in  the 
flanks.  Then  Gustavus  coolly  drew  back  two  brigades 
and  presented  a  second  front  to  the  enemy.  Outnum- 
bered though  he  was,  the  result  was  never  for  a  moment 
doubtful.  Cannon  shot  and  musket  ball  tore  asunder 
the  dense  ranks  of  the  imperialist  army.  Tilly's  own 
guns  were  wrenched  from  him  and  turned  upon  his  in- 
fantry. The  unwieldy  host  staggered  before  the  deft 
blows  of  a  more  active  antagonist.  Leaving  six  thousand 
of  their  number  dying  or  dead  upon  the  field,  Tilly's 
veterans,  gathering  round  their  aged  leader,  retreated 
slowly  from  their  first  defeat,  extorting  the  admiration 
of  their  opponents  by  their  steadiness  and  intrepidity. 

The  victory  of  Breitenfeld,  or  Leipzig — the  battle  bears 
both  names — was  no  common  victory.     It  was  the  grave 
of  the  Edict  of  Restitution,  and  of  an  effort 
to  establish  a  sectarian  domination  in  the   ^a";mp&lrt- 
guise  of  national  unity.    The  bow,  stretched   *?ce  of  tiie 

0  '  victory. 

beyond    endurance,   had    broken    at    last. 
Since  the  battle  on  the  White  Hill,  the  Emperor,  the 
Imperial  Council,  the  Imperial  Diet,  had  declared  them- 
selves the  only  accredited  organs  of  the  national  life. 
Then  had  come  a  coolness  between  the  Emperor  and 


142  Victories  of  Gustavus  A  Jolphus.  1631, 

the  leaders  of  the  Diet.  A  good  understanding  had  been 
re-established  by  the  dismissal  of  Wallenstein.  But 
neither  Emperor  nor  Diet  had  seen  fit  to  take  account 
of  the  feelings  or  wants  of  more  than  half  the  nation. 
They,  and  they  alone,  represented  legal  authority.  The 
falsehood  had  now  been  dashed  to  the  ground  by  Gus- 
tavus.    Breitenfeld  was  the  Naseby  of  Germany. 

Like  Naseby,  too,  Breitenfeld  had  in  it  something  of 
more  universal  import.     Naseby  was  the  victory  of  dis- 
ciplined intelligence  over  disorderly  bravery. 
of3intel'n-0ry       Breitenfeld   was  the  victory  of  disciplined 
gcnc.e over         intelligence   over   the    stiff   routine   of   the 

routine.  ° 

Spanish  tactics.  Those  tactics  were,  after 
all,  but  the  military  expression  of  the  religious  and 
political  system  in  defence  of  which  they  were  used. 
Those  solid  columns  just  defeated  were  the  types  of  what 
human  nature  was  to  become  under  the  Jesuit  organiza- 
tion. The  individual  was  swallowed  up  in  the  mass.  As 
Tilly  had  borne  down  by  the  sheer  weight  of  his  veterans 
adventurers  like  Mansfeld  and  Christian  of  Brunswick, 
so  the  renewed  Catholic  discipline  had  borne  down  the 
wrangling  theologians  who  had  stepped  into  the  places 
of  Luther  and  Melanchthon.  But  now  an  army  had 
arisen  to  prove  that  order  and  obedience  were  weak 
unless  they  were  supported  by  individual  intelligence. 
The  success  of  the  principle  upon  which  its  operations 
were  based  could  not  be  confined  to  mere  fighting.  It 
would  make  its  way  in  morals  and  politics,  in  literature 
and  science. 

Great  was  the  joy  in  Protestant  Germany  when  the 
news  was  told.  The  cities  of  the  south  prepared  once 
.      w  ..  more  to  resist  their  oppressors.    All  that  wns 

stein's  in-  noblest  in    France  hailed  the  tidings  with 

Gustavus.  acclamation.     English    Eliot,   writing   from 


1631.  The  Battle  of  Breitenfeld.  143 

his  prison  in  the  Tower,  could  speak  of  Gustavus 
as  that  person  whom  fortune  and  virtue  had  re- 
served for  the  wonder  of  the  world !  Even  Wallenstein, 
from  his  Bohemian  retreat,  uttered  a  cry  of  satisfaction. 
For  Wallenstein  was  already  in  communication  with 
Gustavus,  who,  Protestant  as  he  was,  was  avenging  him 
upon  the  League  which  had  assailed  him  and  the  Em- 
peror who  had  abandoned  him.  He  had  offered  to  do 
great  things,  if  he  could  be  trusted  with  a  Swedish  force 
of  12,000  men.  He  was  well  pleased  to  hear  of  Tilly's 
defeat.  "  If  such  a  thing  had  happened  to  me,"  he  said 
to  an  emissary  of  Gustavus,  "  I  would  kill  myself.  But 
it  is  a  good  thing  for  us."  If  only  the  King  of  Sweden 
would  trust  him  with  men,  he  would  soon  bring  together 
the  officers  of  his  old  army.  He  would  divide  the  goods 
of  the  Jesuits  and  their  followers  amongst  the  soldiers. 
The  greatest  folly  the  Bohemians  had  committed,  he 
said,  had  been  to  throw  Martinitz  and  Slawata  out  of 
window  instead  of  thrusting  a  sword  through  their  bodies. 
If  his  plan  were  accepted  he  would  chase  the  Emperor 
and  the  House  of  Austria  over  the  Alps.  But  he  hoped 
Gustavus  would  not  allow  himself  to  be  entangled  too 
far  in  the  French  alliances. 

Wallenstein's  whole  character  was  expressed  in  these 
proposals,  whether  they  were  meant  seriously  or  not. 
Cut  off  from  German  ideas  by  his  Bohemian 
birth,  he  had  no  roots  in  Germany.     The      Sesigns'.S 
reverence  which  others  felt  for  religious  or 
political  institutions  had  no  echo  in  his  mind.     As  he 
had  been  ready  to  overthrow  princes  and  electors  in  the 
Emperor's  name,  so  he  was  now  ready  to  overthrow  the 
Emperor  in  the  name  of  the  King  of  Sweden.    Yet  there 
was  withal   a  greatness    about    him   which   raised  him 
above  such  mere  advenatrers  as  Mansfcld.    At  the  head 


144  Victories  of  Gusta  vus  A  dolphus.  1 6  3 1 . 

of  soldiers  as  uprooted  as  himself  from  all  ties  oi  home 
or  nationality,  he  alone,  amongst  the  leaders  of  the  war, 
had  embraced  the  two  ideas  which,  if  they  had  been 
welcomed  by  the  statesmen  of  the  Empire,  would  have 
saved  Germany  from  intolerable  evil.  He  wished  for 
union  and  strength  against  foreign  invasion,  and  he 
wished  to  found  that  union  upon  religious  liberty.  He 
would  have  kept  out  Gustavus  if  he  could.  But  if  that 
could  not  be  done,  he  would  join  Gustavus  in  keeping 
out  the  French. 

Yet   between  Wallenstein  and  Gustavus   it  was   im- 
possible that  there  should  be  anything  really  in  common. 
Wallenstein  was  large-minded  because  he 
sibility  of  an      was  far  removed  from  the  ordinary  preju- 

"ng  between  dices  of  men-  He  was  no  more  affected  by 
Wallenstein        tneir  habits  and  thoughts  than  the  course  of 

and  (justavus. 

a  balloon  is  affected  by  the  precipices  and 
rivers  below.  Gustavus  trod  firmly  upon  his  mother 
earth.  His  Swedish  country,  his  Lutheran  religion,  his 
opposition  to  the  House  of  Austria,  were  all  very  real  to 
him.  His  greatness  was  the  greatness  which  rules  the 
world,  the  greatness  of  a  man  who,  sharing  the  thoughts 
and  feelings  of  men,  rises  above  them  just  far  enough 
to  direct  them,  not  too  far  to  carry  their  sympathies  with 
him. 

Such  a  man  was  not  likely  to  be  content  with  mere 

military  success.     The  vision  of  a  soldier  sovereignty  to 

be  shared  with  Wallenstein  had  no  charms 

\  7.   Politi- 
cal plans  of        for  him.     If  the  Empire  had  fallen,  it  must 

be  replaced  not  by  an  army  but  by  fresh  in- 
stitutions; and  those  institutions,  if  they  were  to  endure 
at  all,  must  be  based  as  far  as  posssible  on  institutions 
already  existing.  Protestant  Germany  must  be  freed 
from  oppression.    It  must  be  organized  apart  sufficiently 


1 03 1.    ,  T7ie  Battle  of  Br eitenf eld.  145 

for  its  own  defence.  Such  an  organization,  the  Corpus 
Eva7igelicorumt  as  he  called  it,  like  the  North  German 
Confederation  of  1866,  might  or  might  not  spread  into  a 
greater  Germany  of  the  future.  It  would  need  the  sup- 
port of  Sweden  and  of  France.  It  would  not,  indeed, 
satisfy  Wallenstein's  military  ambition,  or  the  more 
legitimate  national  longings  of  German  patriots.  But  it 
had  the  advantage  of  being  attainable  if  anything  was 
attainable.  It  would  form  a  certain  bulwark  against  the 
aggression  of  the  Catholic  states  without  necessitating 
any  violent  change  in  the  existing  territorial  institutions. 
If  these  were  the  views  of  Gustavus — and  though  he 
never  formally  announced  them  to  the  world  his  whole 
subsequent  conduct  gives  reason  to  believe 

$  8.   Mis 

that  he  had  already  entertained  them — it  military 
becomes  not  so  very  hard  to  understand 
why  he  decided  upon  marching  upon  the  Rhine,  and 
despatching  the  Elector  of  Saxony  to  rouse  Bohemia. 
It  is  true  that  Oxenstjerna,  the  prudent  Chancellor  of 
Sweden,  wise  after  the  event,  used  to  declare  that  his 
master  had  made  a  mistake,  and  later  military  historians, 
fancying  that  Vienna  was  in  the  days  of  Gustavus  what 
it  was  in  the  days  of  Napoleon,  have  held  that  a  march 
upon  Ferdinand's  capital  would  have  been  as  decisive 
as  a  march  upon  the  same  capital  in  1805  or  1809.  But 
the  opinion  of  Gustavus  is  at  least  as  good  as  that  of 
Oxenstjerna,  and  it  is  certain  that  in  1631  Vienna  was 
not,  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  word,  a  capital  city.  If 
<ve  are  to  seek  for  a  parallel  at  all,  it  was  rather  like 
Madrid  in  the  Peninsular  War.  The  King  had  resided 
at  Madrid.  The  Emperor  had  resided  at  Vienna.  But 
neither  Madrid  in  1808  nor  Vienna  in  1631  formed  the 
centre  of  force.  No  administrative  threads  controlling 
the  military  system   stretched  out  from  either.     In  the 


146  Victories  of  Gustavus  Adolfthus.  1631. 

nineteenth  century  Napoleon  or  Wellington  might  be  in 
possession  of  Madrid  and  have  no  real  hold  of  Spain. 
In  the  seventeenth  century,  Ferdinand  and  Gustavus 
might  be  in  possession  of  Vienna  and  have  no  real  hold 
on  Austria  or  Bohemia.  Where  an  army  was,  there  was 
power;  and  there  would  be  an  army  wherever  Wallen- 
stein,  or  some  imitator  of  Wallenstein,  might  choose  to 
beat  his  drums.  If  Gustavus  had  penetrated  to  Vienna, 
there  was  nothing  to  prevent  a  fresh  army  springing  up 
in  his  rear. 

The  real  danger  to  be  coped  with  was  the  military 

system  which  Wallenstein   had   carried   to   perfection. 

And,    in   turning   to   the    Rhine,   Gustavus 

g  9.  Neces-  ° 

sity  of  find-        showed  his  resolution  not  to  imitate  Wallen- 

i.ig  a  basis  .    .     ,  .  T    .  , 

for  his  opera-  stem  s  example.  His  army  was  to  be  an- 
tl0ns-  chored  firmly  to  the  enthusiasm  of  the  Pro- 

testant populations.  There  lay  the  Palatinate,  to  be 
freed  from  the  oppressor.  There  lay  the  commercial 
cities  Augsburg,  Nuremberg,  Ulm,  and  Strassburg,  ready 
to  welcome  enthusiastically  the  liberator  who  had  set  his 
foot  upon  the  Edict  of  Restitution ;  and  if  in  Bohemia 
too  there  were  Protestants  to  set  free,  they  were  not 
Protestants  on  whom  much  dependence  could  be  placed. 
If  past  experience  was  to  be  trusted,  the  chances  of  or- 
ganizing resistance  would  be  greater  amongst  Germans 
on  the  Rhine  than  amongst  Slavonians  on  the  Moldau. 
For  purposes  of  offence,  too,  there  was  much  to  induce 
Gustavus  to  prefer  the  westward  march.  Thither  Tilly 
had  retreated  with  only  the  semblance  of  an 
resoives^o  army  still  in  the  field.  There,  too,  were  the 
march  to  the      long  string  of  ecclesiastical  territories,  the 

south-west.  °  ° 

Priest's  Lane,  as  men  called  it,  Wiirzburg, 
Bamberg,  Fulda,  Cologne,  Treves,  Mentz,  Worms, 
Spires,  the  richest  district  in  Germany,  which  had  fur- 


1 63 1.  Gustavus  in  South  Germany.  147 

nished  men  and  money  to  the  armies  of  the  League,  and 
which  were  now  to  furnish  at  least  money  to  Gustavus. 
There  Spain,  with  its  garrisons  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine,  was  to  be  driven  back,  and  France  to  be  con- 
ciliated, whilst  the  foundations  were  laid  of  a  policy 
which  would-provide  for  order  in  Protestant  Germany,  so 
as  to  enable  Gustavus  to  fulfil  in  a  new  and  better  spirit 
the  work  left  undone  by  Christian  of  Anhalt.  Was  it 
strange  if  the  Swedish  king  thought  that  such  work  as 
this  would  be  better  in  his  own  hands  than  in  those  of 
John  George  of  Saxony  ? 

Section  III. — March  of  Gustavus  into  South  Certnany. 

The  march  of  the  victorious  army  was  a  triumphal 
progress.     On  October  2,  Gustavus  was  at  Erfurt.     On 
the  loth  he  entered  Wiirzburg :  eight  days    aT.    March 
later,  the  castle  on  its  height  beyond  the    °f^nUtheVU* 
Main  was  stormed   after  a  fierce   defence.    Rhine. 
Through  all  the  north  the  priests  were  expelled  from  the 
districts  which  had  been  assigned  them  by  the  Edict  of 
Restitution.     Gustavus  was  bent  upon  carrying  on  repri- 
sals upon  them  in  their  own  homes.     On  December  16, 
Oppenheim  was  stormed  and  its  Spanish  garrison  put  to 
the  sword.     The  Priest's  Lane  was  defenceless.     Gus- 
tavus kept  his  Christmas  at  Mentz.     His  men,  fresh  from 
the  rough  fare  and  hard  quarters  of  the  north,  revelled 
in  the  luxuries  of  the  southern  land,  and  drank  deep 
draughts  of  Rhenish  wine  from  their  helmets. 

There  is  always  a  difficulty  in  conjecturing  the  inten- 
tions of  Gustavus.     He  did  not,  like  Ferdinand,  form 

plans  which  were  never  to  be  changed.    He    . 

v  °  .  g  2.    Gus- 

did  not,  like  Wallenstein,  form  plans  which    tavus  at 

he  was  ready  to  give  up  at  a  moment's  no- 
tice for  others  entirely  different.     The   essence  of  his 


148  Victories  of  Gustavus  Adolphus.  1631. 

policy  was  doubtless  the  formation,  under  his  own  leader^ 
ship,  of  the  Corpus  Ev  angelic  or um.  What  was  to  be 
done  with  the  ecclesiastical  territories  which  broke  up  the 
territorial  continuity  of  South  German  Protestantism  he 
had,  perhaps,  not  definitely  decided.  But  everything 
points  to  the  conclusion  that  he  wished  to  deal  with  them 
as  Wallenstein  would  have  dealt  with  them,  to  parcel 
them  out  amongst  his  officers  and  amongst  the  German 
princes  who  had  followed  his  banner.  In  doing  so,  he 
would  have  given  every  security  to  the  Catholic  popula- 
tion. Gustavus,  at  least  in  Germany,  meddled  with  no 
man's  religion.  In  Sweden  it  was  otherwise.  There, 
according  to  the  popular  saying,  there  was  one  king,  one 
religion,  and  one  physician. 

He  placed  the  conquered  territories  in  sure  hands. 
Mentz  itself  was  committed  to  the  Chancellor  Oxenst- 
?  3.    The  jerna.     French  ambassadors  remonstrated 

startled  at  with  him  roundly.   Richelieu  had  hoped  that, 

his  victories.  jf  tiie  House  of  Austria  were  humbled,  thj; 
German  ecclesiastics  would  have  been  left  to  enjoy  their 
dignities.  The  sudden  uprising  of  a  new  power  in  Eu- 
rope had  taken  the  French  politicians  as  completely  by 
surprise  as  the  Prussian  victories  took  their  successors  by 
surprise  in  1866.  "It  is  high  time,"  said  Lewis,  "  to 
place  a  limit  to  the  progress  of  this  Goth."  Gustavus, 
unable  to  refuse  the  French  demands  directly,  laid  down 
conditions  of  peace  with  the  League  which  made  nego- 
tiation hopeless.  But  the  doubtful  attitude  of  France 
made  it  all  the  more  necessary  that  he  should  place  him- 
self in  even  a  stronger  position  than  he  was  in  already. 

On  March  31  he  entered  Nuremberg.  As  he  rode 
through  the  streets  he  was  greeted  with  heartfelt  acclama- 
\  4.  Cam-  tions.  Tears  of  joy  streamed  down  the 
Germany  cheeks  of  bearded  men  as  they  welcomed 


1 63 1.   '  Gustavus  in  South  Germany.  i4g 

the  deliverer  from  the  north,  whose  ready  jest  and 
beaming  smile  would  have  gone  straight  to  the  po- 
pular heart  even  if  his  deserts  had  been  less.  The 
picture  of  Gustavus  was  soon  in  every  house,  and  a 
learned  citizen  set  to  work  at  once  to  compose  a  pedigree 
by  which  he  proved  to  his  own  satisfaction  that  the 
Swedish  king  was  descended  from  the  old  hereditary 
Burggraves  of  the  town.  In  all  that  dreary  war,  Gus- 
tavus was  the  one  man  who  had  reached  the  heart  of  the 
nation,  who  had  shown  a  capacity  for  giving  them  that 
for  which  they  looked  to  their  Emperor  and  their  princes, 
their  clergy  and  their  soldiers,  in  vain. 

Gustavus  did  not  tarry  long  with  his  enthusiastic  hosts. 
On  April  5  he  was  before  Donauworth.    Af-    „ 

.  .    ,.  ?  5-     Gus 

ter  a  stout  resistance  the  imperialists  were   tavus  at  Do- 
driven  out.     Once  more  a  Protestant  Easter   nauwor 
was  kept  within  the  walls,  and  the  ancient  wrong  was  re- 
dressed. 

On  the  14th  the  Swedes  found  the  passage  of  the  Lech 
guarded  by  Tilly.  Every  advantage  appeared  to  be  on 
the  side   of  the  defenders.     But  Gustavus    , ,    _ 

(So.     1  he  pas 

knew  how  to  sweep  their  positions  with  a   sage  of  the 
terrible  fire   of  artillery,   and  to  cross   the    death  of 
river  in  the  very  teeth  of  the  enemy.    In  the    Tllly" 
course   of  the  battle  Tilly  was  struck  down,  wounded 
by  a  cannon  shot  above  the  knee.     His  friends  mourn- 
fully carried  him  away  to  Ingolstadt  to  die.     His  life's 
work  was  at  an  end.    If  simplicity  of  character  and  readi- 
ness to  sacrifice  his  own  personal  interests  be  a  title  to 
esteem,  that  esteem  is  but  Tilly's  due.     To  the  higher 
capacity  of  a  statesman  he  laid  no  claim.     Nor  has  he 
any  place  amongst  the  masters  of  the  art  of  war.     He 
was  an  excellent  officer,  knowing  no  other  rule  than  the 
orders  of  constituted  authorities,  no  virtue  higher  than 


150  Victories  of  Gustavus  Adolphus.  1631. 

obedience.  The  order  which  he  reverenced  was  an  im- 
possible one,  and  there  was  nothing  left  him  but  to  die 
for  it. 

The  conqueror  pushed  on.  In  Augsburg  he  found  a 
city  which  had  suffered  much  from  the  Commissions  of 
Resumption  which  had,  in  the  south,  preceded  the  Edict 
1 7.  Gus-  of  Restitution.  The  Lutheran  clergy  had 
Augsburg  been  driven  from  their  pulpits  ;  the  Lutheran 

and  Mumch.  councillors  had  been  expelled  from  the  town 
hall.  In  the  midst  of  the  jubilant  throng  Gustavus  felt 
himself  more  strongly  seated  in  the  saddle.  Hitherto  he 
had  asked  the  magistrates  of  the  recovered  cities  to  swear 
fidelity  to  him  as  long  as  the  war  lasted.  At  Augsburg 
he  demanded  the  oath  of  obedience  as  from  subjects  to  a 
sovereign.  Gustavus  was  beginning  to  fancy  that  he 
could  do  without  France. 

Then  came  the  turn  of  Bavaria.  As  Gustavus  rode 
into  Munich,  Frederick,  the  exiled  Elector  Palatine,  was 
by  his  side,  triumphing  over  the  flight  of  his  old  enemy. 
It  was  not  the  fault  of  Gustavus  if  Frederick  was  not 
again  ruling  at  Heidelberg.  Gustavus  had  offered  him 
his  ancestral  territories  on  the  condition  that  he  would 
allow  Swedish  garrisons  to  occupy  his  fortresses  during 
the  war,  and  would  give  equal  liberty  to  the  Lutheran 
and  the  Calvinist  forms  of  worship.  Against  this  latter 
demand  Frederick's  narrow-hearted  Calvinism  steeled 
itself,  and  when,  not  many  months  later,  he  was  carried 
off  by  a  fever  at  Bacharach,  he  was  still,  through  his  own 
fault,  a  homeless  wanderer  on  the  face  of  the  earth. 

At  Munich  Gustavus  demanded  a  high  contribution. 
Discovering  that  Maximilian  had  buried  a  large  number 
I  8.  Gustavus  °f  guns  in  the  arsenal,  he  had  them  dug  up 
at  Mumch.  again  by  the  Bavarian  peasants,  who  were 
glad  enough  to  earn  the  money  with  which  the  foreign 


1 631.      Waitenstetn*  s  Restoration  to  Command.      151 

invader  paid  them  for  their  labours.  When  this  process 
was  over — waking  up  the  dead,  he  merrily  called  it — he 
prepared  to  leave  the  city  with  his  booty.  During  his 
stay  he  had  kept  good  discipline,  and  took  especial  care 
to  prohibit  any  insult  to  the  religion  of  the  inhabitants. 
If,  as  may  well  have  been  the  case,  he  was  looking 
beyond  the  Corpus  Evangelicorum  to  the  Empire  itself,  if 
he  thought  it  possible  that  the  golden  crown  of  Ferdinand 
might  rest  next  upon  a  Lutheran  head,  he  was  resolved 
that  religious  liberty,  not  narroxv  orthodoxy,  should  be 
the  corner-stone  on  which  that  Empire  should  be  built. 

All  Germany,  except  the  hereditary  dominions  of  the 
House  of  Austria,  was  at  his  feet.     And  he    . 

\  4$.  Strong 

knew  well  that,  as  far  as  those  dominions  position  of 
were  concerned,  there  was  no  strength  to 
resist  him.  Ferdinand  had  done  enough  to  repress  the 
manifestation  of  feeling,  nothing  to  organize  it.  He 
would  have  been  even  more  helpless  to  resist  a  serious 
attack  than  he  had  been  in  1619,  and  this  time  Bavaria 
was  as  helpless  as  himself.  Even  John  George,  who  had 
fled  hastily  from  the  field  of  Breitenfeld,  marched 
through  Bohemia  without  finding  the  slightest  resistance. 
His  army  entered  Prague  amidst  almost  universal  en- 
thusiasm. 

Section  IV. —  Wa  liens  fein' s  Restoration  to  Command. 
Unless   Ferdinand  could  find  help  elsewhere  than  in 
his  own  subjects  he  was  lost.     Abroad  he   3  r   Ftrdi- 
could  look  to  Spain.     But  Spain  could  not    "^nd  looks 

r  r  about  for 

do  very  much  under  the  eyes  of  Richelieu.    help- 
Some  amount  of  money  it  could  send,  and  some  advice. 
But  that  was  all. 

What  that  advice  would  be  could  hardly  be  doubted. 
The  dismissal  of  Wallenstein  had  been   a  check  for 
M 


152  Victories  of  Gustazms  Adolpkus.  1631. 

l6Th  Spain.     He  had  been  willing  to  join  Spain 

Spaniards  in  a  war  with  France.   The  electors  had  pre 

the  recall  of  vailed  against  him  with  French  support,  and 
Walienstein.  the  ^q^  0f  Cherasco,  by  which  the  Ger- 
man troops  had  been  withdrawn  from  fight- 
ing in  support  of  the  Spanish  domination  in  Italy,  had 
been  the  result.  Even  before  the  battle  of  Breitenfeld 
had  been  fought,  the  Spanish  government  had  recom- 
mended the  reinstatement  of  Walienstein,  and  the 
Spaniards  found  a  support  in  Eggenberg,  Walienstein' s 
old  protector  at  court. 

Soon  after  the  battle  of  Breitenfeld,  Walienstein  broke 

off  his  intercourse  with  Gustavus.     By  that  time  it  was 

evident  that  in  any  alliance  which  Gustavus 

stein  as  the°"      might  make  he  meant  to  occupy  the  first 

rival  of  place  himself.    Even  if  this  had  been  other- 

Gustavus.  « 

wise,  the  moral  character  and  the  political 
instincts  of  the  two  men  were  too  diverse  to  make  co- 
operation possible  between  them.  Gustavus  was  a  king 
as  well  as  a  soldier,  and  he  hoped  to  base  his  military 
power  upon  the  political  reconstruction  of  Protestant 
Germany,  perhaps  even  of  the  whole  Empire.  Walien- 
stein owed  everything  to  the  sword,  and  he  wished  to 
bring  all  Germany  under  the  empire  of  the  sword. 

The  arrival  of  the  Saxons  in  Bohemia  inspired  Wal- 
ienstein with  the  hope  of  a  new   combination,  which 

would  place  the  destinies  of  Germany  in  his 
Sft£«eS  hands.  The  reluctance  with  which  John 
ation  with  George  had   abandoned  the  Emperor  was 

John  George.  °  * 

well  known.  If  only  Ferdinand,  taught  by 
experience,  could  be  induced  to  sacrifice  the  Edict  of 
Restitution,  might  not  the  Saxons  be  won  over  from  their 
new  allies?  Wallenstein's  former  plans  would  be  re- 
alized, and  united  Germany,  nominally  under  Ferdinand, 


1631.      Walk 'tisteiri 's  Restoration  to  Command.       153 

in  reality  under  his  general,  would  rise  to  expel  the 
foreigner  and  to  bar  the  door  against  the  Frenchman 
and  the  Swede. 

In  November,  1631,  Wallenstein  met  his  old  lieute- 
nant, Arnim,  now  the  Saxon  commander,  to  discuss  the 
chances  of  the  future.    In  December,  just  as    ,      TT  . 

2  5-  He  is 

Gustavus  was    approaching  the   Rhine,  he    reinstated  in 

.  .    .     ,  „  ,  -,  the  command. 

received  a  visit  from  Eggenberg,  at  Znaim. 
Eggenberg  had  come  expressly  to  persuade  him  to  ac* 
cept  the  command  once  more.  Wallenstein  gave  his 
consent,  on  condition  that  the  ecclesiastical  lands  should 
be  left  as  they  were  before  the  Edict  of  Restitution.  And 
besides  this  he  was  to  wield  an  authority  such  as  no 
general  had  ever  claimed  before.  No  army  could  be  in- 
troduced into  the  Empire  excepting  under  his  command. 
To  him  alone  was  to  belong  the  right  of  confiscation  and 
of  pardon.  As  Gustavus  was  proposing  to  deal  with  the 
ecclesiastical  territories,  so  would  Wallenstein  deal  with 
the  princes  who  refused  to  renounce  their  alliance  with 
the  Swede.  A  new  class  of  princes  would  arise,  owing 
their  existence  to  him  alone.  As  for  his  own  claims,  if 
Mecklenburg  could  not  be  recovered,  a  princely  territory 
was  to  be  found  for  him  elsewhere. 

After   all   it   was    not   upon  written    documents  that 
Wallenstein's  power  was  founded.     The  army  which  he 
gathered  round  him  was  no  Austrian  army 
in  any  real  sense  of  the  word.     It  was  the   Vein's  army" 
army  of  Wallenstein — of  the  Duke  of  Fried- 
land,  as  the  soldiers  loved  to  call  him,  thinking  perhaps 
that  his  duchy  of  Mecklenburg  would  prove  but  a  transi- 
tory possession.     Its  first  expenses  were  met  with  the' 
help  of  Spanish  subsidies.     But  after  that  it  had  to  de- 
pend on  itself.     Nor  was  it  more  than  an  accident  that 
it  was  levied  and  equipped  in  Bohemia.     If  Gustavus 


154  Victories  of  Gustavus  Adolphus.  1631. 

had  been  at  Vienna  instead  of  at  Munich,  the  thousands 
of  stalwart  men  who  trooped  in  at  Wallenstein's  bare 
word  would  have  gathered  to  any  place  where  he  had 
set  up  his  standards.  Gustavus  had  to  face  the  old  evil 
of  the  war,  which  had  grown  worse  and  worse  from  the 
days  of  Mansfeld  to  those  of  Wallen stein,  the  evil  of  a 
military  force  existing  by  itself  and  for  itself.  From  far 
distant  shores  men  practised  in  arms  came  eagerly  to  the 
summons ;  from  sunny  Italy,  from  hardy  Scotland,  from 
every  German  land  between  the  Baltic  and  the  Alps. 
Protestant  and  Catholic  were  alike  welcome  there.  The 
great  German  poet  has  breathed  the  spirit  of  this  hetero- 
geneous force  into  one  of  its  officers,  himself  a  wanderer 
from  distant  Ireland,  ever  prodigal  of  her  blood  in  the 
quarrels  of  others.  "This  vast  and  mighty  host,"  he 
says  (Schiller,  The  Piccolomini,  act  i.  sc.  2), 

is  all  obedient 
To  Friedland's  captains ;  and  its  brave  commanders. 
Bred  in  one  school,  and  nurtured  with  one  milk, 
Are  all  excited  by  one  heart  and  soul. 
They  are  strangers  on  the  soil  they  tread. 
The  service  is  their  only  house  and  home. 
No  zeal  inspires  them  for  their  country's  cause, 
For  thousands  like  myself,  were  born  abroad ; 
Nor  care  they  for  the  Emperor,  for  one  half, 
Deserting  other  service,  fled  to  ours, 
Indifferent  what  their  banner,  whether  'twere 
The  Double  Eagle,  Lily,  or  the  Lion;* 
Yet  one  sole  man  can  rein  this  fiery  host, 
By  equal  rule,  by  equal  love  and  fear, 
Blending  the  many-nationed  whole  in  one. 

Was  it,  forsooth,  the  Emperor's  majesty 
That  gave  the  army  ready  to  his  hand, 

*  That  is  to  say,  the  standard  of  the  Emperor,  of  France,  or  oi 
S veden. 


1632.     Wallensteiri ' s  Restoration  to  Command.        155 

And  only  sought  a  leader  for  it?     No ! 
The  army  then  had  no  existence.     He, 
Friedland,  it  was  who  called  it  into  being, 
And  gave  it  to  his  sovereign — but  receiving 
No  army  at  his  hand  ; — nor  did  the  Emperor 
Give  Wallenstein  to  us  as  General.     No, 
It  was  from  Wallenstein  we  first  received 
The  Emperor  as  our  master  and  our  sovereign ; 
And  he,  he  only,  binds  us  to  our  banner. 

Wallenstein  at  first  accepted  the  command  for  three 
months  only.     In  April  it  was  permanently  1632. 

conferred  on  him.     The  Emperor  was  prac-    cJves  fulf" 
tically  set  aside  in  favour  of  a  dictator.  powers. 

Wallenstein  turned  first  upon  the   Saxons.     In   one 

hand  he  held  the  olive  branch,  in  the  other  the  sword. 

On  May  21st  his  emissary  was  offering  peace 

on  the  terms  of  the  retractation  of  the  Edict   gaxons  driven 

of  Restitution.      On   the   22d  Wallenstein   ?ut°f  Bo- 
hemia. 

himself  fell   upon   the   Saxon   garrison   of 

Prague,  and  forced  it  to  surrender.     It  was  a  plain  hint 

to  John  George  to  make  his  mind  up  quickly.     Before 

long  the  Saxons  had  been  driven  out  of  the  whole  of 

Bohemia. 

John  George  loved  peace  dearly,  and  he  had  joined 
Sweden  sorely  against  his  will.    But  he  was    ?  9.  But  John 
a  man  of  his  word,  and  he  had  promised    noTS-l?!1 
Gustavus   not   to  come  to  terms  with    the   alonc- 
enemy  without  his  consent.  He  forwarded  Wallenstein's 
propositions  to  Gustavus. 

No   man  was   so  ready  as  Gustavus   to    change  his 
plans  in  all   matters  of   secondary  importance,  as  cir- 
cumstances might  require.     In  the  face  of  ,       ^ 
Wallenstein's  armament  and  of  the  hesita-    mands  of 
tions  of  the  Saxon  court,  he  at  once  aban- 


t$6  Victories  of  Gustavus  Adotyhus.  1632. 

doned  all  thought  of  asking  that  the  Rhine  bishoprics 
should  remain  in  his  hands.  He  was  ready  to  assent  to 
the  solution  of  religious  questions  which  satisfied  Wal- 
lenstein  and  John  George.  For  himself,  he  expected  the 
cession  of  at  least  part  of  Pomerania,  in  order  to  protect 
himself  from  a  future  naval  attack  proceeding  from  the 
Baltic  ports.  The  Elector  of  Brandenburg  had  claims 
upon  Pomerania ;  but  he  might  be  satisfied  with  some 
of  the  bishoprics  which  it  had  been  agreed  to  leave  in 
Protestant  hands. 

Such  terms  would  probably  have  met  with  opposition. 

But  the  real  point  of  difference  lay  elsewhere.     Wallen- 

stein  would  have  restored  the  old  unity  of 

HibiUtyT35"      the  Empire,  of  which  he  hoped  to  be  the 

reconciling         inspiring  genius.     Gustavus  pressed  for  the 

Gustavus  and       .     v       .  s    s  .  _  r  ,  . , 

Wailenstein.  formation  of  a  separate  Protestant  league,  if 
not  under  his  own  guidance,  at  least  in  close 
alliance  with  Sweden.  Wailenstein  asked  for  confidence 
in  himself  and  the  Emperor.  Gustavus  had  no  confi- 
dence in  either. 

John  George  wavered  between  the  two.     He,  too,  dis- 
trusted Wailenstein.     But  he  did  not  see  that  he  must 
either  accept  the  Empire,  or  help  on  its  dis- 

3  12.  Hesita-  ,      .  r,  ,  .,,,,,- 

tion  of  John  solution,  unless  he  wished  to  leave  the  future 
George.  ^  Qermanv  to  chance.     The  imperial  unity 

of  Wailenstein  was  something.  The  Corpus  Evangeli- 
corum  of  Gustavus  was  something.  The  Protestant  states, 
loosely  combined,  were  doomed  to  defeat  and  ruin. 


Section  V. —  The  Struggle  between  Gustavus  and 
Wailenstein. 

Long  before  John  George's  answer  could  reach  Gus- 
tavus the  war  had  blazed  out  afresh.    The  Swedish  king 


i632'-  Gustavus  and  Wallenstein..  157 

did  not  yet  know  how  little  reliaiice  he  could 
place  on  the  Elector  for  the  realization  of  proposes1*1"1* 
his  grand  plan,  when  Wallenstein  broke  up   *"6ue  of 
from  Bohemia,  and  directed  his  whole  force 
upon    Nuremberg.     Gustavus   threw  himself  into   the 
town  to  defend  it.     Here,  too,  his  head  was  busy  with 
the  Carpus  Evangelic  or wm.     Whilst  he  was  offering  to 
Saxony  to  abandon  the  ecclesiastical  territories,  he  pro- 
posed to  the  citieens  of  Nuremberg  to  lay  the  foundations 
of  a  league   in  which  the   citizens  alone  should   ally 
themselves  with   him,  leaving  the  princes  to  come  in 
afterwards  if  they  would,  whilst  the  ecclesiastical  terri- 
tories should  remain  in.  his  own  hands.  There  is  nothing 
really  discrepant  in  the  two  schemes.     The  one  was  a 
plan  to  be  adopted  only  on  condition  of  a  final  and  per- 
manent peace.  The  other  was  a  plan  for  use  as  a  weapon 
of  war.     The  noticeable  thing  is  the  persistent  way  in 
which  Gustavus  returned  again  and  again  to  the  idea 
of  founding  a  political  union  as  the  basis  oif  military 
strength. 

He  was  no  more  successful  with  the  citixens  of  Nu- 
remberg than  with  the  Elector  q{  Saxony.     They  replied 

that  a  matter  of  such  importance  should  be    , 

.  j>  2.  His  pro- 

treated  m  common   by  all  the  cities  and   posal  mnac- 

princes  interested.  "  In  that  ease,"  he  re-  cepta 
plied,  bitterly,  "  the  Elector  of  Saxony  will  dispute  for 
half  a  year  in  whose  name  the  summons  to  the  meeting 
ought  to  be  issued.  When  the  cities,  too,  send  deputies, 
they  usually  separate  as  they  meet,  discovering  that 
there  is  a  defect  in  their  instructions,  and  so  refer  every- 
thing home  again  for  further  consideration,  without 
coming  to  any  conclusion  whatever."  Can  it  be  doubted 
that  the  political  incompetence  of  the  Germans,  caused 
by  their  internal  divisions  and  their  long  disuse  of  such 


158  Victories  of  Gustavus  Adolphus.         1632. 

institutions  as  would  have  enabled  them  to  act  in  com- 
mon, was  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  Gustavus,  felt  by  him 
more  deeply  than  the  appearance  in  the  field,  however 
unexpected,  of  Wallenstein  and  his  army  ? 

That  army,  however,  must  be  met.  Wallenstein  had 
60,000  men  with  him  ;  Gustavus  but  a  third  of  the  num- 
l  3.  Gustavus  ber.  The  war  had  blazed  up  along  the 
stein  at  en  Rhine  from  Alsace  to  Coblentz.  Pappen- 
Nuremberg.  heim  was  fighting  there,  and  the  Spaniards 
had  sent  troops  of  their  own,  and  had  summoned  tne 
Duke  of  Lorraine  to  their  aid.  By-and-by  it  was  seen 
how  rightly  Gustavus  had  judged  that  France  could  not 
afford  to  quarrel  with  him.  Though  he  had  dashed  aside 
Richelieu's  favourite  scheme  of  leaving  the  ecclesiastical 
territories  untouched,  and  had  refused  to  single  out  the 
House  of  Austria  as  the  sole  object  of  the  war,  Richelieu 
could  not  fail  to  support  him  against  Spanish  troops.  In 
a  few  weeks  the  danger  in  his  rear  was  at  an  end,  and 
the  scattered  detachments  of  the  Swedish  army  were 
hurrying  to  join  their  king  at  Nuremberg. 

Gustavus  was  now  ready  for  a  battle.  But  a  battle  he 
could  not  have.  Wallenstein  fell  back  upon  his  old 
?4;  Wallen-  tactics  of  refusing  battle,  except  when  he 
trenches  \ia&  a  manifest  superiority  of  numbers.     He 

himself.  entrenched  himself  near  Fiirth,  to  the  north 

of  Nuremberg,  on  a  commanding  eminence  overlooking 
the  whole  plain  around.  For  twelve  miles  his  works 
protected  his  newly-levied  army.  House,  villages,  ad- 
vantages of  the  ground  were  everywhere  utilized  for 
defence. 

In  the  meanwhile,  scarcity  and  pestilence  were  doing 
their  terrible  work  at  Nuremberg.  The  country  people 
had  flocked  in  for  refuge,  and  the  population  was  too 
great  to  be  easily  supplied  with  food.     Even  in  the  army 


1632.    t  Gustavus  and  Wallenstein.  15a 

want  began  to  be  felt.     And  with  want  came 

.  2  5.     Wants 

the  relaxation  of  that  discipline  upon  which    of  the  Swedish 
Gustavus   prided   himself.      He   had   large   army- 
numbers  of  German  troops  in  his  army  now,  and  a  long 
evil  experience  had  taught  Germans  the  habits  of  marau- 
ders. 

Gustavus  was  deeply  irritated.     Sending  for  the  chief 
Germans   in    his    service,    he    rated    them 
soundly.    "  His  Majesty,"  says  one  who  de-    remonstrates"' 
scribed  the  scene,  "was  never  before  seen 
in  such  a  rage." 

"You  princes,  counts,  lords,  and  noblemen,"  he  said, 

"  you   are  showing  your  disloyalty  and  wickedness  on 

your  own  fatherland,  which  you  are  ruining. 

;  J  &     ?  7.    His 

You  colonels,  and  officers  from  the  highest    speech  to  the 

to  the  lowest,  it  is  you  who  steal  and  rob 
every  one,  without  making  any  exceptions.  You  plunder 
your  own  brothers  in  the  faith.  You  make  me  disgusted 
with  you ;  and  God  my  Creator  be  my  witness  that  my 
heart  is  filled  with  gall  when  I  see  any  one  of  you  be- 
having so  villanously.  For  you  cause  men  to  say  openly, 
'  The  king,  our  friend,  does  us  more  harm  than  our 
enemies.'  If  you  were  real  Christians  you  would  con* 
sider  what  I  am  doing  for  you,  how  I  am  spending  my 
life  in  your  service.  I  have  given  up  the  treasures  of  my 
crown  for  your  sake,  and  have  not  had  from  your  German 
Empire  enough  to  buy  myself  a  bad  suit  of  clothes  with." 
After  this  strain  he  went  on  :  "  Enter  into  your  hearts," 
he  said,  "  and  think  how  sad  you  are  making  me,  so  that 
the  tears  stand  in  my  eyes.     You  treat  me    . 

.  ?  S-    Com- 

lll  with  your  evil  discipline ;  I  do  not  say   plains  bitterly 
with  your  evil  fighting,  for  in  that  you  have  . 
behaved  like  honourable  gentlemen,  and  for  that  I  am 
much  obliged  to  you.     I  am  so  grieved  for  you  that  I  am 


rfjo  Victories  of  Gustavus  Adolphns.  1632. 

vexed  that  I  ever  had  anything  to  do  with  so  stiff-necked 
a  nation.  Well,  then,  take  my  warning  to  heart ;  we  will 
soon  show  our  enemies  that  we  are  honest  men  and 
honourable  gentlemen." 

One  day  the  king  caught  a  corporal  stealing  cows. 
,  Punishes  "  ^  son>"  ne  sa-id,  as  he  delivered  him  over 
plunderers.  to  the  provost  marshal,  "  it  is  better  that  I 
should  punish  you,  than  that  God  should  punish  not  only 
you,  but  me  and  all  of  us  for  your  sake." 

Such  a  state  of  things  could  not  last  long.  On  Sep- 
tember 3  Gustavus  led  his  army  to  the  shores  of  Wallen- 
stein's  entrenchments;  but  though  he  made 

g  10.  Fails  to  ... 

storm  Wallen-  some  impression,  the  lines  were  too  skilful- 
ly drawn,  and  too  well  defended,  to  be  bro- 
ken through.  On  the  other  hand,  Gustavus  was  not  a 
Mansfeld,  and  Wallenstein  did  not  venture,  as  at  the 
Bridge  of  Dessau,  to  follow  up  his  successful  defence  by 
an  offensive  movement. 

Want  of  supplies  made  it  impossible  for  Gustavus  to 
remain  longer  at  Nuremberg.    For  the  first  time  since  he 

landed  in  Germany  he  had  failed  in  securing 
g  n.  Is  obliged  .  J  .  & 

to  march  a  victory,  With  drums  beating  and  banners 

dWd>  flying,  he  marched  away  past  Wallenstein's 

encampment ;  but  the  wary  man  was  not  to  be  enticed 

to  a  combat.     As  soon   as   he  was   gone,  Wallenstein 

broke  up  his  camp.     But  he   knew  too  well  where  his 

opponent's   weakness  lay  to  go  in  pursuit  of  Gustavus. 

Throwing  himself  northwards,  he   established  himself 

firmly  in  Saxony,  plundering  and  burning  on  every  side. 

If  only  he  could  work  ruin  enough,  he  might  hope   to 

detach  the  Elector  from  his  alliance  with  the  Swedes. 

I  n.  Wailen-         Gustavus  could   not   choose   but   follow. 

tavus  in  Sax"S'    Wallenstein  had  hoped  to  establish  himself 

onY-  as  firmly  in  Saxony  as  he  had  established 


r632-  The  Battle  of  Liitzen.  161 

himself  at  Ftirth.  He  would  seize  Torgau  and  Halle,  to 
make  himself  master  of  the  passages  over  the  Elbe  and 
Saale,  whilst  Erfurt  and  Naumburg  would  complete  the 
strength  of  his  position.  Gustavus  might  dash  his  head 
against  it  as  he  pleased.  Like  Wellington  at  Torres 
Vedras,  or  Gustavus  himself  at  Werben,  he  would  meet 
the  attack  of  the  enemy  by  establishing  himself  in  a 
carefully  selected  position  of  defence. 

Section  VI. —  The  Battle  of  Liitzen. 

Wallenstein  had  succeeded  at  Nuremberg,  but  he  was 
not  to  succeed  in  Saxony.  Gustavus  was  upon  him  be- 
fore he  had  gained  the  positions  he  needed.  » t  Gustavus 
Erfurt  was  saved  from  the  imperialists,  in  Saxony. 
Gustavus  entered  Naumburg  to  be  adored  as  a  saviour 
by  men  flying  from  Wallenstein's  barbarities.  As  he 
passed  through  the  streets  the  poor  fugitives  bent  down 
to  kiss  the  hem  of  his  garments.  He  would  have  resist- 
ed them  if  he  could.  He  feared  lest  God  should  punish 
him  for  receiving  honour  above  that  which  befitted  a 
mortal  man. 

The  Saxon  army  was  at  Torgau,  and  that  important 
post  was  still  guarded.  Wallenstein  lay  at  Liitzen.  Even 
there,  shorn  as   he   was    of  his    expected    , 

r  j    2,    Wallen- 

strength,  he  threw  up   entrenchments,  and   stein  believes 
believed  himself  safe  from   attack.     It  was 
now  November,  and  he  fancied  that  Gustavus,  satisfied 
with  his  success,  would  go,  after  the  fashion  of  the  time, 
into  winter  quarters. 

In  Wallenstein's  army,  Pappenheim's  dashing  bravery 
made  him  the  idol  of  the  soldiers,  and  gave    z     papPen- 
him  an   almost  independent  position.     He   [jFim  leaves 
begged  to  be  allowed  to  attempt  a  diversion 
on  the  Rhenish  bishoprics.     Wallenstein  gave  the  re« 


1 62  Victories  of  Gusi  ivus  Adolphus.  1632. 

quired  permission,  ordering  him  to   seize  Kalle  on  the 
way. 

It  was  a  serious  blunder  to  divide  an  army  under  the 
eyes  of  Gustavus.     Early  on  the  morning  of  November 

16  the  Swedish  king  was  in  front  of  Wallen- 
of  the  stein's  position  at  L>>tzen.     He  knew  well 

Gustavus  that,  if  there  was  to  be  a  battle  at  all,  he 

battTe. the  must  be  the  assailant.     Wallenstein   would 

not  stir.  Behind  ditche-*-  and  entrenchments, 
ready  armed,  his  heavy  squares  lay  immovably,  waiting 
for  the  enemy,  like  the  Russians  «**  the  Alma  or  the 
English  at  Waterloo.  A  fog  lay  thick  upon  the  ground. 
The  Swedish  army  gathered  early  to  their  morning 
prayer,  summoned  by  the  sounds  of  Luther's  hymn 
tune,  "  God  is  a  strong  tower,"  floating  on  the  heavy  air 
from  the  brazen  lips  of  a  trumpet.  The  king  himself 
joined  in  the  morning  hymn,  "  Fear  not,  little  flock." 
Then,  as  if  with  forebodings  of  the  coming  slaughter, 
others  sung  of  "  Jesus  the  Saviour,  who  was  the  con- 
queror of  death."  Gustavus  thrust  aside  the  armour 
which  was  offered  him.  Since  he  had  received  a  wound, 
not  long  before,  he  felt  uncomfortable  in  it.  Unpro- 
tected, he  mounted  on  his  horse,  and  rode  about  the 
ranks  encouraging  the  men. 

At  eleven  the  mist  cleared  away,  and  the  sun  shone 
out.      The  king  gave  his  last  orders  to  his  generals. 

Then,  looking  to  heaven,  "  Now,"  he  said, 

Y,  5*   AttZlCK  „ 

of  the  "  in   God  s  name,  Jesus,  give   us  to-day  to 

a*d  cs'  fight  for  the  honour  of  thy   holy    name." 

kinghofthe  Then,  waving  his  sword  over  his  head,  he 
cried  out,  "  Forwards !"  The  whole  line 
advanced,  Gustavus  riding  at  the  head  of  the  calvary  at 
the  right.  After  a  fierce  struggle,  the  enemy's  lines  were 
broken  through  everywhere.     But  Wallenstein  was  nol 


1632.     i  The  Battle  of  Lutzen.  163 

yet  mastered.  Bringing  up  his  reserves,  he  drove  back 
the  Swedish  infantry  in  the  centre.  Gustavus,  when  he 
heard  the  news,  flew  to  the  rescue.  In  all  other  affairs 
of  life  he  knew  better  than  most  men  how  to  temper 
daring  with  discretion.  In  the  battle-field  he  flung  pru- 
dence to  the  winds.  The  horsemen,  whom  he  had  or- 
dered to  follow  him,  struggled  in  vain  to  keep  up  with 
the  long  strides  of  their  master's  horse.  The  fog  came 
down  thickly  once  more,  and  the  king,  left  almost  alone 
in  the  darkness,  dashed  unawares  into  a  regiment  of  the 
enemy's  cuirassiers.  One  shot  passed  through  his 
horse's  neck.  A  second  shattered  his  left  arm.  Turn- 
ing round  to  ask  one  of  those  who  still  followed  him  to 
help  him  out  of  the  fight,  a  third  shot  struck  him  in  the 
back,  and  he  fell  heavily  to  the  ground.  A  youth  of 
eighteen,  who  alone  was  left  by  his  side,  strove  to  lift 
him  up  and  to  bear  him  off.  But  the  wounded  man 
was  too  heavy  for  him.  The  cuirassiers  rode  up  and 
asked  who  was  there.  "  I  was  the  King  of  Sweden," 
murmured  the  king,  as  the  young  man  returned  no 
answer,  and  the  horseman  shot  him  through  the  head, 
and  put  an  end  to  his  pain. 

Bernard  of  Weimar  took  up  the  command.  On  the 
other  side  Pappenheim,  having  received  orders  to  return, 
hurried  back  from  Halle.      But  he  brought   ,  ,  _,  .      , 

0  2  6.  Defeat  of 

only  his  cavalry  with  him.  It  would  be  Wailenstein. 
many  hours  before  his  foot  could  retrace  their  weary 
steps.  The  Swedes,  when  they  heard  that  their  beloved 
king  had  fallen,  burnt  with  ardour  to  revenge  him.  A 
terrible  struggle  ensued.  Hour  after  hour  the  batrie 
swayed  backwards  and  forwards.  In  one  of  the  Swedish 
regiments  only  one  man  out  of  six  left  the  fight  unhurt, 
Pappenheim,  the  dashing  and  the  brave,  whose  word 
was  ever  for  fight,  the  Bliicher  of  the  seventeenth  c.en* 


164  Victories  of  Gustavus  AJolphus.  1632. 

tury,  was  struck  down.  At  the  battle  of  the  White  Hill 
he  had  lain  long  upon  the  field  senseless  from  his 
wounds,  and  had  told  those  who  were  around  him  when 
he  awakened  that  he  had  come  back  from  Purgatory 
This  time  there  was  no  awakening  for  him.  The  infantry 
which  in  his  lifetime  he  had  commanded  so  gallantly, 
came  up  as  the  winter  sun  was  setting.  But  they  came 
too  late  to  retrieve  the  fight.  Wallenstein,  defeated  at 
last,  gave  orders  for  retreat. 

The  hand  which  alone  could  gather  the  results  of 
victory  was  lying  powerless.  The  work  of  destruction 
was  practically  complete.  The  Edict  of  Res- 
of  Gustavus  titution  was  dead,  and  the  Protestant  ad- 
rrepara  .  ministrators  were  again  ruling  in  the  north- 
ern bishoprics.  The  Empire  was  practically  dead,  and 
the  princes  and  people  of  Germany,  if  they  were  looking 
for  order  at  all,  must  seek  it  under  other  forms  than 
those  which  had  been  imposed  upon  them  in  conse- 
quence of  the  victories  of  Tilly  and  Wallenstein.  It  is 
in  vain  to  speculate  whether  Gustavus  could  have  done 
anything  towards  the  work  of  reconstruction.  Like 
Cromwell,  to  whom,  in  many  respects,  he  bore  a  close 
resemblance,  he  had  begun  to  discover  that  it  was 
harder  to  build  than  to  destroy,  and  that  it  was  easier  to 
keep  sheep  than  to  govern  men.  Perhaps  even  to  him 
the  difficulties  would  have  been  insuperable.  The 
centrifugal  force  was  too  strong  amongst  the  German 
princes  to  make  it  easy  to  bind  them  together.  He  had 
experienced  this  in  Saxony.  He  had  experienced  it  at 
Nuremberg.  To  build  up  a  Corpus  Evangelicoruvi  was 
like  weaving  ropes  of  sand. 

And  Gustavus  was  not  even  more  than  half  a  German 
by  birth  ;  politically  he  was  not  a  German  at  all.  In  nis 
own  mind  he  could  not  help  thinking  first  of  Sweden.    In 


1632.  The  Battle  of  Liitzen.  163 

the  minds  of  others  the  suspicion  that  he 
was  so  thinking  was  certain  to  arise.  He  were  his 
clung  firmly  to  his  demand  for  Pomerania  as  purpuSf  5 
a  bulwark  for  Sweden's  interests  in  the  Baltic.  Next  to 
that  came  the  Corpus  Evangelicorum,  the  league  of 
German  Protestant  cities  and  princes  to  stand  up  against 
the  renewal  of  the  overpowering  tyranny  of  the  Emperor. 
If  his  scheme  had  been  carried  out  Gustavus  would  have 
been  a  nobler  Napoleon,  with  a  confederation,  not  ot  the 
Rhine,  but  of  the  Baltic,  around  him.  For,  stranger  as 
he  was,  he  was  bound  by  his  religious  sympathies  to  his 
Protestant  brethren  in  Germany.  The  words  which  he 
spoke  at  Nuremberg  to  the  princes,  telling  them  how 
well  off  he  might  be  at  home,  were  conceived  in  the 
very  spirit  of  the  Homeric  Achilles,  when  the  hardness 
of  the  work  he  had  undertaken  and  the  ingratitude  of 
men  revealed  itself  to  him.  Like  Achilles,  he  dearly 
loved  war,  with  its  excitement  and  danger,  for  its  own 
sake.  But  he  desired  more  than  the  glory  of  a  con- 
queror. The  establishment  of  Protestantism  in  Europe 
as  a  power  safe  from  attack  by  reason  of  its  own  strength 
was  the  cause  for  which  be  found  it  worth  while  to  live, 
and  for  which,  besides  and  beyond  the  greatness  of  his 
own  Swedish  nation,  he  was  ready  to  die.  It  may  be 
that,  after  all,  he  was  "  happy  in  the  opportunity  of  his 
death." 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE    DEATH    OF    WALLENSTEIN   AND     THE    TREATY     OI 
PRAGUE. 

Section  I. — French  Influence  in  Germany. 

In  Germany,  after  the  death  of  Gustavus  at  Liitzen,  it 
was  ab  it  was  in  Greece  after  the  death  of  Epaminondas 

at  Mantinea.  "  There  was  more  disturb- 
j  i.  Bemhard  ance  and  more  dispute  after  the  battle  than 
ofSaxeWei.      before  it."     In  Sweden,  Christina,  the  infant 

daughter  of  Gustavus,  succeeded  peaceably 
to  her  father's  throne,  and  authority  was  exercised  with- 
out contradiction  by  the  Chancellor  Oxenstjerna.  But, 
wise  and  prudent  as  Oxenstjerna  was,  it  was  not  in  the 
nature  of  things  that  he  should  be  listened  to  as  Gusta- 
vus had  been  listened  to,  The  chiefs  of  the  army,  no 
longer  held  in  by  a  soldier's  hand,  threatened  to  assume 
an  almost  independent  position.  Foremost  of  these  was 
the  young  Bernhard  of  Weimar,  demanding,  like  Wal^ 
lenstein,  a  place  among' the  princely  houses  of  Ger- 
many. In  his  person  he  hoped  the  glories  of  the  elder 
branch  of  the  Saxon  House  would  revive,  and  the  dis- 
grace inflicted  upon  it  by  Charles  V.  for  its  attachment 
to  the  Protestant  cause  would  be  repaired.  He  claimed 
the  rewards  of  victory  for  those  whose  swords  had 
gained  it,  and  payment  for  the  soldiers,  who  during  the 
winter  months  following  the  victory  at  Liitzen  had  re- 
ceived little  or  nothing.  His  own  share  was  to  be  a  new 
1 66 


1631.       )      French  Influence  in  Germany.  167 

duchy  of  Franconia,  formed  out  of  the  united  bishoprics 
of  Wiirzburg  and  Bamberg.  Oxenstjerna  was  com- 
pelled to  admit  his  pretensions,  and  to  confirm  him  in 
his  duchy. 

The  step  was  thus  taken  which  Gustavus  had  un- 
doubtedly contemplated,  but  which  he  had  prudently 
refrained  from  carrying  into   action.     The    ,        _ 

.  .  g  a.      1  he 

seizure  of  ecclesiastical  lands  in  which  the    League  of 

,      .  _,      .      ..  .  Heilbrona. 

population  was  Catholic  was  as  great  a  bar- 
rier to  peace  on  the  one  side  as  the  seizure  of  the  Pro- 
testant bishoprics  in  the  north  had  been  on  the  other. 
There  was,  therefore,  all  the  more  necessity  to  be  ready 
for  war.  If  a  complete  junction  of  all  the  Protestant 
forces  was  not  to  be  had,  something  at  least  was  attaina- 
ble. On  April  23,  1633,  the  League  of  Heilbronn  was 
signed.  The  four  circles  of  Svvabia,  Franconia,  and  the 
Upper  and  Lower  Rhine  formed  a  union  with  Sweden 
for  mutual  support. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  explain  the  defection  of  the  Elec- 
tor of  Saxony.  The  seizure  of  a  territory  by  military 
violence  had  always  been  most  obnoxious    „       ^  r 

tii  1   •  •  2  3-     Defec- 

to  him.  He  had  resisted  it  openly  in  the  tionof 
case  of  Frederick  in  Bohemia.  He  had  re-  axony- 
sisted  it,  as  far  as  he  dared,  in  the  case  of  Wallenstein 
in  Mecklenburg.  He  was  not  inclined  to  put  up  with  it 
in  the  case  of  Bernhard  in  Franconia.  Nor  could  he 
fail  to  see  that  with  the  prolongation  of  the  war,  the 
chances  of  French  intervention  were  considerably  in- 
creasing. 

In  1 63 1  there  had  been  a  great  effervescence  of  the 
French  feudal  aristocracy  against  the  royal  authority. 

But  Richelieu   stood  firm.     In   March  the 

1631. 
king's   brother,    Gaston   Duke  of  Orleans,    1 4.    French 

fled  from  the  country.     In  July  his  mother,   *°  mcs' 

N 


1 68     Wattensteiri 's  Deaih  :   Treaty  of  Prague.     1632. 

Mary  of  Medici,  followed  his  example.  But  they  had 
no  intention  of  abandoning  their  position.  From  their 
exile  in  the  Spanish  Netherlands  they  formed  a  close 
alliance  with  Spain,  and  carried  on  a  thousand  intrigues 
with  the  nobility  at  home.  The  Cardinal  smote  right 
and  left  with  a  heavy  hand.  Amongst  his  enemies  were 
the  noblest  names  in  France.  The  Duke  of  Guise  shrank 
from  the  conflict  and  retired  to  Italy  to  die  far  from 
his  native  land.  The  keeper  of  the  seals  died  in  prison. 
His  kinsman,  a  marshal  of  France,  perished  on  the 
scaffold.  In  the  summer  of  the  year  1632,  whilst  Gusta- 
vus  was  conducting  his  last  campaign,  there  was  a  great 
rising  in  the  south  of  France.  Gaston  himself  came  to 
share  in  the  glory  or  the  disgrace  of  the  rebellion.  The 
Duke  of  Montmorenci  was  the  real  leader  of  the  enter- 
prise. He  was  a  bold  and  vigorous  commander,  the 
Rupert  of  the  French  cavaliers.  But  his  gay  horsemen 
dashed  in  vain  against  the  serried  ranks  of  the  royal  in- 
fantry, and  he  expiated  his  fault  upon  the  scaffold. 
Gaston,  helpless  and  low-minded  as  he  was,  could  live 
on,  secure  under  an  ignominious  pardon. 

It  was  not  the  highest  form  of  political  life  which 
Richelieu  was  establishing.  For  the  free  expression  of 
opinion,  as  a  foundation  of  government, 
lieu  did  for  France,  in  that  day,  was  not  prepared.  But 
that  could  be  within  the  limits  of  possibility,  Richelieu's 
<io"e•  method  of  ruling  was  a  magnificent  spec- 

tacle. He  struck  down  a  hundred  petty  despotisms 
that  he  might  exalt  a  single  despotism  in  their  place. 
And  if  the  despotism  of  the  Crown  was  subject  to  all  the 
dangers  and  weaknesses  by  which  sooner  or  later  the 
strength  of  all  despotisms  is  eaten  away,  Richelieu  suc- 
ceeded for  the  time  in  gaining  the  co-operation  of  those 
classes  whose  good  will  was  worth  conciliating.     Under 


T632.  French  Influence  in  Germany.  169 

him  commerce  and  industry  lifted  up  their  heads,  know- 
ledge and  literature  smiled  at  last.  Whilst  Corneille 
was  creating  the  French  drama,  Descartes  was  seizing 
the  sceptre  of  the  world  of  science.  The  first  play  of 
the  former  appeared  on  the  stage  in  1629.  Year  by  year 
he  rose  in  excellence,  till  in  1636  he  produced  the  '  Cid ; ' 
and  from  that  time  one  masterpiece  followed  another  in 
rapid  succession.  Descartes  published  his  first  work  in 
Holland  in  1637,  in  which  he  laid  down  those  principles 
of  metaphysics  which  were  to  make  his  name  famous 
in  Europe. 

All  this,  however  welcome  to  France,  boded  no  good 
to  Germany.  In  the  old  struggles  of  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, Catholic  and  Protestant  each  believed    , ,  _.  ,  ,. 

'  go.  Richelieu 

himself  to  be  doing  the  best,  not  merely  for  and  Ger- 
his  own  country,  but  for  the  world  in  gene- 
ral. Alva,  with  his  countless  executions  in  the  Nether- 
lands, honestly  believed  that  the  Netherlands  as  well  as 
Spain  would  be  the  better  for  the  rude  surgery.  The 
English  volunteers,  who  charged  home  on  a  hundred 
battle-fields  in  Europe,  believed  that  they  were  benefit- 
ing Europe,  not  England  alone.  It  was  time  that  all 
this  should  cease,  and  that  the  long  religious  strife 
should  have  its  end.  It  was  well  that  Richelieu  should 
stand  forth  to  teach  the  world  that  there  were  objects 
for  a  Catholic  state  to  pursue  better  than  slaughtering 
Protestants.  But  the  world  was  a  long  way,  in  the  seven- 
teenth century,  from  the  knowledge  that  the  good  of  one 
nation  is  the  good  of  all,  and  in  putting  off  its  religious 
partisanship  France  became  terribly  hard  and  selfish  in 
its  foreign  policy.  Gustavus  had  been  half  a  German, 
and  had  sympathized  deeply  with  Protestant  Germany. 
Richelieu  had  no  sympathy  with  Protestantism,  no  sym- 
pathy with  German  nationality.     He   doubtless  had  a 


»  70     Wallensteiri  s  Death  ;   Treaty  of  Prague.    1632, 

general  belief  that  the  predominance  of  the  House  of 
Austria  was  a  common  evil  for  all,  but  he  cared  chiefly 
to  see  Germany  too  weak  to  support  Spain.  He  accepted 
the  alliance  of  the  League  of  Heilbronn,  but  he  would 
have  been  equally  ready  to  accept  the  alliance  of  the 
Elector  of  Bavaria  if  it  would  have  served  him  as  well 
in  his  purpose  of  dividing  Germany. 

The  plan  of  Gustavus  might  seem  unsatisfactory  to  a 

patriotic  German,  but  it  was  undoubtedly  conceived  with 

the  intention  of  benefiting  Germany.  Riche- 

?  7:  Hi?      ,      lieu  had  no  thought  of  constituting  any  new 

policy  French.  °  °         J 

not  European,  organization  in  Germany.  He  was  already 
aiming  at  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  The 
Elector  of  Treves,  fearing  Gustavus,  and  doubtful  of  the 
power  of  Spain  to  protect  him,  had  called  in  the  French, 
and  had  established  them  in  his  new  fortress  of  Ehren- 
breitstein,  which  looked  down  from  its  height  upon  the 
low-lying  buildings  of  Coblentz,  and  guarded  the  junction 
of  the  Rhine  and  the  Moselle.  The  Duke  of  Lorraine 
had  joined  Spain,  and  had  intrigued  with  Gaston.  In 
the  summer  of  1632  he  had  been  compelled  by  a  French 
army  to  make  his  submission.  The  next  year  he  moved 
again,  and  the  French  again  interfered,  and  wrested  from 
him  his  capital  of  Nancy.  Richelieu  treated  the  old 
German  frontier-land  as  having  no  rights  against  the 
King  of  France. 

Section  II. —  Wallensteiri 's  Attempt  to  dictate  Peace. 

Already,  before  the  League  of  Heilbronn  was  signed, 

the  Elector  of  Saxony  was  in  negotiation  with  Wallen- 

stein.     In  June  peace  was  all  but  concluded 

negotiations       between  them.     The   Edict  of  Restitution 

with  Walkn-      was  to  be  cancelled.     A  few  places  on  the 

Item.  r 

Baltic  coast  were  to  be  ceded  to  Sweden, 


1633-     Wallensteiri 's  Attempt  to  dictate  Peace.        171 

and  a  portion  at  least  of  the  Palatinate  was  to  be  restored 
to  the  son  of  the  Elector  Frederick,  whose  death  in  the 
preceding  winter  had  removed  one  of  the  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  an  agreement.  The  precise  form  in  which 
the  restitution  should  take  place,  however,  still  remained 
to  be  settled. 

Such  a  peace  would  doubtless  have  been  highly  disa- 
greeable to  adventurers  like  Bernhard  of  Weimar,  but  it 
would  have  given  the  Protestants  of  Germany  all  that  they 
could  reasonably  expect  to  gain,  and  would  have  given  the 
House  of  Austria  one  last  chance  of  taking  up  the  cham- 
pionship of  national  interests  against  foreign  aggression. 

Such  last  chances,  in  real  life,  are  seldom  taken  hold 
of  for  any  useful  purpose.  If  Ferdinand  had  had  it  in 
him  to  rise  up  in  the  position  of  a  national    ,      n 

$  2.  Opposi- 

ruler,  he  would  have  been  in  that  position    tion  to  Wai- 
long  before.     His  confessor,  Father  Lamor- 
main,  declared  against  the  concessions  which  Wallen- 
stein  advised,  and  the  word  of  Father  Lamormain  had 
always  great  weight  with  Ferdinand. 

Even  if  Wallenstein  had  been  single-minded  he  would 
have   had   difficulty  in   meeting  such  opposition.     But 
Wallenstein   was    not  single-minded.     He 
proposed  to  meet  the  difficulties  which  were    disapproval 
made  to  the  restitution  of  the  Palatinate  by   tl0n  of]^ls 

J     proceedings. 

giving  the  Palatinate,  largely  increased  by 
neighbouring  territories,  to  himself.  He  would  thus  have 
a  fair  recompense  for  the  loss  of  Mecklenburg,  which  he 
could  no  longer  hope  to  regain.  He  fancied  that  the  solu- 
tion would  satisfy  everybody.  In  fact,  it  displeased 
everybody.  Even  the  Spaniards,  who  had  been  on  his 
side  in  1632  were  ahenated  by  it.  They  were  especially 
jealous  of  the  rise  of  any  strong  power  near  the  line  of 
march  between  Italy  and  the  Spanish  Netherlands- 


172      Wallensteiri 's  Death.     Treaty  of  Prague.   1633. 

The  greater  the  difficulties  in  Wallenstein's  way  the 

more  determined  he  was  to  overcome  them.    Regarding 

himself,  with  some  justification,  as  a  power 

3  .     Wallen- 

stein  and  the  in  Germany,  he  fancied  himself  able  to  act 
at  the  head  of  his  army  as  if  he  were  himself 
the  ruler  of  an  independent  state.  If  the  Emperor 
listened  to  Spain  and  his  confessor  in  1633  as  he  had 
listened  to  Maximilian  and  his  confessor  in  1630,  Wal- 
lenstein  might  step  forward  and  force  upon  him  a  wiser 
policy.  Before  the  end  of  August  he  had  opened  a  com- 
munication with  Oxenstjerna,  asking  for  his  assistance 
in  effecting  a  reasonable  compromise,  whether  the  Em- 
peror liked  it  or  not.  But  he  had  forgotten  that  such  a 
proposal  as  this  can  only  be  accepted  where  there  is 
confidence  in  him  who  makes  it.  In  Wallenstein — the 
man  of  many  schemes  and  many  intrigues — no  man  had 
any  confidence  whatever.  Oxenstjerna  cautiously  re- 
plied that  if  Wallenstein  meant  to  join  him  against  the 
Emperor  he  had  better  be  the  first  to  begin  the  at- 
tack. 

Whether  Wallenstein  seriously  meant   at  this  time  to 

move  against  the   emperor  it  is  impossible  to  say.     He 

?  5.  Was  he  in   loved  to  enter  upon  plots  in  every  direction 

without  binding  himself  to  any;  but  he  was 

plainly  in  a  dangerous  position.     How  could  he  impose 

peace  upon  all  parties  when  no  single  party  trusted  him  ? 

If  he  was  not  trusted,  however,  he  might   still  make 

himself  feared.  Throwing  himself  vigorously 

|ii  Heattacks    Up0n  Silesia,  he  forced  the  Swedish  garri- 

the  Saxons.  *  ° 

sons  to  surrender,  and,  presenting  himself 
upon  the  frontiers  of  Saxony,  again  offered  peace  to 
the  two  northern  electors. 

But  Wallenstein    could    not  be  everywhere.     Whilst 
the  electors  were  still  hesitating,  Bernhard  made  a  dash 


1633-      Wallensteiri s  Attempt  to  dictate  Peace.       173 

at  Ratisbon,  and  firmly  established  himself  ?  7.  Bernhardt 
in  the  city,  within  a  little  distance  of  the 
Austrian  frontier.  Wallenstein,  turning  sharply  south- 
ward, stood  in  the  way  of  his  further  advance,  but  he 
did  nothing  to  recover  the  ground  which  had  been  lost. 
He  was  himself  weary  of  the  war.  In  his  first  command 
he  had  aimed  at  crushing  out  all  opposition  in  the  name 
of  the  imperial  authority.  His  judgment  was  too  clear 
to  allow  him  to  run  the  old  course.  He  saw  plainly 
that  strength  was  now  to  be  gained  only  by  allowing 
each  of  the  opposing  forces  their  full  weight.  '  If  the 
Emperor,'  he  said,  '  were  to  gain  ten  victories  it  would 
do  him  no  good.  A  single  defeat  would  ruin  him.'  In 
December  he  was  back  again  in  Bohemia. 

It  was  a  strange,  Cassandra-like  position,  to  be  wiser 
than  all  the  world,  and  to  be  listened  to  by    „  „  ,„  „ 

3     ?  8  Wallen- 

no  one ;  to  suffer  the  fate  of  supreme  intel-  stein's  difficul- 
ligence  which  touches  no  moral  chord  and 
awakens  no  human  sympathy.  For  many  months  the 
hostile  influences  had  been  gaining  strength  at  Vienna. 
There  were  War-Office  officials  whose  wishes  Wallen- 
stein systematically  disregarded  :  Jesuits  who  objected 
to  peace  with  heretics  at  all ;  friends  of  the  Bavarian 
Maximilian  who  thought  that  the  country  round  Ratisbon 
should  have  been  better  defended  against  the  enemy ; 
and  Spaniards  who  were  tired  of  hearing  that  all  matters 
of  importance  were  to  be  settled  by  Wallenstein  alone. 
The  Spanish  opposition  was  growing  daily.  Spain 
now  looked  to  the  German  branch  of  the  House  01 
Austria  to  make  a  fitting  return  for  the 
aid  which  she  had  rendered  in  1620.  i?Spa.mSlU°a 
Richelieu,  having  mastered  Lorraine,  was 
pushing  on  towards  Alsace,  and  if  Spain  had  good  rea- 
sons for  objecting  to  see  Wallenstein  established  in  the 


174   Wallensteiri  s  Death  :   Treaty  of  Prague.     1C33. 

Palatinate,  she  had  far  better  reasons  for  objecting  to 
see  France  established  in  Alsace.  Yet  for  all  these  spe- 
cial Spanish  interests  Wallenstein  cared  nothing.  His 
aim  was  to  place  himself  at  the  head  of  a  German  na- 
tional force,  and  to  regard  all  questions  simply  from  his 
own  point  of  view.  If  he  wished  to  see  the  French  out 
of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  he  wished  to  see  the  Spaniards 
out  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  as  well. 

And,  as  was  often  the  case  with  Wallenstein,  a  per- 
sonal difference  arose  by  the  side  of  the  political  differ- 
ence. The  Emperor's  eldest  son,  Ferdinand,  the  King 
,       _»  of  Hungary,  was  married  to  a  Spanish  In- 

g  10.  The  . 

Cardinal  fanta,  the  sister  of  Philip  IV.,  who  had  once 

been  the  promised  bride  of  Charles  I.  ol 
England.  Her  brother,  another  Ferdinand,  usually 
known  from  his  rank  in  Church  and  State  as  the  Cardi- 
nal-Infant, had  recently  been  appointed  Governor  of 
the  Spanish  Netherlands,  and  was  waiting  in  Italy  for 
assistance  to  enable  him  to  conduct  an  army  through 
Germany  to  Brussels.  That  assistance  Wallenstein  re- 
fused to  give.  The  military  reasons  which  he  alleged 
for  his  refusal  may  have  been  good  enough,  but  they 
had  a  dubious  sound  in  Spanish  ears.  It  looked  as  if 
he  was  simply  jealous  of  Spanish  influence  in  Western 
Germany. 

Such  were  the  influences  which  were  brought  to  bear 

upon  the  Emperor  after  Wallenstein's  return  from  Ratis- 

m  bon  in   December.      Ferdinand,  as  usual, 

l  11.     The 

Emperor's  was  distracted  between  the  two  courses  pro- 
posed. Was  he  to  make  the  enormous  con- 
cessions to  the  Protestants  involved  in  the  plan  of 
Wallenstein  ;  or  was  he  to  fight  it  out  with  France  and 
the  Protestants  together  according  to  the  plan  of  Spain  ? 
To  Wallenstein  by  this  time  the  Emperor's  resolutions 


stein  and  the 
array. 


1634.         Resistance  to  Wallenstein' s  Plans.  175 

had  become  almost  a  matter  of  indifference.  He  had 
resolved  to  force  a  reasonable  peace  upon  Germany, 
with  the  Emperor,  if  it  might  be  so  ;  without  him,  if  he 
refused  his  support. 

Wallenstein  was  well  aware  that  his  whole  plan  de- 
pended on  his  hold  over  the  army.  In  January  he  re- 
ceived assurances  from  three  of  his  princi- 
pal generals,  Piccolomini,  Gallas,  and  Al-  g  !2.3Walle 
dringer,  that  they  were  ready  to  follow  him 
wheresoever  he  might  lead  them,  and  he 
was  sanguine  enough  to  take  these  assurances  for  faf 
more  than  they  were  worth.  Neither  they  nor  he  him- 
self were  aware  to  what  lengths  he  would  go  in  the  end. 
For  the  present  it  was  a  mere  question  of  putting 
pressure  upon  the  Emperor  to  induce  him  to  accept  a 
wise  and  beneficent  peace. 

Section  III. — Resistance  to  Wallenstein' s  Plans. 
The   Spanish  ambassador,    Ofiate,    was    ill    at    ease. 
Wallenstein,  he  was  convinced,  was  planning  something 
desperate.     What  it  was    he  could  hardly    ,      ,.„     , 

r  J      \  1.  Onate  s 

guess;  but  he  was  sure  that  it  was  some-  movements, 
thing  most  prejudicial  to  the  Catholic  religion  and  the 
united  House  of  Austria.  The  worst  was  that  Ferdi- 
nand could  not  be  persuaded  that  there  was  cause  for 
suspicion.  "  The  sick  man,"  said  Ofiate,  speaking  of 
the  Emperor,  "  will  die  in  my  arms  without  my  being 
able  to  help  him." 

Such  was  Onate's  feelings  toward  the  end  of  January. 
Then  came  information  that  the  case  was  worse  than 
even  he  had  deemed  possible.  Wallenstein,    .       „  ,   „ 

.  2  2-     Belief  at 

he  learned,  had  been  intriguing    with  the    Vienna  that 
Bohemian    exiles,  who    had    offered,  with    w^  I  traitor. 
Richelieu's  consent,  to  place  upon  his  head 


176    Wallenstein' s  Death  :   Treaty  of  Prague.     1634. 

the  crown  of  Bohemia,  which  had  fourteen  years  before 
been  snatched  from  the  unhappy  Frederick.  In  all 
this  there  was  much  exaggeration.  Though  Wallenstein 
had  listened  to  these  overtures,  it  is  almost  certain  that 
he  had  not  accepted  them.  But  neither  had  he  revealed 
them  to  the  government.  It  was  his  way  to  keep  in.  his 
hands  the  threads  of  many  intrigues  to  be  used  or  not  to 
be  used  as  occasion  might  serve. 

Oiiate,  naturally  enough,  believed  the  worst.    And  for 

him  the  worst  was  the  best.     He  went  triumphantly  to 

„  Esrgenbere  with  his  news,  and  then  to  Fer- 

?  3.  OBate  .  , 

informs  Ferdi-  dinand.  Coming  alone,  this  statement 
might  perhaps  have  been  received  with 
suspicion.  Coming,  as  it  did,  after  so  many  evidences 
that  the  general  had  been  acting  in  complete  indepen- 
dence of  the  government,  it  carried  conviction  with  it. 

Ferdinand  had  long  been  tossed  backwards  and  for- 
wards by  opposing  influences.  He  had  given  no  answer 
j  4.  Decision  to  Wallenstein's  communication  of  the  terms 
against  mper°r  °f  peace  arranged  with  Saxony.  The  neces- 
Wallenstein.  g^y  0f  deciding,  he  said,  would  not  allow 
him  to  sleep.  It  was  in  his  thoughts  when  he  lay  down 
and  when  he  arose.  Prayers  to  God  to  enlighten  the 
mind  of  the  Emperor  had  been  offered  in  the  churches  of 
Vienna. 

All  this  hesitation  was  now  at  an  end.  Ferdinand 
resolved  to  continue  the  war  in  alliance  with  Spain,  and, 
\  5.  Deter-  as  a  necessary  preliminary,  to  remove  Wal- 
displace"'0  lenstein  from  his  generalship.  But  it  was 
Wailenstem.  more  easily  said  than  done.  A  declaration 
was  drawn  up  releasing  the  army  from  its  obedience  to 
Wallenstein,  and  provisionally  appointing  Gallas,  who 
had  by  this  time  given  assurances  of  loyalty,  to  the  chief 
command.     It  was  intended,   if  circumstances   proved 


1634-         Resistance  to  Wallenstein' s  Plans-  177 

favourable,  to  intrust  the  command   ultimately  to  the 
young  King  of  Hungary. 

The  declaration  was  kept  secret  for  many  days.  To 
publish  it  would  only  be  to  provoke  the  rebellion  which 
was  feared.     The  first  thing-  to  be  done  was    .       m 

§6.     The 

to  gain  over  the  principal  generals.  In  the  Generals 
beginning  of  February  Piccolomini  and  Aid-  game 
ringer  expressed  their  readiness  to  obey  the  Emperor 
rather  than  Wallenstein.  Commanders  of  a  secondary 
rank  would  doubtless  find  their  position  more  indepen- 
dent under  an  inexperienced  young  man  like  the  King 
of  Hungary  than  under  the  first  living  strategist.  These 
two  generals  agreed  to  make  themselves  masters  of  Wal- 
lenstein's  person  and  to  bring  him  to  Vienna  to  answer 
the  accusations  of  treason  against  him. 

For  Onate  this  was  not  enough.  It  would  be  easier, 
he  said,  to  kill  the  general  than  to  carry  him  off.  The 
event  proved  that  he  was  right.     On  Feb-    „ 

,  .    .  2  7-     Attempt 

ruary  7,  Aldnnger  and  Piccolomini  set  off    to  seize 
for  Pilsen  with  the  intention  of  capturing 
Wallenstein.     But  they  found  the  garrison  faithful  to  its 
general,  and  they  did  not  even  venture  to  make  the 
attempt 

Wallenstein's  success  depended  on  his  chance  of 
carrying  with  him  the  lower  ranks  of  the  army.  On  the 
loth  he  summoned  the  colonels  round  him    . 

j  .     .  .  .  ,  .  ?  8.     Wallen- 

and  assured  them  that  he  would  stand  se-  stein  at 
curity  for  money  which  they  had  advanced 
in  raising  their  regiments,  the  repayment  of  which  had 
been  called  in  question.  Having  thus  won  them  to  a 
favourable  mood,  he  told  them  that  it  had  been  falsely 
stated  that  he  wished  to  change  his  religion  and  attack 
the  Emperor.  On  the  contrary,  he  was  anxious  to  con- 
clude a  peace  which  would  benefit  the  Emperor  and  all 


178    Wallenstein 's  Death  :  Treaty  of  Prague.     1634. 

who  were  concerned.  As,  however,  certain  persons  at 
Court  had  objected  to  it,  he  wished  to  ask  the  opinion  of 
the  army  on  its  terms.  But  he  must  first  of  all  know 
whether  they  were  ready  to  support  him,  as  he  knew  that 
there  was  an  intention  to  put  a  disgrace  upon  him. 

It  was  not  the  first  time  that  Wallenstein  had  appealed 
to  the  colonels.  A  month  before,  when  the  news  had 
.     „,       .       come  of  the  alienation  of  the  Court,  he  had 

(  9.  The  colo- 
nels engage  to    induced  them  to  sign    an  acknowledgment 

!  that  they  would  stand  by  him,  from  which 

all  reference  to  the  possibility  of  his  dismissal  was  ex- 
pressly excluded.  They  now,  on  February  20,  signed  a 
fresh  agreement,  in  which  they  engaged  to  defend  him 
against  the  machinations  of  his  enemies,  upon  his  pro- 
mising to  undertake  nothing  against  the  Emperor  or  the 
Catholic  religion. 

Section  IV. — Assassination   of  Wallenstein. 

Wallenstein  thus  hoped,  with  the  help  of  the  army,  to 

force  the  Emperor's  hand,  and  to  obtain  his  signature  to 

„,  the  peace.     Of  the  co-operation  of  the  Elec- 
ts 1.     The  gar- 
rison of  Prague  tor  of  Saxony  he  was   was  already  secure  ; 
abandons  him.  ..             ....            -  —  ,                 i_ij 

and  since  the  beginning  of  February  he  had 
been  pressing  Oxenstjerna  and  Bernhard  to  come  to  his 
aid.  If  all  the  armies  in  the  field  declared  for  peace, 
Ferdinand  would  be  compelled  to  abandon  the  Spaniards 
and  to  accept  the  offered  terms.  Without  some  such 
hazardous  venture,  Wallenstein  would  be  checkmated  by 
Oiiate.  The  Spaniard  had  been  unceasingly  busy  dur- 
ing these  weeks  of  intrigue.  Spanish  gold  was  provided 
to  content  the  colonels  for  their  advances,  and  hopes  of 
promotion  were  scattered  broadcast  amongst  them. 
Two  other  of  the  principal  generals  had  gone  over  to  the 
Court,  and  on  February  18,  the  day  before  the  meeting 


1634-  Assassination  of  Wallenstein.  179 

at  Pilsen,  a  second  declaration  had  been  issued  accusing 
Wallenstein  of  treason,  and  formally  depriving  him  of 
the  command.  Wallenstein,  before  this  declaration 
reached  him,  had  already  appointed  a  meeting  of  large 
masses  of  troops  to  take  place  on  the  White  Hill  before 
Prague  on  the  21st,  where  he  hoped  to  make  his  inten- 
tions more  generally  known.  But  he  had  miscalculated 
the  devotion  of  the  army  to  his  person.  The  garrison 
of  Prague  refused  to  obey  his  orders.  Soldiers  and  citi- 
zens alike  declared  for  the  Emperor.  He  was  obliged 
to  retrace  his  steps.  "  I  had  peace  in  my  hands,"  he 
said.  Then  he  added,  "  God  is  righteous,"  as  if  still 
counting  on  the  aid  of  Heaven  in  so  good  a  work. 

He  did  not  yet  despair.     He  ordered  the  colonels  to 
meet  him  at  Eger,  assuring  them  that  all  that  he  was 
doing  was  for  the  Emperor's  good.     He  had  now  at  last 
hopes   of  other  assistance.     Oxenstjerna,  indeed,  ever 
cautious,  still  refused  to  do  anything  for  him  till  he  had 
positively   declared  against  the    Emperor. 
Bernhard,  equally  prudent  for  some  time,    standing  with 
had  been  carried  away  by  the  news,  which 
reached  him  on  the  21st,  of  the  meeting  at  Pilsen,  and 
the  Emperor's  denouncement  of  the  general.     Though 
he  was  still  suspicious,  he  moved  in  the  direction  of 
Eger. 

On  the  24th  Wallenstein  entered  Eger.  In  what  pre- 
cise way  he  meant  to  escape  from  the  labyrinth  in  which 
he  was,  or  whether  he  had  still  any  clear   . 

.  ?  3-     His 

conception  of  the   course  before  him,  it  is   arrival  at 
impossible   to   say.      But  Arnim    was    ex-      ger" 
pected  at  Eger,  as  well  as  Bernhard,  and  it  may  be  that 
Wallenstein  fancied  still  that  he  could  gather  all  the 
armies  of  Germany  into  his  hands,  to  defend  the  peace 
which  he  was  ready  to  make.     The  great  scheme,  how- 


180      Wallensteiii 's  Death  :   Treaty  of  Prague.     1C34. 

ever,  whatever  it  was,  was  doomed  to  failure.  Amongst 
the  officers  who  accompanied  him  was  a  Colonel  Butler, 
an  Irish  Catholic,  who  had  no  fancy  for  such  dealings 
with  Swedish  and  Saxon  heretics.  Already  he  had  re- 
ceived orders  from  Piccolomini  to  bring  in  Wallensteiii 
dead  or  alive  No  official  instructions  had  been  given 
to  Piccolomini.  But  the  thought  was  certain  to  arise  in 
the  minds  of  all  who  retained  their  loyalty  to  the  Em- 
peror. A  general  who  attempts  to  force  his  sovereign  to 
a  certain  political  course  with  the  help  of  the  enemy  is 
placed,  by  that  very  fact,  beyond  the  pale  of  law. 

The  actual  decision  did  not  lie  with  Butler.     The  for- 
tress was  in  the  hands  of  two  Scotch  officers,  Leslie  and 
Gordon.     As  Protestants,  they  might  have 

§  4.      Wallen-  « 

stein's  assassi-  been  expected  to  feel  some  sympathy  with 
Wallenstein.  But  the  sentiment  of  military 
honour  prevailed.  On  the  morning  of  the  25th  they 
were  called  upon  by  one  of  the  general's  confederates 
to  take  orders  from  Wallenstein  alone.  "  I  have  sworn 
to  obey  the  Emperor,"  answered  Gordon,  at  last,  "and 
who  shall  release  me  from  my  oath?'  "  You,  gentle- 
men," was  the  reply,  "  are  strangers  in  the  Empire. 
What  have  you  to  do  with  the  Empire?"  Such  argu- 
ments were  addressed  to  deaf  ears.  That  afternoon 
Butler,  Leslie,  and  Gordon  consulted  together.  Leslie, 
usually  a  silent,  reserved  man,  was  the  first  to  speak. 
"  Let  us  kill  the  traitors,"  he  said.  That  evening  Wallen- 
stein's  chief  supporters  were  butchered  at  a  banquet. 
Then  there  was  a  short  and  sharp  discussion  whether 
Wallenstcin's  life  should  be  spared.  Bernhard's  troops 
were  known  to  be  approaching,  and  the  conspirators 
dared  not  leave  a  chance  of  escape  open.  An  Irish 
captain,  Devereux  by  name,  was  selected  to  do  the  deed. 
Followed  by  a  few  soldiers,  he  burst  into  the  room  *,vhere 


1634-  Assassination  of  Wallenstein.  181 

Wallenstein  was  preparing  for  rest.  "  Scoundrel  and 
traitor,"  were  the  words  which  he  flung  at  Devereux  as 
he  entered.  Then,  stretching  out  his  arms,  he  received 
the  fatal  blow  in  his  breast.  The  busy  brain  of  the 
great  calculator  was  still  forever. 

The  attempt  to  snatch  at  a  wise  and  beneficent  peace 
by  mingled  force  and  intrigue  had  failed.  Other  generals 
— Caesar,   Cromwell,  Napoleon — have   sue-    , 

.  \  5-     Rea- 

ceeded  to  supreme  power  with  the  support  son  of  his 
of  an  armed  force.  But  they  did  so  by 
placing  themselves  at  the  head  of  the  civil  institutions  of 
their  respective  countries,  and  by  making  themselves 
the  organs  of  a  strong  national  policy.  Wallenstein 
stood  alone  in  attempting  to  guide  the  political  destinies 
of  a  people,  while  remaining  a  soldier  and  nothing 
more.  The  plan  was  doomed  to  failure,  and  is  only  ex- 
cusable on  the  ground  that  there  were  no  national  in- 
stitutions at  the  head  of  which  Wallenstein  could  place 
himself;  not  even  a  chance  of  creating  such  institutions 
afresh. 

In  spite  of  all  his  faults,  Germany  turns  ever  to  Wal- 
lenstein as  she  turns  to  no  other  amongst  the  leaders  of 
the  Thirty  Years'  War.     From  amidst  the 
divisions    and  weaknesses    of   his    native   parison 
country,  a  great  poet  enshrined  his  memory   Gustavus 
in   a   succession    of    noble   dramas.     Such   a"4  Wallen- 

stein. 

faithfulness  is  not  without  a  reason.  Gus- 
tavus's  was  a  higher  nature  than  Wallenstein's.  Some 
of  his  work,  at  least  the  rescue  of  German  Protestantism 
from  oppression,  remained  imperishable,  whilst  Wallen- 
stein's military  and  political  success  vanished  into  noth- 
ingness. But  Gustavus  was  a  hero  not  of  Germany  as  a 
nation,  but  of  European  Protestantism.  His  Corpus 
Evangelicorum  was  at  the,  best  a  choice  of  evils  to  a 


1 82     Wdllcnstcui 's  Death  :   Treaty  of  Prague.    1634. 

German.  Wallenstein's  wildest  schemes,  impossible  of 
execution  as  they  were  by  military  violence,  were  always 
built  upon  the  foundation  of  German  unity.  In  the  way 
in  which  he  walked  that  unity  was  doubtless  unattain- 
able. To  combine  devotion  to  Ferdinand  with  religious 
liberty  was  as  hopeless  a  conception  as  it  was  to  burst 
all  bonds  of  political  authority  on  the  chance  that  a  new 
and  better  world  would  spring  into  being  out  of  the  dis- 
cipline of  the  camp.  But  during  the  long  dreary  years 
of  confusion  which  were  to  follow,  it  was  something  to 
think  of  the  last  supremely  able  man  whose  life  had 
been  spent  in  battling  against  the  great  evils  of  the  land, 
against  the  spirit  of  religious  intolerance,  and  the  spirit 
of  division. 

Section  V. — Imperialist  Victories  and  the   Treaty  of 
Prague. 
For  the  moment,  the  House  of  Austria  seemed  to  have 
gained  everything  by  the  execution  or  the  murder  of  Wal 
lenstein,  whichever   we   may  choose  to   call   it.      The 
army  was  reorganized  and  placed  under  the  command 
of  the  Emperor's  son,  the  King  of  Hungary.     The  Car- 
dinal-Infant, now  eagerly  welcomed,  was  preparing  to 
join  him  through  Tyrol.     And  while  on  the 
paign  of  one  side  there  was  union   and   resolution, 

there  was  division  and  hesitation  on  the 
other.  The  Elector  of  Saxony  stood  aloof  from  the 
League  of  Heilbronn,  weakly  hoping  that  the  terms  of 
peace  which  had  been  offered  him  by  Wallenstein  would 
be  confirmed  by  the  Emperor  now  that  Wallenstein  was 
gone.  Even  amongst  those  who  remained  under  arms 
there  was  no  unity  of  purpose.  Bernhard,  the  daring 
and  impetuous,  was  not  of  one  mind  with  the  cautious 
Horn,  who  commanded  the  Swedish  forces,  and  both 


1634-     Imperialist  Victories  :   Treaty  of  Prague.     183 

agreed  in  thinking  Oxenstjerna  remiss  because  he  did 
not  supply  them  with  more  money  than  he  was  able  to 
provide. 

As  might  have  been  expected  under  these  circum- 
stances, the  imperials  made  rapid  progress.  Ratisbon, 
the  prize  of  Bernhard  the  year  before,  sur-  .  ^ 
rendered  to  the  king  of  Hungary  in  July.  Battle  of 
Then  Donauwcirth  was  stormed,  and  siege  r  logeffi" 
was  laid  to  Nordlingen.  On  September  2  the  Cardinal- 
Infant  came  up  with  15,000  men.  The  enemy  watched 
the  siege  with  a  force  far  inferior  in  numbers.  Bernhard 
was  eager  to  put  all  to  the  test  of  battle.  Horn  recom- 
mended caution  in  vain.  Against  his  better  judgment 
he  consented  to  fight.  On  September  6  the  attack  was 
made.  By  the  end  of  the  day  Horn  was  a  prisoner, 
and  Bernhard  was  in  full  retreat,  leaving  10,000  of  his 
men  dead  upon  the  field,  and  6,ooo  prisoners  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy,  whilst  the  imperialists  lost  only 
1,200  men. 

Since  the  day  of  Breitenfeld,  three  years  before,  there 
had  been  no  such  battle  fought  as  this  of  Nordlingen. 
As  Breitenfeld  had  recovered  the  Protestant  bishoprics 
of  the  north,  Nordlingen  recovered  the  Catholic  bishop- 
rics of  the  south.  Bernhardt  Duchy  of  Franconia  dis- 
appeared in  a  moment  under  the  blow.  Before  the  spring 
of  1635  came,  the  whole  of  South  Germany, 

,  ?  3-  Impot- 

with  the  exception   of  one  or  two  fortified   ant  results 
costs,  was  in  the  hands  of  the  imperial  com-     r  m  !  • 
manders.     The  Cardinal-Infant  was  able  to  pursue  his 
way  to  Brussels,  with  the  assurance  that  he  had  done 
a  good  stroke  of  work  on  the  way. 

The  victories  of  mere  force  are  never  fruitful  of  good. 
As  it  had  been  after  the  successes  of  Tilly  in    1622,  and 
the  successes  of  Wallenstein  in  1626  and    1627,  so  it 
O 


184     Wallenstehi s  Death  :   Treaty  0/  Prague.    1635. 
was  now  with  the  successes  of  the  King  of 

g  4.   French  ° 

intervention.  Hungary  in  1634  and  1635.  The  imperialist 
armies  had  gained  victories,  and  had  taken  cities.  But 
the  Emperor  was  none  the  nearer  to  the  confidence  of 
Germans.  An  alienated  people,  crushed  by  military 
force,  served  merely  as  a  bait  to  tempt  foreign  aggression, 
and  to  make  the  way  easy  before  it.  After  1622,  the 
King  of  Denmark  had  been  called  in.  After  1627,  an 
appeal  was  made  to  the  King  of  Sweden.  After  1634, 
Richelieu  found  his  opportunity.  The  bonds  between 
France  and  the  mutilated  League  of  Heiibronn  were 
drawn  more  closely.  German  troops  were  to  be  taken 
into  French  pay,  and  the  empty  coffers  of  the  League 
were  filled  with  French  livres.  He  who  holds  the  purse 
holds  the  sceptre,  and  the  princes  of  Southern  and 
Western  Germany,  whether  they  wished  it  or  not,  were 
reduced  to  the  position  of  satellites  revolving  round  the 
central  orb  at  Paris. 

Nowhere  was  the  disgrace  of  submitting  to  French  in- 
tervention felt  so  deeply  as  at  Dresden.     The  battle  of 
Nordlingen  had  cut  short  any  hopes  which 
Peace  of  John  George  might  have  entertained  of  ob- 

taining that  which  Wallenstein  would  wil- 
lingly have  granted  him.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  Fer- 
dinand had  learned  something  from  experience.  He 
would  allow  the  Edict  of  Restitution  to  fall,  though  he 
was  resolved  not  to  make  the  sacrifice  in  so  many  words. 
But  he  refused  to  replace  the  Empire  in  the  condition 
in  which  it  had  been  before  the  war.  The  year  1627  was 
to  be  chosen  as  the  starting  point  for  the  new  arrange- 
ment. The  greater  part  of  the  northern  bishoprics  would 
thus  be  saved  to  Protestantism.  But  Halberstadt  would 
remain  in  the  hands  of  a  Catholic  bishop,  and  the  Pa- 
latinate would  be  lost  to  Protestantism  forever.  Lusatia, 


1635-     Imperialist  Victories  :   Treaty  of  Prague.     185 

which  had  been  held  in  the  hands  of  the  Elector  of 
Saxony  for  his  expenses  in  the  war  of  1620,  was  to  be 
ceded  to  him  permanently,  and  Protestantism  in  Silesia 
was  to  be  placed  under  the  guarantee  of  the  Emperor. 
Finally,  Lutheranism  alone  was  still  reckoned  as  the 
privileged  religion,  so  that  Hesse  Cassel  and  the  other 
Calvinist  states  gained  no  security  at  all.  On  May  30, 
1635,  a  treaty  embodying  these  arrangements  was  signed 
at  Prague  by  the  representatives  of  the  Emperor  and 
the  Elector  of  Saxony.  It  was  intended  not  to  be  a 
separate  treaty,  but  to  be  the  starting  point  of  a  general 
pacification.  Most  of  the  princes  and  towns  so  accepted, 
it,  after  more  or  less  delay,  and  acknowledged  the  su- 
premacy of  the  Emperor  on  its  conditions.  Yerit  was 
not  in  the  nature  of  things  that  it  should  put  an  end  to 
the  war.  It  was  not  an  agreement  which  any  one  was 
likely  to  be  enthusiastic  about.  The  ties  which  bound 
Ferdinand  to  his  Protestant  subjects  had  been  rudely 
broken,  and  the  solemn  promise  to  forget  and  forgive 
could  not  weld  the  nation  into  that  unity  of  heart  and  spirit 
which  was  needed  to  resist  the  foreigner.  A  Protestant 
of  the  north  might  reasonably  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  price  to  be  paid  to  the  Swede  and  the  French- 
man for  the  vindication  of  the  rights  of  the  southern 
Protestants  was  too  high  to  make  it  prudent  for  him  to 
continue  the  struggle  against  the  Emperor.  But  it  was 
hardly  likely  that  he  would  be  inclined  to  fight  very 
vigorously  for  the  Emperor  on  such  terms. 

If  the  treaty  gave  no  great  encouragement  to  anyone 
who  was  comprehended  by  it,  it  threw  still  further  into 
the  arms  of  the  enemy  those  who  were  ex-  g  6.  it  fails  in 
cepted  from  its  benefits.  The  leading  mem-  |ra"ac«;pf-en* 
bers  of  the  League  of  Heilbronn  were  ex-  ance- 
cepted  from  the  general  amnesty,  though  hopes  of  better 


1 86     Wallensteiri 's  Death  :   Treaty  of  Prague.    1635. 

treatment  were  held  out  to  them  if  they  made  their  sub- 
mission. The  Landgrave  of  Hesse  Cassel  was  shut  out 
as  a  Calvinist.  Besides  such  as  nourished  legitimate 
grievances,  there  were  others  who,  like  Bernhard,  were 
bent  upon  carving  out  a  fortune  for  themselves,  or  who 
had  so  blended  in  their  own  minds  consideration  for  the 
public  good  as  to  lose  all  sense  of  any  distinction  be- 
tween the  two. 

There  was  no  lack  here  of  materials  for  a  long  and 
terrible  struggle.  But  there  was  no  longer  any  noble 
aim  in  view  on  either  side.  The  ideal  of 
tioii  ofthe'war"  Ferdinand  and  Maximilian  was  gone.  The 
Church  was  not  to  recover  its  lost  property. 
The  Empire  was  not  to  recover  its  lost  dignity.  The  ideal 
of  Gustavus  of  a  Protestant  political  body  was  equally 
gone.  Even  the  ideal  of  Wallenstein,  that  unity  might 
be  founded  on  an  army,  had  vanished.  From  henceforth 
French  and  Swedes  on  the  one  side,  Austrians  and  Span 
iards  on  the  other,  were  busily  engaged  in  riving  at  the 
corpse  of  the  dead  Empire.  The  great  quarrel  of  princi- 
ple had  merged  into  a  mere  quarrel  between  the  Houses 
of  Austria  and  Bourbon,  in  which  the  shred  of  principle 
which  still  remained  in  the  question  of  the  rights  of  the 
southern  Protestants  was  almost  entirely  disregarded. 

Horrible  as  the  war  had  been  from  its  commencement, 
it  was  every  day  assuming  a  more  horrible  character. 
On  both  sides  all  traces  of  discipline  had  vanished  in  the 
dealings  of  the  armies  with  the  inhabitants  of  the  coun- 
tries in  which  they  were  quartered.  Sol- 
of  Germany"  diers  treated  men  and  women  as  none  but 
the  vilest  of  mankind  would  now  treat 
brute  beasts.  '  He  who  had  money,'  says  a  contempo- 
rary, 'was  their  enemy.  He  who  had  none  was  tor- 
tured because  he  had  it   not.'     Outrages  of  unspeaka- 


1636.     Imperialist  Victories  :   Treaty  of  Prague.     187 

ble  atrocity  were  committed  everywhere.  Human  be- 
ings were  driven  naked  into  the  streets,  their  flesh 
pierced  with  needles,  or  cut  to  the  bone  with  saws. 
Others  were  scalded  with  boiling  water,  or  hunted  with 
fierce  dogs.  The  horrors  of  a  town  taken  by  storm 
were  repeated  every  day  in  the  open  country.  Even 
apart  from  its  excesses,  the  war  itself  was  terrible 
enough.  When  Augsburg  was  besieged  by  the  impe-" 
rialists,  after  their  victory  at  Niirdlingen,  it  contained  an 
industrious  population  of  70,000  souls.  After  a  siege  of 
seven  months,  10,000  living  beings,  wan  and  haggard 
with  famine,  remained  to  open  the  gates  to  the  conquer- 
ors, and  the  great  commercial  city  of  the  Fuggers  dwin- 
dled down  into  a  country  town. 

How  is  it  possible  to  bring  such  scenes  before  our  eyes 
in  their  ghastly  reality  ?     Let  us  turn  for  the 
moment  to  some  notes  taken  by  the  com-   g9.  Notes  of 
panion    of    an    English    ambassador    who    tra^nlr511 
passed  through  the  country  in  1636.   As  the 
party  were  towed  up  the  Rhine  from  Cologne,  on  the 
track  so  well  known  to  the  modern  tourist,  they  passed 
"  by  many  villages  pillaged  and  shot  down."     Further 
on,  a  French  garrison  was  in  Ehrenbreitstein,  firing  down 
upon  Coblentz,  which  had  just  been  taken  by  the  impe- 
rialists.    "  They  in  the  town,  if  they  do  but  look  out  of 
their  windows,  have  a  bullet  presently  presented  at  their 
head."    More  to  the  south,  things  grew  worse.     At  Bac- 
harach,  "  the  poor  people  are  found  dead  with  grass  in 
their  mouths."     At  Rudesheim,    many    persons   were 
"  praying  where  dead  bones  were  in  a  little  old  house ; 
and  here  his  Excellency  gave  some  relief  to  the  poor, 
which  were  almost  starved,  as  it  appeared  by  the  vio- 
lence they  used  to  get  it  from  one  another."     At  Mentz, 
the  ambassador  was  obliged  to  remain  "on  shipboard. 


1 88     Wallensteiri 's  Death  :   Treaty  of  Prague.    1635. 

for  there  was  nothing  to  relieve  us,  since  it  was  taken  by 
the  King  of  Sweden,  and  miserably  battered.  .  .  .  Here, 
likewise,  the  poor  people  were  almost  starved,  and  those 
that  could  relieve  others  before  now  humbly  begged 
to  be  relieved ;  and  after  supper  all  had  relief  sent  from 
the  ship  ashore,  at  the  sight  of  which  they  strove  so  vio- 
lently that  some  of  them  fell  into  the  Rhine,  and  were 
like  to  have  been  drowned."  Up  the  Main,  again,  "  all 
the  towns,  villages,  and  castles  be  battered,  pillaged,  or 
burnt."  After  leaving  Wurzburg,  the  ambassador's  train 
came  to  plundered  villages,  and  then  to  Neustadt, 
"which  hath  been  a  fair  city,  though  now  pillaged  and 
burnt  miserably."  Poor  children  were  "  sitting  at  their 
doors  almost  starved  to  death,"  his  Excellency  giving 
them  food  and  leaving  money  with  their  parents  to 
help  them,  if  but  for  a  time.  In  the  Upper  Palatinate, 
they  passed  "by  churches  demolished  to  the  ground, 
and  through  woods  in  danger,  understanding  that  Croats 
were  lying  hereabout."  Further  on  they  stayed  for  din- 
ner at  a  poor  little  village  "  which  hath  been  pillaged 
eight-and-twenty  times  in  two  years,  and  twice  in  one 
day."  And  so  on,  and  so  on.  The  corner  of  the  veil  is 
lifted  up  in  the  pages  of  the  old  book,  and  the  rest  is 
left  to  the  imagination  to  picture  forth,  as  best  it  may, 
the  misery  behind.  After  reading  the  sober  narrative, 
we  shall  perhaps  not  be  inclined  to  be  so  very  hard  upon 
the  Elector  of  Saxony  for  making  peace  at  Prague. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE   PREPONDERANCE  OF   FRANCE. 

Section  I. — Often  Intervention  of  France. 

The  peacemakers  of  Prague  hoped  to  restore  the  Em- 
pire to  its  old  form.     But  this  could  not  be.    Things  done 
cannot  pass  away  as  though  they  had  never 
been.     I  erdinand's  attempt  to  gain  a  par-   test-autism 
tizan's  advantage  for  his  religion  by  availing   not  yet  out 

°  °  *  °     -of  danger. 

himself  uf  legal  forms  had  given  rise  to  a 
general  distrust  Nations  and  governments,  like  indi- 
vidual men,  are  "tied  and  bound  by  the  chain  of  their 
sins,"  from  which  they  can  be  freed  only  when  a  new 
spirit  is  wreathed  into  them.  Unsatisfactory  as  the  ter- 
ritorial airangements  of  the  peace  were,  the  entire  ab- 
sence ot  *ny  constitutional  reform  in  connexion  with  the 
peace  was  more  unsatisfactory  stili.  The  majority  in  the 
two  Upper  Houses  of  the  Diet  was  still  Catholic;  the 
Imperial  Council  was  still  altogether  Catholic.  It  was 
possible  that  the  Diet  and  Council,  under  the  teaching 
of  exper«mce,  might  refrain  from  pushing  their  preten- 
sions as  far  as  they  had  pushed  them  before ;  but  a 
government  which  refrains  from  carrying  out  its  princi- 
ples from  motives  of  prudence  cannot  inspire  confidence. 
A  strong  central  power  would  never  arise  in  such  a  way, 
and  a  strong  central  power  to  defend  Germany  against 
foreign  invasion  was  the  especial  need  of  the  hour. 
Jui  the  failure  of  the  Elector  of  Saxony  to  obtain  some 

iSg 


tqo  The  Preponderance  of  France.  1&35' 

of  the  most  reasonable  of  the  Protestant  demands  lay  the 
„,,  best  excuse  of  men  like  Bernhard  of  Saxe- 

jj  2.     The 

allies  of  Weimar  and  William  of  Hesse  Cassel  for 

refusing  the  terms  of  accommodation  of- 
fered. Largely  as  personal  ambition  and  greed  of  ter- 
ritory found  a  place  in  the  motives  of  these  men,  it  is  not 
absolutely  necessary  to  assert  that  their  religious  enthu- 
siasm was  nothing  more  than  mere  hypocrisy.  They 
raised  the  war-cry  of  "God  with  us"  before  rushing  to 
the  storm  of  a  city  doomed  to  massacre  and  pilllage  ; 
they  set  apart  days  for  prayer  and  devotion  when  battle 
was  at  hand — veiling,  perhaps,  from  their  own  eyes  the 
hideous  misery  which  they  were  spreading  around,  in 
contemplation  of  the  loftiness  of  their  aim  :  for,  in  all  but 
the  most  vile,  there  is  a  natural  tendency  to  shrink  from 
contemplating  the  lower  motives  of  action,  and  to  fix  the 
eyes  solely  on  the  higher.  But  the  ardour  inspired  by 
a  military  career,  and  the  mere  love  of  fighting  for  its 
own  sake,  must  have  counted  for  much  ;  and  the  refusal 
to  submit  to  a  domination  which  had  been  so  harshly 
used  soon  grew  into  a  restless  disdain  of  all  authority 
whatever.  The  nobler  motives  which  had  imparted  a 
glow  to  the  work  of  Tilly  and  Gustavus,  and  which  even 
lit  up  the  profound  selfishness  of  Wallenstein,  flickered 
and  died  away,  till  the  fatal  disruption  of  the  Empire 
was  accomplished  amidst  the  strivings  and  passions  of 
heartless  and  unprincipled  men. 

The  work  of  riving  Germany  in  pieces  was  not  accom- 
plished by  Germans  alone.  As  in  nature  a  living  or- 
ganism which  has  become  unhealthy  and 
intervention!  corrupt  is  seized  upon  by  the  lower  forms  of 
animal  life,  a  nation  divided  amongst  itself, 
and  devoid  of  a  sense  of  life  within  it  higher  than  the 
aims  of  parties  and  individuals,  becomes  the  prey  of 


1 635.  Open  Intervention  of  France.  191 

neighbouring  nations,  which  would  not  have  ventured  to 
meddle  with  it  in  the  days  of  its  strength.  The  carcase 
was  there,  and  the  eagles  were  gathered  together.  The 
gathering  of  Wallenstein's  army  in  1632,  the  overthrow 
of  Wallenstein  in  1634,  had  alike  been  made  possible  by 
the  free  use  of  Spanish  gold.  The  victory  of  Nordlingen 
had  been  owing  to  the  aid  of  Spanish  troops ;  and  the 
aim  of  Spain  was  not  the  greatness  or  peace  of  Germany, 
but  at  the  best  the  greatness  of  the  House  of  Austria  in 
Germany ;  at  the  worst,  the  maintenance  of  the  old  sys- 
tem of  intolerance  and  unthinking  obedience,  which 
had  been  the  ruin  of  Germany.  With  Spain  for  an  ally, 
France  was  a  necessary  enemy.  The  strife  for  supreme 
power  between  the  two  representative  states  of  the  old 
system  and  the  new  could  not  long  be  delayed,  and  the 
German  parties  would  be  dragged,  consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously, in  their  wake.  If  Bernhard  became  a  tool  of 
Richelieu,  Ferdinand  became  a  tool  of  Spain. 

In  this  phase  of  the  war  Protestantism  and  Catholicism, 
tolerance  and  intolerance,  ceased  to  be  the  immediate 
objects  of  the  strife.  The  possession  of  Al- 
sace and  Lorraine  rose  into  primary  impor-  and  Lor- 
tance,  not  because,  as  in  our  own  days, 
Germany  needed  a  bulwark  against  France,  or  France 
needed  a  bulwark  against  Germany,  but  because  Ger- 
many was  not  strong  enough  to  prevent  these  territories 
from  becoming  the  highway  of  intercourse  between 
Spain  and  the  Spanish  Netherlands.  The  command  of 
the  sea  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Dutch,  and  the  valley 
of  the  Upper  Rhine  was  the  artery  through  which  the 
life  blood  of  the  Spanish  monarchy  flowed.  If  Spain  ot 
the  Emperor,  the  friend  of  Spain,  could  hold  that  val- 
ley, men  and  munitions  of  warfare  would  flow  freely  to 
the  Netherlands  to  support  the  Cardinal-Infant  in  his 


192  The  Preponderance  of Franct.  1635. 

struggle  with  the  Dutch.  If  Richelieu  could  lay  his  hand 
heavily  upon  it,  he  had  seized  his  enemy  by  the  throat, 
and  could  choke  him  as  he  lay. 

After  the  battle  of  Nordlingen,  Richelieu's  first  demand 
l  5.  Riche-  from  Oxenstjerna  as  the  price  of  his  assist- 
fonresses  i*n  ance  had  been  the  strong  places  held  by 
Aisace.  Swedish  garrisons  in  Alsace.     As  soon  as 

he  had  them  safely  under  his  control,  he  felt  himself 
strong  enough  to  declare  war  openly  against  Spain. 

On  May  19,  eleven  days  before  peace  was  agreed  upon 
at  Prague,  the  declaration  of  war  was  delivered  at  Brus- 
sels by  a  French  herald.  To  the  astonish- 
between"  ment  of  all,  France  was  able  to  place  in  the 
France  and        field  what  was  then  considered  the  enor- 

bpain. 

mous  number  of  132,000  men.  One  army 
was  to  drive  the  Spaniards  out  of  the  Milanese,  and  to 
set  free  the  Italian  princes.  Another  was  to  defend 
Lorraine  whilst  Bernhard  crossed  the  Rhine  and  carried 
on  war  in  Germany.  The  main  force  was  to  be  thrown 
upon  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  and,  after  effecting  a 
junction  with  the  Prince  of  Orange,  was  to  strike  directly 
at  Brussels. 

Section  II. — Spanish  Successes. 
Precisely  in  the  most  ambitious  part  of  his  programme 
Richelieu  failed  most  signally.     The  junction  with  the 
Dutch  was  effected  without  difficulty  ;  but 

j!  1.  Failure 

of  the  French     the  hoped-for  instrument  of  success  proved 

attack  on  the        ,,  ...  ....  .^, 

Nether-  the  parent  of  disaster.     Whatever  r  lemings 

lands.  ancj  Brabanters  might  think  of  Spain,  they 

soon  made  it  plain  that  they  would  have  nothing  to 
do  with  the  Dutch.  A  national  enthusiasm  against  Pro- 
testant aggression  from  the  north  made  defence  easy, 
and  the   French  army  had  to  return  completely  unsuc- 


1636.  Spanish  Successes.  193 

cessful.  Failure,  too,  was  reported  from  other  quarters. 
The  French  armies  had  no  experience  of  war  on  a  large 
scale,  and  no  military  leader  of  eminent  ability  had  yet 
appeared  to  command  them.  The  Italian  campaign 
came  to  nothing,  and  it  was  only  by  a  supreme  effort  of 
military  skill  that  Bernhard,  driven  to  retreat,  preserved 
his  army  from  complete  destruction. 

In  1636  France  was  invaded.  The  Cardinal-Infant 
crossed  the  Somme,  took  Corbie,  and  advanced  to  the 
banks  of  the  Oise.     All  Paris  was  in  com-    „ 

3  a.     Spanish 

motion.  An  immediate  siege  was  expected,  invasion  of 
and  inquiry  was  anxiously  made  into  the 
state  of  the  defences.  Then  Richelieu,  coming  out  of  his 
seclusion,  threw  himself  upon  the  nation.  He  appealed 
to  the  great  legal,  ecclesiastical,  and  commercial  cor- 
porations of  Paris,  and  he  did  not  appeal  in  vain. 
Money,  voluntarily  offered,  came  pouring  into  the  trea- 
sury for  the  payment  of  the  troops.  Those  who  had  no 
money  gave  themselves  eagerly  for  military  service.  It 
was  remarked  that  Paris,  so  fanatically  Catholic  in  the 
days  of  St.  Bartholomew  and  the  League,  entrusted  its 
defence  to  the  Protestant  marshal  La  Force,  whose  repu- 
tation for  integrity  inspired  universal  confidence. 

The  resistance  undertaken  in  such  a  spirit  in  Paris 
was  imitated  by  the  other  towns  of  the  kingdom.     Even 

the    nobility,    jealous  as  they  were  of  the    .       „,, 

$  3-    The  in- 
Cardinal,  forgot  their  grievances  as  an  aris-    vaders  driven 

tocracy    in     their    duties    as    Frenchmen. 

Their  devotion  was  not  put  to  the  test  of  action.     The 

invaders,  frightened  at  the  unanimity  opposed  to  them, 

hesitated  and  turned  back.     In  September,  Lewis  took 

the  field  in  person.     In  November  he  appeared  before 

Corbie  ;  and  the  last  days  of  the  year  saw  the  fortress 

ag^in  in  the  keeping  of  a  French  garrison.     The  war, 


194  7he  Preponderance  of  France.  1637. 

which  was  devastating  Germany,  was  averted  from 
France  by  the  union  produced  by  the  mild  tolerance  of 
Richelieu. 

In  Germany,  too,  affairs  had  taken  a  turn.  The  Elec- 
tor of  Saxony  had  hoped  to  drive  the  Swedes  across  the 
sea ;  but  a  victory  gained  on  October  4,  at  Wittstock,  by 
l  Battle  of  thQ  Swedish  general,  Baner,  the  ablest 
Wittstock.  0f  the  successors  of  Gustavus,  frustrated  his 
intentions.  Henceforward  North  Germany  was  de- 
livered over  to  a  desolation  with  which  even  the  misery 
inflicted  by  Wallenstein  affords  no  parallel. 

Amidst  these  scenes  of  failure  and  misfortune  the  man 
whose  policy  had  been  mainly  responsible  for  the  mise- 
a  s  Death  of  ries  °f  bis  country  closed  his  eyes  for  ever. 
Ferdinand  II.  On  February  1 5,  1637,  Ferdinand  II.  died 
at  Vienna.  Shortly  before  his  death  the  King  of  Hun- 
gary had  been  elected  King  of  the  Romans,  and  he  now, 
by  his  father's  death,  became  the  Emperor  Ferdinand 
III. 

The  new  Emperor  had  no  vices.  He  did  not  even 
care,  as  his  father  did,  for  hunting  and  music.  When 
I  6.  Ferdi-  tne  battle  of  Nordlingen  was  won  under  his 
nandin.  command  he  was  praying  in  his  tent  whilst 

his  soldiers  were  fighting.  He  sometimes  took  upon 
himself  to  give  military  orders,  but  the  handwriting  in 
which  they  were  conveyed  was  such  an  abominable 
scrawl  that  they  only  served  to  enable  his  generals  to  ex- 
cuse their  defeats  by  the  impossibility  of  reading  their  in- 
structions. His  great  passion  was  for  keeping  strict  ac- 
counts. Even  the  Jesuits,  it  is  said,  found  out  that,  de- 
voted as  he  was  to  his  religion,  he  had  a  sharp  eye  for 
his  expenditure.  One  day  they  complained  that  some 
tolls  bequeathed  to  them  by  his  father  had  not  been  made 
over  to  them,  and  represented  the  value  of  the  legacy  as 


1638.  The  Struggle  for  Alsace.  195 

\  mere  trifle  of  500  florins  a  year.  The  Emperor  at  once 
gave  them  an  order  upon  the  treasury  for  the  yearly 
payment  of  the  sum  named,  and  took  possession  of 
the  tolls  for  the  maintenance  of  the  fortifications  of 
Vienna.  The  income  thus  obtained  is  said  to  have  been 
no  less  than  12,000  florins  a  year. 

Such  a  man  was  not  likely  to  rescue  the  Empire  from 
its  miseries.  The  first  year  of  his  reign,  however,  was 
marked  by  a  gleam  of  good  fortune.  Baner  g7.  cam 
lost  all  that  he  had  gained  at  Wittstock,  and  Paisn  of  l6"- 
was  driven  back  to  the  shores  of  the  Baltic.  On  the 
western  frontier  the  imperialists  were  equally  successful. 
vVurtemberg  accepted  the  Peace  of  Prague,  and  sub- 
mitted to  the  Emperor.  A  more  general  peace  was 
talked  of.  But  till  Alsace  was  secured  to  one  side  or  the 
other  no  peace  was  possible. 

Section  III. —  The  Struggle  for  Alsace. 
The  year  1638  was  to  decide  the  question.     Bernhard 
was  looking  to  the  Austrian  lands  in  Alsace  and  the 
Breisgau   as   a    compensation   for  his   lost    ,       „,, 
duchy  of  Franconia.     In  February  he  was    capture  of 
besieging  Rheinfelden.     Driven  off  by  the 
imperialists  on  the  26th,  he  re-appeared  unexpectedly  on 
March  3,  taking  the  enemy  by  surprise.     They  had  not 
even  sufficient  powder  with  them  to  load  their  guns,  and 
the  victory  of  Rheinfelden  was  the  result.     On  the  24th 
Rheinfelden   itself  surrendered.      Freiburg  followed  its 
example  on  April  22,  and  Bernhard  proceeded  to  under- 
take the  siege  of  Breisach,  the  great  fortress  which  do- 
mineered over  the  whole  valley  of  the  Upper  Rhine 
Small  as  his  force  was,  he  succeeded,  by  a  series  of  rapid 
movements,  in  beating  off  every  attempt  to  introduce  sup- 
plies, and  on  December  19  he  entered  the  place  in  triumph 


196  The  Preponderance  of  France.  1638. 

The  campaign  of  163S  was  the  turning  point  in  the 
\  2.    The  struggle  between   France   and  the    united 

turning  point  House  of  Austria.  A  vantage  ground  was 
in  the  w^r.        then  won  which  was  never  lost 

Bernhard  himself,  however,  was  loth  to  realize  the 
world-wide  importance  of  the  events  in  which  he  had 
played  his  part.  He  fancied  that  he  had  been  fighting 
for  his  own,  and  he  claimed  the  lands  which  he  had 
conquered  for  himself.  He  received  the  homage  of  the 
_     ,     ,    citizens  of  Breisach  in  his  own  name.     He 

ff  3.     xSernhard 

wishes  to  keep  celebrated  a  Lutheran  thanksgiving  festival 
in  the  cathedral.  But  the  French  Govern- 
ment looked  upon  the  rise  of  an  independent  German 
principality  in  Alsace  with  as  little  pleasure  as  the 
Spanish  government  had  contemplated  the  prospect  of 
the  establishment  of  Wallenstein  in  the  Palatinate.  They 
ordered  Bernhard  to  place  his  conquests  under  the  orders 
of  the  King  of  France. 

Strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  man  who  had  done  so 
much  to  tear  in  pieces  the  Empire  believed, 

(J  4.     Refuses  .  . 

to  dismember  in  a  sort  of  way,  in  the  Empire  still.  "  I  will 
mpire.  never  suffer,"  he  said,  in  reply  to  the  French 
demands,  "  that  men  can  truly  reproach  me  with  being 
the  first  to  dismember  the  Empire." 

The  next  year  he  crossed  the  Rhine  with  the  most 
brilliant  expectations.  Baner  had  recovered  strength, 
1 5.  Death  of  and  was  pushing  on  through  North  Germany 
Jjemhard.  jnto  Bohemia.     Bernhard  hoped  that  he  too 

might  strike  a  blow  which  would  force  on  a  peace  on  his 
own  conditions.  But  his  greatest  achievement,  the  cap- 
ture of  Breisach,  was  also  his  last.  A  fatal  disease  seized 
upon  him  when  he  had  hardly  entered  upon  the  cam- 
paign.    On  July  8,  1639,  he  died. 

There  was  no  longer  any  question  of  the  ownership  of 


1639-  French  Successes.  197 

the  fortresses  in  Alsace  and  the  Breisgau.     French  gov- 
ernors entered  into  possession.     A  French    . 

i  6.     Alsace  in 

general  took  the  command  of  Bernhard's  French 
army.  For  the  next  two  or  three  years  Bern-  ^osscs"'" 
hard's  old  troops  fought  up  and  down  Germany  in  con- 
junction with  Baner,  not  without  success,  but  without 
any  decisive  victory.  The  French  soldiers  were  becom- 
ing, like  the  Germans,  inured  to  war.  The  lands  on  the 
Rhine  were  not  easily  to  be  wrenched  out  of  the  strong 
hands  which  had  grasped  them. 

Section  IV. — French  Successes. 

Richelieu  had  other  successes  to  count  besides  these 
victories  on  the  Rhine.  In  1637  the  Spaniards  drove 
out  of  Turin  the  Duchess-Regent  Chris-  » %  State  oi 
tiha,  the  mother  of  the  young  Duke  of  Ualy- 
Savoy.  She  was  a  sister  of  the  King  of  France  ;  and, 
even  if  that  had  not  been  the  case,  the  enemy  of  Spain 
was,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  the  friend  of  France. 
In  1640  she  re-entered  her  capital  with  French  assist- 
ance. 

At  sea,  too,  where  Spain,  though  unable  to  hold  its 
own  against  the  Dutch,  had  long  continued  to  be  superior 
to    France,  the  supremacy   of    Spain   was   . 

\  2.  Maritime 

coming  to  an  end.  During  the  whole  course  warfare. 
of  his  ministry,  Richelieu  had  paid  special  attention  to 
the  encouragement  of  commerce  and  the  formation  of 
a  navy.  Troops  could  no  longer  be  despatched  with 
safety  to  Italy  from  the  coasts  of  Spain.  In  1638  a 
French  squadron  burnt  Spanish  galleys  in  the  Bay  of 
Biscay. 

In  1639  a  great  Spanish  fleet  on  its  way  to  the  Nether- 
lands was  strong  enough  to  escape  the  French,  who  were 
watching  to  intercept  it.     It  saned  uf  the  English  Chan- 


198  The  Preponderance  of  France.  1639. 

nel  with  the  not  distant  goal  of  the  Flemish 
Spanish  L ,«t  ports  almost  in  view.  But  the  huge  gal- 
ls the  leons  were  ill-manned  and  ill-found.    They 

Downs.  * 

were  still  less  able  to  resist  the  lighter, 
well-equipped  vessels  of  the  Dutch  fleet,  which  was 
waiting  to  intercept  them,  than  the  Armada  had  been 
able  to  resist  Drake  and  Raleigh  fifty-one  years  before. 
The  Spanish  commander  sought  refuge  in  the  Downs, 
under  the  protection  of  the  neutral  flag  of  England. 

The  French  ambassador  pleaded  hard  with  the  king 
of  England  to  allow  the  Dutch  to  follow  up  their  success. 

The  Spanish  ambassador  pleaded  hard  with 

2  4.     Destruc-       ...  .  .  ,         ,       .  , 

tion  of  the  him  for  protection  to  those  who  had  taken 
refuge  on  his  shores.  Charles  saw  in  the 
occurrence  an  opportunity  to  make  a  bargain  with  one 
side  or  the  other.  He  offered  to  abandon  the  Spaniards 
if  the  French  would  agree  to  restore  his  nephew,  Charles 
Lewis,  the  son  of  his  sister  Elizabeth,  to  his  inheritance 
in  the  Palatinate.  He  offered  to  protect  the  Spaniards 
if  Spain  would  pay  him  the  large  sum  which  he  would 
want  for  the  armaments  needed  to  bid  defiance  to 
France.  Richelieu  had  no  intention  of  completing  the 
bargain  offered  to  him.  He  deluded  Charles  with  nego- 
tiations, whilst  the  Dutch  admiral  treated  the  English 
neutrality  with  scorn.  He  dashed  amongst  the  tall 
Spanish  ships  as  they  lay  anchored  in  the  Downs :  some 
he  sank,  some  he  set  on  fire.  Eleven  of  the  galleons 
were  soon  destroyed.  The  remainder  took  advantage 
of  a  thick  fog,  slipped  across  the  Straits,  and  placed 
themselves  in  safety  undertheguns  of  Dunkirk.  Never 
again  did  such  a  fleet  as  this  venture  to  leave  the  Spanish 
coast  for  the  harbours  of  Flanders.  The  injury  to  Spain 
went  far  beyond  the  actual  loss.  Coming,  as  the  blow 
did,  within  a  few  months  after  the  surrender  of  Breisach, 


1659-  French  Successes.  199 

it  all  but  severed  the  connexion  for  military  purposes 
between  Brussels  and  Madrid. 

Charles  at  first  took  no  umbrage  at  the  insult.  He 
still  hoped  that  Richelieu  would  forward  his  nephew's 
interests,  and  he  even  expected  that  Charles    . 

g  5.     France 

Lewis  would  be  placed  by  the  King  of  and  England. 
France  in  command  of  the  army  which  had  been  under 
Bernhard's  orders.  But  Richelieu  was  in  no  mood  to 
place  a  German  at  the  head  of  these  well-trained  vete- 
rans, and  the  proposal  was  definitively  rejected.  The 
King  of  England,  dissatisfied  at  this  repulse,  inclined 
once  more  to  the  side  of  Spain.  But  Richelieu  found  a 
way  to  prevent  Spain  from  securing  even  what  assistance 
it  was  in  the  power  of  a  king  so  unpopular  as  Charles  to 
render.  It  was  easy  to  enter  into  communication  with 
Charles's  domestic  enemies.  His  troubles,  indeed,  were 
mostly  of  his  own  making,  and  he  would  doubtless  have 
lost  his  throne  whether  Richelieu  had  stirred  the  fire  or 
not.  But  the  French  minister  contributed  all  that  was 
in  his  power  to  make  the  confusion  greater,  and  en- 
couraged, as  far  as  possible,  the  resistance  which  had 
already  broken  out  in  Scotland,  and  which  was  threaten- 
ing to  break  out  in  England. 

The  failure  of  1636  had  been  fully  redeemed.  No 
longer  attacking  any  one  of  the  masses  of  which  the 
Spanish  monarchy  was  composed,  Riche-    .  ,  T 

.  2  "■  Insur- 

lieu  placed  his  hands  upon  the  lines  of  rection  in 
communication  between  them.  He  made 
his  presence  felt  not  at  Madrid,  at  Brussels,  at  Milan,  or 
at  Naples,  but  in  Alsace,  in  the  Mediterranean,  in  the 
English  Channel.  The  effect  was  as  complete  as  is  the 
effect  of  snapping  the  wire  of  a  telegraph.  At  once  the 
Peninsula  startled  Europe  by  showing  signs  of  dissolu- 
tion.    Jn   1639  the  Catalonians  had  manfully  defended 


fcoo  The  Preponderance  of  France.  1041. 

Roussillon  against  a  French  invasion.  In  1640  they 
were  prepared  to  fight  with  equal  vigour.  But  the 
Spanish  Government,  in  its  desperate  straits,  was  not 
content  to  leave  them  to  combat  in  their  own  way,  after 
the  irregular  fashion  which  befitted  mountaineers.  Or- 
ders were  issued  commanding  all  men  capable  of  fighting 
to  arm  themselves  for  the  war,  all  women  to  bear  food 
and  supplies  for  the  army  on  their  backs.  A  royal  edict 
followed,  threatening  those  who  showed  themselves  re- 
miss with  imprisonment  and  the  confiscation  of  their 
goods. 

The  cord  which  bound  the  hearts  of  Spaniards  to  their 

king  was  a  strong  one ;  but  it  snapped  at  last.     It  was 

not  by  threats  that  Richelieu  had  defended  France  in 

1636.     The  old   traditions  of  provincial   independence 

~     ,  were  strong  in  Catalonia,  and  the  Catalans 

\  7.  Break-up  , 

of  the  Spanish  were  soon  in  full  revolt.  Who  were  they,  to 
be  driven  to  the  combat  by  menaces,  as  the 
Persian  slaves  had  been  driven  on  at  Thermopylae  by 
the  blows  of  their  masters'  officers? 

Equally  alarming  was  the  news  which  reached  Madrid 
from  the  other  side  of  the  Peninsula.  Ever  since  the 
„  .  days  of  Philip  II.  Portugal  had  formed  an 

pendence  of  integral  part  of  the  Spanish  monarchy.  In 
December  1640  Portugal  renounced  its  alle- 
giance, and  reappeared  amongst  European  States  under 
a  sovereign  of  the  House  of  Braganza. 

Everything  prospered  in  Richelieu's  hands.  In  1641 
a  fresh  attempt  was  made  by  the  partizans  of  Spain  to 
,      „  ..  raise    France    against  him.     The  Count  of 

g  9.  failure  _     ° 

of  Soissons        Soissons,  a  prince  of  the  blood,  placed  him- 

in  France.  , ..  ,        ,         .       .  .  .    ,. 

self  at  the  head  of  an  imperialist  army  to 
attack  his  native  country.  He  succeeded  in  defeating 
the  French  forces  sent  to  oppose  him  not  far  from  Sedan. 


1 641.         Aims  and  Character  of  Richelieu.  201 

But  a  chance  shot  passing  through  the  brain  of  Soissons 
made  the  victory  a  barren  one.  His  troops,  without  the 
support  of  his  name,  could  not  hope  to  rouse  the  coun- 
try against  Richelieu.  They  had  become  mere  invaders, 
and  they  were  far  too  few  to  think  of  conquering  France. 
Equal  success  attended  the  French  arms  in  Germany. 
In  1641  Guebriant,  with  his  German  and  Swedish  army, 
defeated  the  imperialists  at  Wolfenbiittel,  in    .,       _   , 

i  10.  Riche- 

the  north.  In  1642  he  defeated  them  again  lieu'siast 
at  Kempten,  in  the  south.  In  the  same  year  ys' 
Roussillon  submitted  to  France.  Nor  was  Richelieu 
less  fortunate  at  home.  The  conspiracy  of  a  young 
courtier,  the  last  of  the  efforts  of  the  aristocracy  to 
shake  off  the  heavy  rule  of  the  Cardinal,  was  detected, 
and  expiated  on  the  scaffold.  Richelieu  did  not  long 
survive  his  latest  triumph.  He  died  on  December  4  ,1642. 

Section  V. — Aims  and  Character  of  Richelieu. 
Unlike  Lewis  XIV.  and  Napoleon,  Richelieu  counts 
amongst   those    few  French    statesmen  whose   fortune 
mounted  with  their  lives.     It  is  not  difficult    „ 

%  1.     Kiche- 

to  discover  the  cause.  As  in  Gustavus,  love  lieu's  domes- 
of  action  was  tempered  by  extreme  prudence  1C  p°  'cy' 
and  caution.  But  in  Richelieu  these  ingredients  of  char- 
acter were  mingled  in  different  proportions.  The  love 
of  action  was  far  less  impetuous.  The  caution  was  far 
stronger.  No  man  had  a  keener  eye  to  distinguish  the 
conditions  of  success,  or  was  more  ready  to  throw  aside 
the  dearest  schemes  when  he  believed  them  to  be  ac- 
companied by  insuperable  difficulties.  Braver  heart 
never  was.  There  was  the  highest  courage  in  the  con- 
stancy with  which  he,  an  invalid  tottering  for  years  on 
the  brink  of  the  grave,  and  supported  by  a  king  whose 
health  was  as  feeble  as  his  own,  faced  the  whole  might 


202  The  Preponderance  of  France.  1641. 

of  the  aristocracy  of  France.  If  he  was  harsh  and  un- 
pitying  it  was  to  the  enemies  of  the  nation,  to  the  nobles 
who  trod  under  their  feet  the  peasant  and  the  serf,  ana 
who  counted  the  possession  of  power  merely  as  the  high- 
road to  the  advancement  of  their  private  fortunes.  The 
establishment  of  a  strong  monarchical  power  was,  as 
France  was  then  constituted,  the  only  chance  for  indus- 
try and  commerce  to  lift  up  their  heads,  for  the  peace- 
able arts  of  life  to  develop  themselves  in  security,  for  the 
intellect  of  man  to  have  free  course,  and  for  the  poor  to 
be  protected  from  oppression. 

All  this  was  in  Richelieu's  heart;  and  some  little  of 
this  he  accomplished.  The  work  of  many  generations 
was  in  this  man's  brain.  Yet  he  never  attempted  to 
do  more  than  the  work  of  his  own.  As  Bacon  sketched 
out  the  lines  within  which  science  was  to  move  in  the 
days  of  Newton  and  of  Faraday,  so  Richelieu 
signs  only  °"  sketched  out  the  lines  within  which  French 
partially  ac-      statesmanship  was  to  move  in  the  days  of 

ccmplished  r  J 

Colbert  and  of  Turgot,  or  in  those  of  the 
great  Revolution  itself. 

"All  things  for  the  people,  nothing  by  the  people." 
This  maxim  attributed  to  Napoleon  embodied  as  well  the 

policy  of  Richelieu.  In  it  are  embalmed  the 
people    e  strength  and  weakness  of  French  statesman- 

nothing  in         ship.     The  late  growth  of  the  royal  power 

and  the  long  continuance  of  aristocratic  op- 
pression threw  the  people  helpless  and  speechless  into 
the  arms  of  the  monarchy.  They  were  happy  if  some 
one  should  prove  strong  enough  to  take  up  their  cause 
without  putting  them  to  the  trouble  or  the  risk  of  think- 
ing and  speaking  for  themselves.  It  is  no  blame  to 
Richelieu  if,  being  a  Frenchman  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury,  he    worked    under    the    only    conditions    which 


i(54i.         Aims  and  Character  of  Richelieu.  203 

Frenchmen  of  the  seventeenth  century  would  admit. 
We  can  well  fancy  that  he  would  think  with  scorn  and 
contempt  of  the  English  Revolution,  which  was  accom- 
plishing itself  under  his  eyes.  Yet  in  the  England  of  the 
Civil  War,  men  were  learning  not  merely  to  be  governed 
well,  but  to  know  what  good  government  was.  It  was 
r  greater  thing  for  a  nation  to  learn  to  choose  good  and 
to  refuse  evil,  even  if  the  progress  was  slow,  than  to  be 
led  blindfold  with  far  more  rapid  steps. 

Richelieu's  foreign  policy  was  guided  by  the  same 
deep  calculation  as  his  home  policy.  If  at  home  he 
saw  that  France  was  greater  than  any  faction, 
he  had  not  arrived  at  the  far  higher  notion  foreign 
that  Europe  was  greater  than  France,  ex-  po  icy' 
cepting  so  far  as  he  saw  in  the  system  of  intolerance 
supported  by  Spain  an  evil  to  be  combated  for  the  sake 
of  others  who  were  not  Frenchmen.  But  there  is  no  sign 
that  he  really  cared  for  the  prosperity  of  other  nations 
when  it  was  not  coincident  with  the  prosperity  of  France. 
As  it  is  for  the  present  generation  a  matter  of  complete 
indifference  whether  Breisach  was  to  be  garrisoned  by 
Frenchmen  or  imperialists,  it  would  be  needless  for  us, 
if  we  regarded  Richelieu's  motives  alone,  to  trouble 
ourselves  much  with  the  later  years  of  the  Thirty  Years' 
War. 

But  it  is  not  always  by  purity  of  motive  only  that  the 
world's  progress  advances.  Richelieu,  in  order  to  make 
France  strong,  needed  help,  and  he  had  to    . 

Til  r  1      1  1  2  5-      His  sup- 

iOOk    about   for    help   where    the   greatest   port  of  rising 

amount  of  strength  was  to  be  found.     An   causes- 

ordinary    man    would    have    looked    to    the    physical 

strength  of  armies,  as  Wallenstein  did,  or  to  the  ideal 

strength  of  established  institutions,  as   Ferdinand   did. 

Richelieu  knew  better.     He  saw  that  for  him  who  knows 


204  The  Preponderance  of  France.  1641. 

how  to  use  it  there  is  no  lever  in  the  world  like  that  of  a 
rising  cause,  for  a  rising  cause  embodies  the  growing 
dissatisfaction  of  men  with  a  long-established  evil,  which 
they  have  learned  to  detest,  but  which  they  have  not  yet 
learned  to  overthrow. 

In  England  Richelieu  was  on  the  side  of  Parliament- 
ary opposition  to  the  crown.     In  Germany  he  was  on 

2  6  A  d  f  t^xe  s'^e  °^  t'ie  °PPosn;ion  °f  tne  princes 
those  causes       against  the  Emperor.     In   Italy  he  was  on 

which  were  in        .  .  .  r     ,         .  ,  r     . 

themselves  the  side  of  the  independence  of  tne  states 
go°  '  against  Spain.     In  the  Peninsula  he  was  on 

the  side  of  the  provinces  against  the  monarchy.  There 
is  not  the  slightest  reason  to  suppose  that  he  cared  one 
atom  for  any  of  those  causes  except  so  far  as  they  might 
promote  his  own  ends.  Yet  in  every  case  he  selected 
those  causes  by  which  the  real  wants  of  the  several 
countries  were  best  expressed. 

It   is   this  which  distinguishes  Richelieu  from   those 

who  in  later  times  have  measured  the  foreign  policy   of 

France  by  French  interests  alone.     They  have  taken  up 

any    cause   which   promised   to   weaken  a 

4  7.     Contrast  '  *  .         . 

between  powerful    neighbour,    without     considering 

Richelieu  and  ,      .    .,  .,  r^,  r  , 

later  French  what  the  cause  was  worth,  ihey  favoured 
politicians.  Italian  division  in  i860,  and  German  divi- 
sion in  1870.  Richelieu  had  a  clearer  insight  into  the 
nature  of  things  than  that.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
he  would  far  rather  have  attacked  Spain  and  Austria 
through  the  instrumentality  of  the  League  than  through 
the  instrumentality  of  Gustavus  and  the  Protestants  ;  but 
he  saw  that  the  future  was  with  Gustavus  and  not  with 
the  League.  He  sacrificed  his  wishes  to  his  policy.  He 
coquetted  with  the  League,  but  he  supported  Gustavus. 

When  once  Richelieu  had  gained  his  point,  he  was 
contented  with  his  success.     He  never  aspired  to  more 


1 643.  More  French  Victories.  205 

than   he  could   accomplish :  never  struck,    „       _  . 

,  V  ,        .  *    g  8     He  has 

excepting  for  a  purpose  :  never  domineered  no  exorbitant 
through  the  mere  insolence  of  power.  He 
took  good  care  to  get  Alsace  into  his  hands,  and  to 
make  himself  master  of  the  passes  of  the  Alps  by  the 
possession  of  Pignerol;  but  he  never  dreamed  of  found- 
ing, like  Napoleon,  a  French  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine,  or  a  French  kingdom  of  Italy.  His  interference 
with  his  neighbours  was  as  little  obtrusive  as  possible. 

Richelieu  was  quickly  followed  to  the  grave  by  the 
sovereign  in  whose  name  he  had  accom- 

.  .  J<M3- 

plished  so  much.     Lewis  XIII.  died  on  the    ?  9.    Death  of 

^1        r  ir  r  Lewis  XIII. 

14th  of  May,  1643. 

Section  VI. — More  French  Victories. 

His  son  and  successor,  Lewis  XIV.,  was  a  mere  child. 

His  widow,  Anne  of  Austria,  claimed  the  regency,  and 

forgot  that  she  was  the  sister  of  the  King  of  Spain  and 

the  sister-in-law  of  the  Emperor,  in  the  thought  that  she 

was  the  widow  of  one  king  of  France  and  the  mother  of 

another.     Her  minister  was  Cardinal  Maza- 

1643. 
rin,  an  Italian,  who  had  commended  himself    h.    Rule  of 

to  Richelieu  by  his  capacity  for  business 
and  his  complete  independence  of  French  party  feeling. 
If  he  was  noted  rather  for  cleverness  than  for  strength 
of  character,  he  was  at  least  anxious  to  carry  out  the 
policy  of  his  predecessor,  and  to  maintain  the  predomi- 
nance of  the  crown  over  aristocratic  factions  ;  and  for 
some  time  Richelieu's  policy  seemed  to  carry  success 
with  it  through  the  impetus  which  he  had  given  it.  On 
May  19  a  victory  came  to  establish  the  new  authority  of 
the  queen-regent,  the  first  of  a  long  series  of  French  vic- 
tories, which  was  unbroken  till  die  days  of  Marlborough 
and  Blenheim. 


206  The  Preponderance  of  France.  1643. 

The  Spaniards  had  crossed  the  frontier  of  the  Nether- 
lands, and  were  besieging  Rocroy.     The  command  ol 
„,  the  French  forces  was  held  by  the  duke  of 

d  2.    The  .  ■" 

Spaniards  Enghien,  better  known  to  the  world  by  the 

croy.  title  which  he  afterwards  inherited  from  his 

father,  as  the  Prince  of  Conde.  Next  to 
Gaston,  Duke  of  Orleans,  the  late  king's  brother,  he  and 
his  father  stood  first  in  succession  to  the  throne,  and  had, 
for  this  reason,  attached  themselves  to  Richelieu  when 
he  was  opposed  by  the  great  bulk  of  the  aristocracy.  Those 
who  placed  him  at  the  head  of  the  army  probably  ex- 
pected that  a  prince  so  young  and  so  inexperienced 
would  content  himself  with  giving  his  name  to  the  cam- 
paign, and  would  leave  the  direction  of  the  troops  to 
older  heads. 

The  older  heads,  after  reconnoitring  the  Spanish  posi- 
tion at  Rocroy,  advised  Enghien  not  to 
and  Enghien.  fight.  But  there  was  a  certain  Gassion 
among  the  officers,  who  had  served  under 
Gustavus,  and  who  had  seen  the  solid  legions  of  Tilly 
break  down  before  the  swift  blows  of  the  Swedish  king 
at  Breitenfeld.  Gassion  had  learned  to  look  upon  that 
close  Spanish  formation  with  contempt,  and  he  strove 
hard  to  persuade  Enghien  to  give  orders  for  the  attack, 
and,  truth  to  say,  he  had  no  very  hard  task.  Enghien 
was  young  and  sanguine,  and  whether  he  had  a  genius 
for  war  or  not,  he  had  at  least  a  genius  for  battles.  Al- 
ready conscious  of  the  skill  with  which  he  was  to  direct 
the  fortunes  of  many  a  well-fought  field,  he  heartily 
adopted  the  views  laid  before  him  by  Gassion. 

Rocroy  was,  so  to  speak,  a  second  edition  of  Breiten- 
feld, a  victory  gained  by  vigour  and  flexibility  over  solid 
^    ,      r    endurance.     Unreasoning   obedience   once 

t  4.    Battle   of  .... 

Ro«roy.  more   gave  v/ay  before  disciplined  intelli- 


1 643.  More  French  Victories.  207 

gence.  The  Spanish  masses  stood  with  all  the  strength  of 
a  mediaeval  fortress.  There  was  no  manceuvering  power 
in  them.  The  French  artillery  ploughed  its  way  through 
the  ranks,  and  the  dashing  charges  of  the  infantry  drove 
the  disaster  home.  The  glories  of  the  Spanish  armies, 
the  glories  which  dated  from  the  days  of  the  Great  Cap- 
tain, were  clouded  for  ever.  Yet  if  victory  was  lost  to 
Spain,  the  cherished  honour  of  the  Spanish  arms  was 
safe.  Man  by  man  the  warriors  fell  in  the  ranks  in  which 
they  stood,  like  the  English  defenders  of  the  banner  of 
Harold  at  Senlac.  Their  leader,  the  Count  of  Fuentes, 
an  old  man  worn  with  years  and  gout,  and  unable  to  stand, 
was  seated  in  an  arm-chair  to  direct  the  battle  within  a 
square  composed  of  his  veteran  troops.  Death  found 
him  at  his  post.  He  had  fought  in  the  old  wars  of 
Philip  II.  The  last  of  a  long  heroic  race  of  statesmen 
and  soldiers  had  bowed  his  head  before  the  rising  genius 
of  France. 

Thionville   was   then    besieged.      It   surrendered    in 
August.     The  cautious  Richelieu  had  been    ,      „ 

°  £5.    Extension 

contented  to  announce  that  he  reserved  all  of  the  French 
question  of  the  ownership  of  his  conquests 
till  it  should  be  finally  determined  by  a  treaty  of  peace. 
After  Rocroy,  Mazarin  had  no  such  scruples.  Thion- 
ville was  formally  annexed  to  France.  A  medal  was 
struck  on  which  Hope  was  borne  in  the  hand  of  Vic- 
tory, and  on  which  was  inscribed  the  legend,  Prima 
finium  propagatic. 

In  Germany  the  campaign  of  1643  was  less  successful. 
Maximilian  of  Bavaria  had  put  forth  all  his  resources, 
and  his  generals,  the  dashing  John  of  Werth 
and  the  prudent  Mercy,  of  whom  it  was  said    |nj  Turenne 
that  he  knew  the  plans  of  the  enemy  as  well 
as  if  he  had  sat  in  their   councils,  were  more  than  a 


ao8  The  Preponderance  of  France.  1645 

1644.  match  for  the  French  commanders.  In  1644 

they  were  opposed  by  a  soldier  of  a  quality  higher  than 
their  own.  Turenne  was  sent  amongst  them,  but  his 
forces  were  too  few  to  enable  him  to  operate  with  suc- 
cess. Freiburg  in  the  Breisgau  was  taken  before  his 
eyes.  Breisach  was  threatened.  Then  Enghien  came 
with  10,000  men  to  assume  the  command  over  the  head 
of  the  modest  soldier  who  had  borne  the  weight  of  the 
campaign.  Proud  of  his  last  year's  victory  he  despised 
the  counsel  of  Turenne,  that  it  was  better  to  out-manceu- 
vre  the  enemy  than  to  fight  him  in  an  almost  inaccessible 
position. 

The  battle  fought  amongst  the  vineyards  of  Freiburg 

was  the  bloodiest  battle  of  a  bloody  war.    For  three  days 

Enghien  led  his  men  to  the  butchery.   At  last 

Freiburg. e  °      Mercy,  unable  to  provide  food  any  longer  for 

his  troops,  effected  his  retreat.     The  French 

reaped  the  prizes  of  a  victory  which  they  had  not  gained. 

On  the  3d  of  August,  1645,  a  second  battle  of  N5rd- 
lingen  was  fought.  It  was  almost  a  repetition  of  the 
slaughter  of  Freiburg.  As  in  the  year  before, 
g  8.'  Battle  Turenne  had  been  left  to  do  the  hard  work 
of  Nordim-  at  ^g  0pening  of  the  campaign  with  inferior 
forces,  and  had  even  suffered  a  check. 
Once  more  Enghien  came  up,  gay  and  dashing,  at  the 
head  of  a  reinforcement  of  picked  men.  Once  more  a 
fearful  butchery  ensued.  But  that  Mercy  was  slain 
early  in  the  fight,  the  day  might  have  gone  hard  with 
the  French.  As  it  was,  they  were  able  to  claim  a  vic- 
tory. The  old  German  bands  which  had  served  under 
Bernhard  held  out  to  the  uttermost  and  compelled  the 
enemy  to  retreat.  But  the  success  was  not  lasting.  The 
imperialists  received  reinforcements,  and  the  French 
were  driven  back  upon  the  Rhine. 


1 645.  Turenne1  s  Strategy.  209 

The  same  year  had  opened  with  splendid  expectations 
on  the  other  side  of  the  theatre  of  the  war.     The  gouty 
Swedish  general,  Torstenson.  who  had  taken 
up  Baner's  work  in  the  north,  burst  suddenly    of9jankow. 
into  Bohemia,  and  on  the  6th  of  March  in- 
flicted a  crushing  defeat  on  the  imperialists  at  Jankow. 
He  then  harried  Moravia,  and  pressed  on  to  lay  siege  to 
Vienna,  as  if  to  repair  the  fault  which  it  was  the  fashion 
to  ascribe  to  Gustavus.     But  Vienna  was  unassailable, 
and  Torstenson,  like   Turenne,  was  driven   to   retreat. 
He  next  tried  to  reduce  Briinn.     Failing  in  this  he  re- 
turned to  Bohemia,  where,  worn  out  with  his  maladies, 
he  delivered  over  the  command  to  Wrangel,  his  ap- 
pointed successor. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE   END   OF   THE   WAR. 


Section  I. —  Turenne s   Strategy. 

At  last  the  thought  entered  into  men's  minds  that  it  was 

time  to  put  a  stop  to  this  purposeless  misery  and  slaughter. 

It  was  hopeless  to  think  any  longer  of  shak- 

1643. 
ing    the  strong   grasp  of  France   upon  the    ji  1.  Thoughts 

Rhine ;  and  if  Sweden  had  been  foiled  in  °  peace- 
striking  to  the  heart  of  the  Austrian  monarchy,  she 
could  not  be  driven  from  the  desolate  wilderness  which 
now,  by  the  evil  work  of  men's  hands,  stretched  from 
the  Baltic  far  away  into  the  interior  of  Germany.  Long 
ago  the  disciplined  force  which  Gustavus  had  brought 
across  the  sea  had  melted  away,  and  a  Swedish  army 
was  now  like  other  armies — a  mere  collection  of  merce- 
naries, without  religion,  without  pity,  and  without  remorse. 


210  The  End  of  the  War.  1645. 

Negotiations  for  peace  were  spoken  of  from  time  to 

time,  and  preparations  were   at  last  made  for  a  great 

meeting  of  diplomatists.    In  order  to  prevent 

I  2.   Meeting  ,  ,       ,  • 

ot  diploma-         the  usual  quarrel  about  precedency  it  was 
decided  that  some  of  the  ambassadors  should 
hold  their  sittings  at  Osnabriick  and  others  at  Miinster. 
an  arrangement  which  was  not  likely  to  conduce  to  a 
speedy  settlement.     The  Emperor  proved  his  sincerity 
by  sending  his  representative  early  enough  to  arrive  at 
Miinster  in  July,  1643,  whilst  the  Swedish  and  French 
ambassadors  only  made  their  appearance  in  the  March 
1644,       and  April  of  the  following  year,  and  it  was 
1645-       oniy  in  June,  1645,  that  the  first  formal  pro- 
position was  handed  in. 

All  who  were  concerned  were  in  fact  ready  to  make 

peace,  but  they  all  wished  it  made  on  their  own  terms. 

_,  Ferdinand  III.  was  not  bound  by  his  father's 

}  3.   Reluc-  ,  : 

tanceofthe  antecedents.  The  Edict  of  Restitution  had 
eivePup°ail0  been  no  work  of  his.  Long  before  this  he 
thatis asked.  jla(j  been  rea(jy  to  give  all  reasonable  satis- 
faction to  the  Protestants.  He  had  declared  his  readi- 
ness to  include  Calvinists  as  well  as  Lutherans  in  the  re- 
ligious peace.  He  had  offered  to  restore  the  Lower  Pa- 
latinate to  Frederick's  son,  and  he  actually  issued  a  gene- 
ral amnesty  to  all  who  were  still  in  arms  ;  but  he  shrank 
from  the  demand  that  these  arrangements  of  the  Empire 
should  be  treated  of,  not  in  the  constitutional  assemblies 
of  the  Empire,  but  in  a  congress  of  European  powers. 
To  do  so  would  be  to  tear  the  last  veil  from  the  sad  truth 
that  the  Empire  was  a  mere  shadow,  and  that  the  states 
of  which  it  was  composed  had  become  practically  in- 
dependent sovereignties.  And  behind  this  degradation 
lay  another  degradation,  hardly  less  bitter  to  Ferdinr.nd. 
The  proudest  title  of  the  great  emperors  of  old  had  been 


1 645 •  Turenne' s  Strategy.  211 

that  of  Increaser  of  the  Empire.  Was  he  to  go  down  to 
posterity  with  the  title  of  Diminisher  of  the  Empire  ?  And 
yet  it  was  beyond  his  power  to  loosen  the  hold  of  France 
upon  Alsace,  or  of  Sweden  upon  Pomerania. 

Nor  was  it  only  as  Emperor  that  Ferdinand  would  feel 
the  loss  of  Alsace  deeply.  Together  with  the  Breisgau  it 
formed  one  of  territories  of  the   House  of    . 

?  4.     Espe- 
Austria,  but  it  was  not  his  own.     It  was  the    cially  the 

inheritance  of  the  children  of  his  uncle  Leo-      reissau- 
pold,  and  he  was  loth  to  purchase  peace  for  himself  by 
agreeing  to  the  spoliation  of  his  orphan  nephews. 

Maximilian  of  Bavaria  viewed  the  question  of  peace 
from  another  point  of  view.  To  him  Alsace  was  noth- 
ing, and  he  warmly  recommended    Ferdi-   . 

j  j        ■     j-  1  j-  ?5-  Aims  of 

nand  to  surrender  it  for  the  sake  of  peace,  the  Elector 
If  concessions  were  to  be  made  at  all,  he 
preferred  making  them  to  Catholic  France  rather  than 
to  the  Protestants  in  the  Empire,  and  he  was  convinced 
that  if  Alsace  remained  under  French  rule,  the  motive 
which  had  led  France  to  support  the  Protestants  would 
lose  its  chief  weight.  But  besides  these  general  con- 
siderations, Maximilian,  like  Ferdinand,  had  a  special 
interest  of  his  own.  He  was  resolved,  come  what  might, 
to  retain  at  least  the  Upper  Palatinate,  and  he  trusted 
to  be  seconded  in  his  resolve  by  the  good  offices  of 
France. 

The  position  of  Maximilian  was  thus  something  like 
that   of  John  George  of  Saxony  in   1632.      He  and  his 
chief  ally  were  both  ready  for  peace,  but 
his  ally  stood  out  for  higher  terms  than  he   campaign  of 
was  prepared  to  demand.     And  as  in   1632    r  4  ' 
Wallenstein  saw  in  the  comparative  moderation  of  the 
Elector  of  Saxony  only  a  reason  for  driving  him  by 
force  to  separate  his  cause  from  that  of  Gustavus,  so  in 


1 1 2  The  End  of  the  War.  1646. 

1646  the  French  government  resolved  to  fall  upon  Ba- 
varia, and  to  force  the  elector  to  separate  his  cause  from 
that  of  Ferdinand. 

The  year  before,  the  Elector  of  Saxony,  crushed  and 

ruined  by  the  Swedes,  had  consented  to  a  separate  truce, 

and  now  Turenne  was  commissioned  to  do 

out-manceu"6      tne   same  with    Bavaria.      In    August    he 

vres  the  effected  a  junction  on  the  Lahn  with  Wran- 

Jjavarians.  J 

gel  and  the  Swedes,  and  if  Enghien  had 
been  there,  history  would  doubtless  have  had  to  tell  of 
another  butchery  as  resultless  as  those  of  Freiburg  and 
NOrdlingen.  But  Enghien  was  far  away  in  Flanders, 
laying  siege  to  Dunkirk,  and  Turenne,  for  the  first  time 
at  the  head  of  a  superior  force,  was  about  to  teach  the 
world  a  lesson  in  the  art  of  war.  Whilst  the  enemy  was 
preparing  for  the  expected  attack  by  entrenching  his 
position,  the  united  French  and  Swedish  armies  slipped 
past  them  and  marched  straight  for  the  heart  of  Bavaria, 
where  an  enemy  had  not  been  seen  since  Bernhard  had 
been  chased  out  in  1634.  That  one  day,  as  Turenne 
truly  said,  altered  the  whole  face  of  affairs.  Everywhere 
the  roads  were  open.  Provisions  were  plentiful.  The 
population  was  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  blessings  of 
peace.  Turenne  and  Wrangel  crossed  the  Danube 
without  difficulty.  Schorndorf,  Wiirzburg,  Nordlingen, 
Donauwbrth  made  no  resistance  to  them.  It  was  not 
till  they  came  to  Augsburg  that  they  met  with  opposition. 
The  enemy  had  time  to  come  up.  But  there  was  no 
unanimity  in  the  councils  of  the  enemy.  The  Bavarian 
generals  wanted  to  defend  Bavaria.  The  imperialist 
generals  wanted  to  defend  the  still  remaining  Austrian 
possessions  in  Swabia.  The  invaders  were  allowed  to 
accomplish  their  purpose.  They  arrived  at  the  gates  of 
Munich  before  the  citizens  knew   what  had  become  of 


i6i$.  The  Treaty  of  Westphalia.  213 

their  master's  army.  With  grim  purpose  Turenne  and 
Wrangel  set  themselves  to  make  desolate  the  Bavarian 
plain,  so  that  it  might  be  rendered  incapable  of  support- 
ing a  Bavarian  army.  Maximilian  was  reduced  to  straits 
such  as  he  had  not  known  since  the  time  when  Tilly  fell 
at  the  passage  of  the  Lech.  Sorely  against  his  will  he 
signed,  in  May,  1647,  a  separate  truce  with  the  enemy. 
The  truce  did  not  last  long.  In  September  Maxi- 
milian was  once  more  on  the  Emperor's  side.  Bavaria 
paid  dearly  for  the  elector's  defection.     All   ,  „  . 

,    -      ,      ,   ,  2 8-  Las' 

that  had  been  spared  a  year  before  fell  a  struggles  of 
sacrifice  to  new  devastation.  The  last  great 
battle  of  the  war  was  fought  at  Zusmarshausen  on  May 
17,  1648.  The  Bavarians  were  defeated  and  the  work 
6f  the  destroyer  went  on  yet  for  a  while  unchecked.  In 
Bohemia  half  of  Prague  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Swedes, 
and  the  Emperor  was  left  unaided  to  bear  up  in  the  un- 
equal fight. 

Section  II. —  The  Treaty  of  Westphalia. 

Ferdinand  could  resist  no  longer.     On  the  24th  of 
October,  1648,  a  few  months  before  Charles    ,       _, 
I.  ascended  the  scaffold  at  Whitehall,  the    Peace  of 
Peace  of  Westphalia  was  signed.  es  p  a  ia. 

The  religious  difficulty  in  Germany  was  settled  as  i* 
ought  to   have  been   settled  long  before.      Calvinism 
was  to  be   placed  on  the  same  footing  as 
Lutheranism.      New- Year's   day  1624.   was   ?2-  Religi°us 

_  '  T  settlement. 

fixed  upon  as  the  date  by  which  all  dis- 
putes were  to  be  tested.  Whatever  ecclesiastical  bene- 
fice was  in  Catholic  hands  at  that  date  was  to  remain  in 
Catholic  hands  forever.  Ecclesiastical  benefices  in  Pro- 
testant hands  at  that  date  were  to  remain  in  Protestant 
keeping.     Catholics  would  never  again  be  able  to  lay 


214  The  End  of  the  War.  1648. 

claim  to  the  bishoprics  of  the  north.  Even  Halberstadt, 
which  had  been  retained  at  the  Peace  of  Prague,  was 
tiow  lost  to  them.  To  make  this  settlement  permanent, 
the  Imperial  Court  was  reconstituted.  Protestants  and 
Catholics  were  to  be  members  of  the  court  in  equal 
numbers.  And  if  the  judicial  body  was  such  as  to  make 
it  certain  that  its  sanction  would  never  be  given  to  an 
infringement  of  the  peace,  the  Catholic  majority  in  the 
Diet  became  powerless  for  evil. 

In  political  matters,  Maximilian  permanently  united 
the  Upper  Palatinate  to  his  duchy  of  Bavaria,  and  the 
Electorate  was  confirmed  to  him  and  his 
Lulemau"1  descendants.  An  eighth  electorate  was 
created  in  favour  of  Charles  Lewis,  the 
worthless  son  of  the  Elector,  Frederick,  and  the 
Lower  Palatinate  was  given  up  to  him.  Sweden  estab- 
lished herself  firmly  on  the  mouths  of  the  great  north- 
ern rivers.  The  Eastern  part  of  Pomerania  she  sur- 
rendered to  Brandenburg.  But  Western  Pomerania, 
including  within  its  frontier  both  banks  of  the  lower 
Vistula,  was  surrendered  to  her  ;  whilst  the  possession 
of  the  bishoprics  of  Bremen  and  Verdun,  on  which 
Christian  of  Denmark  had  set  his  eyes  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  gave  her  a  commanding  position  at  the 
mouths  of  the  Elbe  and  the  Weser.  The  bishoprics  of 
Halberstadt,  Camin,  Minden,  and  the  greater  part  ot 
the  diocese  of  Magdeburg,  were  made  over  to  Branden- 
burg as  a  compensation  for  the  loss  of  its  claims  to  the 
whole  of  Pomerania,  whilst  a  smaller  portion  of  the 
diocese  of  Magdeburg  was  assigned  to  Saxony,  that 
power,  as  a  matter  of  course,  retaining  Lusatia. 

France,  as  a  matter  of  course,  retained  its  conquests. 
,     „  .      f      It    kept    its    hold    upon    Austrian    Alsace, 

?  4.  Gains  of  *  r 

France.  Strasburg,  as  a  free  city,  and  the. immediate 


1648.  TJu  Treaty  of  Westphalia.  215 

vassals  of  the  Empire  being,  however,  excluded  from 
the  cession.  The  strong  fortress  of  Philippsburg,  erected 
by  the  warlike  Elector  of  Treves,  received  a  French  gar- 
rison, and  the  three  bishoprics,  Metz,  Toul,  and  Verdun, 
which  had  been  practically  under  French  rule  since 
the  days  of  Henry  II.  of  France,  were  now  formally 
separated  from  the  Empire.  Equally  formal  was  the 
separation  of  Switzerland  and  the  Netherlands,  both  of 
which  countries  had  long  been  practically  independent. 
The  importance  of  the  peace  of  Westphalia  in  Eu- 
ropean history  goes  far  beyond  these  territorial  changes. 
That  France  should  have  a  few  miles  more    ,     _ 

2  5.   1  Re  ques- 

and  Germany  a  few  miles  less,  or  even  that   tioKofitoiera- 

1-.  .         ,  ,    ,  .....  .     tion  left  to  the 

r  ranee  should  have  acquired  military  and  German 
political  strength  whilst  Germany  lost  it,  PruiCS£- 
are  facts  which  in  themselves  need  not  have  any  very 
great  interest  for  others  than  Frenchmen  or  Germans. 
That  which  gives  to  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  its  promi- 
nent place  amongst  treaties  is  that  it  drew  a  final  de- 
marcation between  the  two  religions  which  divided  Eu- 
rope. The  struggle  in  England  and  France  for  the 
right  of  settling  their  own  religious  affairs  without  the 
interference  of  foreign  nations  had  been  brought  to  a  close 
in  the  sixteenth  century.  In  Germany  it  had  not  been 
brought  to  a  close  for  the  simple  reason  that  it  was  not 
decided  how  far  Germany  was  a  nation  at  all.  The 
government  of  England  or  France  could  tolerate  or  per- 
secute at  home  as  far  as  its  power  or  inclination  per- 
mitted. But  the  central  government  of  Germany  was 
not  strong  enough  to  enforce  its  will  upon  the  territorial 
governments  ;  nor  on  the  other  hand  were  the  territorial 
governments  strong  enough  to  enforce  their  will  with- 
out regard  for  the  central  government.  Thirty  years  of 
war  ended  by  a  compromise  under  which  the  religious 
Q 


2i6  The  End  of  the  War.  1648. 

position  of  each  territory  was  fixed  by  the  intervention 
of  foreign  powers,  whilst  the  rights  of  the  central  gov- 
ernment were  entirely  ignored. 

Such  a  settlement  was  by  no  means  necessarily  in 
favour  of  religious  toleration.  The  right  of  an  Elector  of 
?  6.    How  Bavaria  or  an  Elector  of  Saxony  to  impose 

th^resal"  Zl*  ft^s  belief  by  force  upon  his  dissident  sub- 
this-  jects  was  even  more  fully  acknowledged 

than  before.  He  could  still  give  them  their  choice  be- 
tween conversion  or  banishment.  As  late  as  in  1729  an 
Archbishop  of  Salzburg  could  drive  thousands  of  indus- 
trious Protestants  into  exile  from  his  Alpine  valleys,  leav- 
ing a  void  behind  them  which  has  not  been  filled  up  to 
this  day.  But  if  such  cases  were  rare,  their  rarity  was  in- 
directly owing  to  the  Peace  of  Westphalia.  In  1617  a 
bishop  who  had  to  consider  the  question  of  religious  per- 
secution, had  to  consider  it  with  the  fear  of  Christian  of 
Anhalt  before  his  eyes.  Every  Protestant  in  his  do- 
minions was  a  possible  traitor  who  would  favour,  if  he 
did  not  actively  support,  the  revolutionary  attacks  of 
the  neighbouring  Protestants.  In  1649  all  such  fear  was 
at  an  end  for  ever.  The  bishop  was  undisputed  master 
of  his  territory,  and  he  could  look  on  with  contemp- 
tuous indifference  if  a  few  of  his  subjects  had  sufficient 
love  of  singularity  to  profess  a  religion  other  than  his 
own. 

It  may  perhaps  be  said  that  the  assurance  given  by 

the  Peace  of  Westphalia  was  after  all  no  better  than  the 

™    ^         assurance  given  by  the  Peace  of  Augsburg, 

\  7.  The  Peace  i>  3  6.  6» 

oi  Westphalia  but  even  so  far  as  the  letter  of  the  two 
the  Peace  of  documents  was  concerned,  this  was  very  far 
Augsburg.  from  being  the  case.  The  Peace  of  Augs- 
burg was  full  of  uncertainties,  because  the  contracting 
parties  were  unable  to  abandon  their  respective  desires. 


1648.  Co?ulition  of  Germany.  217 

In  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  all  was  definite.     Evasion 
or  misinterpretation  was  no  longer  possible. 

If  the  letter  of  the  two  treaties  was  entirely  different, 
it  was  because  the  spirit  in  which  they  were  conceived 
was  also  entirely  different.     In  1555  Protes-    ,  „    _ 

3  "^  \%.    General 

tantism  was  on  the  rise.    The  peace  of  1555    desire  for  the 

,  i>ii  continuance  of 

was  a  vain  attempt  to  shut  out  the  tide  by  peace, 
artificial  dykes  and  barriers.  In  1648  the  tide  had  re- 
ceded. The  line  which  divided  the  Protestant  from 
the  Catholic  princes  formed  almost  an  exact  division  be- 
tween the  Protestant  and  Catholic  populations.  The 
desire  for  making  proselytes,  once  so  strong  on  both 
sides,  had  been  altogether  extinguished  by  the  numbing 
agony  of  the  war.  All  Germany  longed  for  peace  with 
an  inexpressible  longing.  The  mutual  distrust  of 
Catholic  and  Protestant  had  grown  exceedingly  dull. 
The  only  feeling  yet  alive  was  hatred  of  the  tyranny  and 
exactions  of  the  soldiers. 

Section  III. —  Condition  of  Germany. 
What  a  peace   it  was  when   it   really  came  at  last! 
Whatever  life  there  was  under  that  deadly  blast  of  war 
had  been  attracted  to  the  camps.     The  strong  man  who 
had  lost  his  all  turned  soldier  that  he  might  be  able  to 
rob  others  in  turn.     The  young  girl,  who  in 
better  times  would  have  passed  on  to  a  life   of 'the  war. 
of  honourable  wedlock   with   some   youth 
who  had  been  the  companion  of  her  childhood  in  the 
sports  around  the  village  fountain,  had  turned  aside,  foi 
very  starvation,  to  a  life  of  shame  in  the  train  of  one  or 
other  of  the  armies  by  which  her  home  had  been  made 
desolate.     In  the  later  years  of  the  war  it  was  known 
that  a  body  of  40,000  fighting  men  drew  along  with  it  a 
loathsome  following  of  no  less  than  140,000  men,  women, 


ai8  The  End  of  the  War.  1648. 

and  children,  contributing  nothing  to  the  efficiency  of 
the  army,  and  all  of  them  living  at  the  expense  of  the 
miserable  peasants  who  still  contrived  to  hold  on  to 
their  ruined  fields.  If  these  were  to  live,  they  must  steal 
what  yet  remained  to  be  stolen ;  they  must  devour,  with 
the  insatiable  hunger  of  locusts,  what  yet  remained  to  be 
devoured.  And  then,  if  sickness  came,  or  wounds — 
and  sickness  was  no  infrequent  visitor  in  those  camps— 
wliat  remained  but  misery  or  death  ?  Nor  was  it  much 
better  with  the  soldiers  themselves.  No  careful  surgeons 
passed  over  the  battle-field  to  save  life  or  limb.  No 
hospitals  received  the  wounded  to  the  tender  nursing 
of  loving,  gentle  hands.  Recruits  were  to  be  bought 
cheaply,  and  it  cost  less  to  enrol  a  new  soldier  than  to 
cure  an  old  one. 

The  losses  of  the  civil  population  were  almost  incre- 
dible.    In  a  certain  district  of  Thuringia  which  was  pro- 
bably better  off  than   the   greater   part  of 

\  2.  Decrease  °  * 

of  the  Germany,  there  were,  before  the  war  cloud 

popuation.  burst,  i,7i7  houses  standing  in  nineteen 
villages.  In  1649,  only  627  houses  were  left.  And  even 
of  the  houses  which  remained  many  were  untenanted. 
The  1,717  houses  had  been  inhabited  by  1,773  families. 
Only  316  families  could  be  found  to  occupy  the  627 
houses.  Property  fared  still  worse.  In  the  same  dis- 
trict 244  oxen  alone  remained  of  1,402.  Of  4,616  sheep, 
not  one  was  left.  Two  centuries  later  the  losses  thus 
suffered  were  scarcely  recovered. 

And,  as  is  always  the  case,  the  physical  decline  of  the 
population  was  accompanied  by  moral  decadence.    Men 
who   had  been  accustomed  to  live  by  the 
decadence.         strong  arm,  and  men  who  had  been  accus- 
tomed to  suffer  all  tilings  from  those  who 
were  strong,  met  one  another,  even  in  the  days  of  peace, 


1648.  Condition  of  Germany.  219 

without  that  mutual  respect  which  forms  the  basis  of  well- 
ordered  life.  Courts  were  crowded  with  feather-brained 
soldiers  whose  highest  ambition  was  to  bedeck  them- 
selves in  a  splendid  uniform  and  to  copy  the  latest 
fashion  or  folly  which  was  in  vogue  at  Paris  or  Versailles. 
In  the  country  district  a  narrow-minded  gentry,  without 
knowledge  or  culture,  domineered  over  all  around,  and 
strove  to  exact  the  uttermost  farthing  from  the  peasant 
in  order  to  keep  up  the  outward  appearance  of  rank. 
The  peasant  whose  father  had  been  bullied  by  maraud- 
ing soldiers  dared  not  lift  up  his  head  against  the  ex- 
actions of  the  squire.  The  burden  of  the  general 
impoverishment  fell  heavily  upon  his  shoulders.  The 
very  pattern  of  the  chairs  on  which  he  sat,  of  the  vessels 
out  of  which  he  ate  and  drank,  assumed  a  ruder  appear- 
ance than  they  had  borne  before  the  war.  In  all  ranks 
life  was  meaner,  poorer,  harder  than  it  had  been  at  the 
beginning  of  the  century. 

If  much  of  all  this  was  the  result  of  the  war,  something 
was  owing  to  causes  antecedently  at  work. 

„,,        „  ,      •        1       ,         .        .  r    ,  2  4-   Intellec- 

The  German  people  in  the  beginning  of  the   tual  decline 
seventeenth  century  was  plainly  inferior  to    thenar  °re 
the  German  people  in  the  beginning  of  the 
sixteenth  century.     During  the  whole  course  of  the  war 
Maximilian  of  Bavaria  was  the  only  man  of  German 
birth  who  rose  to  eminence,  and  even  he  did  not  attain 
the  first  rank.     The  destinies  of  the  land  of  Luther  and 
Gothe,  of  Frederick  II.  and  Stein  were  decided  by  a  few 
men  of  foreign  birth.     Wallenstein  was  a  Slavonian, 
Tilly  a  Walloon,  Gustavus  a  Swede,  Richelieu  a  French- 
man.    The  penalty  borne  by  a  race  which  was  unable 
to  control  individual  vigour  within  the  limits  of  a  large 
and  fruitful  national  life  was  that  individual  vigour  itself 
died  out. 


»2o  The  End  of  the  War.  1648. 

We  may  well  leave  to  those  who  like  such  tasks  the 
work  of  piling  up  articles  of  accusation  against  this  man 

or  that,  of  discovering  that  the  war  was  all 
ties  inherited"  tae  &u\t  of  Ferdinand,  or  all  the  fault  of 
timesearly  Frederick,  as  party  feeling  may  lead  them. 

Probably  the  most  lenient  judgment  is  also 
the  truest  one.  With  national  and  territorial  institutions 
the  mere  chaos  which  they  were,  an  amount  of  political 
intelligence  was  needed  to  set  them  right  which  would 
be  rare  in  any  country  or  in  any  age. 

As  far   as  national  institutions  were   concerned  the 
Thirty  Years'  War  made  a  clean  sweep  in  Germany. 

Nominally,  it  is  true,  Emperor  and  Empire 
disintegration  still  remained.  Ferdinand  III.  was  still  ac- 
ermany.  COrding  to  his  titles  head  of  all  Christendom, 
if  not  of  the  whole  human  race.  The  Diet  still  gathered 
to  discuss  the  affairs  of  the  Empire.  The  imperial  court, 
re-established  on  the  principle  of  equality  between  the 
two  religions,  still  met  to  dispense  justice  between  the 
estates  of  the  Empire.  But  from  these  high-sounding 
names  all  reality  had  fled.  The  rule  over  German  men 
had  passed  for  many  a  long  day  into  the  hands  of  the 
princes.  It  was  for  the  princes  to  strive  with  one 
another  in  peace  or  war  under  the  protection  of  foreign 
alliances  ;  and  by  and  by,  half  consciously,  half  uncon- 
sciously, to  compete  for  the  leadership  of  Germany  by  the 
intelligence  and  discipline  which  they  were  able  to  fos- 
ter under  their  sway. 

When  the  days  of  this  competition  arrived  it  was  of 
inestimable  advantage  to  Germany  that,  whatever  else 

had  been  lost,  Protestantism  had  been 
ant'ism  saved",     saved.     Wherever  Protestantism  had  firmly 

rooted  itself  there  sprang  up  in  course  of 
ti-me  a  mighty  race  of  intellectual  giants.     Gdthe   and 


1648.  War  between  France  and  Spain.  221 

Schiller,  Lessing  and  Kant,  Stein  and  Humboldt,  with 
thousands  more  of  names  which  have  made  German  in- 
tellect a  household  word  in  the  whole  civilized  world, 
sprung  from  Protestant  Germany.  When  Bavaria, 
scarcely  more  than  two  generations  ago,  awoke  to  the 
consciousness  that  she  had  not  more  than  the  merest  ru- 
diments of  education  to  give  to  her  children,  she  had  to 
apply  to  the  Protestant  north  for  teachers. 

For  Germany  in  1648  the  worst  was  over.     Physically, 
at  least  she  had  no  more  to   suffer.    One    „       m 

§  8.     The 

page  of  her  history  was  closed  and  another    worst  over  for 
had  not  yet  been   opened.     She  lay  for  a      etma°y- 
time  in  the  insensibility  of  exhaustion. 

Section  IV, — Continuance  of  the  War  between  France 
and  Spain. 
For  France  T64S  is  hardly  a  date  at  all.    She  was  rid 
of  the  war  in  Germany.     But  her  war  with  Spain  was 
not  browght  to  an  end.     And  if  Spain  would    .       „ 

*»  r  .  I  s.     Peace 

no  longer  have  the  support  of  the  imperial-   between  Spa™ 

•   ^        j-  j-*  t-  t.   *.i  aiKl  the  .Dutch. 

ists  of  Germany,  France  was  at  the  same 
time  deprived  of  the  support  of  a  far  more  vigorous  ally. 
Spain  at  last  lowered  its  haughty  neck  to  accept  condi- 
tions of  peace  on  terra&s  of  equality  from  the  Dutch  re- 
public. The  eighty  years'  war  of  the  Netherlands  was 
brought  to  a  conclusion  simultaneously  with  the  thirty 
years'  war  of  Germany.  Spain  could  mow  send  rein- 
forcements to  Flanders  by  sea  without  fearing  the  over- 
whelming superiority  of  the  Dutch  marirae,  and  could 
defend  the  southern  frontier  of  the  obedient  provinces 
without  having  to  provide  against  an  attack  in  the  rear. 
In  the  long  run,  a  duel  between  France  and  Spain 
could  be  of  no  doubtful  issue.  It  was  a  contest  between 
the  old  system  of  immobility  and  intolerance  and  the 


222  TJie  End  of  the  War.  1652. 

new  system  of  intelligence  and  tolerance ;  between  4 
1 2.  France  government  which  despised  industry  and 
and  Spam.  commerce,  and  a  government  which  fostered 
them.  But  however  excellent  might  be  the  aims  which 
the  French  government  kept  in  view,  it  was  still  in  it? 
nature  an  absolute  government.  No  free  discussion  en' 
lightened  its  judgment.  No  popular  intervention  kept 
in  check  its  caprices.  It  was  apt  to  strike  roughly  and 
ignorantly,  to  wound  many  feelings  and  to  impose  griev- 
ous burdens  upon  the  poor  and  the  weak  whose  lamen- 
tations never  reached  the  height  of  the  throne. 

Suddenly,  when  Mazarin's  government  appeared  most 
firmly  rooted,  there  was  an  explosion  which  threatened 
i  3.    The  t0  change  the  whole  face  of  France.     An 

Fronde.  outcry  arose  for  placing  restrictions  upon 

rights  of  the  crown,  for  establishing  constitutional  and 
individual  liberties.  The  Fronde,  as  the  party  which 
uttered  the  cry  was  called,  did  its  best  to  imitate  the 
English  Long  Parliament  whose  deeds  were  then  ringing 
through  the  world.  But  there  were  no  elements  in  France 
upon  which  to  establish  constitutional  government.  The 
Parliament  of  Paris,  which  wished  itself  to  be  considered 
the  chief  organ  of  that  government,  was  a  close  corpora- 
tion of  lawyers,  who  had  bought  or  inherited  judicial 
places  ;  and  of  all  governments,  a  government  in  the 
hands  of  a  close  corporation  of  lawyers  is  likely,  in  the 
long  run,  to  be  the  most  narrow-minded  and  unprogres- 
sive  of  all  possible  combinations;  for  it  is  the  business  of 
a  lawyer  to  administer  the  law  as  it  exists,  not  to  modify 
it  in  accordance  with  the  new  facts  which  rise  constantly 
to  the  surface  of  social  and  political  life.  Nor  were  the 
lawyers  of  the  parliament  fortunate  in  their  supporters. 
The  Paris  mob,  combined  with  a  knot  of  intriguing 
courtiers,  could  form  no  firm  basis  for  a  healthy  revolu* 


i657-  War  between  France  and  Spain.  223 

tion.  It  was  still  worse  when  Conde,  quarrelling  on  a 
personal  question  with  Mazarin,  raised  the  standard  of 
aristocratic  revolt,  and  threw  himself  into  the  arms  of  the 
Spanish  invader.  Mazarin  and  the  young  king  repre- 
sented the  nation  against  aristocratic  selfishness  and  in- 
trigue ;  and  when  they  obtained  the  services  of  Turenne, 
the  issue  was  hardly  doubtful.  In  1652  Louis  XIV.  entered 
Paris  in  triumph.  In  1653  Conde,  in  conjunction  with  a 
Spanish  army,  invaded  France,  and  pushed  on  hopefully 
for  Paris.  But  Turenne  was  there  with  a  handful  of  troops  ; 
and  if  Conde  was  the  successor  of  Gustavus  in  the  art  of 
fighting  battles,  Turenne  was  Wallenstein's  successor  in 
the  art  of  strategy.  Conde  could  neither  fight  nor  advance 
with  effect.  The  siege  and  reduction  of  Rocroy  was  the 
only  result  of  a  campaign  which  had  been  commenced 
in  the  expectation  of  reducing  France  to  submission. 

In  1654  Conde  and  the  Spaniards  laid  siege  to  Arras, 
whilst  the  French  were  besieging  Stenay.  Stenay  was 
taken;  Arras  was  relieved.  In  1655  further  g4  The  war 
progress  was  made  by  the  French  on  the  with  sPain- 
frontier  of  the  Netherlands ;  but  in  1656  they  failed  in  the 
siege  of  Valenciennes. 

With  the  check  thus  inflicted,  a  new  danger  appeared 
above  the  horizon.  In  England  there  had 
arisen,  under  Cromwell,  a  new  and  power-  Cromwell,  and 
ful  military  state  upon  the  ruins  of  the  mon-  pain' 
archy  of  the  Stuarts.  To  Cromwell  Spain  addressed  itself 
with  the  most  tempting  offers.  The  old  English  jealousy 
of  France,  and  the  political  advantage  of  resisting  its 
growing  strength,  were  urged  in  favour  of  a  Spanish  alli- 
ance. Cromwell  might  renew  the  old  glories  of  the  Plan- 
tagenets,  and  might  gather  round  him  the  forces  of  the  Hu- 
guenots of  the  south.  If  Charles  I.  had  failed  at  Rochelle, 
Cromwell  might  establish  himself  firmly  at  Eordeaux. 


224  The  End  of  tfie  War.  1660. 

For  a  moment  Cromwell  was  shaken.     Then  he  made 
two  demands  of  the  Spanish   ambassador.      He  must 
have,  he  said   freedom  for  Englishmen  to 
rcfiises3"1  trade  in  the  Indies,  and  permission  for  Eng- 

terrmsWeU'S  lishmen  carrying  on  commercial  inter- 
course with  Spain  to  profess  their  religion 
openly  without  interference.  "  To  give  you  this,"  was 
the  Spaniard's  cool  reply,  "  would  be  to  give  you  my 
master's  two  eyes." 

To  beat  down  religious  exclusiveness  and  commercial 
exclusiveness  was  the  work  to  which  Cromwell  girded 
himself.  An  alliance  with  France  was 
between'3"0  quickly  made.  The  arrogant  intolerance  of 
England"1"1  Spain  was  to  perish  through  its  refusal  to 
admit  the  new  principle  of  toleration.  The 
politic  tolerance  of  France  was  to  rise  to  still  higher 
fortunes  by  the  admission  of  the  principle  on  which  all 
its  successes  had  been  based  since  Richelieu's  accession 
to  power.  In  1657,  six  thousand  of  Cromwell's  Ironsides 
landed  to  take  part  in  continental  warfare.  The  union 
of  Turenne's  strategy  with  the  valour  and  discipline 
which  had  broken  down  opposition  at  Naseby  and  Wor- 
cester was  irresistible.  That  autumn  the  small  Flemish 
port  of  Mardyke  surrendered.  In  1658  Dunkirk  was 
taken,  and  given  over,  according  to  compact,  to  the 
English  auxiliaries.  But  France,  too,  reaped  an  ample 
harvest.  Gravelines,  Oudenarde,  Ypres  saw  the  white 
flag  of  France  flying  from  their  ramparts. 

Spain  was  reduced  to  seek  for  peace.     In  1660  the 

Treaty  of   the    Pyrenees,  a    supplement  as  it  were  to 

the  Treaty  of  Westphalia,  put  an  end  to  the 

Treaty  of  the     long  war.      The   advantages  of  the   peace 

were  all  on  the  side  of  France.     Roussillon 

and  Artois,  with  Thionville,   Landrecies,  and  Avesnes, 


i66o.  War  between  France  and  Spain.  225 

were  incorporated  with  France.  Another  condition  was 
pregnant  with  future  evil.  Lewis  XIV.  gave  his  hand  to 
the  sister  of  Philip  IV.  of  Spain,  the  next  heiress  to  the 
Spanish  monarchy  after  the  sickly  infant  who  became 
afterwards  the  imbecile  and  childish  Charles  II.  At 
her  marriage  she  abandoned  all  right  to  the  great  in- 
heritance ;  but  even  at  the  time  there  were  not  wanting 
Frenchmen  of  authority  to  point  to  circumstances  which 
rendered  the  renunciation  null  and  void. 

Richelieu's  power  had  been  based  upon  tolerance  at 
home  and  moderation  abroad.  Was  it  likely  that  his 
successors  would  always  imitate  his  exam-  1  The 
pie?  What  guarantee  could  be  given  that  greatness  of 
the  French  monarchy  would  not  turn  its  on  its  tolerance, 
back  upon  the  principles  from  which  its  strength  had 
been  derived  ?  In  a  land  of  free  discussion,  every  gain 
is  a  permanent  one.  When  Protestantism,  or  toleration, 
or  freedom  of  the  press,  or  freedom  of  trade  had  been 
once  accepted  in  England,  they  were  never  abandoned; 
they  became  articles  of  popular  belief,  on  which  no  hesi- 
tation, except  by  scattered  individuals,  was  possible. 
Multitudes  who  would  find  it  difficult  to  give  a  good 
reason  why  they  thought  one  thing  to  be  true  and 
another  untrue,  had  yet  a  hazy  confidence  in  the  result  of 
the  battle  of  reason  which  had  taken  place,  much  in  the 
same  way  as  there  are  millions  of  people  in  the  world 
who  believe  implicitly  that  the  earth  goes  round  the  sun, 
without  being  able  to  give  a  reason  for  their  belief. 

In  France  it  was  hard  for  anything  of  the  kind  to  take 
place.   Tolerance  was  admitted  there  by  the  mere  will  of 
the  government  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
just  as  free  trade  was  admitted  by  the  mere   appended 'on 
will  of  the  government  in    the  nineteenth   ^e  wiU  of  tne 
century.    The  hand  that  gave  could   also 


236  The  End  of  the  War.  1660. 

take  away ;  and  it  depended  on  the  young  king  to 
decide  whether  he  would  walk  in  the  steps  of  the  great 
minister  who  had  cleared  the  way  before  him,  or  whether 
he  would  wander  into  devious  paths  of  his  own  seeking. 
At  first  everything  promised  well.  A  great  statesman, 
Colbert,  filled  the  early  part  of  the  manhood  of  Lewis 

XIV.  with  a  series  of  domestic  reforms,  the 
tolerance  of        least  of  which  would  have  gladdened  the 

heart  of  Richelieu.  Taxation  was  reduced, 
the  tolls  taken  upon  the  passage  of  goods  from  one  pro- 
vince to  another  were  diminished  in  number,  trade  and 
industry  were  encouraged,  the  administration  of  justice 
was  improved ;  all,  in  short,  that  it  was  possible  to  do 
within  the  circle  of  one  man's  activity  was  done  to  make 
France  a  prosperous  and  contented  land.  But  the  happy 
time  was  not  of  long  duration.  The  war  fever  took  pos- 
session of  Lewis  ;  the  lust  of  absolute  domination  entered 
into  his  heart.  He  became  the  tyrant  and  bully  of  Eu- 
rope ;  and  as  abroad  he  preferred  to  be  feared  rather 
than  to  be  loved,  at  home  he  would  be  content  with 
nothing  else  than  the  absolute  mastery  over  the  con- 
sciences as  well  as  over  the  hearts  of  his  subjects.  The 
Edict  of  Nantes,  issued  by  Henry  IV.  and  confirmed  by 
the  policy  of  Richelieu,  was  revoked,  and  intolerance 
and  persecution  became  the  law  of  the  French  monarchy, 
as  it  had  been  the  law  of  the  Spanish  monarchy. 

It  was  not  for  this  that  Henry  IV.  and  Rl- 
l  12.  Fate  chelieu  had  laboured.  The  tree  that  bears  no 
French  frint  must  be  cut  down  to  the  ground,  or  it  will 

monarchy  perish  by  its  own  inherent  rottenness.  As  the 

Empire  had  fallen,  as  the  Spanish  monarchy  had  fallen, 
the  French  monarchy,  shaken  by  the  thunders  of  La 
Hogue  and  Blenheim,  fell  at  last,  when,  amidstthe  corrup* 
tion  of  Versailles,  it  ceased  to  do  any  useful  work  for  man. 


INDEX. 


AUS 

AACHEN         (Aix-la-Chaj>elle) 
place  of  coronation,  2. 

Administrators.     See  Bishoprics. 

Aix  la-Chapelle.     See  Aachen. 

Aldringer,  offers  to  assist  Wallen- 
stein,  175 ;  declares  against  him, 
177  ;  tries  to  seize  him,  177. 

Alsace,  Mansfeld  in,  50  ;  his  designs 
there,  56  ;  Mansfeld  returns,  to,  60 ; 
pioposed  march  of  Mansfeld  to  75  ; 
its  possession  of  importance  to 
France,  191  ;  comes  into  French 
possession,  197. 

Anhalt.  Prince  of.  See  character  of 
Anhalt. 

Anne  of  Austria,  Regent  of  France, 
205. 

Anspach,  the  Margrave  of,  hopes  for 
a  revolution,  135. 

Anstruther,  Sir  Robert,  his  mission 
to  the  King  of  Denmark,  84. 

Arnim,  ordered  by  Wallenstein  to 
besiege  Stralsund,  108  ;  commands 
the  Saxons  at  Breitenfeld,  139  ;  his 
conference  with  Wallenstein,  153  ; 
is  expected  to  meet  Wallenstein  at 
Eger,  179. 

Arras,  besieged  by  Conde,  223. 

Augsburg,  city  of,  swears  obedience 
to  Gustavus,  150 ;  besieged  by  the 
imperialists,  187;  resists  Turenne, 
212. 

Augsburg,  Peace  of,  9 ;  questions 
arising  out  of  \\,  10  ;  evaded  by  the 
Protestants,  11. 

Austria,  Lower,  estates  of,  attempt 
to  wring  concessions  from  Ferdi- 
nand, 36. 
Austria,  Upper,  surrenders  to  Maxi- 
milian, 42  ;  pledged  to  Maximilian, 
46;  restored  to  Ferdinand,  119. 


BET 

Austria,   the   House    of;    territories 

governed  by  it,  9  ;  its  branches,  24. 
Avesnes  incorporated  with    France, 
225. 

BAUTZEN,    besieged    by  John 
George,  42. 

Bergen-op-zoom,  siege  of,  63. 

Bernhard  of  Weimar,  joins  the  King 
of  Denmark,  101 ;  joins  Gustavus, 
138;  takes  the  command  of  the 
Swedes  at  Liitzen,  163;  his  expec- 
tations after  the  death  of  Gustavus, 
166  ;  his  duchy  of  Franconia.  167; 
takes  Ratisbon,  173  ;  is  invited  to 
assist  Wallenstein,  179;  prepares 
to  march  to  Eger,  179;  is  defeated 
at  Nbnilingen,  183;  loses  his  duchy 
of  Franconia,  183  ;  his  alliance  with 
France,  190  ;  defeats  the  imperial- 
ists at  Rheinfelden  and  takes 
kheinfelden.  F'eiburg,  and  Brei- 
sach,  195 ;  his  death,  196. 

Bachararch,  misery  at,  187. 

Baden-Durlach,  Margrave  of,  joins 
Frederick,  54  ;  defeated  at  Wimp- 
fen,  57;  abandons  his  allies,  60; 
aids  the  King  of  Denmark,  101. 

Bamberg  and  Wiirzburg,  Bishop  of, 
attacked  by  Mansfeld,  49. 

Baner,  defeats  the  Imperialists  at 
Wittstock,  194;  is  driven  back  to 
the  coast  of  the  Baliic,  195;  fights 
in  different  parts  of  Germany,  196. 

B&rwalde,  treaty  of,  132. 

Bethlen  Gabor,  P'ince  of  Transylva- 
nia, attacks  Austria,  40 ;  prepares 
to  aid  Frederick,  44  ;  defeats  Buc- 
quoi,  49 ;  threatens  Austria,  88, 
94;  is  joined  by  Mansfeld,  97; 
withdraws  from  the  contest,  101. 
227 


228 


Index. 


BRE 

Bishoprics,  question  connected  with 
them  left  unsettled  at  the  Peace  of 
Augsburg,  10 ;  in  the  north  they 
mainly  fall  under  Protestant  ad 
ministrators,  12 ;  forcible  recon- 
version of  the  population  where 
this  is  not  the  case,  14;  Protestant 
administrators  not  acknowledged 
by  the  Diet,  14  ;  attempt  to  brin.^ 
over  Cologne  and  Strasburg  to 
Protestantism,  14  ;  questions  relat- 
ing to  them  settled  for  a  time  at 
Miihlhausen,  41;  reopened  after 
the  battle  of  Stadtlohn,  67  ;  names 
of  those  reclaimed  in  the  Edict  of 
Restitution,  121  ;  arrangement  for 
them  at  the  treaty  of  Prague,  184. 

Boguslav,  Duke  of  Pomerania,  com- 

f)elled  to  accept  a  garrison  by  Wal- 
enstein,  108  ;  supports  Wallenstein 
in  the  siege  of  Stralsund  no  ;  com- 
plains of  Wallenstein's  soldiers, 
127  ;  submits  to  Gustavus,  130. 

Bohemia,  the  Royal  Charter  granted 
in,  25;  its  infringement,  27;  ac- 
knowledgment of  Ferdinand  as  its 
king,  28  ;  revolution  in  29  ;  direc- 
tors appointed.  32  ;  war  begins  in, 
32  ;  political  incapacity  of  the  re- 
volutionary government,  32 ;  it 
make^  application  to  foreign  powers, 
35 ;  election  of  Frederick  as  king, 
38  ;  suppression  of  the  Revolution, 
45  ;  occupied  by  John  George,  151.; 
the  Saxons  driven  out  of,  155  ;  Tor- 
stenson's  occupation  of,  209. 

Bohemia  King  of,  h  s  functions  as 
an  Elector,  1.  See  also  Rudolph 
If.,  Matthias,  Frederic*  V.,  and 
Ferdinand  II. 

Bohemian  Brethren  expelled  from 
Bohemia,  46. 

Brande  burg,  bishopric  of,  named  in 
the  Edict  of  Restitution,  131. 

Brandenburg,  Elector  of,  1.  See  also 
John  Sigismund,  and  George 
William. 

Biaunau,  Protestant  church  at,  27. 

Breda,  siege  of,  76 

Breisach,  taken  by  Bernhard,  195. 

Bieisgan,  taken  possession  of  by  the 
French,  195. 

Breitenfeld,  battle  of,  141. 

Bremen,  archbishopric  of,  connexion 
of.  with  Christian  IV.,  78;  named 
in  the  Edict  of  Restitution,  120; 
given  up  to  Sweden,  214. 


CHE 

Bridge  of  Dessau,  battle  of,  96. 

Brunn,  besieged  by  Torstenson,  209, 

Brunswick,  peace  negotiations  at,  93. 

Brussels,  conferences  for  peace  at,  52. 
57.  6°/ 

Bucquoi,  commands  the  army  in- 
vad"  lg  Bohemia,  32 ;  defeats  Mans- 
fcld,  3-  ;  joined  by  Maximilian,  43  ; 
advises  to  delay  a  battle,  44 ;  is 
killed,  49. 

Buckingham,  Duke  of,  his  expedition 
to  Rhe,  114;  intends  to  raise  the 
siege  of  Rochelle,  115 ;  is  mur- 
dered, 115. 

Budweis,  attacked  by  the  Bohemians, 
32. 

Burgundy,  Eastern.  See  Franche 
Comte. 

Butler,  receives  orders  to  capture 
Wallenstein,  180  :  consults  on  the 
murder  with   Leslie  and   Gordon, 


CALVINISM  in  Germany,  18.  _ 
Camin,  bishopric  of,   named  in 
the  Edict  of  Restitution,  121. 

Casale,  sieges  of,  1.-2,  123. 

Catalonia,  insurrection  of,  199. 

Charles  I.,  King  of  England,  lorms  an 
alliance  with  Christian  IV.,  86  ;  is 
unable  to  fulfil  his  engagement,  95  ; 
sends  Sir  C.  Morgan  to  aid  Chris- 
tian IV.,  101  ;  quarrels  with  France, 
xii ;  attempts  to  succour  Rochelle, 
113;  his  arrangements  about  the 
Spanish  fleet  in  the  Downs,  198. 

Charles  V.,  his  strength  external  to 
the  empire,  8;  his  meeting  with 
Luiher,  9  ;  forced  to  yield  to  lh« 
Protestants,  9. 

Charles  Emanuel,  Duke  of  Savoy, 
helps  the  Bohemians,  33  ;  plans  Kir 
his  advancement  in  Germany,  35  ; 
attacks  Genoa,  76;  reduced  to  sub- 
mission by  Richelieu,  122. 

Charles  L  wis.  Elector  Palatine, 
claims  his  father's  dominion,  198; 
rect  lves  the  Lower  Palatinate,  214. 

Charles,  Prince  of  Wales  proposed 
marriage  with  an  Infanta,  51  ; 
treaty  with  Spain  broken  off,  70  ; 
proposed  marriage  with  Henrietta 
Maria.  74.  See  shades  1.,  King 
of  England. 

Charles  the  Great  (Charlemagne) 
nature  of  his  authority,  2. 

Cherasco,  tieaty  of,  135. 


Index. 


229 


COR 

Chichester,  Lord,  his  embassy  to  the 
Palatinate,  59. 

Christian  IV.,  King  of  Denmark; 
his  connection  with  Germany,  78  ; 
his  views  on  the  course  of  the  war, 
79  ;  his  offers  to  England  to  make 
war,  84  ;  his  offer  accepted,  85 ;  at- 
tacked by  Tilly,  94 ;  defeated  at 
Luiter,  96 ;  refuses  Wallenstein's 
terms  of  peace,  101  ;  sends  agents 
to  Stralsund,  109  ;  makes  peace  at 
Liibeck,  117. 

Christian  of  Anhalt,  leader  of  the 
German  Calvinists,  38;  his  cha- 
racter and  policy,  18 ;  his  part  in 
the  foundation  of  the  Union,  21  ; 
his  intrigues  in  Austria,  26;  his 
plan  for  supporting  the  Bohemians, 
34 ;  commands  the  Bohemian 
army,  44. 

Christian  of  Brunswick,  administra- 
tor of  Halberstadt,  his  instalment 
in  the  cathedral,  54;  resolves  to 
take  part  in  the  war,  55 ;  invades 
the  diocese  of  Paderborn,  55  ;  de- 
feated at  Hochst,  59 ;  retreats  to 
Alsace,  60;  marches  through  Lor- 
raine, 63 ;  loses  his  arm  at  Fleurus, 
64 ;  threatens  the  Lower  Saxon 
Circle,  65 ;  negotiates  with  the  Em- 
peror, 6f ;  is  defeated  at  Stadtlohn, 
and  resigns  the  See  of  Halberstadt, 
67  ;  joins  Christian  IV.,  95  ;  dies,  96. 

Christina,  Queen  cf  Sweden,   166. 

Christina,  Regent  of  Savoy,  assisted 
by  the  French,  197. 

Church  lands  secularized,  10,  11 ; 
legal  decision  about  them  against 
the  Protestants,  14. 

Cities,  free  imperial,  their  part  in  the 
Diet,  6. 

Cleves,  war  of  succession  in,  21. 

Coblentz,  fired  at  by  the  French  in 
Ehrenbreitstein,  187. 

Colbert,  his  reforms,  226. 

Cclogne,  Elector  of,  1  ;  failure  of  an 
attempt  by  him  to  bring  over  the 
electorate  to  Protestantism,  14. 

Conde,  Prince  of,  takes  part  with 
Spain,  223. 

Convention  of  Passau.  See  Pas- 
sau. 

Corbie,  taken  by  the  Spaniards,  and 

retaken  by  the  French,  193. 
Cordova,   Gonzales     de,   commands 
the  Spaniards  in  the  Lower  Palati- 
nate, 50;  takes   Hurt  in  the  battle 


EMP 

ofWimpfen,  57;  joins  in  defeating 
Christian  of  Brunswick  at  K6chstc 
59  ;  c  mmands  at  Fleurus,  63. 

Corneille,  writes  "  The  Cid,"  169. 

Cromwell,  courted  by  France  and 
Spain,  223;  decides  to  help  France, 
334. 


DANHOLM,  seized  by  Wallen. 
stein's  soldiers,  109. 

Darmstadt,  entered  by  Mansfeld,  58. 

Descartes,  his  first  work  published, 
169. 

Dessau,  the  Bridge  of,  battle  of,  96. 

Devereux,  murders  Wallenstein,  180. 

Diet  of  the  Empire,  1 ;  its  reform  in 
the  J5th  century,  5;  its  constitu- 
tion, 5 ;  how  far  opposed  to  Pro- 
testantism, 8  ;  its  meeting  in  1608, 
21. 

Directors  of  Bohemia  appointed,  31. 

Donauworth,  occupation  of,  20 ;  en- 
tered by  Gustavus,  149;  surren- 
ders to  Turenne  212. 

Downs,  the  Spanish  fleet  takes  refuge 
in  the,  198. 

Dunkirk,  surrender  of,  224. 


EAST  FRIESLAND,  invaded  by 
Mansfeld,  64. 

Ecclesiastical  reservation,  the.  See 
Bishoprics. 

Edict  of  Restitution,  issued,  120. 

Eger,  Wallenstein  summons  his  colo- 
nels to,  179. 

Eggenberg  confers  with  Wallenstein, 
99  ;  favours  Wallenstein's  restora- 
tion, 151 ;  joins  Onate  against  Wal- 
lenstein, 176. 

Ehrenbreitstein,  receives  a  French 
garrison,  170;  fires  on  Coblentz,  187. 

Elector  Palatine,  1.  See  also  Frede- 
rick IV.,  and  Frederick  V. 

Electors,  functions  of,  1  ;  their  part 
in  the  Diet,  6 ;  their  quarrel  with 
Wallenstein,  103,  124 ;  demand 
Wallenstein's  dismissal,  T27. 

Eliot,  Sir  John,  his  satisfaction  at  the 
victories  of  Gustavus,  142. 

Elizabeth,  Electress  Palatine,  en- 
courages her  husband  to  accept  the 
crown  of  Bohemia,  39. 

Emperor,  functions  of,  1  ;  he  is  prac- 
tically scarcely  more  than  a  Ger- 
man king,  2. 


2JO 


Index. 


FER 

Enghien,  Duke  of  (afterwards  Prince 
of  Conde),  defeats  the  Spaniards  at 
Rocroy,  206 ;  commands  at  the 
battle  of  Freiburg  and  Nordlingen, 
208.     See  Conde,  Prince  of. 

England.  See  James  I.,  Chaides  I., 
l.  harles,  Prince  of  Wales. 

English  ambassador  (the  Earl  of  Ar- 
undel >,  notes  of  his  journey  through 
Germany,  187. 

Erfurt,  Gustavus  at,  147. 


FABRIC1US,  thrown  out  of  win- 
dow, 30. 

Felton,  murders  Buckingham.  115, 

Ferdinand,  the  Archduke,  afterwards 
the  Emperor  Ferdinand  I.,  repre- 
sents Charles  V.,  at  Augsburg, 
10. 

Ferdinand,  Archduke  (afterwards  the 
Emperor  Ferdinand  II.)  rules  Sty- 
ria,  Carinthia,  and  Carniola,  24 ; 
puts  down  Protestantism  there,  24  ; 
acknowledged  as  Ki  g  of  Bohemia, 
28 ;  his  character,  28 ;  swears  to 
the  Royal  Charter,  29 ;  elected 
Kingof  Hungary,  32  ;  receives  help 
from  Spain,  33 ;  promises  to  re- 
spect the  Royal  Charter,  36;  be- 
sieged by  Mansfeld,  37  ;  elected 
.h-mperor,  38  ;  comes  to  terms  with 
Maximilian,  40  ;  puts  Frederick  to 
the  ban,  46 ;  refuses  to  go  beyond 
the  agreement  of  MUhlhausen,  68 ; 
accepts  Wallenstein's  offer  to  raise 
an  army,  89 ;  grants  Mecklenburg 
to  Wallenstei.i,  105,  118  ;  oppresses 
the  Protestants,  120 ;  recovers  Up- 
per Austria,  119  ;  takes  part  in  the 
Mantuau  war,  121  ;  carries  out  the 
Edict  of  Restitution,  126;  despises 
Gustavus,  134;  refuses  to  aband  11 
the  Edict,  137  ;  looks  to  Spain  for 
help,  15c;  hesitates  what  to  do 
about  Wallenstein,  174;  decides 
against  him,  176  ;  consents  to  the 
Peace  of  Prague,  184  •  his  death, 
.  '94- 

»"erdinand,  King  of  Hungary  (after- 
wards the  Emperor  Ferdinand 
III.);  his  marriage,  174  ;  com- 
mands the  army  after  Wallens'ein's 
death,  182  ;  becomes  Emperor, 
194;  reluctance  to  surrender  Al- 
sace to  the  French,  210. 

Ferdinand,  tha  Cardinal-infant  ;  pro- 


FRE 

posed  command  of,  resisted  by 
Wallenstein,  171 ;  joins  the  King 
of  Hungary  before  the  battle  of 
Nordlingen,  182  ;  proceeds  to  Brus- 
sels, 183;  invades  France,  192. 

Fleurus,  battle  of,  63. 

France,  takes  precautions  against 
Mansfeld,  63  ;  its  internal  dissen- 
sions, 77,  112  ;  at  war  with  Eng- 
land, 113;  intervenes  in  Italy  and 
makes  peace  with  England,  122 ; 
supremacy  of  Richelieu  in,  168 ; 
places  itself  at  the  head  of  a  Ger- 
man alliance,  189 ;  declares  war 
openly  against  Spain,  192 ;  con- 
tinues the  war  with  Spain,  197  ;  its 
victories  over  Spain,  205  ;  its  vic- 
tories in  Germany,  307;  its  gains 
by  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  214  ; 
continuance  of  its  war  with  Spain, 
221  ;  successes  of,  in  Flanders, 
224 ;  its  gains  by  the  treaty  of  the 
Pyrenees ,  224  ;  its  condition  under 
Lewis  XIV  ,  226. 

Franche  t_omte,  included  in  the  Em- 
pire, 2. 

Franconia,  duchy  of,  assigned  to 
Bernhard,  167 ;    taken    from  him, 

„  [83- 

Frankenthal,  garrisoned  by  Vere's 
troops,  57  ;  given  up  to  the  Span- 
iards, 60. 

Frankfort-on-the  Main,  place  of  coro- 
nation, 2. 

Frankfort-on-the-Oder,  taken  by 
Gustavus,  134. 

Frederick  III.,  the  Emperor,  words 
used  to  him.  2. 

Frederick  IV.,  Elector  Palatine, 
nominal  leader  of  the  Calvinists, 
18  ;  his  death,  31. 

Frederick  V.,  Elector  Palatine,  his 
marriage,  31  ;  encourages  the  Bohe- 
mians, 31  ;  proposal  that  he  shall 
mediate  in  Bohemia,  34  ;  is  elected 
King  of  Bohemia,  38  ;  becomes  un- 
popular at  Prague,  43  ;  his  defeat 
at  the  White  Hill,  45  ;  takes  refuge 
at  the  Hague,  45  ;  put  to  the  ban, 
46 ;  maintains  his  claims  to  Bo- 
hemia, 48  ;  proposal  that  his  eldest 
son  shall  be  educated  at  Vienna, 
52  ;  his  prospects  in  1O22,  53  ;  joins 
Mansfeld  in  Alsace,  57  ;  seizes  the 
Landgrave  of  Darmstadt,  58 ; 
driven  back  to  Mannheim  59;  re- 
turns  to    the    Hague,  ou ;    enters 


Index. 


231 


GUS 

Munich  with  Gustavus,  150;    his 

dea.h,  171. 
Freiburg  (in  the  Breisgau\  surrenders 

to   Berahard,   195 ;    retaken,   208  ; 

battle  of;  208. 
Friedland,  Prince  and  Duke  of.     See 

Wallenstein. 
Friesiand.     See  East  FriesLand. 
Fronde,  the,  217. 
Fuentes,  Count  of,  killed  at   Rocroy, 

207. 
Fiirth,  Wallenstein's  entrenchments 

at,  158. 


GALLAS,  offers  to  assist  Wallen- 
stein, 175. 

Gassion  advises  the  French  to  give 
battle  at  Rocroy,  206. 

Gaston,  Duke  of  Orleans,  leaves 
France,  167  ;  takes  part  in  a  re- 
bellion, 168. 

George  of  Ltineburg,  a  Lutheran  in 
'  Wallenstein's  service,  98  :  sent  into 
Silesia,  roi. 

George  William,  Elector  of  Branden- 
burg, consents  to  his  sister's  mar- 
riage with  Gustavus,  81 ;  refuses  to 
join  Gustavus,  131 ;  compelled  to 
submit  to  him,  135. 

Germany,  its  political  institutions, 
1-7 ;  what  it  included,  2  ;  divided 
into  circles,  6  ;  its  miserable  condi- 
tion, 186 ;  its  condition  after  the 
Peace  of  Westphalia.  217. 

Gliickstadt,  fortified  by  Christian  IV., 
78  ;  siege  of,  117. 

Gordon,  his  part  in  Wallenstein's 
murder,  180. 

Gravelines  surrenders  to  the  French, 
224. 

Guebriant,  defeats  the  Imperialists  at 
Wolfenbiittel  and  Kempten,  201. 

Guise,  the  Dukeof,  leaves  France,  r68. 

Guiton,  Mayor  of  Rochelle,  115. 

Gustavus  Adolphus,  King  of  Sweden, 
his  character,  79;  early  struggles, 
80;  visits  Germany,  81  ;  hostile  to 
the  growth  of  the  Empire,  82 ; 
views  on  religion  and  politics,  83  ; 
projects  a  general  league  against 
the  House  of  Austria,  84;  refuses 
to  taice  part  in  it  on  the  terms  of- 
fered, and  attacks  Poland,  86 ;  sends 
help  to  Stralsund,  104 ;  makes  peac^ 
with  Poland,  124 ;  negotiates  with 
France,  224 ;  lands  in  Pomerania, 


HEN 

127  ;  gains  possession  of  the  lands 
on  the  Baltic  coast,  131 ;  negotiates 
with  France,  131  ;  signs  the  treaty 
of  Birwalde,  132;  compels  the 
Elector  of  Brandenburg  to  join  him, 
135  ;  fails  to  relieve  Magdeburg, 
136 ;  entrenches  himself  at  Wer- 
ben,  138 ;  allies  himself  with  Saxony, 
139  ;  his  skill  as  a  commander,  140 ; 
defeats  Tilly  at  Breitenfeld,  141 ; 
receives  overtures  from  Wallenstein, 
143 ;  his  political  plans,  144 ;  de- 
termines to  march  to  the  Rhine, 
145 ;  keeps  Christmas  at  Mentz, 
147;  his  reception  at  Nuremberg, 
148;  enters  Donauwarth,  and  de- 
feats Tilly  at  the  Lech,  149  ;  occu- 
pies Munich,  1 50  ;  lays  down  terms 
of  peace,  1 56 ;  proposes  a  league  of 
the  cities,  157  ;  rebukes  his  officers, 
159  ;  fails  in  storming  Wallenstein's 
entrenchments,  160 ;  follows  Wal- 
lenstein into  Saxony,  161  ;  attacks 
Wallenstein  at  Lotzen,  162 ;  his 
death,  163 ;  his  future  plans,  165. 

IT  AGENAU,  seized  by  Mansfeld, 

Hague,  the,  Frederick  takes  refuge 
there,  45 ;  returns  after  his  cam- 
paign in  Germany,  60. 

Halberstadt,  diocese  of,  Christian  of 
Brunswick  Bishop  of  it,  54 ;  for- 
feited by  his  treason,  65  ;  occupied 
by  Wallenstein,  92  ;  named  in  the 
Edict  of  Restitution,  120;  execu- 
tion of  the  Edict  at,  125 ;  not  re- 
covered by  the  Protestants  at  the 
treaty  of  Prague,  184;  restored  at 
the  peace  of  Westphalia,  214. 

Halle,  Pappenheim's  march  to,  162. 

Hamburg,  its  commerce,  78  ;  refuses 
to  submit  to  Wallenstein,  no. 

Hanse  Towns,  offers  made  them  by 
the  Emperor,  106. 

Havelberg,bishopricof,  named  in  the 
Edict  of  Restitution,  121. 

Heidelberg,  garrisoned  by  Vere,  57  ; 
taken  by  Tilly,  61 ;  treatment  of 
Protectants  at,  119. 

Heilbronn,  the  league  of,  167 ;  its 
leading  members  excepted  from  the 
amnesty  of  the  treaty  of  Prague, 
184. 

Heiligenhafen,  combat  of,  102. 

Henry  IV.,  King  of  France,  plans  in- 
tervention in  Germany,  22. 


23a 


Index. 


JOH 

Henry  the  Fowler,  notan  emperor,  2. 
Hesse   Cassel,   L.ndgrave    of.      See 

Maurice,  and  William. 
Hesse  Darmstadt.     See  Lewis. 
Hochst,  battle  of,  59. 
Horn,  commands  a  Swedish  force  in 

Mecklenburg,  134  ;    is  defeated  at 

Niirdiingen,  18.3. 
Huguenots,     nature      of     toleration 

granted  to,  173;  insurrection  of  77, 

112;  tolerated  by  Richelieu,  116. 
Hungary,  political  divisions  of,  40. 


IMPERIAL     Council    {Reichsho- 
frath)  intervenes  in  the  case  of 
Donauworth,  20. 
Imperial   Court     (Re-ichskammerge- 
richt),  institution,  6  ;  out  of  work- 
ing order,  19. 
Ingolstadt,  Tilly's  death  at,  149. 
Italy,  kingdom  of,  3.,  122. 


JAMES  I.,  K  ng  of  England,  offers 
to  mediate  In  Bohemia  and  Ger- 
many, 35,  47 ;  proposes  to  pay 
Mansfeld,  51 ;  his  negotiations  with 
Spain,  51,  jo ;  desires  aid  from 
France,  71 ;  supports  Mansfeld,  75  ; 
orders  him  not  to  relieve  Breda, 
76  ;  agreement  with  Christian  IV., 
85  ;  death  of,  86 

Jankow,  battle  of,  209. 

Jesuits,  the,  appear  in  Germany,  13. 

John  Ernest,  Duke  of  Saxe- Weimar, 
ideas  of  religious  liberty,  94;  sup- 
ports Mansield,  96;  dies.,  101. 

John  George,  Elector  of  Saxony,  at 
the  head  of  the  Lutheran  and  neu- 
tral party,  15,  22  ;  wishes  to  pacify 
Bohemia,  31  :  his.  share  in  Ferdi- 
nand's election  to  the  Empire,  38; 
is  gained  over  by  Maximilian  41 ; 
his  vacillations  in  1622,  62  ;  refuses 
to  join  in  the  Danish  war,  87  ;  his 
son  elected  administrator  of  Mag- 
deburg, 126  ;  attempts  to  mediate 
between  Gustavus  and  the  Em- 
peror, 133,  134 ;  joins  Gustavus, 
139  ;  failure  of  his  army  at  Breiten- 
feld,  141  ;  despatched  into  Bohe- 
mia, 151 ;  enters  Prague,  151  ;  is 
driven  out  of  Bohemia,  155;  pro- 
poses terms  of  peace  to  Gustavus, 
156;  refuses  to  join  the  league  of 
Heilbruun,   167;     negotiates,    with 


LOR 

Wallenstein,  170  ;  hopes  for  peace, 
184  ;  agrees  to  the  Peace  of  Prague, 
185;  his  troops  defeated  at  Witt- 
stock,  194. 

John  Sigismund,  Elector  of  Branden- 
burg his  claim  to  the  duchy  oi 
Cleves,  21  ;  turns  l.alvinist,  22. 

Joseph  Father,  employed  as  Riche- 
lieu's agent,  128. 

KEMPTEN,  battle  of,  201. 
Klostergrab,  Protestant  church 
at,  27. 
Kiiln.     See  Cologne. 


LA  FORCE,  commands  at  Paris, 
*93- 

Lamonnain,  Father.  Ferdinand's 
confessor,  declares  against  peace, 

Landrecies  incorporated  with  France, 
224. 

League,  the  Catholic,  its  formation, 
21  ;  agrees  to  the  treaty  ef  Ulni, 
42.  See  Maximilian,  Duke  of  Ba- 
varia. 

Lebus.  bishopric  of,  121. 

Lech,  battle  at  the  passage  of  the,  149. 

Leipzig,  assembly  at,  133. 

Leipzig,  batde  of.     See  Breitenfeld. 

Leslie,  his  part  in  Wallenstein's  mur- 
der, 180. 

Leuchtenberg,  Landgrave  of,  taken 
prisoner  by  Mansfeld,  40. 

Lewis  XIII.,  King  of  France,  hit 
character,  72 ;  his  jealousy  of  Spain, 
73 ;  summons  Richelieu  to  his 
council,  74  ;  takes  part  against 
Spain,  75  ;  his  policy  towards  the 
Huguenots,  112  ;  at  war  with  Eng- 
land, 113  ;  invades  Italy,  122  ;  dis- 
likes the  success  of  Gustavus,  148  ; 
takes  the  field  against  Spain,  193  ; 
dies,  205. 

Lewis  X1Y.,  King  of  France,  acces- 
sion of,  205. 

Lewis,  Landgrave  of  Hesse  Darm- 
stadt, ta   en  prisoner,  58. 

Lombardy,  the  iron  crown  of,  3. 

Lorraine  (Lothringen),  included  in 
the  Empire.  2 ;  Mansfeld  and  Chris- 
tian of  Brunswick,  in,  63. 

Lorraine,  Duke  of,  joins  the  Span- 
iards against  Gustavus,  158;  is  re- 
duced to  subjection  by  France,  170. 


Index. 


233 


MAN 

Lower  Saxony,  Circle  of,  threatened 
by  Christian  of  Brunswick  and 
Tilly,  64  ;  refuses  to  support  Chris- 
tian, 65  ;  disunion  amongst  its 
members,  68  ;  attacked  by  Tilly,  87. 

Llibeck,  bishopric  of  named  in  the 
Edict  of  Restitution,  121. 

Liibeck,  Peace  of,  117. 

Lusatia,  invaded   by  the   Saxons,  42. 

Luther,  his  meeting  with  Charles  V.,9. 

Lutherans,  17;  their  estrangements 
from  Frederick  in  Bohemia,  43 ; 
still  remain  in  Paderborn,  55. 

Lutter,  battle  of,  96. 

Liitzen,  battle  of,  161. 


MAGDEBURG,  city  of,  refuses  to 
admit  Wallenstein's  troops,  105, 
126  ;  declares  for  Gustavus,  134  ; 
stormed  and  sacked,  136. 

Mag  eburg,  diocese  of,  occupied  by 
WalleLStein,  92  ;  included  in  the 
'  Edict  of  Restitution,  120  ;  execu- 
tion of  the  Edict  at,  126. 

M.igdeburg,  Protest  .nt  administra- 
tor of,  not  acknowledged  as  Arch- 
bishop by  the  Diet,  14. 

Maintz.     See  Mentz. 

Majest'dtsbrief.     See  Royal  Charter. 

Manheim,  garrisoned  by  Vere,  57 ; 
retreat  of  Frederick  and  Mansfeld 
to,  59  ;  taken  by  Tilly,  60. 

MansLld,  C  unt  Ernest  of,  takes 
service  with  the  Bohemians  and 
besieges  Pilsen,  33;  tikes  the  field 
against  Bucquoi,  36  ;  is  defea  ed  by 
him,   37 ;  character   of   his   army, 

48  ;  occupies  the  Upper  Palatinate, 

49  ;  marches  into  Alsace,  50 ;  aims 
at  becoming  master  of  part  of  it, 
56  ;  invades  the  Lower  Palatinate, 
57;  seizes  the  La  ndgrav  of  Darm- 
stadt, 58 ;  state  of  his  army,  59  ; 
retreats  to  Alsace,  60 ;  occupies 
Lorraine,  63  ;  cuts  his  way  through 
the  Spanish,  Netherlands,  relieves 
Bergen-op-zoom,  and  invades  East 
Friesland,  64  ;  returns  to  the  Neth- 
erlands, 69 ;  assisted  by  France, 
74 ;  proposed  march  into  Alsace, 
75  ;  fails  to  relieve  Breda  76  ;  sent 
to  help  the  King  of  Denmark,  86 ; 
joins  Christian  IV.,  94  ,-  defea  ed 
at  the  Bridge  of  l3c:r.au,  96 ; 
marches  through  Silesia  into  Hun- 
gary, 96 ;  dies,  97. 


MER 

Mantua  and  Montferrat,  war  of  suc- 
cession .n,  121. 

Mardyke,  surrender  of,  224. 

Martinitz,  one  of  the  Regents  of  Bo- 
hemia, thrown  out  ot  window,  30. 

Mary  of  Medici,  opposes  Richelieu, 
132  ;  obliged  to  leave  France,  160. 

Matthias,  Archduke,  rises  against 
Rudolph  II.,  25 ;  succeeeds  as 
Em  eror,  26.  See  Matthias,  Em- 
peror. 

Matthias,  Emperor,  his  election,  26  ; 
his  attempts  to  brea't  the  Royal 
Charter,  27  ;  his  death,  36. 

Maurice-,  Landgrave  of  Hesse  Cassel, 
submits  to  Spinola,  47. 

Maximilian,  Archduke,  governs  Ty- 
rol, 24. 

Maximilian,  Duke  of  Bavaria,  his 
character  and  policy,  15  ;  his  part 
in  the  formation  of  the  League  21 ; 
prepares  tu  attack  Bohemia,  39  ; 
proposed  transference  of  the  Pa- 
latinate Electorate  to,  40 ;  gains 
over  the  North  German  princes, 
41;  attaches  Austria  and  Bohemia, 
42 ;  receives  Upper  Austria  in 
pledge,  46  ;  receives  the  Electorate, 
6t  ;  his  policy  after  the  peace  of 
LUbeck,  118  ;  makes  an  iffort 
against  the  French,  207;  is  ready 
to  surrender  Alsace  to  the  French, 
211  ;  but  refuses  to  surrender  the 
Upper  Palatinate,  211  ;  makes  a 
truce,  which  does  not  last  long,  213. 

Mayence.     See  Mentz 

Mazarin,  Cardinal,  Minister  of  Anne 
cf  Austria,  205. 

Mecklenburg,  Dukes  of  their  land 
pledged  to  Wallenstein,  105  ;  for- 
mally given  to  Wallenstein,  118. 

Meissen.     See  Misnia. 

Melancthon,  his  protect  against  theo- 
logical disputation,  13. 

Mentz,  entered  by  Spinola,  42  ; 
treaty  for  the  dissolution  of  the 
Union  signed  at,  47. 

Mentz,  Archbishop  of,  one  of  the 
Electors,  6  ;  lays  claim  to  lands  in 
North  Germany,  98. 

Mentz,  city  of,  Gustavus  at,  147  ; 
given  over  to  Oxenstjerna,  148  ; 
misery  at,  187. 

Mercy,  prudence  of,  208 ;  is  killed, 
208  ; 

Merseburg,  bishopric  of,  named  in 
the  Edict  of  Restitution,  121. 


234 


Index. 


NUR 

Merseburg,  city  of,  taken  by  Pap- 
penheim,  139. 

Metz,  annexed  by  France.  215. 

Minden,  bishopric  of,  named  in  the 
Edict  of  Restitution ,  lai. 

Misnia,  bishopric  of,  named  in  the 
Edict  of  Restitution,  121. 

Montmorenci,  Duke  of,  his  rebellion, 
168. 

Morgan,  Sir  Charles,  commands  an 
English  force  sent  in  aid  of  Den- 
mark, 101. 

M'uhlhau-  en  (in  Thuringia),  agree- 
ment of,  41 ;  meeting  of  the  Electors 
at,  103. 

Munich,  occupied  by  G  istavus,  150. 

Miinster,  meeiing  of  diplomatists  at, 
210. 

Miinster,  diocese  of,  threatened  by 
Mansfeld,  64. 


NANCY  taken  possession  of  by 
the  French,  180. 
Nantes,  Edict  of,  71  ;  its  revocation, 

226. 
Naumburg,   bishopric  of,  named  in 

the  Edict  of  Restitution,  121. 
Naurnburg,  city  of,  entered  by  Gus- 

tavus,  161. 
Netherlands,   the,   included    in    the 

Kmpire,  2. 
Netherlands,  the  Spanish,  defended 

against  a  French  attack,  191. 
Netherlands,   United  States   of  the, 

end  of  their  truce  with  Spain,  51  ; 

acknowledgment  of  their  indepen- 
dence, 221 
Neuberg,  Wolfgang  Wilhelm,  Count 

Palatine   of,    lays     claim     to    the 

duchy  of  Cleves,  22  ;  has  his  ears 

boxed,  22. 
Neustadt,  misery  at,  188. 
Nevers,  Duke  of,  his   claims   to  the 

succession  in  Mantua,  122. 
New    Brandenburg,   taken    by  Tilly, 

J34- 
Nienburg,  holds  out  for  Christian  IV., 

101. 
Nordheim,  holds   out   for   Christian 

IV.,  101. 
N<*r   lingen.    treatment    of    the    Pro- 
test nts  at,   120  ;    battle  of,    183  ; 

second    battle  of,  208 ;   surrenders 

to  Turenne,  213. 
Nureiiibi-rg  joins  the  Union,  20,  21  ; 

meeting    of   the   Union  at,  41  ;  de- 


PIL 

serts  the  Union,  47  ;  welcomes 
Gustavus,  148  ;  despatches  Gustav- 
us  against  Wallenstein,  158;  suffer- 
ings of,  158. 


ONATE,     opposes     Wallenstein, 
175;  proposes   to  kill  Wallen- 
stein, 177. 
Oppenheim,  stormed    by    Gustavus, 

M7- 

Os.  abriick,  election  of  a  Catholic 
Bishop  of,  67  ;  meeting  of  diploma- 
tists ai,  217. 

Otto  the  Great,  becomes  Emperor,  2. 

Oudenarde,  surrender  to  the  French, 
224. 

Oxenstjerna,  his  view  of  Gustavus' 
march  upon  the  Rhine,  145 ;  re- 
ceives the  government  of  Mentz. 
148  ;  his  position  after  the  dea'.h  of 
Gustavus,  166  ;  a<ked  to  help  Wal- 
lenstein. 172  ;  keeps  his  doubts  till 
the  last,  179  ;  surrenders  fortresses 
in  Alsace  to  Richelieu,  192. 


PADERBORN,  attack  upon  by 
Christian  of  Brunswick,  55. 

Palatinate,  the  Lower,  attacked  by 
Spinola,  43  ;  defended  by  Vere,  49 ; 
invaded  by  Tilly,  50  ;  conquered  by 
Tilly,  60 ;  the  eastern  part  made 
over  to  Maximilian,  119 ;  the 
whole  restored  to  Charles  Lewis, 
214. 

Palatinate,  the  Upper,  Mansfeld's 
occupation  of,  50  ;  its  conquest  Ly 
Tilly,  50;  made  over  to  Maximi- 
lian, 119  ;  secured  to  him  by  the 
peace  of  Westphalia,  214. 

Pappenheim,  confidence  that  Gusta- 
vus will  be  beaten,  139  ;  storms 
Magdeburg,  135  ;  commands  on 
the  Rhine,  161  ;  leaves  Wallen- 
stein before  the  batile  of  Liitzen, 
161  ;   is  kille-t  at  Lutzen,  161. 

Passau,  convention  of,  Q. 

Peace  of  Augsburg      See  Augsburg. 

Peace  of  Phillipsburg,  French  garri- 
son of,  215. 

Piccolomini,  offers  to  join  Wallen- 
stein, 175  ;  declares  against  him, 
177  ;  tries  to  seize  him,  177  ;  orders 
Butler  to  cnp.u  e  Wallenstein,  180. 

Pignerol,  seized  by  Kichelieu,  124. 

Pliscau  refuses  to  lake  part  with  the 


Index. 


235 


RIC 

Bohemian  directors,  32  ;  besieged 
and  taken  by  Mansfeld,  33  ;  Wal- 
lenstein  holds  a  meeting  of  officers 
at,  177. 

Pomerania  laid  wa  te  by  Wal  en- 
stein's  troops,  127  :  Gustavus  lands 
in,  128  ;  divided  between  Branden- 
burg and  Sweden,  214. 

Pomerania,  Duke  of.    See  Boguslav. 

Portugal,  independence  of,  200. 

Prague,  revolution  at,  29  ;  Frederick 
crowned  King  of  Bohemia  at.  38  ; 
Frederick's  growing  unpopu'arity 

-  there,  43  ;  battle  at  the  White  Hill 
near,  45  ;  entered  by  the  Saxons, 
151  ;  recovered  by  Wallenstein, 
155  ;  part  of  it  taken  by  the  Swedes, 

2I3- 

Prague,  the  treaty  of,  184. 

Prin  es  of  the  Empire,  their  increas- 
ing power,  3  ;  compared  with  the 
French  vassals,  4  ;  care  little  for 
the  Diet,  5  ;  their  part  in  the  Diet, 
6;  the  majority  opposed  to  Pro- 
testantism, 9. 

Protestantism,  its  ri=e  in  Germany, 
7  ;  its  position  in  North  Germany, 
12  ;  its  divisi  ">n,  12 ;  contrast  be- 
tween it  in  the  north  and  the  south, 

Pyrenees,  treaty  of  the,  224. 


RATISBON,  diets    held    at,  61, 
127;  taken  by  Bernhard,  173.   | 

Ratseburg,   bishopric   of,   named  in  1 
the  Edict  of  Restitution,  121. 

Regensburg.     See  Ratisb  m.  ! 

Reichshofrath.   See  Imperial  Council. 

Reichskammergericht.  See  Imperial 
C  >urt. 

Rhe,  Isle  of,  Buckingham's  expedi- 
tion to,  114. 

Rheinfelden,  battli  of,  195. 

Richelieu,  bee  imcs  a  minister  of 
Louis  XIII.,  74  ;  recovers  the  Val- 
telline  75  ;  his  plans  frustrated  by 
the  insurrection  of  the  Huguenots, 
77;  wishe.  to  make  peace  with 
them,  112  ;  causes  of  his  success, 
116;  his  policy  of  toleration,  116; 
takes  part  in  the  Mantuan  War, 
122  ;  negotiates  wiih  Swede  ',  124; 
is  startled  by  the  victories  of  Gus- 
tavus, 148:  defends  himself  against 
the  French  aristocracy,  167 ;  na- 
ture of  the  government  esta  lished 


SPA 

by  him,  168  ;  his  aims  in  Europe. 
169  ;  intervenes  more  decidedly  in 
Germany,  184,  190  ;  aims  at  the 
conquest  of  Alsace,  191 ;  obtains 
conirol   ov  r  for  resses  in  Alsace, 

192  ;  failure  of  his  a'tack  upon  the 
S  anish  Netherlands,  192  ;  suc- 
cessfully resists  a  Spanish  invasion, 

193  ;  continues  the  struggle  with 
Spain,  197 ;  his  successes,  197,  201  ; 
his  deithan  1  policy,  201. 

Rochelle,   insurrection   of,   77,   112 ; 

siege  of,   114;  surrender  of,   115; 

subsequent  treatment  of,  116. 
Rocroy,  attacked  by  the  Spaniards, 

206  ;   battle  of,  207. 
Rohan,  Duke  of,  insurrection  of,  123. 
Rostock,  its  harbour  blocked  up  by 

Wauenstein,  108. 
Roussitlon,    conquered    by    France, 

200,  201  ;  annexed  to  France,  224. 
Royal  Charter,  the  ( Majest'dtsbrief), 

granted  by  Rudolph  II.,  25  ,  its  for- 
feiture declared,  45 
Riidesheim,  misery  at,  187. 
Rudolph   II.,   Emperor,  his  part   in 

the  Austrian  territjries,  24;  grants 

the  Royal  Charter  of  Bohr-mia,    5  ; 

tries  to  withdraw  it    26;  dies,  26; 

fate  of  his  art-treasures,  43. 
Rupert,  Prince,  his  birth  at  Prague, 

43- 


SALUCES,  siezed  by  Richelieu, 
124. 

Salzburg,  persecution  of  Protestants 
of,  216. 

Saxony,  Elector  of,  1.  See  also  John 
George. 

Savoy,  Duke  of.  See  Charles  Emanuel. 

Schorndorf,  surrenders  to  Turenne, 
212. 

Sigismund,  King  of  Poland,  a  claim- 
ant to  the  crown  o1  Sweden,  81. 

Sigismund,  the  Emperor,  anecdote 
of,  2. 

Slawata,  one  of  the  Regents  ■  f  Bohe- 
mia, 30  ;  thrown  out  of  window  30. 

Soissons,  Count  of,  rebels  in  France, 
200. 

Soubise,  Duke  of,  rebels,  77. 

Spain,  intervenes  in  the  war,  42 ; 
anxious  for  peace,  43  ;  military 
position  of  in  1624,  74  ;  loses  tie 
Valtelline,  75 ;  takes  part  in  the 
Mantua  war,  121 ;  supports   Wal- 


236 


Index. 


TIL 

lenstein,  151  ;  takes  part  in  the 
war  on  the  Rhino,  is8;  turns 
against  Wallenstein,  171  ;  at  war 
with  France,  192 ;  invades  France, 
193  ;  naval  inferiority  of,  197,  198  ; 
rebellion  of  the  Catalans,  199  ;  loss 
of  Portugal,  200 ;  continues  the 
war  with  France  after  the  Peace 
of  We  tphalia,  221;  continues  the 
war  with  Fi  ance,  221 ;  agrees  to  the 
Peace  of  the  Pyrenees,  224. 

Spens,  Sir  James,  his  mission  to 
Sweden,  84. 

Spinola,  attacks  the  Palatinate,  42 ; 
returns  to  Brussels,  50;  besieges 
Bergen-op-znom,  63  ;  besieges  Bre- 
da, 75  ;  besieg"S  Casale,  123. 

Spires,  Bishop  of,  attacked  by  Vere, 
So. 

Stade,  taken  by  Tilly,  117. 

Stadtlohn.  battle  of,  66. 

Stenay,  besieged  by  Conde,  223. 

Stralsund,  siege  of,  108. 

Strasburg,  Bishopric  of,  failure  of  an 
attempt  to  place  it  in  Protestant 
hands,  14. 

Strasburg,  city  of  joins  the  Union, 
20,  21  ;  deserts  it,  47. 

Sweden,  her  gains  at  the  Peace  of 
Westphalia,  214. 

Switzerland  included  in  the  Empire, 


TABOR,  occupied  by  Mansfeld, 
48. 

Thionville,  besieged  by  the  French, 
207 ;    annexed   to    France,  224. 

Thirty  Years'  War,  the  disputes 
which  led  to  it,  14  ;  commencement 
of,  30  ;  end  of,  213. 

Thurn,  ('ount  He.i  y  of,  his  part  in 
the  Bohemian  Revolution,  30;  his 
operations  against  Bucquot,  33; 
besieges  Vienna,  36;  aids  Chris- 
tian IV.,  101. 

Tilly,  commands  the  army  of  the 
League,  42  ;  his  part  in  the  con- 
quest of  fiohem  a,  44;  his  army, 
48 ;  conquers  the  Upper  Palati- 
nate, 50 ;  invade*  the  Lower  Pa- 
latinate, 51  ;  his  prospects  in  1622, 
55  ;  defeats  the  Margrave  of  Baden 
at  Wimpfen,  57  ;  defeats  1  hristian 
of  Brunswick  at  H<J  hst,  59  ;  con- 
quers the  Lower  Palatinate,  61 ; 
threatens  the  Lower  Saxon  Circle, 


WAL 

64 ;  defeats  Christian  of  Bruns- 
wick at  Stadtlohn,  66 ;  attacks 
Lower  Saxony,  87 ;  makes  head 
against  Christian  IV.,  95  ;  defeats 
him  at  Lutter,  96 ;  besieges  Stade 
and  Gluckstadt,  117  ;  his  campaign 
against  Gustavus,  134  ;  takes  Mag- 
deburg, 136;  attacks  Saxony,  ng; 
defeated  at  Breitenfeld,  141  ;  his 
defeat  and  death  at  the  passage  of 
the  Lech,  149. 

Torgau,  holds  out  against  Wallen- 
stein, 161. 

Torstenson,  his  campaign  of  1645, 
209. 

Toul,  annexed  to  France,  215. 

Treves,  Elector  of,  1  ;  makes  an  alli- 
ance with  France,  170. 

Trier.     See  Treves. 

TUbingen,  university  of,  17. 

Turenne,  his  part  in  the  campaigns 
of  1644  and  1645,208;  his  strategy 
in  Bavaria  in  1646,  212. 

Turin,  changes  of  government  in, 
197. 


ULM,  joins  the  Union,  20,  21 ; 
deserts  it,  47. 
Ulm,  treaty  of,  42. 
Union,  the  Protestant,  formation 
of,  21  ;  enters  into  an  agreement 
with  the  Duke  of  Savoy,  33  ;  its 
coolness  in  the  cause  of  the  Bohe- 
mians, 34  ;  refuses  to  support  Fre- 
derick in  Bohemia,  41  ;  agre<s  to 
the  treaty  of  Ulm,  42 ;  its  dissolu- 
tion, 47. 


VALTELLINE,  the  Spaniards 
driven  from  the,  7.5. 

Verdi  n,  bishopric  of,  occupied  by  a 
son  of  Christian  IV,  78;  named 
in  the  EdiU  of  Restitution,  121  ; 
given  up  to  Sweden,  215. 

Verdun,  annexed  to  France,  214. 

Vere,  Sir  Horace,  defends  the  Lower 
Palatinate,  49,  57. 

Vienni,  besieged  by  Thurn,  36;  at- 
tacked by  Hethlcn  Gabor,  40  ;  at- 
tacked by  Torstenson,  209. 

WALT.ENSTFIN,  his  birth  and 
education.  88;  r-Kcs  an  arm) 
for  the  Emperoi,   and  is  created 


Index. 


237 


WAL. 

Ptfnce  of  Friedland,  89  ;  his  mode 
of  carrying  on  wa-,  90 ;  enters 
Magdeburg  and  Halberstadt,  92 ; 
defeats  Mansfeld  at  the  Bridge  of, 
Dessaa,  06 ;  his  quarrel  with  the 
Leaguo,  08  ;  confers  with  Eggen- 
berg,  90 ;  is  created  Duke  of  Fried- 
land.  1.  k>;  subdues  Silesia,  rot ; 
conq-iers  SchJ  swig  and  Jutland, 
Ivj2  ;  cotipiajnts  of  the  Electors 
against  him,  103 ;  his  fresh  levies, 
it  4  ;  Mt-cldeaburt;  pledged  to  him, 
105  ;  named  Admiral  of  the  Baltic, 
108  ;  attempts  to  burn  the  Swedish 
fleet,  108 ;  besieges  Stralsund,  108  ; 
assists  in  the  siege  of  Gluckstadt, 
117;  his  inves'iture  with  the  Due  >y 
of  MeckSenburg,  118;  his  bre  ch 
with  the  Electors,  124;  talks  njf 
sacking  Rome,  .127 ;  his  depriva- 
tion denaanded,  127 ;  his  dismis- 
sal, i'9  ;  mafces  overtures  to  Gus- 
tavus,  142  ;  feTcaks  off  his  imrer- 
course  with  G  .stavus,  15;  ;  is  ire- 
instated  in  command  <bv  it-he  Em- 
peror, 153  ,•  •character  <of  his  army, 
153;  drives  tfee  Sax'unsoutof  Bo- 
hemia, 155 ;  eotrewches  himself 
near  Niir  imberg,  158 ;  repulses 
Gustavus  aradiEarches  initoSaKOnv, 
t6o  ;  takes  up  a  position  at  Liitzen  • 
is  defeated,  rot  ;  snegistiaies  wi  th 
the  Saxons,  170 ;  hopes  to  bring 
about  peace,  iyt,;  'Begcstiates  with 
the  Swedes,  172  ;  prepares  to  fcuve 
the  Emperor  to  accept  peace  from 
Jiim,  174  ;  opposition  to  him,  175  ;  | 
the  Emperor  decides  against  him,  j 
176  ;  throws  himself  upon  his  offi- 
cers, 177;  is  declared  a  traitor, 
*nd  Abandoned  by  the  garrison  of  I 


ZUS 

Prague  178 ;  his  murder,  181 ; 
causes  of  his  failure,  18 1. 

Werben,  camp  of  Gustavus  at,  138. 

Werth,  John  of,  g^icral  in  Maximi- 
lian's service,  207. 

Weston,  Sir  Richard,  represents  Eng- 
land sat  the  Congress  at  Brussels, 
57- 

Westphalia,  the  Peace  of,  opening  of 
negotiations  for,  209  ;  signature  of, 
E13  ;  its  results,  215. 

White  Hill,  battle  of  the,  45. 

Wiesloch,  combat  of,  57. 

William,  Landgrave  of  Hesse  Cassel, 
joins  Gustavus,  138  ;  shut  out  from 
*he  benefits  of  the  treaty  of  Prague, 
186  ;  his  alliance  with  France,  190. 

Wimpfen,  battle  of,  57. 

Winter-king,  nickname  of  Frederick, 

39- 
Wisraiar  in  WaSlemstein's  hands,  io3. 
Wittinjgau,  occupied  by  Mansfeld,  48. 
Wittstock  battle  of,  194. 
Wolfeisbuittel  holds  out  for  Christian 

IV.,  lot  ;  battie  at,  201. 
Wramgel,  succeeds      Torstemson    as 

commander  of  the    Swedes,   209 ; 

jjoiins  Turenrse,  212. 
Wiirteanfeerg,  accepts  tfee  terms  of  the 

treaty  of  Prague,  195. 
Waraburg  takem  by  Gflastavus,  147; 

surrenders  to  Turenne,  212. 


Y 


PRES,  surrenders  to  the  French, 
224. 


ZNAIM,  Wallenstein  confers  witlh 
Eggenberg  ax,  153. 
.Zusmarsiiauseu,  battle  of,  231. 


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Ohio  State  Univ.,  Columbus,  O. 
Free  Schools,  Oswego,  N.  Y. 


Bishop  J.  F.  HURST,  ex-President  of  Drew  Theol.  Sem. 
"  It  appears  to  me  that  the  idea  of  Morris  in  his  Epochs  is 
strictly  in  harmony  with  the  philosophy  of  history — namely,  that 
great  movements  should  be  treated  not  according  to  narrow 
geographical  and  national  limits  and  distinction,  but  universally, 
according  to  their  place  in  the  general  life  of  the  world.  The 
historical  Maps  and  the  copious  Indices  are  welcome  additions 
to  ujc  volumes." 


EPOCHS    OF    ANCIENT 
HISTORY. 

A   SERIES    OF    BOOKS  NARRATING    THE    HISTORY  OP 

GREECE  AND  ROME,  AND  OF  THEIR  RELA  T/ONS  TO 

OTHER   COUNTRIES  AT  SUCCESSIVE  EPOCHS. 

Edited  by 

Rev.  G.  W.  Cox  and  Charles  Sankey,  M.A 

Eleven  volumes,  i6mo,  with  41  Maps  and  Plans, 
Sold  separately. 


TROY  —  ITS  LEGEND,  HISTORY,  AND 
LITERATURE.     By  S.  G.  W.  Benjamin. 

"  The  task  of  the  author  has  been  to  gather  into  a  clear 
and  very  readable  narrative  all  that  is  known  of  legendary, 
historical,  and  geographical  Troy,  and  to  tell  the  story  of 
Homer,  and  weigh  and  compare  the  different  theories  in  the 
Homeric  controversy.  The  work  is  well  done.  His  book  is 
altogether  candid,  and  is  a  very  valuable  and  entertaining 
compendium." — Hartford  Courant. 

"As  a  monograph  on  Troy,  covering  all  sides  of  the  ques- 
tion, it  is  of  great  value,  and  supplies  a  long  vacant  place  in 
our  fund  of  classical  knowledge." — N.  Y.  Christian  Advocate. 

THE  GREEKS  AND  THE  PERSIANS.  By 
Rev  G.  W.  Cox. 

"It  covers  the  ground  in  a  perfectly  satisfactory  wav. 
The  work  is  clear,  succinct,  and  readable." — New  York 
Independent. 

'  Marked  by  thoiough  and  comprehensive  scholarship  and 
by  a  skillful  style." — Congregalionalist. 

"It  would  be  hard  to  find  a  more  creditable  book.  The 
author's  prefatory  remarks  upon  the  origin  and  growth  of 
Greek  civilization  are  alone  worth  the  price  of  the  volume ' 
—Christian  i/nwn, 


EPOCHS  OF  ANCIENT  HISTORY 

THE  ATHENIAN  EMPIRE— From  the  Flight 
of  Xerxes  to  the  Fall  of  Athens.  By  Rev. 
G.  W.  Cox. 

"  Mr.  Cox  writes  in  such  a  way  as  to  bring  before  the 
reader  everything  which  is  important  to  be  known  or  learned; 
and  his  narrative  cannot  fail  to  give  a  good  idea  of  the  men 
and  deeds  with  which  he  is  concerned." — The  Churchman. 

"Mr.  Cox  has  done  his  work  with  the  honesty  of  a  true 
student.  It  shows  persevering  scholarship  and  a  desire  to 
get  at  the  truth." — New  York  Herald. 

THE  SPARTAN  AND  THEBAN  SUPREMA- 
CIES.    By  Charles  Sankey,  M.A. 

"  This  volume  covers  the  period  between  the  disasters  of 
Athens  at  the  close  of  the  Pelopenesian  war  and  the  rise  of 
Macedon.  It  is  a  very  striking  and  instructive  picture  of  the 
political  life  of  the  Grecian  commonwealth  at  that  time."— 
The  Churchman. 

"  It  is  singularly  interesting  to  read,  and  in  respect  to 
arrangement,  maps,  etc.,  is  all  that  can  be  desired." — Boston 
Congregationalist. 

THE  MACEDONIAN  EMPIRE— Its  Rise  and 
Culmination  to  Death  of  Alexander  the 
Great.     By  A.  M.  Curteis,  M.A. 

"A  good  and  satisfactory  history  of  a  very  important  period. 
The  maps  are  excellent,  and  the  story  is  lucidly  and  vigor* 
ously  told. " —  The  Nation. 

"  The  same  compressive  style  and  yet  completeness  of 
detail  that  have  characterized  the  previous  issues  in  this 
delightful  series,  are  found  in  this  volume.  Certainly  the  art 
of  conciseness  in  writing  was  never  carried  to  a  higher  or 
more  effective  point." — fioston  Saturday  Evening  Gaeelte. 

**#  The  above  Jive  vuiumes  give  a  connected  and  complete 
history  of  Greece  from  the  earliest  times  te  the  death  *f 
Alexander. 


EPOCHS  OF  ANCIENT  HISTORY 

EARLY  ROME— From  the  Foundation  of  the 
City  to  its  Destruction  by  the  Gauls.  By 
W.  Ihne,  Ph.D. 

"  Those  who  want  to  know  the  truth  instead  of  the  tra- 
ditions that  used  to  be  learned  of  our  fathers,  will  find  in  i »>ft 
work  entertainment,  careful  scholarship,  and  sound  sense.1  -— 
Cincinnati  Times. 

"  The  book  is  excellently  well  done.  The  views  are  those 
of  a  learned  and  able  man,  and  they  are  presented  in  this 
volume  with  great  force  and  clearness." — The  Nation. 

ROME  AND  CARTHAGE— The    Punic  Wars. 

By  R.  Bosworth  Smith. 

"  By  blending  the  account  of  Rome  and  Carthage  the  ac- 
complished author  presents  a  succinct  and  vivid  picture  of 
two  great  cities  and  people  which  leaves  a  deep  impression. 
The  story  is  full  of  intrinsic  interest,  and  was  never  better 
told." — Christian  Union. 

"  The  volume  is  one  of  rare  interest  and  value." — Chicago 
Interior. 

"An  admirably  condensed  history  of  Carthage,  from  its 
establishment  by  the  adventurous  Phoenician  traders  to  its 
sad  and  disastrous  fall." — New  York  Herald. 

THE  GRACCHI,   MARIUS,  AND  SULLA.    By 

A.  H.  Beesley. 

"  A  concise  and  scholarly  historical  sketch,  descriptive  of 
the  decay  of  the  Roman  Republic,  and  the  events  which  paved 
the  way  for  the  advent  of  the  conquering  Csesar.  It  is  an 
excellent  account  of  the  leaders  and  legislation  ol  the  repub- 
lic."— Boston  Post. 

"It  is  prepared  in  succinct  but  comprehensive  style, and  is 
an  excellent  book  for  reading  and  reference." — New  York 
Observer. 

"  No  better  condensed  account  of  the  two  Gracchi  and  the 
turbulent  careers  of  Marius  and  Sulla  has  yet  appeared."— 
New  York  Independent 


EPOCHS  OF  ANCIENT  HISTORY 

THE  ROMAN  TRIUMVIRATES.     By  the  Very  Rey, 

Charles  Merivale,  D.D. 

"  In  brevity,  clear  and  scholail^  ^eatment  of  the  subject, 
and  the  convenience  of  map,  index,  and  side  notes,  the 
volume  is  a  model." — New  York   Tribune. 

"  An  admirable  presentation,  and  in  style  vigorous  and 
picturesque. " — Hartford  Courant. 

THE  EARLY  EMPIRE— From  the  Assassina- 
tion of  Julius  Caesar  to  the  Assassination 
Of  Domitian.     By  Rev.  W.  Wolfe  Capes,  M.A. 

"  It  is  written  with  great  clearness  and  simplicity  of  style, 
and  is  as  attractive  an  account  as  has  ever  been  given  in 
brief  of  one  of  the  most  interesting  periods  of  Roman 
History." — Boston  Saturttay  Evening  Gazette. 

"It  is  a  clear,  well-proportioned,  and  trustworthy  perfor- 
mance, and  well  deserves  to  be  studied." — Christian  at 
Work. 

THE  AGE  OF  THE  \NTONINES— The  Roman 
Empire    of  the    Second    Century.    By   Rev. 

W.  Wolfe  Capes,  M.A. 

"  The  Roman  Empire  during  the  second  century  is  the 
broad  subject  discussed  in  this  book,  and  discussed  with 
learning  and  intelligence." — New  York  Independent. 

"  The  writer's  diction  is  clear  and  elegant,  and  his  narra- 
tion is  free  from  any  touch  of  pedantry.  In  the  treatment  of 
its  prolific  and  interesting  theme,  and  in  its  general  plan,  the 
book  is  a  model  of  works  of  its  class  " — New  York  Herald. 

"We  are  glad  to  commend  it.  It  is  written  clearly,  and 
with  care  and  accuracy.  It  is  also  in  such  neat  and  compact 
form  as  to  be  the  more  attractive." — Congregationalist. 

*#*  The  above  six  volumes  give  the  History  of  Rome  from 
the  founding  of  the  City  to  the  death  of  Marcus  Aureliui 
Antoninus. 


EPOCHS    OF    MODERN 
HISTORY. 

A   SERIES   OF  BOOKS  NARRATING    THE  HISTORY  Of 

ENGLAND  AND  EUROPE  AT  SUCCESSIVE  EPOCHS 
SUBSEQUENT  TO  THE  CHRISTIAN  ERA. 

Edited  by 
Edward  E.  Morris. 

Eighteen  volumes,  i6mo,  with  74-Maps,  Plans,  and  Tables, 
Sold  separately. 


THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES— 
England  and  Europe  in  the  Ninth  Century. 
By  the  Very  Rev.  R.  W.  Church,  M.A. 

"A  remarkably  thoughtful  and  satisfactory  discussion  ol 
the  causes  and  results  of  the  vast  changes  which  came  upon 
Europe  during  the  period  discussed.  The  book  is  adapted  to 
be  exceedingly  serviceable." — Chicago  Standard. 

"At  once  readable  and  valuable.  It  is  comprehensive  and 
yet  gives  the  details  of  a  period  most  interesting  to  the  student 
of  history. " — Herald  and  Presbyter. 

"It  is  written  with  a  clearness  and  vividness  of  statement 
which  make  it  the  pleasantest  reading.  It  represents  a  great 
deal  of  patient  research,  and  is  careful  and  scholarly."— 
Boston  Journal. 

THE  NORMANS  IN  EUROPE— The  Feudal 
System  and  England  under  the  Norman 
Kings.    By  Rev.  A.  H.  Johnson,  M.A. 

"  Its  pictures  of  the  Normans  in  their  home,  of  the  Scan- 
dinavian exodus,  the  conquest  of  England,  and  Norman 
administration,  are  full  of  vigor  and  cannot  fail  of  holding  the 
reader's  attention." — Episcopal  Register. 

"  The  style  of  the  author  is  vigorous  and  animated,  and  he 
has  given  a  valuable  sketch  of  the  origin  and  progress  of  the 
great  Northern  movement  that  has  shaped  the  history  ol 
modern  Europe. " — Boston  Transcript. 


EPOCHS  OF  MODERN  HISTORY 

THE   CRUSADES.     By  Rev.  G.  W.  Cox. 

"  To  be  warmly  commended  for  important  qualities.  The 
author  shows  conscientious  fidelity  to  the  materials,  and  such 
skill  in  the  use  of  them,  that,  as  a  result,  the  reader  has 
before  him  a  narrative  related  in  a  style  that  makes  it  truly 
fascinating. ' ' — Congregationalist. 

"  It  is  written  in  a  pure  and  flowing  style,  and  its  arrange, 
ment  and  treatment  of  subject  are  exceptional." — Christian 
Intelligencer. 

THE  EARLY  k"»  L  A  N  T  AG  EN  ETS— Their 
Relation  to  the  History  of  Europe;  The 
Foundation  and  Growth  of  Constitutional 
Government.    By  Rev.  W.  Stubbs,  M.A. 

"  Nothing  could  be  desired  more  clear,  succinct,  and  well 
arranged.  AH  parts  of  the  book  are  well  done.  It  may  be 
pronounced  the  best  existing  brief  history  of  the  constitution 
for  this,  its  most  important  period." — The  Nation. 

"Prof.  Stubbs  has  presented  leading  events  with  such  fair- 
ness and  wisdom  as  are  seldom  found.  He  is  remarkably 
clear  and  satisfactory." — The  Churchman. 

EDWARD    III.     By  Rev.  W.  Warburton,  M.A. 

"The  author  has  done  his  work  well,  and  we  commend  it 
as  containing  in  small  space  all  essential  matter." — New  York 
Independent. 

"  Events  and  movements  are  admirably  condensed  by  the 
author,  and  presented  in  such  attractive  form  as  to  entertain 
as  well  as  instruct." — Chicago  Interior. 

THE  HOUSES  OF  LANCASTER  AND  YORK 
— The  Conquest  and  Loss  of  France.    By 

James  Gairdner. 

"  Prepared  in  a  most  careful  and  thorough  manner,  and 
ought  to  be  read  by  every  student. " — New  York  Times. 

"It  leaves  nothing  to  be  desired  as  regards  compactness, 
accuracy,  and  excellence  of  literary  execution." — Boston 
Journal. 


